

Ilya Starinov.

Soldier of the Century

Theory and practice of a coup d'état, Moscow 2002

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ORGANIZING

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RAISER OF THE XX CENTURY PROFESSOR ILYA GRIGORYEVICH STARINOA

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The composition of the Organizing Committee is given as of July 1, 2000. Given that the core of the anniversary celebrations will be practical conferences and seminars on the theory and practice of partisan and counter-partisan struggle, literary and journalistic discussions on the work of Professor Starinov I.G. the composition of the organizing committee will be specified by the introduction of members from among the representatives of veteran organizations, the armed forces of Russia, as well as near and far Abroad.

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FOREWORD

PART 1. MATERIALS FOR THE BIOGRAPHY

Autobiography

I was born on August 2, 1900 in the village of Voinovo, Volkhov District, Orel Region. In the same year, the family moved to the Tver region to the Redkino station. In 1903 they returned to the village again.

On June 18, 1918, he was drafted into the army by the Bolkhov District Military Commissariat. He served in the 20th regiment of the 3rd infantry division (Commander - Solodukhin). After a month of training, he fought on the Southern Front with the troops of Kornilov. In the area of the town of Korocha, Kursk region, he was surrounded and captured, but escaped and went out to his own. He was wounded in the leg, was in a hospital in Tula. After being wounded, he was assigned to the 27th engineer company of the 9th engineer battalion. Fought against Denikin and Wrangel on the Southern Front in the Crimea. He reached Kerch, then through the frozen strait - to the North Caucasus and Grozny. The commander of the Army was M.K. Lewandowski.

From September 1921 to September 1922 he studied at the Voronezh School of Military Railway Technicians.

September 1922 - head of the subversive team of the 4th Korostensky and Red Banner Railway Regiment in Kyiv. Company commander - Alexander Evdokimovich Kryukov, commander of the Ukrainian military district - I.E. Yakir. Prepared the invaders.

From autumn 1923 to autumn 1924 he studied at the Leningrad School of Military Railway Technicians.

From the autumn of 1924 he was a company commander of the 4th Korosten Regiment. Built a railroad Orsha - Lepel. Trained bombers. In 1925 - 1928 he

taught the soldiers in Kyiv.

In 1929, he trained saboteurs at the Kyiv school of M.K. Kochegarova. From December 30, 1930 - in the 4th department of the headquarters of the Ukrainian military district, he trained partisan saboteurs, was engaged in the creation and improvement of sabotage equipment. simultaneously

In 1931 he worked at a school with Kochegarov and Lisitsin in Kupinsk, in Svyatoshyn. Prepared saboteurs, carried out activities to prepare for a possible guerrilla war.

March 1932 - head of the intelligence unit, letter A of the Ukrainian military district, prepared partisan saboteurs in Tiraspol.

March 1933 - Moscow, an employee of the Main Intelligence Directorate at the General Staff of the Red Army. The chief of the General Staff was Marshal Yegorov, the head of the department was Ya.K. Berzin, head of department - Mirra Sokhnovskaya.

September 1933 - May 1935 - studying at the military transport Academy of the Red Army. The head of the Academy is General of the Army Pugachev.

May 1935 - Deputy military commandant of the Leningrad-Moskovskaya station. Station Commandant - Major B.I. Filippov. Met and accompanied high-ranking officials: K.E. Voroshilov, B.M. Shaposhnikova, M.N. Tukhachevsky, V.K. Blucher, V.M. Primakov. Lived in Leningrad. In combination, he taught the technique of barriers on the roads at the Military Transport Institute.

November 1936 - November 1937 - Spain. Directly subordinated to Ya.K. Berzin and his deputies R.Ya. Malinovsky, K.A. Meretskov, G.M. Stern. He went from adviser to a sabotage group to adviser to the 14th partisan corps (3000 people). They operated in the area of Taruel, Zaragoza, near Madrid and Barcelona. He taught partisans mine-subversive business, techniques and tactics of sabotage. Organized schools near Valencia, in Hayen, prepared major sabotage operations. Translator - A.K. Obrucheva became my wife

Together with the Spanish comrades, we carried out a number of operations: in Grenada, they blew up a water pipe and a bridge; a tunnel near Cordoba was put out of action for five days; derailed the composition with the headquarters of the Italian aviation division; they blew up the bridge over the Alecante River (at night they seized the kitchen, filled it with explosives and left it in the middle of the bridge, then

blew up); near Cordoba, a train with Moroccan soldiers was derailed; in a forest near Madrid, they set fire to and destroyed a large accumulation of fascists, equipment and ammunition.

Under Zaragoza, with the approval of Dolores Ibarruri, the 14th partisan corps under the command of Domingo Ungria.

In November 1937, he handed over his affairs to Salnyn and went to Paris with a driver. Stayed at the embassy for five days. I boarded a boat in Brest to Leningrad. On the way we stopped at Antwerp. Returned with tanker P.I. Lipin, and went with him to Madrid from Moscow. Scouts met in Leningrad. Almost immediately I went to Moscow and stayed at the Baltshug Hotel. Met with the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate S.G. Gendin. They went with him to the Kremlin for an appointment with K.E. Voroshilov.

February 1938 - head of the central scientific and testing range of the railway troops at the station. Gorokhovets of the Gorky Railway. The head of the railway troops was General A.E. Kryukov. We tested railway and construction equipment.

November 1939 - head of the demining group on the Karelian Isthmus. Subordinated to A.E. Kryukov. March 17, 1940 was wounded in the right hand. Received a certificate of disability.

August 13, 1940 - Head of the Department of Mining and Barrages of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army. Head of Department - M.I. Zakharov. The head of the engineering troops of the Red Army - General A.F. Fyuking. In Nakhabino, experts were trained in barrage and demining.

June 28, 1941 - head of the operational group of barriers on the Western Front. From July 13, concurrently head of the Operational and Training Center of the Western Front. Reported directly to the commander of the front Ya.F. Pavlov, then A.I. Eremenko. Dealt with barriers.

At the end of September - head of the operational-engineering group of the South-Western Front. I had 5 battalions and 5 operational groups at my disposal. They carried out barriers, carried out mining of railways and roads, especially important objects near Kharkov and in Kharkov. Front Commander - Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. I was directly subordinate to the Military Council of the front. They destroyed the headquarters of the 58th division, led by Lieutenant General Georg von Braun, and blew up Lieutenant General Beinecker on a mine.

November 17, 1941 - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army Engineering Troops. Chief of Staff - General Nazarov. They carried out mining, the installation of barriers, the destruction of bridges, roads near Moscow, on the Kalinin and Western fronts - from Serpukhov to Kalinin.

December 1941 - head of the operational-engineering group on the Southern Front near Rostov. He had five battalions at his disposal. They set up fences and mined. Mines were produced in the workshops of the Rostov State University. In February 1942 - ice campaigns through the Taganrog Bay.

April 1942 - Commander of the 5th Separate Special Forces Engineering Brigade on the Kalinin Front near the city of Torzhok. Front Commander - General I.S. Konev. At disposal - 5 battalions (about 4 thousand soldiers and officers). They made the device of anti-personnel and anti-tank strips from Rzhev to Surozh - about 400 km in total.

August 1942 - head of the Higher Operational School for Special Purposes of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD), which was at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of the partisan movement, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov. The school was located at St. Bykovo Ryazan Railway. They prepared top-class specialists and commanders, planned operations, tested new sabotage equipment.

September 1942 - Moscow. Assistant Chief of Staff for sabotage at P.K. Ponomarenko. Prepared instructions, developed plans of operations. Was on business trips in the Caucasus, in Rostov and Novorossiysk. Organized partisan operations.

March 18, 1943 - Member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front. Front Commander General F.I. Tolbukhin. He organized the training of partisan groups for being thrown behind enemy lines.

May 1943 - Deputy Head of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement for sabotage, General T.A. Strokach. He created sabotage services at headquarters and in partisan formations.

April 1944 - Deputy Chief of the Polish Headquarters of the partisan movement A. Zavadsky. He was engaged in the organization of partisan struggle, interaction with

Soviet partisans on the border with Poland. At this time, for the dissertation written before the war, he received the title of candidate of technical sciences.

June 1944 - chief of staff of the Soviet mission in Yugoslavia. Based in Bucharest. They were engaged in organizing interaction between the Soviet Army and the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOAYU). Many times I met and talked with Marshal I.B. Tito.

February 1945 - head of the operational-engineering group for the clearance of roads and railways in the liberated territory of Germany. Subordinated to marshals R.Ya. Malinovsky, I.S. Konev. They worked north of Budapest, in the Potsdam region, in cities on the Rhine.

I met Victory Day in Berlin.

May 1945 - Moscow. Worked in the Central Party Archive. Military archive of the KGB.

November 1945 - Deputy Head of the 20th Directorate of the Railway Troops of the Soviet Army in Lvov. Carried out mine clearance and restoration of railways. Participated in the fight against Bandera. The head of the department is General N. V. Borisov.

September 1946 - Head of the Logistics Department of the Military Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Head of the Institute - General F.I. Solovyov. Since 1949 - head of the operational-tactical group of partisan struggle.

Since January 1956 - retired.

1957 - senior researcher at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. hosted participation in writing a six-volume history of the Great Patriotic War.

Since 1964 - a teacher of sabotage tactics at the Advanced Courses for Officers (KUOS).

In 1984 he was awarded the title of professor.

Until 1987, he taught at educational institutions of the KGB.

I have awards: 2 Orders of Lenin, 5 Orders of the Red Banner, Order of the Patriotic War II degree, Order of Friendship of Peoples, Order of the October Revolution, Order of Yegorov (Czechoslovakia), 30 medals of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Germany, Spain.

I consider the following to be my contribution to military theory and practice:

1. Creation of means of mine-explosive barriers and sabotage equipment in 1925 - 1930s. For this work he received the title of candidate of technical sciences. The developments were widely used in Spain and during the Great Patriotic War. They were mass-produced. In the report of the TsSHPD, in terms of assessing the effectiveness of mines, "Starinov's train mines" - PMS - took 1st place.

2. Training of partisan personnel in 1930-1933 and in 1941-1945.

Among them: the commander of the 14th partisan corps Domingo Ungria (Spain), and his deputy Antonio Buetrage, who later led the corps in France; Lubomir Ilic (Yugoslavia), who received the rank of major general in France and headed the operational department of the Internal Resistance Forces; Alexander Zavatsky (Poland), Chief of Staff of the Polish Partisan Movement; Torunchik (Poland), head of the partisan school in Poland; Ivan Harish (Yugoslavia), Major General, commander of a partisan unit, People's Hero of Yugoslavia; Egorov Aleksey Semenovich, commander of a partisan formation in Czechoslovakia, Hero of the Soviet Union. In Czechoslovakia, an order named after him was established.

In the pre-war years, instructors trained directly by me prepared over 1000 qualified partisans.

During the Great Patriotic War, the instructors I trained also trained over 5,000 partisan saboteurs in various schools. Only in the Operational Training Center of the Western Front, 1,600 people were trained.

3. To the most significant operations carried out under my direction

I attribute the following:

In Spain: the destruction of the headquarters of the Italian air division; the collapse of a train with Moroccans, the collapse of a military echelon in a tunnel, interrupting important enemy communications for a long time; putting out of action for a week communications between the southern and Madrid fronts of the enemy.

During the Great Patriotic War: in October 1941 - the transformation of the Kharkov lines of communication practically into a trap for the enemy, which obviously greatly hampered his offensive; in February 1942 - ice campaigns through the Taganrog Bay, as a result of which the Mariupol-Rostov-on-Don highway was disabled 4

and the German garrison on Kosaya Gora was defeated; the creation of a sabotage service in Ukrainian partisan formations and in the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement in 1943, as a result of which over 3,500 train wrecks were made in Ukraine, while in 1942 - only 202. In 1944 - training and creation of partisan formations of Ukrainian partisans for partisan warfare abroad - in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania.

I have written manuals, including top secret ones, on the issues of maintaining guerrilla warfare, which were used in the training of partisans. Meetings, impressions

1915 Autumn. Tsar **Nicholas II** visits Tver. Among the students of the elementary school, I greeted the tsar as he passed along Millionnaya Street. The king and queen rode in an open car, accompanied by horsemen. This episode didn't make much of an impression on me.

1917 Tver. He worked under the leadership of the marshal of the provincial nobility **Nikolai Mikhailovich Panafidin**. The leader was approachable, determined and very competent in supplying the army with shoes. His assistant, Prince Machulidzev knew the business as a department, but he was arrogant. After the October Revolution, they were gone. After their disappearance, he worked with Andrei Andreevich Andreev, chairman of the Tver provincial executive committee, future secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He was simple, quick-witted, interested in production. This was already in 1918-1919. I was surprised that the owners of leather enterprises and shoe factories lived very modestly, worked very hard, money was mainly invested in production.

Civil War. **L.D.** I saw **Trotsky** personally in 1919 on the Southern Front, when he spoke to the 20th regiment of the 3rd rifle division in July in the Kursk region. I remember the performance, it was bright, fiery. Trotsky spoke confidently of an imminent victory. We shouted "Hurrah" loudly.

The second time I saw him was in August 1921 in Odessa at a parade. He spoke to us, the future cadets. We were all dressed in underwear - as there was no other uniform of the same type. Trotsky spoke as usual well, his speech was often interrupted by our "cheers".

End of 1919. Rostov-on-Don. Closely saw **K.S. Voroshilov**. He performed at rally on the occasion of the liberation of the city.

The second time I happened to meet Voroshilov in Krasnodar under funny circumstances. I went to Moscow with a referral to the main directorate of military schools. I had to ride on the footboard of the wagon. I was unexpectedly detained, removed from the train, and my documents were taken away. Voroshilov received me in his carriage, he was then the commander-in-chief of the North Caucasian military district. He received me well, asked about everything and finally ordered the documents to be returned to me. Then I met him in Leningrad in 1936 upon his arrival from Moscow. There is a photograph of this meeting.

In 1937, upon returning from Spain, he was at a reception in the Kremlin together with the head of the GRU, General S.G. Gendin. Voroshilov was then People's Commissar of Defense. He expressed his pleasure with the work I had done, admired the train crash we had carried out with the headquarters of the Italian air division. In February 1938 I also met him in connection with my work in preparation for guerrilla warfare in the event of enemy aggression carried out in the early 1930s. He talked on the phone with Yezhov, took me under his protection.

However, Voroshilov is to blame for the fact that all preparations for the guerrilla war were curtailed. Later, during the Patriotic War, he understood something and did a lot. It's written in history. He served as commander of the partisan movement from September 6 to November 19, 1942. During this period, we talked with him many times and worked together on a letter to Stalin on the creation of special forces brigades for sabotage behind enemy lines. They often drank tea. Sometimes **M.I.** was present at the same time and took part in our conversations. **Kalinin**.

In August-November 1942, they worked together at the TsSHPD on partisan action plans. Being the commander-in-chief of the partisan movement, Voroshilov did a great job of developing the partisan struggle and providing the partisans with comprehensive support. But it seemed to me that he was very afraid of Stalin and did everything to please him.

October 1920. I saw **N. Makhno** closely in a village near Melitopol. His troops went to the front. He made a positive impression on us. He was very neatly dressed, in a good mood, on a fine horse. His cloak made a special impression.

1923 From that time until 1941, he repeatedly met and talked with General **D.M. Karbyshev**. He worked in the main military engineering department and taught at the Academy. Voroshilov (Higher Military Combined Arms Academy). I met with him about my article about a new method of massive undermining of rails. This article I 5

sent to the military-technical magazine. Karbyshev gave her a positive review. He was really simple in communication, attentive, advised me to continue my work and pay attention to the use of mines to crash trains. The last time I saw him was June 21, 1941. We were traveling in the same car of the Minsk-Brest train to the exercises of the troops of the Western Front planned from June 22. We talked a lot about current events, not thinking about the possibility of a sudden war.

1924 I met with the inventor of radio-controlled mines **Bekauri** during tests near Kiev. He was very attentive to details and captivated me with his views on mining.

In 1926, in Kharkov, I first met with the commander of the Ukrainian military district, **Yakir Iona Emmanuilovich**. I was then the commander of the 7th company of the 4th Red Banner Korosten railway regiment. The meeting took place during the development of a plan for barriers on the Southwestern Railway. He was a very attentive, charming man, deeply delving into the matter. In 1930 - 1933 he met with him, already working in intelligence. Yakir was always fit, neat, punctual

In 1928 I met **N.I. Bukharin**. He was treated in Kislovodsk and performed at the request of vacationers. Small in stature, dressed very simply, with a cane. In his speeches, he spoke out against collectivization, but for communal farming. He said: everyone should work and get rich. The richer every peasant lives, the richer the state will be. He walked freely in the park with his comrades, without any protection, entered into a conversation with those who wished.

1930 **Berzin Yan Karlovich** - head of the GRU of the Red Army. My first meeting with him took place at the end of 1930, when I was applying for a job in the GRU. The following meetings took place in 1932 - when promoted, and in 1933 - when entering the military transport academy, then in 1936 - in Spain. He was a rare person with a phenomenal memory, insightful, understandable in communication, sensitive. Berzin knew how to look far ahead. Admired my mines. I felt sincere.

1934 **Kaganovich Lazar Moiseevich** - the first meeting with him took place in the Central Committee of the party in connection with my business trip to study the causes of the train crash on the Orenburg-Novosibirsk railway. He was the Minister of Railways. The first impression when parting ways on a business trip was favorable. Later, he was dissatisfied with the result of our check, since we did not identify the enemies of the people, and for this reason he was exceptionally rude. In 1935 I met him again. The reason for the meeting was my refusal to work at the Ministry of Railways after graduating from the military transport academy. He expressed his displeasure at my refusal and bade a cold farewell.

In 1943, in the Caucasus, he turned to him with a request to allocate aircraft to deliver food to the Crimean partisans. He was a member of the military council of the front. He refused the request, saying: "What kind of partisans are they that they cannot feed themselves."

I first heard about **I. V. Stalin** after the Great October Socialist revolution, when he was appointed People's Commissar for Nationalities. IN

The second time I heard about him was in Georgia in the spring of 1921, during a feast at the switchman of the Samtredia station. The switchman was a Social Democrat and spoke unflatteringly about Kobe-Dzhughashvili.

In the winter of 1943, while passing by, I happened to visit the Samtredia station. It turned out that The switchman was repressed back in 1924.

At one time, I sent a letter to Stalin in connection with the outrages that were being created during the collectivization of agriculture. The letter, as I know, reached Stalin, but, of course, no measures were taken. Stalin did not go to the places.

Before collectivization, I actively opposed Trotsky and other factionalists. It was obvious to me from official press reports that they did not believe in socialism. This saved me. Everyone who once stood for Trotsky and other opponents of Stalin has long since died.

I saw how in 1932 - 1933 Russian grain was exported abroad through Odessa, and at the same time the peasants were dying of hunger. The frozen corpses of starving peasants lay even on the main street of Odessa. And the Red Army soldiers passed by, who met the columns of the driven "kulaks" to the Gulag camps and sang: "There is a free country in the world ...

In 1935, I already had a chance to see Stalin up close at a reception for graduates of the military academies. I was sitting at the last table and it seemed to me not the same as I used to see it in the photo. I liked Stalin's speech. In it, he said that cadres decide everything. He clinked glasses with his closest neighbors on the table, wished everyone good health. - For your health! he spoke with a Georgian accent.

Fate decreed that neither I nor my relatives were repressed. I was partly saved by the war in Spain.

After my first appeal to the Leader, I repeatedly wrote memos that began with the words: "Dear Comrade Stalin!" When the Great Patriotic War began and when the enemy approached Moscow, I wrote from Rostov, from the Kalinin Front, about the need to improve minefields, about the creation of special troops to disable enemy communications. Letters got to those who did not solve the issues. When I sent such reports signed by P.K. Ponomarenko or N.S. Khrushchev, they reached the addressee, but the matter did not move forward anyway.

The second time I saw Stalin up close was in his waiting room. He passed by, but did not receive me.

1936 **Tukhachevsky Mikhail Nikolaevich**, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. I met him in 1936. Accompanied him on the Leningrad-Moscow train. He invited us to his car, drank tea, talked for a long time about the guerrilla war. He was somehow closed, depressed. During the conversation, he almost did not express his personal judgments. Earlier, in 1932, I first met him at the test of radio-controlled mines, together with Bekauri near Kiev. He was then cheerful, friendly, felt confident.

Shaposhnikov Boris Mikhailovich in 1935 - 1936, commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District. I met him in 1935 on the train with an escort. In all his deeds and deeds, it was felt that he was a strong-willed and decisive commander. I felt like I was in charge. At the end of September 1941, at the General Staff in Moscow, in connection with my appointment as head of the operational-engineering group for the Southwestern Front, I met with him for the second time. He was then the Chief of the General Staff. Made a bad impression. Was depressed, wary. It seemed that he was broken and, as it turned out later, since 1938 he was afraid of repression and slept dressed. That's what his adjutant said. Seeing me out of the office, he called me a darling, although he was five years older, it seemed to me then, but in fact he was 18 years older than me, but he looked very young.

Pavlov Dmitry Grigoryevich, commander of the Belarusian military district. We first met him in Spain in 1937. Then he was the commander of a tank regiment. Our relationship was very close. Then he had little experience. On June 21, 1941, we met again in Minsk, he was confident in himself. They remembered Spain, talked about the concentration of Germans on the border. He did not doubt then his strength, he felt self-confidence.

Dolores Ibarurri. I met her on the first day of my arrival in Valencia in November 1936, the conversation was on the issue of organizing partisan actions. She served as secretary of the KPI, was a good speaker, organizer, she was a very effective woman.

Jose Diaz - Secretary of the CPI. He helped us a lot in organizing the partisan struggle.

Mikhail Koltsov - met him in Spain several times, very talented, talkative, but, in my opinion, there was a lot of exaggeration in his reports.

Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg - came to Spain with an interpreter, a curious, brave, talented person. He was a welcome guest in my apartment.

Ernest Hemingway is a brave man. The only military correspondent went with us behind enemy lines near Cordoba. He was very inquisitive. In my detachment, Domingo Ungrii, there was a Jewish partisan, an American Alex. An incomparable combat comrade, very combative, of exceptional courage. And so, as soon as we made a train wreck with Italian pilots, Hemingway often visited us. But the time was such that relations with foreigners were, to put it mildly, not encouraged. And especially the connections of Russians with Americans. It could have been hit. And I, to my present regret, avoided unnecessary meetings with Hemingway. I sent him to Domingo, to an interpreter, and I personally tried to communicate with him less. You never know, an American!

With **S.A. Vaupshasov**, I first met in Spain in 1937. Then we met in 1942 in Moscow, in OMSBON, in 1944 - in Belarus. He was the leader of a partisan detachment. After the war, they met at meetings of veterans. In the 1920s, he worked as an adviser in China, and in the 1930s he took part in preparations for a guerrilla war in the event of an enemy invasion of Belarus. A man of amazing mind, well prepared, brave, possessed great organizational skills.

Marshal **Meretskov K.A.** - Hero of the Soviet Union. I first met him in Spain in 1937. He was an adviser. He came to our battalion after the train crash. Helped the partisans with weapons. Energetic, intelligent military leader. They met in Moscow in 1942-1943 in the artillery department. After the war - at meetings about all sorts of anniversaries. The meetings were friendly and warm. They remembered a lot.

Mekhlis L.Z. - Meetings with him were unpleasant, especially when he lectured me on the Belorussian front, reprimanding me for the fact that we did not have time to blow up the bridge. During an unpleasant conversation, German planes appeared and he went into the dugout. The second meeting with him took place in the Kremlin. He received me instead of Stalin on the issue of creating special forces 7

sabotage behind enemy lines. Without listening fully, he accused me of not driving the Germans into the cold by my actions. The third time we met was in the Caucasus. He was a member of the Military Council. I came to him to ask for planes with provisions for the Crimean partisans. He did not give planes.

Timoshenko S.K. My first meeting with him took place on June 28, 1941 in the Kremlin in his office. He sent me to the Western Front. He was very excited, set tasks for the complete destruction of bridges. The second meeting took place on the Western Front in July 1941. I kept calmer, ordered the organization of an operational training center, seconded 12 border guard officers to my disposal. But his mood then was depressed.

Brezhnev Leonid Ilyich. I met him in 1943 in the Caucasus. He was then the head of the political department of the army, the meetings were equal, he sometimes drank my hundred grams. A very business person. He was returning with him from Malaya Zemlya. When he was General Secretary of the CPSU, his apparatus did everything possible to prevent anyone from visiting him. The last time I ran into him was at a veterans meeting.

Voznesensky N.A. - Chairman of the State Planning Committee. I happened to meet him in 1941-1942. An exceptionally capable person, personally made a great contribution to the supply of partisans with special equipment. Very pleasant and helpful in communication.

Khrushchev N.S. We first met in October 1941. He was a member of the Military Council of the Western Front and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the UKP. I worked under his leadership in the creation of barriers and mining of the Kharkov communications junction and enterprises of the city, bridges, mansions, including house No. 17 on Dzerzhinsky Street, where he himself lived. Khrushchev was the only person who at that time was not afraid of Stalin, like most. I personally asked him to accept me on the issue of creating special subdivisions for sabotage behind enemy lines. He helped me enroll the Spaniards who worked in Kharkov in factories in my brigade, including Domingo Ungria. He believed in our mining work. We met several times in liberated Kyiv. The meetings were always friendly. I visited his apartment, was well acquainted with Nina Petrovna, children. Already in Moscow, his daughter Rada studied at Moscow State University and was friends with my daughter Olga, she visited our house several times. With the consent of **Strokach T.A.** Khrushchev sent me to the Polish headquarters of the partisan movement. In 1963, when publishing the article "The Secret of Colonel Starinov" in Izvestia, Adzhubey coordinated it with Khrushchev. Nikita Sergeevich confirmed the explosion of house No. 17 in Kharkov. Until that time, the explosion of the house was attributed to the underground workers.

Joseph Broz Tito. My first meeting with him took place in 1944 in Bucharest. I was then assigned to the Soviet mission. I met him at the airport, he flew in from the Union after negotiations with the allies in Italy. With him was General N. V. Korneev, the head of the mission. Tito addressed me by name: "Rodolfo, are you here? Very glad to see you!" (obviously, he knew about me from Ivan Harish). Then they flew to the city of Craiova, where the headquarters of the NOAU, which had relocated from Yugoslavia, was located. I reported to him the whole current situation, provided everything necessary for both my mission and the NOAU headquarters. Tito walked in a marshal's uniform, was energetic. He also met with representatives of other missions: the British one, headed by Churchill's son, and the American one. Churchill's son is a plump, smiling, friendly fellow. We explained ourselves through an interpreter, representatives of all missions sometimes gathered in the evenings at Tito's. We drank tea, Tito liked it very strong. He almost always had his wife with him. He loved to talk, to dream about a new life, about a new Yugoslavia. He was an extremely pleasant conversationalist. We stayed in Craiova for about a month, then moved to Rzhats, and then to Belgrade. Here he already felt much more confident, although from the outside he always looked thoughtful. He was unhappy that he was guarded by Soviet security officers. It was impossible to reach him without their knowledge. He called me "the god of sabotage". I was grateful for the preparation of Ivan Harish and Lubomir Ilich, his attitude was very warm.

The second time our paths crossed with him was in 1967. I then went to Yugoslavia at the invitation of Ivan Harish, stayed there for a whole month, lived in a hotel. I met Tito at the World Trade Fair. We had lunch together and spent the whole day. They talked about everything. He was at that time dissatisfied with Stalin, his instructions on collectivization.

Alexander Zavadsky studied with me back in 1933 in Moscow on Pyatnitskaya Street at the Sverchevsky School. He was the commander of the Polish group. Even then he spoke Russian well. Then they met in the spring of 1944. He recognized me and then asked Strokach and Khrushchev to work at his headquarters as a deputy chief to organize partisan struggle in Poland. I was at his headquarters for 3-4 months. At school, he was very attentive to his studies, a receptive person, slightly above average height, strong physique. As an organizer, he was talented, courageous, for some reason did not tolerate priests, although he talked to them

politely.

Henri Marty - Secretary of the French Communist Party. He was engaged in the formation of international brigades in 1937 in Spain. We met with him in the city of Albacete, took people from him. And the first meeting was still in Moscow, he studied at the Sverchevsky school. A very pleasant listener, cheerful, smart, quickly found a common language with everyone. It is he

He said that the French sailors from the time of the Civil War remembered and told everyone that the Red Army in Russia did not kill prisoners and therefore foreign soldiers willingly surrendered.

Palmiro Togliatti - studied in Moscow through the Comintern at the Sverchevsky school, later became secretary of the Communist Party of Italy. During the war he served as a partisan in Italy. Medium height, dark haired, handsome, charming man. Competent, curious, very educated, with a broad outlook.

Uborevich I.P. I met him in 1932. He was then the commander of the Belarusian military district. They examined the bridge over the river with him. Pripyat. The bridge there was mined during the civil war. Then I met him in 1935 at a reception at Stalin's. He looked very good then, thin, charming.

Krupskaya N.K. - Deputy People's Commissar of Education of the RSFSR. In 1937-1938, my wife worked with her as head of the department for orphanages. I met with Nadezhda Konstantinovna at the Commissariat, sometimes we dined together. She was a very respectable lady, calm and sad, attentive to people. Always neatly and modestly dressed.

Georgy Dimitrov - Chairman of the Comintern. I met in his office twice together with **A.I. Bolotin** (regimental commissar of the 5th Special Forces Engineering Brigade) in 1942. Decided the question of service in the brigade of the Spaniards. Much was said about the partisan movement. A man of deep thought. Large-scale, one might say, personality. It was immediately felt. He spoke Russian well.

Primakov Vitaly Markovich. I met him in September 1932 at the exercises of the troops of the Leningrad Military District near Leningrad. I participated as the leader of a sabotage group of Ukrainian partisans. He met with his former participants in the civil war, then students of our Ukrainian school, who mastered sabotage equipment. He was exceptionally glad to see us, talked a lot with us, recalled the civil war. He was interested in mines, praised them. He kept himself simple with both commanders and soldiers. He was very neatly dressed, looked very fit, with good bearing. The impression of him has not faded over the years, although he was only one of many military leaders with whom I had to meet.

King Mihai saw him in the royal palace at a reception on the occasion of the liberation of Romania from the Nazis. He was very young, of medium height, handsome, dressed in a military uniform. At the reception, I remember, there were many different ambassadors. It was felt that the affairs, however, were in charge of the queen mother, still a young woman then, unexpectedly modestly dressed.

Malinovsky R.Ya. I met him in Spain. He was Berzin's deputy, he came to our battalion near Cordoba. He was distinguished by an extremely serious approach to each case, especially in detail. Then we met with him in Hungary in 1944. He was already a front commander. After the war, we met several times at meetings of veterans. The meetings were warm and cordial.

Konev I.S. My first meeting with him took place on the Kalinin Front in the spring of 1942. He was at that time the commander of the front. He helped a lot in solving the problems of the partisans. With his approval, the necessary layouts were made. A soldier's uniform was put on a wooden frame and protruded from the trenches 200 meters from the enemy. A German sniper shot at him, thereby revealing himself. Konev brought one such model from the front and kept it in his apartment in Moscow as a memory.

Then we met in 1944 in Germany. He has already become a marshal. I carried out mine clearing of roads in the territory liberated by his troops. Then we performed an interesting operation with his consent. The Germans parachuted boxes of ammunition for their troops, some of them fell on our territory. We selected them. I organized a workshop where these shells, mines, cartridges were reloaded: gunpowder was taken out and tol. Then, in the same boxes and on their own parachutes, but by our planes, they were dropped at night by the Germans. These ammunition exploded when fired. The German command immediately began searching for pests in the arms factories. This lasted ten days.

We met often after the war. We lived on the same street in Moscow, Sadovo Kudrinskaya, walked in the evenings, talked about everything, I visited him at his dacha. A brilliant commander, he fought according to the principle - to beat the enemy with lesser forces. This is for me.

Vasilevsky A.M. - I met him in 1942, when he was chief of the General Staff. They decided on the creation of a special brigade for operations behind enemy lines. Helped. The commander was powerful. He was against the militarization of partisan formations. After the war, they met at the editorial office of the Moscow News newspaper on the anniversary of the Battle of Kursk.

Tolbukhin F.I. - Marshal, Commander of the Southern Front. I was a member of his military council and a representative of the Ukrainian ShPD in 1943 for a month in the Donbass. Clever, intelligent, calm, competent officer.

Sokolovsky Vasily Danilovich. I met him in Germany in 1945 in his office. He was at that time the commander of a group of Soviet troops. We decided on the export of railway equipment (machine tools, a whole locomotive building plant, repair plants). General Borisov, the head of the 20th Department of Restoration Works, gave me the command to do this, but Marshal Sokolovsky did not allow it, motivating the refusal by the fact that we ourselves would have to restore the eastern part of Germany. The man thought for the future, decisive, economic, pleasant interlocutor. It made a wonderful impression on him.

Blucher Vasily Konstantinovich - I first met him in Moscow in 1933. Sverchevsky and I met him at the Kursk railway station, on the second day we listened to his speech at school. Blucher spoke about the importance of our school, about the fact that the Chinese are very good at fighting, using sabotage and traps, inflicting damage on the enemy, while maintaining their strength. He impressed us with his posture, he kept himself very worthy, felt confident. He is taller than average, and his uniform was very tight. The second meeting in Leningrad took place in 1935: I met and accompanied him to Moscow. He did not communicate with anyone then, he rode in a compartment alone.

Wilhelm Pieck - studied at the Swierchevsky School in 1933. I taught him the basics of organization, tactics and strategy of guerrilla warfare. He was very attentive, inquisitive, spoke Russian poorly. Modest. always focused on something.

Ernst Telman - also studied at the Sverchevsky school. Above average height, fit, studied successfully, attentively. As far as I remember, most of all he was interested in supply issues.

Alexander Dubcek - 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. I met with him in 1944 on the formation of partisan detachments. He delved deeply into the essence of each case. I liked him and we even became friends. The second meeting took place in 1959 in Czechoslovakia on the 15th anniversary of the Czechoslovak uprising. I had a personal invitation from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. At that time, I worked at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, participated in writing the history of the Great Patriotic War.

Fedorov Aleksey Fedorovich - General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of a partisan unit in the Chernihiv region. Secretary of the Chernihiv Regional Committee. Clever, cunning, he knew how to multiply the results of his military operations, he had good and competent assistants (Egorov A.S. - assistant in sabotage, chief of staff - Rvanov).

Yaremchuk V.M. - district worker, graduated from Kochegarov's school. He commanded a partisan detachment, then a unit in northern Ukraine. Brave, desperate warrior. He began to partisan in 1941, reached the border, Hero of the Soviet Union. Later he organized an international unit and fought in Czechoslovakia.

Grabchak A.M. - Hero of the Soviet Union. Border guard officer, commander of a partisan formation in the Zhytomyr and Kyiv regions. The officer was very brave. He acted exceptionally well. He blew up, for example, a bridge across the river Uhort near the city of Olevska, Zhytomyr region. The bridge was heavily guarded. He made a torpedo out of five air bombs and launched fifteen kilometers to the bridge on a railcar. The guards, obviously, thought that they were their own, and opened the gate. The bridge exploded. He was a big inventor. So in the city of Gorodnishche, two air bombs were loaded onto a cart, covered with hay, a basket with chickens was placed on top, and a fuse pin was tied to the leg of one chicken. They left the cart in the bazaar opposite the school where the German garrison was located. When the driver left, the Germans came up for the chickens, and when they took the one that was tied to the check, there was an explosion. 12 fascists died and many were injured.

Kovpak S.A. He had experience of guerrilla warfare since the civil war. I knew him from the pre-war years, from the Kochegarov school. During the war we met often, visited him in the compound in the Zhytomyr region. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, general, brave grunt, resolute. He became famous for his raids in Ukraine, undermining bridges, derailing trains, destroying small German garrisons along the way. After the war, we met many times, visited me at the dacha. He was loved, but he is a very cautious person. Not too talkative, liked to listen.

Kochegarov M.K. - Colonel, security officer, head of the school for training underground partisans. The school at the end of the 20s was located near Kiev, and then, at the beginning of the war, in Kharkov. Great person, knowledgeable professional. He was an adviser in Spain, we also met there, although it was forbidden to me (I was then in charge of the GRU). After the war, he worked in the KGB, was arrested along with Beria, and was imprisoned for one year.

Vershigora P.P. - General, Hero of the Soviet Union. At first he was the head of intelligence at Kovpak, then the chief of staff of the partisan formation, and after Kovpak left for the Central Committee of Ukraine, he became the commander of the formation. Before the war he was a writer, later wrote "Raid on the San and Vistula" and already, while working at the Academy of the General Staff, wrote a book about the nationwide partisan war. Our relationship was very friendly, we often visited each other.

Naumov M.I. - General, Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of a partisan formation. Before the war - a border guard officer. A very skilled leader. Arranged raids in the steppe part of Ukraine - the Dnepropetrovsk region, and always unexpectedly for the Germans. After the war, he served in the border troops in Ukraine, visited me.

Saburov A. V. - commander of a partisan formation, general, Hero of the Soviet Union. Before the war, he worked in the NKD. Partisanil from Kyiv to Bryansk, to the border. He followed in the footsteps of Kovpak, was a dishonest worker - he made many additions: checked by the commission, proven. After the war he served in the fire department.

Rudnev S.V. - General, Hero of the Soviet Union - commander of a partisan detachment, then commissar of the Kovpak formation. I met him at the beginning of the war, he was a party worker and studied at courses for the training of partisan commanders near Kiev. Erudite, with an inquisitive mind. The partisans loved him very much.

Ponomarenko P.K. - Before the war, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus. We met for the first time in early July 1941 near the city of Orsha, in the forest, at the headquarters of the front. I offered him my services in organizing a guerrilla war, showed my mines. He went with them to Timoshenko (he was at that time the commander of the front and the people's commissar of defense). Marshal immediately agreed with our proposals and ordered the creation of an operational training center for the Western Front. I was appointed part-time as his boss. Ponomarenko at that time was inquisitive, peppy, but he was poorly versed in business, for example, he was going to train partisans in a week, he did not like it when they contradicted him. He was very self-confident. They also met in the capital at the Moscow Hotel. At one time, we wrote a letter to Stalin together, he handed it over in his own name. The letter was about partisan actions on enemy communications. Stalin agreed, but did not help with the supply, proceeding from the wrong message: let the partisans provide for themselves at the expense of trophies.

In November-December 1942, we met with him in Moscow on the issue of organizing the TsSHPD. By that time, his ambition had increased even more. He did not invite me to the headquarters, but General Shchadenko - deputy. Minister of Defense and Chief of Personnel, appointed me the head of the Higher Operational School and Ponomarenko's assistant for sabotage. Ponomarenko did not want Voroshilov to be the commander-in-chief of the partisan forces, did not want to obey him. And he managed to convince Stalin. Voroshilov was removed, and then the TSShPD itself was liquidated.

I had big disagreements with Ponomarenko on the organization of the partisan struggle. I, like Voroshilov, was for the militarization of partisan formations in order to act according to military plans, so that the detachments would merge into formations, so that they would be centrally provided with everything they needed. And Ponomarenko wanted the partisans to act in separate detachments and provide themselves with trophies, in which Stalin supported him.

The "rail war" made me his enemy, and he never mentioned my name anywhere, even after the war.

Major General **Nazarov**, Chief of Staff of the Red Army Engineering Troops. Tall, thin, fit. On November 17, 1941, I was called from the South-Western Front to lay mines on the approaches to Moscow; I was then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Engineering Troops. With Nazarov, they flew around on an airplane, examined the area from Serpukhov to Klin, around Vladimir. We went to military units, checked all the work on the barriers, determined where the more dangerous direction was, gave appropriate instructions. That winter there was a lot of snow and severe frosts, and we had to check the mines, to make sure that the fuses were in order. They checked the correctness of mining bridges in Moscow. So he personally checked the bridge at the TsPKiO them. Gorky. He was also engaged in the operational training center, connecting it to the defense system of Moscow. His cadets were of great help, mining especially important areas almost under the enemy's nose. On their own vehicles, they brought mine-blasting equipment, disabled the Klin-Kalinin highway, laid mines and undermined the canvas in those places where there were no detours. They did this together with the setting up of anti-tank barriers.

Grizodubova V.S. - Pilot, Hero of the Soviet Union. I first met her in Moscow at Vnukovo. She provided us with planes for flights to the partisans, she flew herself. A very energetic woman. She understood our needs, helped a lot, the partisans loved her. In 1944 in Tiraspol, she gave us planes for flights to Romania. After the war, they met in the committee of veterans, at meetings. She was always kind, pleasant and charming.

Tolstoy A.N. - writer. We met and got acquainted in Kharkov after the victory of the Kursk salient. Vershigora and Tolstoy came to me in September 1943. I was the Deputy Chief of Staff of the USHPD. They collected materials about military operations. A very large man, good-natured, cheerful, told a lot of jokes, tales, about Ilya Ehrenburg, about trips with him.

Konstantin Simonov - my first meeting with him took place in September 1944 in Belgrade, he came as a correspondent for the Red Star. He was three weeks, constantly

traveled around Yugoslavia. For one laudatory article, Tito awarded him some kind of order. He often talked to me, got to know the situation. Deeply penetrating in conversation, smart, intelligent. Amazingly quickly wrote articles clean.

We met for the second time in 1967, also in Yugoslavia, at an exhibition, but that time they met him rather coldly, as if they did not notice him. They did not forget that after the war he published an article where he called Tito twice Judas. Then he quickly left for the Union.

Linkov Grigory Matveyevich - engineer, completed a short-term training. He was thrown behind enemy lines with a group of 52 people in 1941 in the Orsha region. But the group was thrown out in the wrong place. And besides, they were scattered over a long distance. The group was unable to meet. He was left alone, spent the winter in a village where there were no Germans. In the spring of 1942, a trusted person came to him, and during the spring they organized four brigades, something like about 2 thousand partisans, including from the fighters leaving the encirclement. Among them was officer Brynsky, later Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of a partisan unit.

Linkov's brigades derailed about 2,000 trains on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland. They blew up bridges, set up ambushes. I have known him since July 1941, then we met after the war in Moscow. We visited each other, became friends. A man of strong character, a competent engineer, a participant in the civil war. Hero of the Soviet Union, colonel.

Academician **Flerov G.N.** We met him in the summer of 1942 at Balezin's office. He already knew about the history of the trophy notebook of the murdered German nuclear scientist and in 1975 or 1976 in April he invited him to visit him. He then lived near the Sokol metro station. I stayed with my wife for three hours. They talked a lot about that notebook, how it was obtained, what path it had taken before Stalin, and to what extent it prompted the start of work on the atomic project. The impression from meetings with him was very good. I met with his assistant Yuri Nikolaevich Smirnov, Doctor of Physical Sciences, quite often.

Budyonny S.M. I first saw him in 1921 in the Caucasus. He was with Voroshilov. Then they met at the reception of the academy graduates in 1935. On June 28, 1941, he escorted me to the Western Front to set up barriers. In November 1941, in Moscow on Gorky Street, he overtook his car, recognized him and stopped to let him through. He, however, stopped himself, and made a rather rude remark to me. Resentment, of course, was inappropriate.

General **Eremenko A.I.** - first met in July 1941 north of Orsha. He was the commander of the Belorussian Front. During the retreat of our troops, we blew up 2 bridges: railway and road. Even a German tank was blown up on the highway. But the Germans very quickly restored traffic - they broke houses, and a temporary bridge was made from these materials. Eremenko doubted that the bridge had been blown up, and then scolded me strongly. But when the pilots confirmed that the bridge had been blown up, and the river was blocked with logs in bulk next to the bridge, he walked away and we even drank tea together, and then he taught us officers how to throw grenades at the tanks. He was very clever at it, oddly enough. After the war, we met with him at a meeting dedicated to the anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad.

Vatutin N.F. - General, met in July 1943 in the area of the Kursk Bulge. I was engaged in barriers, and he and Khrushchev came to inspect how it was done. Very carefully examined the preparation for the installation of min. Medium height, soft, calm, intelligent person. That's how I remember him.

Bulganin N.A. - Minister of Defence. In the year 1947, a large delegation: Kovpak, Strokach, myself, and ten other people, turned to him on the issue of teaching the tactics of guerrilla warfare. The issue was resolved positively only after the intervention of a member of the Central Committee Kuznetsov.

PART 2. CONVERSATIONS WITH THE OLD

These "Conversations" were born from those records that were accumulated by the editorial teams of the almanacs "Vypel" and "Arman" for three years: 1997 - 1999. Questions were asked by different people. After processing the notes, we compiled the following interview:

- **Ilya Grigorievich, you remember, there was such a song: "Our traces will remain on the dusty paths of distant planets." Tell me, on what paths of our planet did your traces remain?**

- There are many paths, but history will erase everything, everything will be covered with snow, sand, silt ... Everything is entered.

- **Where did you start, from Spain?**

- It all started with the Civil War. It all started with the first fight with White. Then he was captured, then escaped, then fought in the encirclement. One was surrounded by the enemy, he ended up in the city of Korocha, Kursk province, overwhelmed by the enemy. And if by that time I had not read how our people fled to imperialist Germany, I, of course, would not have overcome this obstacle. I thought that if our people fled from German captivity, from the enemy encirclement in a foreign land, then I definitely need to leave on my own land. And I escaped from captivity and left the encirclement. Moreover, when leaving the encirclement, you won't believe it, I practically didn't sleep for 120 hours.

- In fact, this is where your partisan biography began?

- This was the beginning of partisan life. I saw what partisans are.

- Ilya Grigorievich, how did your Spanish epic begin?

- The Spanish epic began with the fact that I graduated from the Military Transport Academy. Before that, I trained partisans: Chinese, Poles and representatives of other nations. And when the Spanish events began, I began to ask to be sent to Spain. Because I have experience. I listened to Blucher - directly, adopted the experience of other outstanding partisans.

- Did you know Tukhachevsky?

- I saw Tukhachevsky, but Tukhachevsky did not teach me. But Yakir taught, Blucher taught, Berzin - especially gave me a lot professionally.

- What can you say about Berzin?

One thing can be said about Berzin. He was an extremely talented and, if I may say so, piercing person. My Spanish epic began with the fact that I asked Berzin to report that I was in Leningrad at work not related to the activities of saboteurs. He quickly demanded me to Spain. A week after his request, having handed over his affairs, through France he arrived to Berzin in Spain. Initially, he instructed me to teach five underground saboteurs. I looked at them and realized that they would not be of much use. Then, on the initiative of Berzin and Dolores Ibarruri, I was assigned a group of scouts led by commander Domingo Ungria. These 12 people already had experience of being behind enemy lines. With them, I began to make the first sorties to the enemy near Teruel, where we set up ambushes and wrecked trains.

- Tell me, how was the famous 14th partisan corps created?

- There were many partisan detachments in Spain. They were led by two departments - the OGPU and the GRU. And everyone led as best they could. And, finally, our detachment, commanded by Domingo Ungria, for whom I was an adviser and instructor, managed to derail a train with the headquarters of the Italian air division near Cordoba and destroy its commander and headquarters. This caused a furor, reached the Republican General Staff. And the General Staff established the world's first special-purpose battalion. Moreover, in this battalion, a one and a half salary, improved maintenance, flight rations were established. And unlimited, unlimited gasoline. The battalion was tasked, along with other battalions, to cut the lines of communication between the enemy's southern army and the Brunet during the Brunet operation and between the Madrid group. Disable the railroads and highways along the Tahoe River. We managed to do this with the help of mass laying of delayed action mines and by blowing up a bridge over the Alicante River.

- Ilya Grigoryevich, there is a very interesting fact in your book. You used the experience of the Trojan War of the ancient Greeks. They say there was a Trojan horse, and you have a Trojan mule. What is this story?!

- Here is how it was. There was a monastery. The Nazis settled in this monastery, and they tried to attack it, they suffered losses, but the result did not work. We managed to capture the mule. He came from this monastery. We supplied the mule with explosives - delayed-action mines, and non-retrievable ones. Boxes were hung on the mule from two sides, to the right and to the left, they contained a delayed action charge that explodes after a certain time or if they are unloaded, a double slowdown. We drove past the monastery. We were fired upon. We seem to have retreated. A mule from this monastery - rather home. There, of course, they were delighted, they began to unload it and an explosion occurred. As a result of the explosion, many fascists were killed, because everyone wanted to see how they unloaded. A lot of fascists died, and we almost without a fight took this monastery, which, in fact, was an impenetrable fortress.

- Ilya Grigoryevich, they say that Hemingway made the American Alex from your detachment the main character of his novel "For Whom the Bell Tolls?"

- Generally speaking, he wrote about my detachment and Mamsurov's detachment ... They were friends with Alex. He often visited us, collected a lot of material and eventually created a work of art.

- **Did you know Khadzhi Mamsurov well?**

- Very good.

Is he a hero?

- Mamsurov was definitely a heroic person. In addition, he was also an extremely honest person. And with all the features of a Caucasian.

- **Ilya Grigoryevich, many of those who knew you say that you are not only the same age as the century, but also the saboteur of the century. This is true?**

- You see, in Yugoslavia they called me the god of sabotage. And I began to get involved in sabotage business from the twenty-fourth year. I followed the instructions, the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense that our army should be prepared for the fact that if someone finds himself behind enemy lines, he should not surrender, but begin to act behind enemy lines in a partisan manner. These instructions of Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze formed the basis of all my activities.

- **Ilya Grigoryevich, as I understand it, your ideas go back to Denis Davydov?**

- Yes, I started reading Denis Davydov back in the First World War. - **If you managed**

to get through to Stalin at one time, how would the war in Russia?

- You know, it could have turned out differently. But for me, it worked out the way it did. And if I got through to Stalin, he might agree. Then 10 sabotage brigades would have been created, which, according to my calculations, were enough to cut off the enemy's communication routes from their sources of supply. But in this case, personally, I would not talk to you now. Because nowhere could it be written that this was Starinov's idea. It would be written that these are the wise thoughts of Joseph Vissarionovich. And Starinov would be superfluous.

- **Ilya Grigoryevich, you said that in Yugoslavia you were called the god of sabotage. Why in Yugoslavia?**

- Why in Yugoslavia? Because in Yugoslavia my first assistant and translator was a Serb, no, I'm lying, a Croat, Ivan Harish, who later commanded a detachment and was an instructor, also in Spain, and an adviser, commander of a sabotage brigade. He, after the fall of Spain, went through France, Austria, Germany, returned to Yugoslavia, made a powerful home-made mine himself, and with this mine undermined the composition of the German division. Completely destroyed an important train and everything that was transported in it. For which he was called the Thunderer. The place where the crash was made is planted with flowers, well-groomed, there are corresponding inscriptions.

- **Tell me, how did Marshal Tito assess the actions of Ivan Harish?**

- The Marshal highly appreciated him. He turned Ivan Harish from an ordinary fighter into folk hero who ended the war with the rank of major general.

- **Tell me, how did Tito treat you?**

- Tito, Tito treated him so well that I personally met him already in 1967, traveled ...

- **At his personal invitation?**

- On his behalf. Not his personal, but on his behalf.

- **Understandable. And how did he meet you?**

- Very well, we talked for a long time, sincerely. They remembered a lot. - **Ilya Grigoryevich, do you think the Serbs can remember their combat experience to repel aggression?**

- I believe that they have lost a significant part of their knowledge. After all, the war was over 50 years ago. Those who remained, for the most part, succumbed to the belief that there really would be no more wars, and they did not have proper preparation for decades. And I have no idea about the current preparation.

- **But do you think the Yugoslavs are good fighters?**

- As fighters, the Serbs are one of the best ... Of the entire Yugoslav state, I am the first place would put Montenegrins and Serbs.

- **They, so to speak, although the experience has been lost, can they resist aggression, in your opinion?**

- They can.

- Including partisan?

- Including partisan. They can. They are very meticulous people, they grasp everything very quickly. If ours, and we have many specialists, if ours go there and give them the opportunity to use modern technology, then they will definitely be able to. With small losses or no losses on their part, they will be able to inflict heavy losses on the enemy without engaging in battle.

- Ilya Grigorievich, how can you evaluate the participation of your Spanish friends in partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War?

- Their role is very great. They have made a huge contribution, not yet appreciated at all. Rated he, it turns out, is not with us, but in Czechoslovakia. There is an order in Czechoslovakia, this is an order ...

- Yegorova?

- Yegorova. But Yegorova was taught a lot directly by Domingo Ungria. Egorov was the head of the financial department, became friends with Domingo Ungria. And so Domingo Ungria told him about his work, about what they did in Spain. He shook everything on his mustache and in the end declared that he no longer wanted to be ...

- A financier?

- Yes. I don't want, he says, to be a financier, I want to be a saboteur. They took him as a saboteur, put him as a deputy commander in the best connection, to Fedorov. And there he organized the most important operation, which paralyzed the Kovel knot. This time. Second. He flew to Czechoslovakia in August 1944. In total, 22 people flew with him. A month later he had 2000 plus. He skillfully applied the most modern means, up to radio-controlled mines. Both Czechs and Slovaks appreciated his high merits and established the Egorov Order, which I also have.

- Ilya Grigoryevich, why did the Czechs and Slovaks give you the Order named after Yegorov?

- And they gave it to me because I sent Yegorov on the right path. So I do.

So he is your student?

- He's my student. And it was not anyone who handed me the order, but Yegorov himself. - **Ilya**

Grigoryevich, if it's not difficult for you, you could remember the first minutes, days of the war, the Great Patriotic War. Where were you at that moment?

- I remember the first minutes. For the first few minutes I slept at the army headquarters in Pogrin. The bombing started. We thought it was a mistake, that our planes did not fix the bombs well and so, in vain, they drop. They even watched how they dropped it. And then they realized that the war had begun. They climbed under the bridge from such a calculation, under the bridge there were barges with grain for Germany. The Germans will not destroy them. And so it happened. They didn't bomb this bridge. This is how another war began for me.

- And remember, in your book there is such an episode as in the morning during the war they transmitted by loudspeaker...

- Yes, they transmitted over the loudspeaker ...

- As for the morning routine...

- Oh, yes, yes. They said that today is a good day, we must use it for charging, use for walking.

- You also wrote that you will remember this exercise until the end of your days.

- Yes, this exercise ... This exercise was in Pogrin, and due to the loudness of the speakers this radio physical exercise could be heard far away.

- Ilya Grigorievich, how do you assess the experience of guerrilla warfare in the first Patriotic, in Russia in 1812, and in the Second Patriotic War?

- In 1812, it was headed by the smartest, one might say, brilliant man Denis Davydov. His actions, the thoughts that he reported to Kutuzov - and his contribution, I must honestly say, his contribution to the victory over the French in the First Patriotic War was high. Because guerrilla warfare was then organized by people who understood that the essence of guerrilla warfare is not in individual actions. And he conducted operations, cutting off enemy troops from the source of supply. Cut them off, and relatively easily and coordinated with

main forces.

- And in the Great Patriotic War could it be done or not?

- It was possible ... By 1932, we had everything prepared in case the enemy invaded our borders. An organized, mass partisan movement was to begin in its rear.

- You've spent ten years on this, haven't you?

- Yes, we spent ten years on it. But in 1937, all activities were eliminated for two reasons. The first reason: we imagined that we would not retreat, but would fight only on foreign territory. The second, the most terrible, is that wonderful partisans were ranked among the enemies of the people ...

- Your future partisans?

- Future partisans. Or rather those who survived. Here, for example, was how Medvedev was sitting and how many were sitting, even SV Prokopyuk was sitting. Those who were prepared to go to work with the Germans died. These people had, for example, stockpiles of mines prepared to blow up locomotives. I didn't find any of them after the war...

- Ilya Grigoryevich, if the leadership had turned out to be smarter and had managed to solve the problem of cutting off fascist communications, how, in your opinion, could a war have developed?

- The war would have developed very simply. After the invasion, the enemy would go to the line fortified areas, concentrated and would have died there.

- That is actually...

- He would approach the fortified areas, use up ammunition and, not being able to defend himself, would be forced to capitulate. He had very little stock.

- So it could have turned out like with the French army?

- In principle, they said quite rightly, it could turn out like with French army, only the German army would freeze before the French.

- Ilya Grigoryevich, I was struck by one moment in your book. When you returned from Spain, you were summoned for interrogation by the NKD. You write: there I felt such fear, which I did not experience even in the rear of the enemy. Tell me, please, how purely psychologically a person walked under bullets, under explosions ... Psychologically, how is this possible?

- Under the bullets, under the explosions, I could hide, but here I was sitting, and as soon as he pressed button, and I would be sent to a place of no return. It's really scary.

- But you risked your life in the rear of Franco too.

- In the rear of Franco ... Can you imagine, I once had to sit in the rear of Franco for two whole weeks. But we were sitting near the garrison, only two kilometers away. Thickets, good forest ones, and sat near the station that fed Cordova with electricity. But we are within a radius of 15 kilometers from the base, we were not allowed to touch anyone day or night. A fascist is coming, a fascist is coming, and let him go, no one was touched. Only outside the radius of 15 kilometers, there we have already carried out operations. The enemy had the impression that this was a dead zone, that there was no one here. In fact, we were there. And from this dead zone, at a distance of twenty-odd kilometers, a train with the headquarters of the aviation division was derailed.

- Ilya Grigoryevich, tell me, did you experience fear in the rear of Franco?

- Experienced.

- Often?

- Well, most of all I was afraid the first time I crossed the front line. I didn't know Spain. I did not know how my comrades would behave. First time, new people, first assignment. Certainly. And then I was inspired by our translator. She is northerner. And I admired the fact that she was completely free to go behind enemy lines.

- Is this your future wife?

- Yes.

- Ilya Grigorievich, tell me, during the war, you actually took risks all the time life. How did your wife handle it?

She inspired people. She grew up in the north, and then she was brought up in such a spirit: if you die, then die with honor.

- And during the war years, how did she survive in our country?

- And during the war years I had a son, so she was bound by her son.

- Was she worried about you?

- Certainly. The people went for Russia, for the Soviet Union against fascism, and literally everyone united in this war. And the Germans fought against, and the Finns fought against. And the Germans fought very well. But surprisingly, they turned out to be bad partisans. They saved the situation near Teruel when the Nazis advanced on Teruel, from Teruel to Valencia. And at the same time, in the rear of the enemy, they demanded that someone command from the left, right, in front. Such is their military installation in character.

- There was another tactic.

- Yes. Finns are also excellent warriors. They fought against fascism in Spain exclusively. Fine. But I had to part with them. They drank vodka. And when they got drunk, they began to rage.

- Really more Russians drank?

- More. But, most importantly, get drunk and buzz!

In Russia and Spain, children helped the partisans in every possible way. Children went to war. At that time I was the commander of a separate engineering brigade for special purposes. At this time, I met girls who had escaped from the concentration camp. So we sheltered them, and they performed valuable tasks: they could hide where no one could see them. They are also small. And they brought very valuable reports. And participated in separate operations. - **Ilya Grigoryevich, did you have many such children in the detachment?**

- I think there were twenty people all the time. Well, imagine they are suffered in the rear, that staying with us was a pleasure for them.

- Despite the combat situation?

- They were sure that once there is a rifle, then the second time they will not be caught.

- **Ilya Grigoryevich, you wrote in the book how you mined Kharkov. You have such words: although Kharkov was already full of mines, I wanted to put more and more of them.**

- Yes.

- **You probably know the Hero of the Soviet Union Elena Mazanik?**

- I know.

- **She blew up the Gauleiter of Belarus in Minsk, just as you blew up in Kharkov... Who did you blow up?**

- Lieutenant General von Braun.

- **Yes. And she blew up the Gauleiter of Belarus. But after all, the Germans thousands of Minskers were shot.**

- Right.

- **And after that, as she was awarded the title of Hero, she ended up in a mental hospital, because she always dreamed of her fellow countrymen killed. Was the life of a lousy Gauleiter worth a thousand shot Soviet people?**

- I was personally horrified when I found out what was done after the destruction of this von Braun. To destroy Lieutenant General Georg von Braun, it was not my initiative, it was Khrushchev's personal initiative.

- How did you react to this?

- I told Khrushchev, among other things, that it is better to mine the grandiose bridge so as not to go through it later. But he showed perseverance. On November 3, 1941, he set me this task, but I considered it secondary and did not deal with it. Then, on November 12, he asks me how this house is. And I answer him: I have a lot of very important work, so I didn't get it. He looked askance at me. Once, he says, he is ordered to do it. He ordered me to mine his house.

The task was that there are many good mansions in Kharkov. This nice mansion may or may not be visited by a general. We will only waste a lot of explosives in vain, there will be nothing but harm for us. It was necessary to make sure that the one who was supposed to, the head of Kharkov, occupied this house. To do this, we did the following. We pretended to mine all the good mansions. We drove up there in cars, brought boxes of sand, I imitated that they brought tol. So that spies can report that all these mansions are mined. They mined, unloaded such a box and at the house where Khrushchev lived. But they just made such a trap. We planted two mines in this mansion. The first mine is 135 kilograms. A pile of coal, about 25 tons. And in this pile of coal there is a mine. The mine was supposed to explode for a month

in two, if it had not been touched. But if they start touching her, she should have exploded immediately. It was visibility. In fact, this mine had to be found by the enemy, and the enemy had to make sure that it did not explode just because the batteries were dead. And they sat down because they were drained of blood, as they say, because they put her in raw coal. And so the Germans were cackling, they say, there, they were glad that the Russians were fools, and their batteries were bad. The real mine that they needed to clear, in fact, could not be cleared. And yes, it was well hidden. They reported to the general, the general thanked, rewarded and discharged his wife. My wife did not have time to arrive, as we learned that he already lives there. Nikita gave the command, and on the night of November 14, in the morning, at the command from Voronezh, we blew up this house and at the same time a large headquarters, the headquarters building ... An additional 350 kg was laid, and there an additional 1080 kg was laid. We give signals at the same time. And, in our opinion, they should have exploded at the same time. But it was not possible to verify. The plane that flew to check, did not reach the place and was forced to turn back. I saw the results myself in August 1943. Instead of a headquarters building, there were bare walls with a hole, and instead of a mansion, there was a pool in which children swam.

- But after all, probably, they also shot many Kharkiv residents in retaliation?

- I was very interested and worried about this question. Approximately 3,000 people were shot for Cuba. Instead of Cuba, the German appointed a Gauleiter worse than before in Belarus. We only lost from it. In our case, the Germans were convinced that the perpetrators of the explosion were not local residents. And even the people living opposite were not shot. However, they shot the hostages, from those who were already destined for execution. Generally speaking, it's sad, but a lot of our people died, this general was not worth it.

- So these actions are quite problematic, right?

- These actions, in my opinion, are rather problematic. For example, intelligence officer Nikolai Kuznetsov. He killed two or three, became a hero of the Soviet Union. But in fact, a large number of Ukrainians were shot because of his actions, and now this is going sideways for us. In Spain, when we caught a German who fought on the side of the Nazis, we did not shoot him. We tried not to destroy the prisoners, but to decompose them. It cost us nothing, and brought much more benefit.

- That is, I believe that even a lofty goal does not justify worthless means, right?

- Yes. I have to tell a story from the Civil War. During the Civil War we transferred two British officers behind enemy lines. These officers fought alongside the White Guards. According to our calculations, they deserved to be shot for assisting the enemy and for bullying the Red Army soldiers. But on the orders of commander Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze they were not shot. They were fed and watered. And even if they themselves did not have enough, they were fed anyway. They were brought to the front line and at the first opportunity were thrown across the front line. In the rear of the enemy, the news of their execution would have brought us more harm. And so what benefit did they bring? Firstly, they themselves fell under the suspicion that they were recruited by the Reds, since we let them out. With their stories about our good treatment of prisoners, they corrupted the White Guards. And I will tell you that the French fleet rebelled thanks to our treatment of prisoners in this way. We did not shoot the French prisoners, but released them, they decomposed the troops, and said that the Bolsheviks were not such barbarians as they are said to be. And in the end, the French left without engaging in battle. And in Bavaria and Hungary, former prisoners of war, released by us, contributed to the formation of republics.

- Tell me, why did our minds lack such a mind during the Great Patriotic War?

- And I'll tell you a terrible thing: nothing helped the Germans to keep their troops in obedience, like Stalin's order of this nature: to destroy all the invaders to the last. We must destroy every single invader. And this leaflet in Russian and German was distributed widely by the Germans. And when I talked with the prisoners, the Germans, they were afraid and thought that since they were taken prisoner, they would definitely be shot.

Is that why they fought to the end?

- So they held on. They were sure that they would be shot. And the partisans shot. And I will tell you that we had cases so sad that it is better not to write about them. Saburov shot even the Slovaks, who fought first against the Germans, and then went over to the partisans. When there was a threat of encirclement, he took them and shot them.

- Why?

- Out of stupidity. In Spain, we have achieved such a situation that the enemy did not use repressions against the population at all. This is good. This helped us. It helped the enemy too, but it helped us more. We tried to make explosions where it was impossible to blame the population. We worked with other methods only where the population was pro-fascist. Then they shot. And we have been very successful in these areas.

- Ilya Grigoryevich, I remember one episode from your book. Your meeting with Mehlis. In 1941, when he told you that there was an order from Stalin to turn the Moscow region into a snowy desert. The enemy should stumble only on cold and ashes. This is an inhuman command.

- It's inhuman, it's a wild command. His text was scattered in millions of copies to partisan areas. They wrote: drive the German into the cold! And in fact...

- They drove the Russians into the cold?

- They drove the Russians. Our fools didn't understand... The Finns really drove the Russians out into the cold.

- But how?

- Very simple. The Finns in general, retreating, evacuated the entire population. There was no population. And the remaining houses, the most attractive ones, were mined. And after the explosion of several such houses, the houses stood, but no one occupied them, no one wanted to be killed by a mine.

- So why did we do everything the other way around? After all, burning villages, thereby doomed the local population to death?

- Yes Yes Yes. It was ... As a result, there were 18 thousand partisans in the Leningrad region, and after this order there were only three. In Ukraine, before the order, there were about 30,000 partisans, by the spring 4,000 remained.

- Why?

- But because the population went against it. The Germans say: save your villages. And people went to the police. I must say that the Germans in the police detachments had almost a million Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. Almost a million!

- Because of such stupid policy?

- Precisely because of such stupid policy.

- After all, it's a fact that Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya was seized by her own, local residents.

- Yes Yes.

- When she wanted to set fire to the barn.

- That is, they actually made a loss for themselves. And the population.

- You tell how you with great difficulty managed to save your future partisans from starvation?

- Yes. Hardly succeeded

- Which Stalin then shot before the war.

- Yes. By the way, I lost faith in Stalin when, after visiting the village, I wrote a memorandum about what was happening there, what a horror. For this, I was almost imprisoned. By the way, my letter to Stalin did not get through. And many of the authors of such letters disappeared.

- Tell me, how many times did you stand on the verge of death under Stalin?

- A lot of. So many. For the first time, I was on the verge of death when I arrived from Spain. If not for the blown up train with the headquarters of the aviation division, then I would have been shot.

- Were you considered an agent of Yakir, Tukhachevsky?

- Well, not necessarily Yakir's agent. I just worked with him for a long time. But since the collapse of this train made a great impression on Voroshilov and others, then ... I myself saw the photograph. Amazing impression. They really liked it...

- That is, Voroshilov saved you?

- Saved Voroshilov, yes.

- Ilya Grigoryevich, after all, Denis Davydov practically commanded a professional partisan army during the First Patriotic War?

- Exactly. Professional. And we proposed, and Stalin agreed with this. So he even said on September 5: we can win only by joint actions of partisans and troops. But he did nothing to make it happen. By the way, even Prince Golitsyn, in 1856, proposed to develop this idea of Denis Davydov, but it was not developed.

- And why did Stalin, knowing the experience of Denis Davydov, not accept the Frunze doctrine that each military unit should defend itself in an environment?

- This experience was used until 1926 - 1927. And everything stopped in 1933. In 1933, we already believed that the Red Army was the strongest of all, and we would fight on the territory of the aggressor.

- You are the organizer and strategist of the rail war in Belarus. What were the goals of this war...

- I was a categorical opponent of the rail war. And that's why I'm now a colonel - not a Hero, not a general. I got myself so many opponents that they were enough when writing history. This war brought colossal harm to us and brought great benefits to the Germans. Why. First. The Germans had no shortage of rails. The Germans in the occupied territory by May, when it was planned, had more than 11 million pieces of rails. They wanted to undermine 300 thousand in one month. But 300 thousand rails - it was only 4%, even less. But at the same time, the order did not say to undermine the rails on the main trunk tracks, which means it was possible on the spare, secondary, depot ones. That is, the sabotage was not aimed at interrupting, mainly, highways. Now Stalin spoke enthusiastically about the rail war, approved it and said that as a result of this war we could put the enemy in front of a catastrophe, because we would close all routes to sources of supply. But we thought, I, in particular, and among the big workers, such as Khrushchev, who agreed with me, we thought that this blow would be very small, and very large funds would be spent to undermine it. Why? Because the rails will be torn to score points, on the secondary tracks, where the partisans are the masters, there they will undermine the rails. An explosion on secondary tracks was equally valued with the main. Second. The Germans very quickly learned to eliminate the consequences of the explosions of these rails. They invented - the Germans are, after all, inventive people - they invented the rail bridge. Here is such a rail bridge, 80 cm, which was superimposed on the broken parts of the rail. The rails usually pierced only 30-35 cm during a train crash. And the gap was closed by this eighty-centimeter bridge. Trains were supplied with these bridges, and where they saw damaged rails, they laid them down and drove on. In general, what happened in August. In August, it was planned to blow up 300,000 rails. They blew up only 2014. But in August, train wrecks among Belarusians - I don't remember others, but about the same for others - the number of train wrecks among Belarusians in August decreased by more than 200. And the Belarusians themselves admit that a dozen wrecks trains are worth more than a hundred undermined rails. Because when a train crashes, not only the rail is undermined, but, most importantly, the rolling stock is disabled to some extent, and sometimes to a very strong extent. And makes trains slow down. This time. Second. Basically, the rails on secondary sidings were blown up. And so the German retreat began. It was very important for our troops to capture the railways in a whole state. And what worked. The Germans undermined the rails on the tracks they traveled on. They brought out the paths that our troops had to restore. The partisans also undermined the rails on the sidings. I remember there was a case when it was necessary to assemble rails at the Orsha station to restore the node. Kabanov, who later became the Minister of Railways, sends a "deck" to bring sidings from the Orsha-Apel stretch, on which the partisans had previously operated. This road was now in a liberated area. Imagine the surprise when they arrived in the evening and did not bring the rails. No rails, no arrows. The partisans so mutilated the rails that it made no sense to take them for restoration. This means that the partisans helped the Germans to impede the advance of our troops.

- What is republican Spain for you? How do you assess the struggle of the republican army today, the actions of the 14th corps. What did you manage to transfer from the experience of the First Patriotic War to Spain, what didn't work, and why didn't you succeed?

- I succeeded in what I overcame contrary to the directives of the Headquarters, contrary to the directives of Stalin. Stalin called for the creation of partisan detachments to set fire to forests. If I had come up with such an idea, I would have been called a provocateur. And I had to somehow avoid this issue so as not to be accused of either side. Because if we set fire to the forests, then there would be no partisan movement at all. And what would be left of Russia anyway?

- And the forests are the home of partisan detachments.

- Second. Stalin gave a directive that everything that could not be taken out - livestock, grain - everything should be destroyed during the withdrawal. If all this were done, then the population, 60 million, would have to perish. This was not done. And thanks to what was not done, the population could feed the partisans and even direct the carts. Here, carts to Leningrad. Otherwise, with scorched fields and forests, destroyed by cattle and grain, the entire population would have died, and in general there would have been no partisan movement.

- Ilya Grigorievich, you are a participant in three wars ...

- Four.

- Civil, Spanish...

- Finnish and...

- Which of the wars do you remember the most?

- All of them are memorable. Not a single war passed by. I can't even compare... The most offensive war, the pitiful war, is, of course, the Finnish one, when as a result of victory we were defeated. It was embarrassing. Another two weeks, and we would have fought on two fronts. In Finnish and in the Caucasus. And so is every war. Of course, the worst of all, for me was the first, the Civil War. Where it would be possible to somehow turn around - this is still the Great Patriotic War. Somehow, bypassing the regulations, taking risks ... The first one was very busy. I emerged from the first, Civil, War as a warrior. Because by the end I was already among the best team that dealt with barriers.

- Did you become a professional in subsequent wars?

- In the latter I acquired a specialty.

- What is the role of special units in these operations?

- The role of special units is colossal. If we had such special units as recommended by Frunze, for example, in 1925, as recommended by Denis Davydov and Prince Golitsyn, we would, of course, stop the Germans before approaching Moscow.

- In one of the interviews you said that the Wehrmacht could have been defeated back in 1943 year. What reasons prevented this?

- In 1943, we had 12,000 well-functioning and well-connected partisans. It would only be necessary for the state, Stalin, to provide them with explosives and set competent tasks, we, of course, could easily close enemy communications in 1943 and thereby deprive the enemy of the possibility of supply from the rear. They would have cut off the enemy troops at the front from their sources of supply, and without this he would not have been able to fight.

- Did Denis Davydov suggest this back in the First Patriotic War?

- Yes, what he proposed at the beginning of the war, we did in our time before 1931. Moreover, both wars show that preparation is needed at the front, and preparation is needed even more in the rear. Because at the front, the enemy is only ahead and in the sky. And here and behind, and in front, and in the sky, and on the side - from one and the other. Therefore, training must be very thorough and designed to be combined with the technique that makes it possible to destroy the enemy without entering into battle with him, without even entering into a combat collision. If you look, the most typical example. The Americans lost 30% of their manpower and 70% of their equipment in South Vietnam without engaging in battle. This is due precisely to the skillful use of partisan sabotage activities.

This is the biggest mistake. Second. They eliminated training in the army and did not target people so that they would not surrender, but would join the partisans. Here one tells: it was seen how entire columns fell behind enemy lines in order to surrender. And most of them died there. Meanwhile, they could move on to partisan actions, cut off the enemy. And they died.

- They said this: if one soldier remains from the company, then the company dies, but if partisan remains alone, then a whole unit is formed.

- Yes. There were also such examples. The most classic example is Ivan Harish, who went through France, Germany, Austria and, in fact, alone created a partisan detachment, a partisan formation, inflicted great damage on the enemy, and during the war he lost only 168 people, and he destroyed the enemy at least 2000. He blew up 168 trains, and in each train...

- Then I have a question: what is the role and significance of guerrilla warfare in the 19th and 20th centuries, that is, today.

- The role of guerrilla warfare is increasing with the growth of technology. After all, before the technique was, that the partisans, that in the troops. Shovel, crowbar, stick. And now the partisans have equipment that is very portable and can be controlled even by radio.

- You say that the partisans today have new equipment. What?

- What should I tell you? It is no secret for everyone that after the war, 20 years ago, we already had special institutions and institutions that manufactured new equipment. For example, a shaped charge specially for partisans. This made it possible to perform the same task with approximately 5-7 times less charge. Now magnetic mines, which were invented, unfortunately, not by us. At the end of the Second World War, they could be put on and taken off, and now they are already unremovable. It is placed, for example, on a car - on a gas tank, on a pipe, but it is no longer possible to remove it - it will explode. This also dramatically increases the capabilities of the partisans. Because earlier I found a mine, took it and took it off. Already in the last war, approximately more than half of the railway mines were laid non-removable. You could find them, but you couldn't extract them.

- **Now there is a movement to ban anti-personnel mines, mines in general. What is your assessment of these actions?**

- Anti-personnel mines, I would willingly removed. They are of little use in the war, and the harm to the population is colossal. They remain in the thousands. Suffice it to say that in the last war we used up about 40 million anti-personnel mines. And on these mines we did not beat even 400 thousand Germans.

- **Because the civilian population exploded?**

- They were put, left and forgotten. Then their own people follow them and suffer heavy losses. Therefore, in order not to inflict damage on the civilian population, anti-personnel mines, of course, must be removed.

- **Ilya Grigoryevich, can you be called the number one partisan of the 20th century? Wouldn't that be a big mistake?**

- I think it will be strong. Because there were heroic partisans, very strong, but who did not manage to make it until 1999. I just got lucky. And so, I think, Medvedev Nikolai Arkhipovich is the strongest partisan, and finally, Kvitinsky.

- **Well, okay. Do you feel like a representative of the entire partisan movement in Russia?**

- Unfortunately no.

- **Why?**

- Because I could not cover the entire partisan movement in view of the fact that we did not have it, unfortunately, centralized.

- **But you did everything in your life to make it happen?**

- I did everything, risked, but could not. And as a result, he remained, as they say, with a bag. Because at the head of the partisan movement was put a smart, reasonable, intelligent man, but who loved the authorities more than himself.

- **And more than Russia?**

- Probably more. And he believed that you can risk people in order to achieve your goals.

- **Do you mean Stalin?**

- Stalin. This was established by Stalin. He introduced privileges, created a caste of untouchables leaders, and here we have the result.

- **You want to say that we are now reaping the fruits of the Stalinist sowing?**

- Absolutely right. Absolutely. Very good expression, I didn't think of it. Absolutely correct.

- **And if you put it in your professional language, in the language of a miner, how can you assess the current situation?**

- We're committed. And the people did not realize this betrayal.

- **So you were talking about a time bomb?**

- We can't defuse a time bomb. There are many of them.

- **Ilya Grigorievich, so what do we have now?**

- We are reaping the sowing of time bombs planted by Stalin.

- **Why?**

- Because we can't neutralize them until now. He managed to tear the performers away from the leaders, and therefore we are used to voting, not choosing, used to believe and wait for them to fall on the rails, instead of dealing with those who make such promises.

- **Nevertheless, they do not fall on the rails, although they promise.**

- Do not lie on the rails. And faith in these promises is our very impoverishment.

PART 3. REFLECTIONS

99 years through all obstacles

Giving, breathing deeply is not
only the conscience, the soul
And the mind flies high in me At
the height God needs. Sergei

Shilo.

Introduction.

When my books of memoirs came out in 1997-1999, and especially after my 98th birthday, I received many questions. The first question was "why, having been awarded the orders of Lenin, 5 orders of the Red Banner, 3 other orders of the USSR, as well as the Order of Czechoslovakia named after Egorov, having served in the army for over 3 years in general positions and having completed a number of brilliant operations, remained in the rank of colonel.

The second question: how can you explain the fact that you managed to live up to 99 years old, while maintaining a memory and working capacity that even young people can envy?

Third question: what are my most impressive positive and negative occasions of life?

And in this post I will try to answer these questions.

My happiness is that I remained a colonel. Spain saved me.

Returning in November 1937 from Spain to Leningrad and entering the military commandant's office of the Leningrad-Moskovsky station, the place of my last service, I was stunned. The entire composition of the commandant's office was repressed, with the exception of the clerk, for their connection with the enemies of the people, for the fact that the military commandant of the station, Boris Ivanovich Filippov, received the Order of the Red Star on the proposal of the head of military communications of the Red Army, General Apoga, who was allegedly in the group of enemies of the people. I was Boris Ivanovich's deputy, and if I had not been in Spain, I would have been repressed along with his assistants. Since then, I began to sleep in warm underwear.

When I returned to Moscow, I was received by the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, General S.G. Gendin. He congratulated me on my return and receiving the Order of Lenin and the Red Star, which were presented to me by M.I. Kalinin, and introduced me to Marshal Voroshilov, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Kliment Efremovich expressed his admiration for my deeds: the explosion of the train with the headquarters of the Italian aviation division, the explosion of the train in the tunnel, and other deeds and instructed Gendin to present me for further awards. Gendin introduced me to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, but he himself was soon arrested, as a result, I stayed at the Balchuk Hotel and continued to sleep in warm underwear. 14th partisan corps. Then they stopped letting me into the GRU.

In Moscow, I found a colleague, Pyotr Nikolaevich Monakhov, with whom I served 8 years in the Korosten railway regiment. He, having learned that I worked abroad, provided:

- Ilyusha, you worked abroad, and I have children. I didn't visit him again.

At the beginning of February 1938, I was invited to the Lubyanka and offered to write everything about my work with Yakir and Berzin. Stunned, I left the house on Lubyanka. For a long time I could not come to my senses. What to do? I decided to try to get an appointment with Voroshilov, because only he could save me. And I was not mistaken. I was lucky that I, along with my son A.D. Tsyurupy was returning on a ship from Spain, and he was friends with Voroshilov's son. He gave me the direct telephone number of Kliment Efremovich. I called him, told him about what they asked me at the Lubyanka and asked him to receive me. The meeting took place and I heard the following conversation with Yezhov:

- Hello, Nikolai Ivanovich. I have a certain Starinov who recently arrived from Spain. He was interrogated about the fulfillment of the tasks of Yakir and Berzin in preparing gangs and laying weapons for them.

Pause. An unnaturally thin talk is heard in the receiver.

Voroshilov says again:

- Certainly. He carried out the tasks of the enemies of the people, but he was a small man, he could not know the essence of the matter.

Another pause. And again the marshal says:

- But he distinguished himself in Spain to a large extent atoned for his guilt. Leave him alone, we will take appropriate measures ourselves. (This whole conversation was recorded in my memoirs in agreement with K. Voroshilov in 1963 at his dacha).

This was followed by an order to award me the rank of colonel and the appointment of the head of the Central Scientific and Testing Railway Test Site near the Gorokhovets station in the Gorky region. According to the state, this position was supposed to be a general.

Before leaving for a new place of service, I was to be treated in Kislovodsk, and I decided to bring my things to an old acquaintance, Yevsey Karpovich Afonko, with whom, back in 1926-1930, I was preparing border sections of Ukraine for the barrier. Now he worked at the Metrostroy and was not afraid that I had returned from abroad. I left with him the radio, typewriter and other things that I had bought in Paris.

Returning from the resort, I learned that Afonko was repressed, but my things survived.

I didn't have much luck on the field. At the end of November 1938, several motor vehicles and cranes were defrosted due to the oversight of my subordinates, and I and they could be accused of sabotage. But Commissar Denisov and I managed to find a person who fixed everything. Everything worked out.

In the autumn of 1939, they began to accuse me of giving a positive assessment of Barkar's invention, which was being tested at our training ground, and by that time had been arrested. Fortunately, in November I was called to Moscow, from where I left for Leningrad as the head of the operational-engineering group for demining railways on the Karelian Isthmus as they were liberated by the Red Army troops. During the war with Finland in January 1940, I was seriously wounded in my right hand. He was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner, which by that time had been awarded to 236 people.

When I was discharged from the hospital, I was issued a certificate of unfitness for military service with deregistration, but I did not show this certificate to anyone until 1999, when I registered my disability of the 2nd group. With my hand bandaged, I returned to the training ground and, with the consent of the chief of communications of the Red Army, began to fulfill my duties. The arm needed further treatment as the bones had healed and broken nerves had caused it to become paralyzed. I was helped by the head of the engineering troops of the Red Army, General A.F. Khrenov, who invited me to work as the head of the department of mining and obstacles in the Main Directorate of Engineering Troops of the Red Army. This gave me the opportunity to continue the treatment of the arm - to stitch the torn nerves and remove it from the bandage, but it was not possible to completely restore the arm.

The Great Patriotic War found me on a business trip at the exercises of the troops of the Belarusian Military District, which were to begin on June 22 near Brest, but, fortunately, I was with Z.I. Kolesnikov - deputy head of the combat training department of the SMI, we only reached Kobrin (this is approximately 40 km from Brest) and stayed overnight there.

On June 24 we returned to Moscow. On June 26, I was appointed chief of the operational engineering group of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief on the Western Front, at whose disposal 3 sapper battalions and a very small amount of mine-explosive weapons were given. Before leaving we were received by People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Timoshenko. On his behalf, we received broad powers to destroy various objects in front of the advancing enemy. Information about the routes of our groups, about the deployment of the headquarters of the fronts and armies operating in the directions where it was supposed to use mine-explosive barriers and the destruction of various objects, we received from the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Major General G.N. Malandin, who warned that we were covering the Moscow strategic direction, and if important bridges were not blown up during the withdrawal of our troops, or if they were blown up before the withdrawal of the troops, then we would be shot. Then we were handed a mandate signed by the people's commissar of defense.

Behind Vyazma, near the bridge over the Dnieper, I presented my mandate to the head of the bridge guard and announced that the bridge should be prepared for destruction. Before I had time to finish this, we were surrounded and disarmed. The head of security contemptuously threw!

- Poorly your hosts work? They do not even know to whom the protection of bridges is subordinated. Now you're covered, you fascist bastard. Turns out the boss is right! The protection of bridges was transferred to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, and our mandates were signed by the People's Commissar of Defense. We were taken to the district branch of the NKD, it took a lot of time to find out and control of our battalions was lost. Very important bridges across the Berezina River at Station 24

Borisovo went to the enemy intact. Mekhlis called me to the headquarters of the front, an unpleasant conversation took place, which ended only with the appearance of German aircraft. He went into hiding.

The group then proceeded successfully.

In mid-September I received an order to urgently return to Moscow. My boss M.A. Nagorny ordered to engage in barriers near Moscow, and for several days I took part in the formation of new units, went to defensive lines - around the capital, even flew around them, figuring out where and how to strengthen the barriers.

At the end of September, I was appointed head of a special operational engineering group to assist the troops of the South-Western Front in the defense of the Kharkov region. Late at night, Kotlyar was received by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal V. Shaposhnikov. Having outlined the situation on the Southwestern Front, he asked me:

Do you remember Operation Alberich?

Of course, I knew this operation well: military historians considered it the most significant on mass destruction and mining.

- So, - continued Shaposhnikov, - it will be necessary to destroy and mine in the Kharkov region on a much larger area, and I cannot guarantee five weeks for work. You will have to act quickly.

On September 29, I left for Kharkov together with a small group of specialists. The task was completed, despite all the hardships, and on October 24 the enemy occupied Kharkov.

On November 10, our group had to drink a thicket of bitterness: intelligence delivered a copy of the order of the German command dated November 8, 1941 to the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. The order reported that during the offensive of the "valiant troops of the Fuhrer" on Kharkov and in Kharkov itself, Russian engineering mines were found in large numbers and among them - delayed-action mines with clock locks and electrochemical fuses. The inept placement and camouflage of the mines enabled the experienced Reich sappers to quickly detect and neutralize them."

In fact, they did not deactivate a single non-retrievable delayed-action mine and the mines continued to explode for a long time, but this was established only after the liberation of Kharkov in 1943.

A copy of the said order, translated into Russian, was delivered to me with an accompanying note written in an unfamiliar but energetic handwriting: "These easily detectable and neutralized mines were installed under the direction of Colonel I. G. Starinov."

I did not have time to give an explanation. To the Military Council of the front, where to point out the moments that clearly indicate that the order of the fascist command is a fake, as new news came: German sappers removed a particularly difficult mine from the basement of house No. 17 on Dzerzhinsky Street in Kharkov and now the head of the garrison, Lieutenant General, is located in the house Georg von Braun.

My nerves were tense, I lived for two days as if I myself were on an unrecoverable mine. November 13 N.S. Khrushchev instructed to explode the radio mines in Kharkov, and on November 14 we carried it out by sending early in the morning radio signals from the Voronezh radio station. On the afternoon of November 14, an aircraft sent for reconnaissance photographed the districts of Kharkov that were of interest to the Military Council. The pictures confirmed that some of the radio mines had exploded with great effect. Unfortunately, the area of Dzerzhinsky Street was not captured by the camera lens and I saw the result of the explosion of Khrushchev's mansion only after the liberation of Kharkov, in August 1943, and I learned about the results of the operation "Trap" only after the end of the war, but I was no longer in the engineering troops. Moreover, after the war, I saw photographs of the destruction of a number of objects in the Kharkov Museum, including the Khrushchev mansion, the headquarters of the Ukrainian military district, allegedly destroyed by underground partisans. This falsification was done by the former secretary of the Kharkov Regional Party Committee A.A. Epishev. The truth was restored only on February 6, 1963, after the publication of an article by Ovid Gorchakov in Izvestia. And a couple of years later, the film "The Story of an Idea" was created about the operation "Trap". It has been shown on TV many times.

In June 1943, Khrushchev called me and showed me a letter from the head of the engineering troops, Nazarov, in which it was written that during the German offensive on Rostov, the enemy easily overcame the defensive lines on the distant approaches. Minefields were made under the leadership of Colonel Starinov. Nikita Sergeevich asked me what I could say about this letter. It angered me, but didn't discourage me. I answered:

- Indeed, in January-February 1942, I participated in the construction of these barriers together with Major Zhurin, head of the engineering troops of the 56th Army. We had very few anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. I organized their production in Rostov, Novocherkassk and Akai. We finished work on minefields in early March, and I left for Moscow. In connection with the melting of snow, the mines were on the surface and the sappers of the 56th Army, under the leadership of Major Zhurin, did a great job of masking the mines. This must have been noticed by the Germans. When the attack on Rostov began, Major Zhurin was engaged in minefields, and I had nothing to do with them. Moreover, the commander of the 56th Army, General Tsyganov, when meeting with him in 1942, noted the exceptional importance of the "Ice Campaigns" through the freezing Taganrog Bay. These ice campaigns organized by our group contributed to the fact that the Germans did not invade the Kuban in the winter of 1942.

Khrushchev listened attentively to me, smiled and said:

- Clear. Tomorrow we will fly together to the front.

And together with Khrushchev and Strokach I flew to the Voronezh front. For five days we got acquainted with the state of minefields on the Kursk salient. I was convinced that in the event of an offensive by enemy troops, he would not be able to use railways and roads in the territory he occupied, since a lot of work had been done to install barriers on them. They came back together again. After a few minutes of flight, the right engine caught fire. An emergency landing was made and we moved to another. Khrushchev behaved calmly.

The greatest danger for me was my activity in the field of partisan warfare, when I had to speak out against the chief of staff of the partisan movement P.K. Ponomarenko, defending Lenin's position that "partisan action is not revenge, but military actions." As a result, we developed a very difficult relationship. They became especially dangerous for me after I reacted negatively to the idea of a "rail war" proposed by Ponomarenko and approved by Stalin.

That's how it was.

At the beginning of July 1941, at the headquarters of the Western Front, I met with Voroshilov, who asked if I was training partisans and promised to call and connect me on this matter.

On July 11, I met a group of artillery captain Vasiliev, who had left the rear of the enemy, and immediately I remembered the position of Denis Davydov and Mikhail Frunze on the significance and our capabilities to conduct partisan operations.

There was no call from Voroshilov, and I went to the representative of the Stavka, army commissar of the 1st rank, 3.L., who was at the front headquarters. Mehlis. He received me and listened to my proposals on guerrilla warfare. I explained how important, continuously growing importance is the mining of railways in the rear of the German troops, that sabotage on enemy communications will require much less forces and means than their bombardment, that the enemy will not have enough forces to reliably protect communications. Mehlis did nothing. Then I turned to a member of the Military Council of the front, P.K. Ponomarenko and showed him two samples of PMS and KZ anti-train mines made by me in the field - a wheel lock.

Ponomarenko asked me to immediately submit a note addressed to the People's Commissar of Defense and a draft NPO order on the organization of an operational training center for the Western Front and its staff. The next day they were signed by Marshal Timoshenko, who, while remaining People's Commissar of Defense, took command of the Western Front. Thus, on July 13, an operational training center was created - the OTC of the Western Front. I was appointed head of it.

The task of the OTC included: preparation, logistics and transfer to the rear of the enemy partisan formations.

I began my activity with the training of instructors from the officers of the border guards assigned to me and from the most literate people who wanted to fight the enemy in his rear. I managed to do this within two weeks and at the same time, contrary to my desire, border guard officers transferred sabotage groups and partisan detachments to the rear of the enemy without proper training at the direction of the Central Committee of the Party of Belarus.

At the end of August 1942, at the request of Khrushchev, Ponomarenko sent me to Kyiv to train a group of instructors there, which I did in five days. But I did not find a single partisan trained by us before the war in Kyiv. When I presented the list of partisans prepared by me before the war to the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Burmistrenko M.D., he did not find anyone either.

In November 1941, Ponomarenko presented a report on the work of the OEC for four months and a letter addressed to I.V. Stalin, in which he proved on the basis of my Spanish experience and the first

reports of partisan commanders who returned from the rear, the need to organize extensive systematic sabotage work and proposed the necessary measures for this. I showed that a tank battalion - a formidable force on the battlefield - is completely helpless in echelon and can be destroyed even by two saboteurs. Planned mass sabotage can close the traffic on the railways and night traffic on the roads. This will force the enemy to withdraw dozens of divisions from the front to guard communications, which will make it difficult to carry out sabotage, but will not rule it out. I proposed to create one sabotage brigade on each front and widely train aces-saboteurs.

Ponomarenko did not object to the content of my letter, but offered to send it to Comrade Stalin on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party of Belarus. For reliability. I agreed. This letter was written and sent. However, as I later found out, it was heavily edited: it did not contain the expressions I cited that partisan actions were not revenge, but military operations; that the main goal of guerrilla warfare is to cut off enemy troops from a source of supply; about the need to train aces-saboteurs. Moreover, it was proposed to move from the lengthy training of individuals or groups of "classic saboteurs" to a widely organized, planned mass sabotage work. But, as the experience of the guerrilla war in Spain showed, this could only be achieved if there were a sufficient number of classic saboteurs.

In his works, Ponomarenko writes that he wrote this letter on the basis of the experience gained as a result of three months of partisan struggle. In fact, my letter, which was used by Poyemarenko, was written on the basis of the experience of guerrilla warfare in Spain.

In December 1941, Stalin summoned Ponomarenko. A two-hour conversation took place on the development and leadership of the partisan movement. Stalin pointed out that it is necessary to orient the partisans so that they solve their problems, capturing trophies, collecting weapons and ammunition abandoned by the retreating troops on the battlefields. True, it was noted that, as far as possible, the supply of partisans from the center would expand, but this route could not yet become the main one, mainly due to a shortage of aircraft.

Stalin and Ponomarenko spoke out against special formations for their transfer to the rear of the enemy. Instead, Stalin invited Ponomarenko to start organizing the central headquarters of the partisan movement at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander and head this headquarters.

From the first day of the work of the TsShPD, his efforts were directed at organizing communications with partisan detachments. For this, a radio school was created. After the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, Stalin ordered to stop work on the formation of the headquarters of the partisan movement, and the central radio school was transferred to the budget of the Council of People's Commissars of Belarus.

In the spring of 1942, a powerful German offensive began in the south. As a result, on May 30, the GKO decided: in order to unite the leadership of the partisan movement behind enemy lines and for its further development, create a central headquarters of the partisan movement (TSSHPD) at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, as well as form the Ukrainian, Bryansk, Western, Kalinin, Leningrad and Karelo-Finnish headquarters of the partisan movement. Subsequently: other headquarters were created. P. Ponomarenko was appointed head of the TsSHPD.

At the end of August, I was urgently summoned to Moscow by the Deputy Minister of Defense, General Ye.A. Shchadenko. and, contrary to my objections, he ordered me to appear at the disposal of the head of the TsShPD without surrendering command of the fifth separate engineering brigade.

Ponomarenko appointed me the head of the technical department of the TsSHPD and agreed with me about the formation of a higher operational school using a group of Spaniards.

On September 6, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement was established, headed by K.E. Voroshilov.

On September 8, at the suggestion of Voroshilov, I was appointed assistant to the head of the TsShPD for sabotage. Voroshilov, having experience in guerrilla warfare, did a great job of logistical support for the partisans.

Back in early August 1942, the commissar of the fifth separate engineering brigade A.I. Bolotov wrote a letter to I.V. Stalin and substantiated the need for the urgent creation of sabotage brigades. We were supported by the Commander of the Kalinin Front I.S. Konev. The letter came across to Voroshilov. Learning about this, Konev sent us to him. Voroshilov received us in the presence of M.I. Kalinin. They fully agreed with our proposal. Voroshilov called Malenkov's assistant, who received us. Malenkov read the letter and ordered to appear together with the head of the engineering troops of the Red Army with a plan to create such troops. The next day we came to Malenkov with such a plan. He got to know him and called Vasilevsky, the chief of the General Staff, to receive us and tell him that the GKO would approve our proposal.

Vasilevsky read our proposals, asked how we would transfer these brigades behind enemy lines. We answered that mainly through the front line and by air. Experience ground transfer - we already have. He didn't ask any other questions. But instead of brigades, separate battalions of miners were created without the radio communications they needed. But they, despite this, successfully operated behind enemy lines. However, no centralized leadership was created by them.

In October 1942, Voroshilov, chief. Sivkov and I signed a letter to I.V. Stalin on the need for the militarization of partisan forces behind enemy lines, the creation of large formations up to divisions and corps. General Sivkov was at Vasilevsky's, he objected. The head of the TsSHPD categorically objected. I was at the reception of Malenkov, he did not decide anything. And in November 1942, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement was abolished, allegedly due to excessive centralization, and also because it is better to lead the partisan movement than to command.

On March 7, 1943, the TsSHPD was liquidated and partisan formations operated independently behind enemy lines, led by the peripheral headquarters of the partisan movement, the intelligence agencies of the Red Army, the NKD, and guards miners. This sometimes led to the fact that some partisans recruited scouts in enemy-controlled territory, while others destroyed them.

On April 17, 1943, the TsSHPD was again restored, but the Ukrainian headquarters remained subordinate to the Headquarters. The TsSHPD was finally abolished on January 14, 1944, when the guerrilla war was in full swing.

Our disagreement with P.K. Ponomarenko, and later with Marshal Golikov.

Disagreements with Ponomarenko began from the very first day I took office as head of the operational training center of the Western Front. In this position, I proposed to suspend the transfer of partisan formations to the rear of the enemy without proper preparation and without the necessary sabotage means. Ponomarenko ordered the training of saboteurs to be limited to 7-10 days and not to get involved in the training of, as he called, classic saboteurs. Ponomarenko rejected my proposals to create a special body to lead the partisan forces, to plan their actions and provide them with comprehensive support and ordered me to be guided by the directive of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of July 18, 1941. He believed that the partisans should be led by underground party bodies and argued that the centralized control of the actions of the partisans would lead to the fact that these plans would hang in the air, since by the time they were executed the enemy would be in a different place. Instead of creating large partisan formations up to divisions and corps, Ponomarenko argued, and this was recorded in the draft field manual of 1943, that the main unit of partisan forces is a separate independent partisan detachment.

However, experience later showed that large partisan formations, up to partisan divisions, such as the S.A. formation, became the main force. Kovpak, A.F. Fedorov, M. Naumov, Grishin and others.

Ponomarenko believed that trophies were the main source of supply for partisans. But I thought that the partisans should be supplied with everything necessary from the rear of the Red Army, since they are an integral part of the Armed Forces. Force. Today we know that the trophies did not provide even 5% of the needs of the partisans.

I did not agree with the Stalinist directive "drive the Germans into the cold", since the population suffered more than the Germans from this, and this led to a sharp decrease in the number of partisans and an increase in the number of policemen. However, this still somehow forgave me.

But the most dangerous thing for me was my sharply negative attitude towards the "rail war", which Ponomarenko praised, and which historians still praise. In 1986, the academic publishing house published a book by P.K. Ponomarenko "National struggle in the rear of the Nazi invaders 1941-1945."

In this book, the author argued that the "rail war" took place in full in accordance with the "plans of the Soviet military command".

"Based on the experience of rail strikes by partisans in 1942 and the first half of 1943, the TsSHPD began in June 1943 to develop the first general operation of the "rail war". This plan was based on the following premises.

The partisan movement by this time was already so powerful that the partisan brigades were near the most important railway detachments and communications of the enemy.

"The partisan movement was completely manageable. The existing radio communication network provided operational guidance and made it possible to organize coordinated strikes by large partisan forces against certain enemy targets at a set time."

"Undermining the rails was not difficult and it was possible to teach people how to make such explosions in the shortest possible time. The air transport capabilities of the TsSHPD made it possible to supply partisan brigades and detachments with the amount of explosives and detonators necessary for rail strikes."

"Partisans will be able to repeat strikes, increase the disorganization of transport and put the enemy in front of a catastrophic lack of rails."

On June 24, 1943, the plan of the "Rail War" was discussed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus and adopted a resolution "On the destruction of the enemy's railway communications by the method of "Rail War".

"By July 9, 1943, the TsSHPD completed the development of a detailed plan for the first strike of a rail war, and now it was required to report it to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and obtain approval and the necessary assistance measures."

"To do this, from July 12 not September 1, it is necessary to make 400 sorties."

According to preliminary estimates of the TsSHPD, the partisans needed to deliver 200-250 tons of explosives. In addition, it was taken into account that many sections of the railways would be taken from battle, so the partisans should have been provided with ammunition and medicines.

The first simultaneous strike of the operation "rail war" TsSHPD planned to carry out in the first days of August. At this time, the withdrawal of the 2nd German Panzer Army from the battle area on the Kursk Bulge was supposed.

"JV Stalin recommended starting the operation a little earlier. This would have an impact on the emerging "situation in the front-line rear of the 2nd Panzer Army and would not contradict the general task of the operation."

"The Supreme Commander-in-Chief assessed these interactions between partisans and the Red Army as the first major, jointly developed strategic operation to defeat the enemy."

"Having received the approval of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the TsShPD issued an order on July 14, 1945. "On the partisan "rail war" on enemy communications".

"Partisan formations and detachments stationed in the areas of railways were ordered:" Simultaneously with other sabotage, carry out systematic and widespread destruction of rails on the main highways, spare, access auxiliary, depot tracks, "destroy spare rails" excluding the possibility for the enemy of altering and maneuvering rails".

"The order said:" TsSHPD warns partisans and partisans, command and political staff of detachments and brigades that this operation is of exceptional importance, can frustrate all the plans of the enemy, put him in a catastrophic situation.

"Dedicated aviation units ... brilliantly coped with the task and delivered the necessary supplies of combat supplies by the beginning of the operation ..."

"The first blows of the rail war on the night of July 22, 1943 were delivered by the Oryol partisans, who, as was due to the Headquarters, had previously planned a general operation."

... "5133 rails were blown up in eight sections in one night."

"In the following days, the Oryol and Bryansk partisans continued to strike ... and to At the beginning of the general operation, 9526 rails were blown up.

On August 3, 1943, the general operation "rail war" began, when partisan detachments and formations dealt the first massive blow to the railways.

"The operation began simultaneously on a front of 1000 km and covered the entire rear of the German fascist troops from the front line to the western border of the USSR.

Further, Ponomarenko cites a table from which it can be seen that the Ukrainian partisans did not actually take part in this rail war. During the first stage, the partisans of Ukraine had to blow up 80,000 rails, they only blew up 7,100.

In the second, they blew up 620 pieces and they were no longer included in the plans for the rail war. IN this is my merit and at the same time it put me over the cliff into the abyss.

I managed to prove the harmfulness of the plan developed by the TsTSSHD for the troops of the Red Army to the head of the TsShPD, General T.A. Strokach and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine N.S.

Khrushchev. They actually agreed with me and the Ukrainian partisans actually did not participate in this war. I gave them the following reasons:

1. We don't have enough explosives to crash trains.
2. On enemy-controlled territory. The USSR has over 10 million rails and it removes them from sections it does not need and takes them to Germany for remelting. At the same time, the Germans are experiencing an acute shortage of steam locomotives and are forced to produce them by reducing the production of tanks.
- 3.. The establishment of an order recommending the destruction of rails not only on highways, but also on sidings, is useful not to the Red Army, but to the enemy, especially when he retreats. It is clear, after all, that during the withdrawal the enemy will destroy the rails on the highways, and the rest of the tracks will be undermined by the partisans, and the advancing units of the Red Army will have nothing to restore the roads destroyed by the enemy.
4. The effectiveness of explosives, which the partisans do not have enough to crash trains, is ten times higher than when blowing up rails, since when a train crashes, the damage inflicted on the enemy is hundreds of times greater than that inflicted on rolling stock and transported cargo .

N.S. Khrushchev listened to my assessment of the rail war and was very sad: "Yes, I agree," but the whole trouble lies in. that the plan for the "rail war" was approved by Joseph Vissarionovich. If. we will be given additional explosives specially allocated for this operation, then we will have to participate without making any adjustments to the "rail war" plan approved by Stalin.

For this purpose, we were supplied with only two tons of explosives, although we needed 32 tons to fulfill the plan to blow up 88,000 rails.

As experience later showed, the partisans became convinced that the massive undermining of the rails caused an almost complete cessation of train traffic on many highways only in the first 5-6 days, then the protection of the highways was strengthened and the partisans began to undermine sections unnecessary for the enemy. To restore movement, the Germans began to use welding of undermined rails, used special linings for docking, and then they began to use 80-centimeter long rupture pads.

Shortly after the start of the rail operation, it was found that 100-gram thick checkers specially made for this operation, which showed themselves well in tests, in many cases left a hole or spot on the rails during the explosion.

During the operation of the rail war for 1.5 months, Soviet partisans blew up 24,705 rails, not at the same time in July, 743 train wrecks were made by Belarusian partisans, and in August, at the height of the "rail war", they blew up only 467 trains. It became clear to the partisans that "rail warfare" was less effective than train wrecks, and they drastically reduced the number of rail blasts and increased the number of train blasts, and were blowing up about 800 trains a month thereafter. The postings can go on.

My negative attitude towards the rail war made Ponomarenko my enemy. He turned against me the head of the main personnel department, General F.M. Golikov. It should be noted that before the start of the rail war, Ponomarenko tried in every possible way to bring me closer to him, to the point that he took me as his assistant in sabotage and at the same time appointed the head of the technical department of the TsSHPD, while retaining my position as head of the Higher Operational School for Special Purposes, - general position.

As a result of the mess with the headquarters of the partisan movement, in May 1943 I became deputy head of the Ukrainian broadband for sabotage under the leadership of T.A. Strokach.

In early May, in Moscow, I met with Ponomarenko. We were talking about how to cut off the enemy troops from the sources of supply, and he suggested doing this by blowing up 800,000 rails in a month. I remained true to my opinion that this can only be done by derailing trains. He wanted me to take part in the development of the "rail war" operation. He did not listen to my objections, and we parted coldly. I didn't meet him again. In his book on partisan struggle, he does not write a word about me. Moreover, his negative attitude towards me was reflected in the report of the central headquarters, where my work is assessed negatively. In addition, many documents with my proposals were missing. So, not a word was mentioned about the operational training center of the Western Front, which trained about 1600 people and transferred over 300 of them across the front line. Only the report noted that PMS mines were the most widely used among that PMS instant and delayed guerrillas, but maybe this is because he might not have known the actions invented by me.

In June 1942, I was shocked by the news about the explosion of an aircraft at the Vnukovo airfield with mine-explosive equipment sent to the partisans. As Deputy USHPD for

sabotage; I, stunned, flew to Moscow. By this time, there were the following versions of the explosion: the presence in the transported goods of such means that could explode during transportation due to poor packaging; that it could be a sabotage; I posted a new version.

At this time, I received another terrible news: three Spaniards disappeared from our school, including Salvador Campillo, a participant in "ice campaigns" and partisan actions in the North Caucasus. Campillo was involved in the packaging of mine-explosives sent to the partisans. As a result, Strokach decided to send the Spaniards out of the school. I managed to negotiate with A.P. Sudoplatov, who had at his disposal a separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes (OMSBON), which was essentially an operational training center for the preparation and transfer of partisans behind enemy lines along the NKD line, so that he would take the Spaniards to him. This saved me and Sudoplatov. But after the arrest of Beria, Sudoplatov was also arrested. He was threatened with execution, but Dolores Ibaruri turned to Khrushchev and asked to mitigate the punishment in gratitude for saving the Spaniards. Sudoplatov was given 15 years.

And the plane, as it was established by the investigation, exploded because there were additional tanks of gasoline on board, which were not removed from the plane in the morning, and in the afternoon the gasoline evaporated and exploded.

Later it was also established about the Spaniards: it turned out that Campillo and his friends decided to go to Spain and fight the Nazis there. They were already detained in Tehran and sentenced to 10 years.

In 1964, my book of memoirs "Mines are waiting in the wings" was prepared for publication, but after the fall of Khrushchev, as many as 8 printed sheets were withdrawn from it. In 1965 Voenizdat terminated the contract with me for the publication of the second book. In the same year, the magazine "Rise" stopped the publication of this book, which they had undertaken earlier.

I felt that the leaders who came to power would not admit the truth about Khrushchev's contribution to the war behind enemy lines and my attitude to the "rail war". I fell into disgrace. This was facilitated by the fact that in September-November 1944, as the head of the USSR military mission under the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, I worked together with Tito.

All this led to the fact that I could not defend my doctoral dissertation, and only in 1988 my second book of memoirs "Go Invisible" was published, although again in a sharply reduced form. All of the above led to the fact that I remained a colonel, and for the 62nd year I have been holding this title with honor.

And now about my longevity.

I'm in my hundredth year. I can still walk around the apartment a little, but for now not complaining. The only bad thing is that the eyesight is poor.

In 1927, the doctor of medicine Guberlis, who treated me for rheumatic heart disease, told me not to despair that with proper treatment and behavior I could live more than 50 years. And lived.

Now, analyzing my whole life, I can say how I lived to the hundredth year.

I was the first child in the family. When I was born my mother was a little under twenty, my father a little more. However, my parents did not become centenarians. Mother died 38, father - 54 children. Nor were their parents long-lived. I don't know them.

My childhood was difficult. The family consisted of 8 people, and they all lived in one room, slept on bunk beds. In the summer they ran barefoot, wearing clothes one after another. Since the age of 8, I have already started earning money, picking mushrooms and berries and selling them at the market with my mother. From the age of 12, I already worked as a watchman on a peat machine, maintaining a fire in it. I studied then at an elementary school, in Zavidovo, where I traveled by train, getting up at five in the morning.

I started swimming in the pond very early and bathed until late autumn, and in the winter I wiped myself with a wet towel in the morning. In cold water he fished with a net. At an early age he began to go in for sports, skating and skiing. When I was 9 years old, my father burned a pouch and stopped smoking. I never saw him drunk and there was no vodka in our house.

Before the first wound since 1919, I had never been to the doctor. The wound was light, but at the front first aid is not immediately available, I have gangrene. The question arose about removing the right leg to the knee. But, fortunately, I was cured and my leg was saved.

During the civil war, I there were difficult experiences: captivity and escape from captivity.

In 1924 I was in a sanatorium in Essentuki - treated the stomach. A year later, I cured him, following the instructions of the doctors, with appropriate nutrition.

In 1927, while performing work to save the bridge during the ice drift, I found myself in icy water, and being in wet clothes, I caught a greasy cold. After that, I fell ill with rheumatism, and ended up in the hospital. All joints and heart were affected. Stayed 7 months

and when he was discharged from the hospital, he barely made it to the cab driver. Arriving in the regiment, he entered into the performance of his duties as a company commander, with difficulty reaching the barracks.

In the hospital, I drank a huge amount of drugs, especially salicylic acid. Thanks to this, and such good nutrition, I was cured, but my heart defect remained. For health reasons, I was subject to dismissal, but the command of the regiment left me in the service.

In 1928, I tried to enter the military engineering academy, but failed the exam. Entered in 1930 immediately for the second year in the military transport academy and in 1935 he graduated with honors.

In 1936 - 1937, he participated in the guerrilla war in Spain as an adviser, preparing saboteurs and more than once going with them behind enemy lines. During this time, I never got sick. And my heart didn't fail me. I never started smoking, and once I tried vodka, I never drank it. There was a lot of wine in Spain and for free, but I didn't drink it either, but preferred juices. I tried beer once in my life.

In 1937, after returning from Spain, I suffered a lot, being left without work for three months. This seriously damaged my health. But when everything got better, and they gave me a ticket to Kislovodsk, I got better.

In 1939, during the war with Finland, I was seriously wounded in the right hand, received a certificate of unfitness for military service with deregistration. I didn't show the certificate to anyone, they helped to treat my hand: the broken nerves were sewn together, the bones grew together, but the hand remained little able to work, and again, thanks to friends, I remained to serve in the army.

During the Great Patriotic War, he never got sick and was not wounded, despite the fact that that he was in a very difficult situation.

But soon after the end of the war, I spent a month in the hospital with pneumonia, then three times with cholecystitis. More than once I was ill with tonsillitis and flu, but thanks to the efforts of doctors, medicines and my correct lifestyle, I fully recovered. I have always considered rational nutrition to be of paramount importance, I have never abused anything, I preferred most of all dairy and vegetable foods, fruits and juices. Walked a lot.

There were moments in my life that had a negative effect on my state of health. This is, first of all, the overthrow of N.S. Khrushchev as a result of the conspiracy of the Stalinists. Khrushchev sharply cut off many of the privileges established by Stalin for the leadership. He tried to limit the terms of tenure in responsible positions and instead of voting for one candidate, organize elections. The conspirators did everything possible to make Khrushchev's figure less popular: if there was food in the country, his shortage was organized. There were queues. I, before the fall of Khrushchev, had to be in Kyiv: the shops were half empty. The next day after the removal of Khrushchev, the situation improved. The stores immediately became a lot of all sorts of goods and products.

Tatyana Petrovna and I experienced perestroika and reforms especially hard. For us, June 12, 1990 was a dark day on the calendar and the conspiracy in Belovezhskaya Pushcha in 1991, as a result of which the troops of seven military districts, about 25 million Russians, including all my nephews, ended up outside Russia.

In 1948, I managed to achieve the creation of the group "Organization and tactics of partisan warfare" at the Military Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which I headed concurrently with the post of head of the logistics department. As a result of the activities of this group, dozens of enthusiasts have appeared who have become deep. to study the issues of guerrilla warfare, I included Vladimir Nikolaevich Andrianov, Grigory Ivanovich Boyarinov, Petr Ivanovich Nishchev, Vladimir. Igorevich Pronichev, Boris Fedorovich Baranov, Anatoly Isaevich Tsvetkov, Sergei Krylov, Yuri Nikolaevich Polyakov, later V.N. Andrianov and G.I. Boyarinov achieved the creation of Advanced Courses for Officers at the KGB Academy, where hundreds of specialists were trained, who later became the foundation of Vympel and Alpha. Many of the students became my friends, and V.N. Andrianov, B.F. Baranov, P.I. Nishchev - chiefs.

During difficult experiences, my friends always supported and helped me. Igor Viktorovich Vvloshin and Yuri Ivanovich Drozdov gave me great help. Attention and assistance are rendered to me by V.B. Volkov, B.A. Pleshkunov, P.I. Nishvv, D.A. Shaposhnikov, V.P. Simonov, V.M. Vareshin, I.M. Pogrebnoy, V.A. Bratus, S.P. Shile, V.I. Kikot, S.P. Shtin, V.N. Polyakov.

In the publication of my last books, I was especially helped by L.P. Lavrukhin and I.I. Komarova, who, moreover, together with my other friends, created the film "Soldier of the Century" about me.

Until now, they do not forget me, my old friends, the Spaniards, visit and congratulate me.

Throughout my life I have met many good and kind people. This, and my first bosses and associates A.S. Kryukov, N.G. Desyatkin, N.V. Denisov, A.F. Khrenov, A.I. Bolotov, N.E. Afonko, who helped in difficult times. This is mine too. healers-doctors E.N. Titova, N.G. Gavrilenkova, S.D. Nvkrasova and her nurse Tamara Nikolaevna, E.Yu. Shapovalova, T.V. Morozova, T.I. Balezina.

And my wives have helped me throughout my life. With the first, Anna Kornilovna, my former translator, who went with me behind enemy lines in Spain, we lived happily for 48 years. I was very upset by her death, but my friends did not leave me alone. Fate gave me another beautiful woman. Tatyana Petrovna Matrosova - ballet dancer of the Bolshoi Theater, honored figure skating coach, widow of a pilot who died in Spain when she was only 25 years old. We have been neighbors for twenty years. She was a sensitive, gentle woman. With her, a second youth came to me and we lived wonderfully for 14 years. On March 1, 1999, she died of a stroke.

Summing up, I came to the conclusion: purposeful exercise not only prevents diseases, but also cures them. So, with the help of special exercises, I got rid of prostatitis and adenoma.

And so, in order to live long,
You must not drink, do not
smoke, Live in harmony
in the family, Constantly engage in
exercises And pour cold water in the morning.

December 1999 Beams of history reflected in a crooked mirror

In connection with recent events, I decided to write this article on the issue of partisan actions and the protection of our rear facilities from enemy sabotage. I have devoted many years and energy to this cause and, being still in good memory, I cannot stand aside from all the events that are taking place. Our great ancestor Alexander Suvorov said: "without the torch of history, tactics are darkness." This statement will be useful if you look not only back, but also forward. Let me give you some facts.

In the USSR, they acted on the basis of Lenin's position that partisan actions are not revenge, but military actions, and M.V. Frunze's instructions that troops prepared for partisan actions can defeat a stronger enemy. But this requires advance training of personnel and the development by the General Staff of plans for the organization of partisan operations and their conduct.

After the civil war, by 1930 a lot of work had been done. In 1930 - 1932, in connection with the military-technical progress, this work intensified. In 1931, there were five educational institutions in Ukraine that trained partisan personnel, four of them through the OGPU and one large school through the GRU, hidden partisan formations were created in the border zone with a large stock of weapons, ammunition and explosives. In Belarus, similar preparations were also carried out and 50,000 rifles and a large amount of ammunition and explosives were laid.

There was a large school in Moscow, directed by Karol Sverchevsky, in which only foreigners studied. In 1933, I had the opportunity to participate in teaching the tactics and techniques of sabotage to two Chinese and Polish groups and some leading officials of the Comintern.

At combined-arms special exercises in 1930 - 1932, the tactics of partisan actions were worked out. In 1933, with the advent of the doctrine: the immediate transfer of military operations to the territory of the aggressor, preparations for partisan operations in the event of war in 1934 finally stopped. In 1937-1938, as a result of unjustified repressions, there were almost no well-trained personnel left, and underground partisans completely disappeared. This led to dire consequences for us.

Speaking on July 3, 1941 with an appeal to the people, I.S. Stalin called for the organization of partisan detachments and sabotage groups behind enemy lines and assigned them tasks, including such as setting fire to forests.

Stalin demanded that during the withdrawal of our troops all food supplies that could not be taken out be destroyed, instead of distributing it to the population. Stalin did not call on the troops that remained behind enemy lines and did not have the opportunity to break through to their own, to move on to partisan actions. As a result, in the first three months of the war, more than two million soldiers of the Red Army were captured and went missing, and this was in an area where there were all favorable conditions for waging a guerrilla war.

And meanwhile, it was these troops, who found themselves behind enemy lines, that would have been, in essence, a second front back in 1941. Having at its disposal all types of weapons and combat

equipment, large stocks of ammunition in warehouses, the circled would immediately move on to active partisan and sabotage operations.

On July 18, 1941, in the directive of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, the leadership of the party forces was entrusted to the underground party bodies. Such bodies did not exist and could not exist. To fulfill this instruction, all party bodies located in partisan formations began to be called underground.

In December 1941, Stalin ordered the new secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Belarus to form the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD), then soon canceled his order, and the TSSHPD was created only on May 30, 1942. September 6, 1942 K.E. Voroshilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement. On November 17, this post was abolished, allegedly due to excessive centralization, and on March 7, 1943, the TsSHPD was also disbanded. On April 17 of the same year, it was re-formed and finally liquidated on January 14, 1944 at the height of the guerrilla war.

On November 7, 1944, in a holiday greeting, Stalin no longer set any tasks for the partisans, and at that time all the conditions were ripe for the transfer of partisan actions outside the Soviet Union. The command did nothing for this. And only in Ukraine, thanks to the correct understanding of these issues, N.S. Khrushchev, Ukrainian partisans acted abroad, became the detonators of the Slovak National Liberation Uprising, and in September 1944 tore the Eastern Front of the enemy into two parts, thereby covering themselves with unfading glory. Separate Ukrainian partisan formations reached the Rhine itself.

In the draft field charter of 1943, developed under the leadership of the head of the TsShPD P.K. Ponomarenko and approved by Stalin, it was recorded that the main partisan formations were independently operating partisan detachments and that trophies were their main sources of supply. Life has convincingly shown that already in 1943 the majority of partisan detachments were consolidated into partisan formations, that with trophies, the selection of weapons and ammunition on the battlefields, the partisans' needs for mines and explosives were hardly covered by 5%, and for ammunition and small arms - up to 15%.

In the spring of 1943, all conditions were ripe for cutting off enemy troops from their sources of supply, when the enemy experienced an acute shortage of steam locomotives and began to increase their production by reducing the production of tanks. When 10 million rails turned out to be in the occupied territory, the enemy removed them from the sections he did not need and took them to Germany for remelting. At that time, there were over 100,000 partisans behind enemy lines, thousands of aces-saboteurs who had contact with the headquarters of the partisan movement located in our rear. The guerrillas committed more than 1,500 train wrecks every month. When supplied with the right amount of explosives, they could produce 5-6 times more crashes and thereby cut off 80% of enemy troops from their sources of supply.

But on July 14, 1943, Ponomarenko signed an order on a "rail war", which stated that the enemy could be put in front of a catastrophe by massive undermining of rails on highways, sidings and auxiliary tracks. According to Ponomarenko's calculations, this required 30 tons of explosives. Stalin agreed with him. The plan was approved, but no action was taken to ensure it. Ponomarenko believed that a 100-gram block of TNT was enough to destroy one rail. The calculation was made at the training ground in the Soviet rear. In reality, the destruction of one rail required at least two charges of 200 grams, that is, four times more. The first days of the rail war showed that 100-gram checkers often left a hole or only a spot in the rail when they exploded. And it took two-hundred-gram checkers, as it was said in the instruction "Subversion". As a result, only 214,000 rails were blown up in 1.5 months, mainly on auxiliary and emergency tracks, where there were no guards. And more than 30 tons of explosives were used up, which could have produced at least 2000 train wrecks.

Despite the fact that the "rail war" plan was approved by Stalin, the Ukrainian partisans did not actually participate in the rail war. As a result, in the TsSHPD, where I was deputy chief of staff for sabotage, a sabotage service was created in the formations, which directed its main efforts to train derailment. This led to the fact that very quickly the Ukrainian partisans increased the train wreck by 5-6 times. They could have had more, but there were not enough explosives. So, if in 1942 Ukrainian partisans derailed 202 trains, then in 1943 - over 3.5 thousand. According to the original plan drawn up by the TsShPD, the Ukrainian partisans were to destroy over 80 thousand rails, and they blew up only about 8 thousand, with the explosives that the TsShPD gave for this purpose.

It all ended very sadly for me. I became a big foe of P.K. Ponomarenko, who in the documents did not show my participation in the partisan war, although I was the organizer of the operational training center of the Western Front, his assistant in sabotage for more than 6 months. I was also the head of the Higher Operational School of Special

appointment (VOSHON), which trained ace saboteurs, including Domingo Ungria, with whom I, as an adviser, went from a sabotage group to the 14th partisan corps in Spain within 10 months, as well as Jose Viesca, Jose Brao, Antonio Francis and many others.

For 10 months, our formation in Spain destroyed over two thousand fascist soldiers and officers, including the headquarters of the Italian aviation division. An ammunition train crashed in a tunnel. During the Brunet operation in July 1937, our special battalion under the command of D. Ungriy took part in disrupting the transfer of enemy troops near Madrid. During this time, the formation of D. Ungriy lost 14 people killed, including 10 killed in battle, 2 died when crossing the front line, 1 was blown up by a mine, and my driver was killed by anarchists in Valencia.

The former head of the financial department A.S. also studied with me. Yegorov, who mastered the technique and strategy of sabotage on the job. Subsequently, he became the organizer of large partisan sabotage operations in the formation of A.F. Fedorov. Being thrown in August 1944 with a group of 22 people behind enemy lines in Slovakia, a month later he turned into the commander of a large partisan formation, which, acting on the principle of destroying the enemy, preserving and increasing its strength, inflicted significant damage on the enemy. The government of Czechoslovakia, taking into account his great merits, established the "Order of Yegorov", which was awarded to

I.

Everyone is surprised that I survived in connection with the negative assessment of the "rail war". N.S. saved me. Khrushchev, who correctly understood the harm of the "rail war", which caused significant damage to our advancing troops.

After the Great Patriotic War, illustrious partisan commanders, seeing that their experience was not taken into account, tried to prove the need to prepare troops for partisan operations. But unsuccessfully. Only me and P.P. Vershigora managed to do little to resolve this issue. Vershigora lectured on guerrilla warfare at the Academy of the General Staff, and I taught at the Academy. M. V. Frunze, where my book "The Partisan Movement in the Military District" was published with the stamp "secret", edited by the head of the department of military history of this academy, General Vorobyov. He introduced a number of provisions with which I did not agree, but could not object. These additions exalted the role of I. Stalin in the leadership of the guerrilla war.

Being the head of the logistics department at the Military Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I, with the assistance of the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General I.I. Maslennikov organized a group "Organization and Tactics of Partisan Fighting", which has been working for more than three years. After Maslennikov's suicide, which he committed after the arrest of Beria, this group gave impetus to the emergence of many enthusiasts who well understood the significance of partisan actions in the upcoming wars on the basis of experience and military-technical progress. Among them were: colonels G.I. Boyarinov, B.A. Pleshkunov, S. Krylov, D.A. Shaposhnikov, and especially V.N. Andrianov.

The proposals of such illustrious commanders as twice Heroes Generals S.A. Kovpak, A.F. Fedorov, the legendary hero G.M. Linkov were not taken into account in the preparation of troops for guerrilla operations in North Korea (DPRK), and about 170 thousand North Korean soldiers were captured after Seoul was occupied by American troops. And all this because the Korean troops were trained by our advisers, who did not understand the role and significance of guerrilla actions in modern wars. And the South Vietnamese guerrillas, trained by Chinese specialists, created unbearable conditions for the American troops. Without engaging in battles with them, they destroyed 70% of military equipment and 30% of manpower, forcing the invaders to go home in disgrace.

The entry of our troops into Afghanistan was carried out without taking into account the capabilities of the Afghan partisans, and our troops during 10 years of struggle, with huge expenses for this war and the presence of significant losses, turned friendly Afghanistan into one of the bases of international terrorism. And if there were no enmity between individual groups of Afghan partisans, our losses would be much higher.

In Chechnya, our military leadership essentially contributed to the creation of a well-trained and well-armed army of General Dudayev. As a result of the incompetence of the leaders, we did not achieve the expected victory. We are lucky that the Chechens did not take into account the experience of partisan actions in World War II, otherwise this would lead to fatal consequences for us.

We did not use our capabilities to destroy the bands of Basayev's militants in the first days of their invasion of Dagestan, we did not apply the latest achievements in military and sabotage equipment. The operations of our troops to destroy the gangs of Basayev and others are accompanied by unreasonable casualties of the population.

For strengthening of the defense of anti-sabotage protection is necessary so that our the rays of history are not reflected in a crooked mirror, as happens in many historical works.

Thoughts on guerrilla warfare

Misunderstanding that the base of the partisans is the people, attachment to the front, inability to break away from it for their wide, unrestricted maneuvers in the operational and strategic depth of the enemy rear - this was the reason for the failures of the first partisan detachments.

Historical experience teaches that the success of the liberation (partisan) struggle depends to a decisive extent on how carefully it is prepared, how much it stems from a nationwide political crisis and how much it relies on the revolutionary and patriotic upsurge of the people, and sometimes on the political situation in other countries. which can in one way or another affect the course and final outcome of the struggle.

Significant impact on the scope, depth and effectiveness of guerrilla warfare They also have heroic-patriotic traditions and freedom-loving peoples.

A decisive role in the outcome of a guerrilla war is often played by the presence of an organization capable of leading the people's liberation struggle. Historical experience convincingly shows that popular uprisings and guerrilla wars fail even under all other favorable conditions in the absence of a single organization capable of leading the popular masses and successfully leading their struggle. In modern conditions such organizations can be religious, national or social parties.

However, not only the presence of a special body of military leadership of partisan forces plays a role, but also its quality. The experience of partisan struggle in the Second World War and subsequent national liberation wars convincingly showed that the command of the actions of partisan forces must be created in advance and staffed with personnel with the necessary training. Mistakes in guerrilla leadership were often costly and reduced the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare. Therefore, those leaders of the national liberation movements acted correctly, who in advance created a competent military leadership of the partisan forces, as was the case, for example, in China, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Cyprus and a number of other countries. This fully justified itself.

However, just as the most competent headquarters is useless in the absence of ordinary soldiers, so the military leadership of the guerrilla forces certainly cannot be considered a guarantee of success. Who are these people who operate in partisan detachments?

Partisans are direct participants in actions that cause damage to the enemy in manpower, military equipment, disrupt the management of the population and troops, reduce the combat capability of enemy troops in other ways, conduct reconnaissance, etc.

Participants in the guerrilla movement and guerrilla warfare are also all those who, without directly participating in the actions of the guerrillas, provide the guerrilla forces with everything necessary for struggle and life. Note that such participation in guerrilla warfare is usually more dangerous than participation in combat operations of detachments, which, having inflicted damage on the enemy, can get out from under his blow, while their assistants remain in place and often suffer heavy losses. Therefore, it is clear how unfair it is that many worthy local residents who ensured the actions of Soviet partisans in the Great Patriotic War were not awarded.

The readiness of the broad masses of the people for guerrilla warfare against foreign and domestic enslavers can only be realized most effectively with **proper advance preparation**.

Preparation for guerrilla warfare against reactionary and colonial governments, as well as preparation for it in the event of an enemy invasion, includes the spiritual and political preparation of the population, the creation of special leadership bodies, the organization of guerrilla forces, their preparation, planning of actions and comprehensive support.

The preparation of partisan forces for warfare includes: the creation of leadership bodies, training of personnel, the formation and arming of groups and detachments both on enemy-controlled territory and outside the country, up to the organization of the production of explosives, mines and grenades and simple means, the organization of covert control .

Consequently, the preparation of the partisan forces for the fight can be considered complete when materially secure controlled partisan formations are created, as well as variants of plans for their actions, depending on the possible conditions for the deployment of the war.

Such training under ordinary peaceful conditions requires a considerable amount of time (sometimes from 2 to 5 years). It must be comprehensive and cover as many regions of the country as possible, so that then, by sudden simultaneous actions, cause confusion in the enemy and prevent him from suppressing the partisan forces at the very beginning of their activity.

Unfortunately, all this was liquidated in 1937-1939. A similar picture was in Ukraine and the Leningrad Military District.

The success of their actions largely depended on how correctly the theory of organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare was developed, to what extent it corresponded to practice, how well the leaders and commanders of guerrilla forces mastered it. The backwardness of theory, its inability to timely reveal new phenomena that affect the possibilities and effectiveness of guerrilla warfare, cost great sacrifices and sharply reduced the effectiveness of guerrilla operations in past wars.

However, it is not enough to have and systematically improve the theory of the art of guerrilla warfare; it must become the property of those who conduct or will conduct guerrilla operations.

In his address to the Soviet people on July 3, 1941, Stalin also called for guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. He said: "In areas occupied by the enemy, it is necessary to create partisan detachments, mounted and on foot, to create sabotage groups to fight against parts of the enemy army, to kindle guerrilla warfare everywhere and everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telegraph and telephone communications, set fire to forests, warehouses and convoys. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupt all their activities. "

The posing of the question of the methods of guerrilla warfare in Stalin's speech surprised me. Firstly, there is no one to create partisan detachments in the areas occupied by the enemy, not to mention all the difficulties of this matter. This should have been done even before the occupation of the territory. Secondly, partisans cannot set fire to wagon trains and engage in battles with parts of the enemy army. After all, in combat contact, the enemy has the opportunity to build up his forces, receive reinforcements during the battle, while the partisans, having very limited resources, cannot do this. In addition, after all, enemy troops are equipped, as a rule, much better than partisans! How can untrained, poorly armed people (after all, these partisan detachments would be created on enemy territory) fight with units of a regular enemy army? This appeal by Stalin aimed the partisans at fruitless partisanism, and not at partisan warfare in order to cut off enemy troops from their sources of supply. Thirdly, the call to set fire to forests behind enemy lines was harmful to the partisans and useful to the Nazis. If anyone else had said that the partisans should set fire to the forests, then he would no doubt be considered a provocateur or a fool.

Moreover, in the same speech, he demanded "during the forced withdrawal of Red Army units ... not to leave the enemy a single kilogram of bread ... Collective farmers must steal all cattle, hand over the grain for safekeeping to state bodies for export to the rear areas, bread and the fuel which cannot be taken out must certainly be destroyed."

The situation was quite different in the territories left by our troops in 1941. A significant part of the Soviet land was occupied by fascist invaders before any evacuation of even the most important defense enterprises began. Soon after the enemy invasion, the evacuation of industrial equipment, agricultural machinery and collective farm livestock and food from those areas threatened by the occupation began. At the same time, almost only workers and engineering and technical personnel were evacuated from local residents. Very few railway workers were evacuated and all the collective farmers remained in place. Thus, the bulk of the population did not evacuate.

In such conditions, the export and destruction, instead of distribution, of food, and, above all, grain, doomed the population of the territories temporarily occupied by the enemy to starvation. The literal implementation of these orders would only lead to a sharp increase in the number of collaborators, would cause hatred among the local residents for the Soviet government and the army, and would push many into the service of the enemy. After Stalin's speech, the hasty formation and transfer to the rear of the enemy intensified without proper preparation of partisans, detachments and sabotage groups. Meanwhile, their main task was not even formulated: to cut off enemy troops from their sources of supply.

Only a month after the start of the war, on July 18, 1941, a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops" appeared. However, it did not bring clarity. It did not say a word about the preparation of partisan formations, the organization of communications and supplies, the involvement of military personnel in the partisan struggle, who, due to the current situation, ended up behind enemy lines and could not break through to the main forces.

Red Army. And this decree did not set the task of cutting off enemy troops from their sources of supply.

The mistakes made in the organization of the partisan movement are: **The first mistake is the substitution of the military organization by party organs.**

The second mistake is the lack of advance preparation for guerrilla warfare troops to

The third mistake is the "Drive the German into the cold" policy. The fourth mistake - the task of cutting off the enemy from the source of supply was not set.

Elimination of measures taken earlier in case of hostile aggression

Repressions that destroyed experienced, well-trained personnel and the elimination of measures taken earlier in the event of enemy aggression 3-4 years before the war were the main catastrophic mistake made in the course of preparations for war.

According to Lieutenant General A.I. Todorsky repressed:

Out of 5 marshals of the Soviet Union - 3B
Out of 2 army commissars of the first rank - 2B Out of
4 army commanders of the first rank - 2B
Out of 12 commanders of the second rank -
12B Out of 2 fleet flagships of the second rank -
2B Out of 6 flagships of the first rank - 6B
Out of 15 army commissars of the second rank - 15B Out
of 67 commanders - 60B
Out of 28 corps commanders - 25B Out
of 199 commanders - 136B
Out of 397 brigade
commanders - 221B Out of 36 brigade commissars - 34

If you count only the highest staff, from marshals to army commissars of the second rank inclusive, it turns out that out of 46 people 42 were put out of action.

No defeat ever leads to such a monstrous loss of command personnel. Only the complete surrender of the country after a lost war can have such consequences.

For partisans, open combat is the most disadvantageous activity.

In the Draft Field Manual of 1943, it is written that trophies are the basis for providing partisans. Crimean partisans in the autumn and winter of 1942/43 were dying of hunger at the moment when the aircraft dropped bombs on enemy communications. The effectiveness of these bombings was minimal. The guerrillas could have derailed enemy trains with great success, but they were starving to death. It was easier for them to undermine the train than to get a loaf of bread. In fact, captured ammunition and weapons in partisan formations constituted an insignificant part of their needs. Weapons and ammunition completed in the Soviet rear, the detachments received at the points of formation. In the early years of the war, partisans procured weapons and ammunition in the fields after the battles. The local population helped them a lot. But in the reports, the commanders of the partisan formations, weapons and ammunition picked up on the former battlefields, were passed off as trophy ones.

The destruction of food during the withdrawal, the requirement to "drive the Germans into the cold" by setting fire to the settlements in which they were located, helped the occupiers a lot. They carried on propaganda that all this was being done by the Soviet government because it no longer thought of returning, otherwise why destroy what could be preserved for use upon return.

History does not know such a massive use of the population and prisoners of war in the fight against their troops, as it was during the Great Patriotic War. Over one million two hundred thousand Soviet people of almost all nationalities participated in the war against their homeland in the police, as well as in military formations. Many prisoners of war went to these military formations, created by the occupiers, with the aim of escaping from starvation captivity and at the first opportunity to go over to the side of the partisans, as did the brigade under the command of Gil-Radionov, which, having destroyed the occupiers and hardened traitors who were in it, completely switched to side of the partisans, turning into the 1st

anti-fascist brigade. Many police officers, risking the lives of their families, also went over to the side of the partisans. So in Belarus, over 26 thousand policemen went over to the partisans.

The destruction of grain and other foodstuffs during the withdrawal of the Red Army hampered the deployment of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.

The picture could have been much worse if all Stalin's demands were met in full. Then a sea of population would begin behind enemy lines, which was what the invaders needed, and there would be no one to disrupt the work of enemy communications. So basically the partisans could only eat at the expense of the local population.

The partisan movement was characteristic of many occupied European countries. Even such a small country as Belgium had its partisans, who bravely acted on enemy communications.

In the course of the war against the Japanese invaders in Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, national liberation armies grew up and strengthened on the basis of partisan detachments, which turned into powerful forces that liberated these countries from colonial oppression. Moreover, it was the flames of the guerrilla war that thwarted many of the plans of the Japanese militarists.

The fear of the armed people on the part of the Allied governments led to the fact that in October 1944 the Anglo-American troops landed on the already liberated territory of Greece and began a war against the Greek national liberation troops, who had previously fought against the Nazi invaders. And this struggle between the Anglo-American troops and the reactionary forces of Greece continued until 1948. The Americans acted in the same treachery with partisan forces in Italy, in the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands occupied by the Japanese.

After the Second World War, the armed forces of many countries created anew special units for guerrilla and, above all, sabotage operations behind enemy lines, and there is an extensive literature on the basics of organization, tactics of guerrilla operations and the strategy of guerrilla warfare. Much of it is open. Knowledge of the fundamentals of the organization and tactics of guerrilla warfare is necessary for troops that can find themselves behind enemy lines and there, if necessary, go over to guerrilla operations.

Local residents often supplied the partisans with food, providing them with shelter and shelter, and in the first year of the war they even obtained weapons for the partisans on the battlefields, i.e., in essence, they did the same for the partisans as military supplies for the soldiers of the Red Army. The Germans quite reasonably considered such people to be the same partisans as those who directly fought the hostilities - and dealt with them accordingly. Stalin, apparently, did not think so - after all, after the war, only a few such Soviet patriots who helped the partisans, risking their lives, received a partisan medal. This can hardly be considered fair. However, as I said, after the war, there was little justice for the partisans in general.

First of all, these were the Spaniards, who entered the fight against fascism back in 1936, during the fascist uprising in Spain, and who, after the fall of the republic, managed to get into the Soviet Union. From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, they sought permission to fight the enemy in the Soviet armed forces, primarily in the rear of the invaders. It should be noted that the Spaniards, residents of a country with a warm climate, successfully participated in January-February 1942 in ice campaigns through the Taganrog Bay behind enemy lines, acted in Ukraine, Bryansk, in the Tver and Smolensk regions, in the North Caucasus.

I would like to note that their participation in the war has so far practically not been reflected in our press. (One can only recall Serno Roque's book "The Spaniards in Russia in 1941-1945"). Meanwhile, one of the main merits of the Spaniards in this war is that they generously shared their combat experience with our partisans. I would like to acknowledge the courage and bravery of José Viesco, Paso Sandovan Angel, Ramos del Osco, Juan Ramírez, Juan Bravo, Rafael Estrello and many others who helped train the relevant personnel in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia and actively participated in partisan actions.

If the actions of the partisans often led to the extermination of the civilian population by the Nazis, then how justified was their need? It would be foolish to sidestep this issue by pretending it doesn't exist. We must find an answer.

PART 5 FRIENDS AND STUDENTS

During his life, Ilya Grigorievich had to meet with many people. He has a lot of students. Many consider him their friend. In his small modest apartment -

people all the time. Who comes just to see, who consult on their professional affairs. Each of the guests could tell a lot about Ilya Grigorievich and, probably, will say more. We recorded several conversations and stories, which we present here.

Petr Ivanovich Nishchev

- Petr Ivanovich, you have been cooperating with Ilya Grigorievich for many years, and you know even more. What can you say about him as a person?

- Ilya Grigorievich, as far as I remember, treated each listener very warmly. The student could ask him any question, even the most stupid one. He always patiently, sparing no time for explanation, talked with the listener. There were very good conditions at the advanced training courses for officers (KUOS), where Ilya Grigorievich taught, was an associate professor of a special department. The delayed teachers could stay overnight. At this time, those who wished could communicate with him on various issues as much as they wanted. As a person who is in love with his work, he spared no time for our training. This is his main feature.

The second trait that brought him nothing but trouble had to do with pulpit meetings. I think he was sometimes harsh. He could say a hard "no" to the head of the department. That is, he could object to the head of the department when the issue already seemed resolved. Which is generally considered harmful. You need to be more subtle with the head of the department. One on one you can fight any battle. Many leaders did not like this.

Our misfortune, I would not be afraid to say - the tragedy in the defense of the state lies in the fact that in certain historical times we had a developed partisan movement, a huge experience. And Russia has never been able to generalize its historical partisan experience.

- Since the time of Denis Davydov?

- Yes.

- And what caused it?

I will not talk about the times of Denis Davydov, Ilya Grigorievich knows better about the fate of those who gained experience during the Civil War. And I thought a lot about the experience of the Great Patriotic War. I asked this question to Ilya Grigorievich. The fact is that in the 1950s and 1960s, nuclear weapons and means of delivering them to any target appeared. Political and military figures of that time began to believe that the further course of history was connected not only with the presence, but with the use of nuclear weapons. Then we became convinced that, it turns out, it is, to a certain extent, a deterrent factor. I am also one of those who think so. Although it is impossible to give a guarantee that it will not be applied. In the current conditions, it is certainly a deterrent.

The Americans - when we talk about the Americans, of course, we mean the United States of America - they have no modern experience in guerrilla warfare. In the Civil War, since which more than a hundred years have passed, they gained incredibly valuable experience in guerrilla warfare. But the means and methods of conducting armed struggle have radically changed since that time. But what is positive about them? They buy up all the books that are published on this topic in the world and carefully work them out. And on the basis of this borrowed experience, they are developing their special forces. What they call special forces, green berets, rangers and so on. They take this issue incredibly seriously. And in our country, this business has approximately, as I said, almost completely died out since 1956. And resumed only in 1965. And it resumed not because awareness came to us, but because the top leadership saw that at that time our potential adversary used these forces effectively in various local conflicts, in resolving a number of issues, but we do not have this. And then, gradually, gradually, training in the methods of guerrilla warfare began to revive and reached a certain professional level. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, this problem again came to a standstill.

- Petr Ivanovich, you are a specialist in the field of terror and anti-terror. The foreign press often says that Ilya Starinov is the number one saboteur of our century, but the Americans do not use his work experience, considering it the experience of a terrorist. And, perhaps, that is why his experience has not been widely used?

- I think it is impossible to talk about him as the number one terrorist on a global scale. This characterization is incorrect. Because the basic principle that is contained in all his theoretical and applied works: to apply the experience that he has accumulated, and everything that he has developed, should only be for the purpose of protecting the Fatherland and in wartime. It is clear that some methods can be used to protect the Fatherland in peacetime. If methods are used only to protect the Fatherland and only in wartime, this is not terrorism. Everyone who studied with him, and everyone who in one way or another helped him in his work and, so

to say, participated, all of this opinion. Therefore, attributing him to terrorists with the light hand of the media is a commonplace, superficial judgment.

- As a specialist, what can you say about this?

- I think that fighting and defense, they go together. And, of course, some of what he wrote could be used by the enemy. But if the state is interested in putting defense higher than amateur, amateur terrorism, then, of course, the latter will fall into protective networks. And from this point of view, I believe that every counterintelligence officer, organizing preventive defense, must know what a terrorist can know and how a terrorist can act. If so, then, of course, there is no danger from his work. Books are freely sold abroad, which explain how to make not only a mine, but also a detonator cap. When Ilya Grigorievich was preparing personnel, he never forgot to warn that there are things that should be standard, factory

manufacturing.

Foreign literature of this kind is now being sold in our country on sale. This literature is very dangerous, harmful and completely unnecessary for civil society. This is how to produce shoes, bread, sow, plow - this is necessary. And here, in this area, knowledge should be owned by a very limited circle of people and for the sole purpose of preventing crimes. The main goal is preemption. Then comes the detection, then the warning, and then the suppression, if at an early stage it was not possible to intercept the encroachment.

Modern specialists who deal with this problem, of course, should study such literature in order to improve their professional level. Because a good, professional textbook can only be written by a professional. But there are no professionals. Because a professional must have experience. And the experience of armed struggle against tanks, with grenade launchers is not the same experience. Not the one. Therefore, there are problems here. Defense is always a more complex, time-consuming task, both in terms of means and resources, than an attack.

And in the preparation of the one who is engaged in this business, painstaking work is needed, based on historical experience, textbooks are needed.

- It seems to me that the figure of Ilya Grigorievich was not in demand in our country to the end. In your opinion, what prevented this? The man was repeatedly presented with the highest award, but he also walked on a razor's edge, he was repeatedly sentenced to the highest measure of punishment. That is, from one extreme to the other. On the one hand, everyone seemed to realize that he was doing the right thing, useful to the country. On the other hand, many of his undertakings were simply rejected. In your opinion, why did this happen? The fact that he, an extraordinary person, could speak and assert ...

- Yes, affirm. He wanted to do his job. And once a person insists, this very often causes misunderstanding. Misunderstanding, or rather, unwillingness to understand, because it is associated with a certain risk. This is the first. The second, I would say, is still more related to the political system. Throughout our military experience, we have not been able to work out the concept of defending our Fatherland with minimal forces, mobilized when it is clear that danger is brewing and it is necessary to deploy and use all our forces. But they always did not have time to do it qualitatively and secure it for the future.

For example, I am opposed to keeping large contingents of special forces in peacetime just because they can be needed. No. You need to have a base that can deploy in a matter of hours, days or months to solve a specific problem. This base should be I would like to refer to a historical example, when the French were highly skilled locksmiths in years. The Second World War became pilots. That is, if a nation is educated, then it is possible to quickly prepare for solving a serious problem at a high level. If, however, to maintain large elite forces, then this is expensive for the budget. I speak so boldly on this subject, because at one time I wrote a motivated note that only a specific, so to speak global, deterioration of the situation requires the transfer of material forces to create such a contingent. And so it should warm up to a certain point. People should do creative work. If the nation is prepared and well organized, then everything will go on in the best possible way. And after Frunze, there was a huge purge in the ranks of those who knew the business. And those who were prepared for the start of the war, there were about thirty people left, well, maybe a little more. Kalinin said best of all about the beginning of the partisan struggle in the first months of the Great Patriotic War: "The peasant shifted from foot to foot and thought how to start ...". So this part "shifted from foot to foot" in textbooks and monographs was thrown out, because it did not coincide with the general ideology. In the occupied territory, he could not shift, but allegedly immediately entered the struggle. No, here Mikhail Ivanovich is exceptionally accurate.

Further. The Great Patriotic War ended. Many prominent partisans in Belarus went to party and economic work. More they to this issue, except in meetings

on memorable dates, did not return and did not write anything. Then nuclear weapons arose, which allegedly made the methods of guerrilla warfare unnecessary. In our country, special forces are everywhere. It got overly involved. In one of my works, I wrote that no matter how cretins they were, these members of the Politburo, they understood: you create an elite (and all special forces are an elite), and the elite requires attention, special allowances. So he rode on the armor until the age of 32, what to do with him? He doesn't want anything else, and he doesn't know how. Therefore, the state, which looks deep and far, must solve all these issues, creating only a small professional core, so that it can build up muscles and strength when the historical situation requires it. I stand by this point of view. The creation of special forces everywhere and everywhere should be resolutely suppressed. This is bad for the state.

Unacceptable, I think, is the constant change of views on the problem of partisan struggle, the absence of a struggle of opinions and the fact that our main development is under the influence of American charters. Because they have one concept, one idea, we have a completely different one. No wonder Yavlinsky said that the Americans use "bulldozer tactics": that is, if they don't like someone, then erase him and that's it! What is happening in Kosovo now? Tragedy. After all, the Yugoslav army also, albeit truncated, uses the American charter. They enter the village and begin to clean up these militants. Nothing could be more harmful. If you look at our materials from the time of the fight against the anti-Soviet underground, then the one who used weapons in the village bore criminal, party and other responsibility. You can't shoot in the village. Therefore, many questions arise about this "bulldozer tactics." Unfortunately, our statutes are also subject to this influence. You can borrow, but positive, in relation to our specifics and our worldview.

- What else would you like to add about Ilya Grigorievich?

- Having spent more than 30 years next to him, I can say that there are few such obsessed people. I have always liked people who have chosen their path once and for all and have not deviated from it all their lives no matter what. After all, he was executed five times, but he never backed down from his ideas. As soon as this inspiration and understanding came to him, at the age of 99 he lives with his idea. This is the first. Second. He is well-read. Once I was present at such a conversation. One of the very respected people asked him: "How do you, Ilya Grigorievich, kill time?" There is such an expression in everyday life - "how you kill time." He replied, "I don't understand it. I don't have enough time."

He asks: "Have you read this book? What is your opinion? Look, pay attention to this." He reads exceptionally fast and remembers what he read. He has a huge personal library. Then - a huge personal archive.

Of course, personality is shaped by other personalities. There is no such outstanding figure in the Soviet Union or abroad from the national liberation or communist movement, related at that time, who would not know him. Joseph Broz Tito. Difficult to communicate, but communicated freely with Starinov. Ilya Grigorievich is not a timid man. Until very recently, in the most difficult times, he wore the Order of Yugoslavia. In a period of complications and, as they say, under the "father of his own" to have a Yugoslav order (not to surrender it) meant to be close to the enemy of the people. He neglected it. Conducted extensive correspondence with foreign countries.

Well, in everyday life he was very modest, unpretentious. I got an apartment before the war. And now the whole family - both the adult son and the adopted daughter - are all registered in it. And he stood in line, as it should be, as a participant in the Civil War. And so, when, at the age of 82, he asked to expedite the receipt of an apartment, one of the deputy chairmen of the KGB of the USSR, I don't want to give his last name, said: "But who, at the age of 82, asks for an apartment?" Ilya Grigoryevich shared this trouble with me. I say: "What kind of difficulty is this? You sit with Grigory Karpovich Tsinev constantly in the Presidium at all big celebrations. This is the first deputy chairman. He will ask you, Ilya, how do you live? And you answer him: You, with an apartment. - something without apartments. In a day they will give you everything. "

Indeed, at one of the celebrations, Ilya Grigorievich did just that. Grigory Karpovich summoned this deputy chairman, because he was the first and not just the first, but the first with a prop and shouting: "Why are you burying us! Who are you! closed. And if you make such a mistake again, we will speak differently. "

Even in the simplest everyday matters he experienced difficulties. Great in defending the Fatherland, a true patriot, but in everyday life he often experiences difficulties - where he could simply use his merits. Indeed, as a participant in the Civil War, he was often among those people who influenced the state of affairs in any area.

This is a bright personality. And the main lordship lies in the fact that his whole life is love for the Motherland. Love. Everything is filled with love. He got himself into nothing but trouble. I am convinced that the enormous creative hard work contributes to his long and spiritual life. And I am glad that fate allowed me to communicate with him for so long.

There were times when I didn't agree with what I read. He patiently instructed: "Read the archives and work in the archives. Without knowledge of the real sources, you will be mistaken all the time, you will hesitate, you will take the wrong position. Only the study of reliable materials gives rise to conviction. Information, then ... It does not mean that you will come to the right judgment, no, but at least there will be the right prerequisites.

- Ilya Grigorievich has many famous operations on his account. Take, for example, the train explosion in the tunnel near Cordoba.

- Yes, the train was very heavy, it was double traction, two steam locomotives. He hooked a bridge mine set by Ilya Grigorievich and began to move into the tunnel. The partisans at that moment threw incendiary mines at the train, and it, already entering the tunnel, was on fire. The guard battalion began to close the entrances. Closed, open in a few hours, the fire continues. And so for five days. The effectiveness of the action was so high that not only Spanish newspapers, but also French newspapers wrote about it, both in English and in American ones. The operation was very well known. If, let's say, aviation did this, and if only for one day stopped traffic on the railway, I assure you that all the pilots who participated, the commanders of these crews, would become heroes.

Why didn't they give him a Hero of the Soviet Union?

- As far as I know, he was presented many times to the Hero of the Soviet Union. First time for Spain. But our volunteers were sent there under false names, and he was there as Rudolfo. And it was impossible to publicize our advisers at that time. Even the simplest things could only be written about 20-25 years later, during the Khrushchev thaw. And before that, it was especially spread that he was a senior adviser that he communicated ...

Malinovsky, who will become the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, Malino is his pseudonym. They were talking. Berzin. Whoever you take, they all knew each other, and therefore, as always happens, they retained special comradely relations, although they occupied different positions in society and the military hierarchy. But, nevertheless, fighting friendship, it always remained. If Ilya Grigoryevich wanted to get an appointment, he could always get in, but he did not use it.

- The experience of the Spanish partisan war, in my opinion, could be transferred to the partisan movement in the Soviet Union. But what Ilya Grigorievich proposed, as a rule, was met by the military, by the Supreme Commander, even at the army level, with a sharply negative attitude, they did not perceive these operations. Although he tried to harmonize them with the problems of the army, corps, front.

- Yes.

- What could be causing this?

- You are probably familiar with the book "Small War. Partisanship and sabotage" by M. Drobov. One of the best monographs on guerrilla warfare, on the history of guerrilla warfare in the late 19th and first quarter of the 20th century. There were a lot of bright commanders who left the partisans. But the fate of all of them is tragic. Particularly characteristic in this respect is the fate of the commander of the Western Front, Pavlov. Ilya Grigoryevich pays a lot of attention to him, because he was also in Spain. And he went up to the commander of the front or the special Western District - literally all positions during the year. But he couldn't master them. There were many people in the leadership, the highest echelon of the army, who did not imagine the specifics of army service, they had no experience.

And in the books on the partisan movement that were written, Trotsky, and Tukhachevsky, and Putno were mentioned, and, no matter who we take, they all turned out to be at a certain period, in 1937, or even earlier, enemies of the people. Therefore, all these textbooks were destroyed. They were good in content, but they quoted expressions, expressed the opinions and positions of these people. So these books had to be destroyed. Therefore, the commanders who had and could use the experience of guerrilla warfare, they, in fact, did not remain. And this is a profession. A profession that requires both knowledge and experience. And it so happened that before the start of the Great Patriotic War, when organizing the partisan movement, if my memory serves me, then from those who had experience of the Civil War and the war in Spain, there were about 30 people. All the rest died.

- Frunze said that if one soldier remains from a company, then an entire company dies, if only one partisan remains from a detachment of partisans, then a new partisan detachment is formed. Did he develop this position in his work at the department or during the war?

- Undoubtedly. And communicating with people, and working with archives. He has such, such a research quality: with each group commander and even an ordinary participant who returned from the rear, he always found an opportunity to talk. What contributes 43

success, what hinders, what are the conditions, how should the equipment be changed, what documents are needed for action? He was keenly interested in what was happening behind enemy lines with groups abandoned there. And so he knew the practice well. And he even argued, although it was not safe, that not all commanders and not all troops - encircled - should leave the rear.

According to his theory, the encirclement must create a partisan detachment, get in touch and destroy enemy communications. The army surrenders not because its numbers have decreased, but because there is no ammunition and nothing to eat. And he understood this very well. Let's take the Brest Fortress. How long did it stay. Why? There were ammunition, and there was something to eat. And in all his works, he emphasized the fallacy of the position that all those who remained in the rear were traitors to the motherland. And so the sword of Damocles hung over those who, against their will, were surrounded, because the German was well motorized, well prepared. And honest people who fought to the last breath, getting surrounded, became outcasts. This policy, of course, influenced the initial stage of the guerrilla war. Everyone tried to get out by any means, and to carry a wounded comrade on themselves to prove that I got out, and had no other communication with the Germans, except for the battle. These are difficult, tragic moments in our history.

- Frunze even had the opposite. We have moved away from the Leninist-Frunze construction of the armed forces of the Soviet Republic.

- Quite right. Because the armies of the young Soviet state, to a greater extent, grew out of partisan detachments, and, of course, he knew this issue subtly. And here there was not just a retreat, but there was a complete retreat and distrust of the Soviet man, who was tragically surrounded. He was immediately considered a traitor. This cannot even be called a mistake, it is a tragic page in the history of our struggle against the occupier.

- Talking with many people who today serve in the special forces, and many journalists, I heard the opinion that Starinov is not a strategist after all. He is just a tactician, an executor, and has no skill in planning such operations. And so those events that he proposed were uninteresting. So is it or not?

- There is no Soviet Union now, and you can talk about many things, as Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov wrote in his book. Under Soviet rule, getting acquainted with the archives was a huge problem. Most of the people who say this have never had the opportunity to get acquainted with the archives where these materials are. Ilya Grigorievich - developer of a number of operations. Some of them are extremely successful. Especially the Kovel knot and so on.

- This is the brightest event of the Great Patriotic War. The most famous. You can even say such an event that even affected Hitler, and not just the headquarters of the Supreme Commander.

- I would say that in the actions of Ilya Grigorievich, as a performer, a partisan, on The saboteur had many unique episodes at the performing level, performing as the head of a small sabotage unit and with his personal participation. After 1941, he was already at the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, then at the Ukrainian Headquarters, then in Yugoslavia, Poland and other places. He was already the leader who developed the operations. But, the operation needs not only to be conceived, but it must be technically, organizationally, personnel, and so on. Then he spoke out against the rail war in the sense that it was presented in these operations, when it meant simply undermining the rails. He correctly believes that only the collapse of the echelon has an effect. **- Ilya Grigorievich repeated many times that he was categorically against the "rail war".**

- Yes. In the version as seen by the Central Headquarters, it was precisely the undermining of the rails. Starinov reasonably, on the basis of a large amount of factual material, proved the harmfulness of the idea of the Central Headquarters. The German did not suffer much. There were many railroad tracks in the occupied territory. During the night, for two or three hours, he restored all the undermined rails, he learned to make short segments, cut them in, and the trains again went to the East. And this seeming efficiency turned into its opposite. Because every kilogram of tola behind enemy lines was worth its weight in gold. And Ilya Grigorievich, speaking out against the rail war, was for the war on rails, but in a different execution. Of course, he made a lot of opponents, and maybe even enemies. And, at the same time, he had a number of brilliant performing operations in the Great Patriotic War, which he led. Suffice it to recall the Kharkov mining operation in 1941, when our troops left Kharkov. He, in fact, mined the city not only with radio mines, but there were other mines - delayed action. Books have been written about it. But not everything is in these books. Without delving into this issue, I would like to talk about this operation. The operation was very difficult, because the delivery of radiomines from Moscow took place in the most difficult conditions.

Ilya Grigoryevich personally supervised the mining of the mansion where Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev lived when he was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and Kharkov was the capital. He knew that it was a beautiful mansion, that some important person would occupy it. And so it happened. He set up three radio mines here. He put one radio mine on the trigger signal and two radio mines, they are called spinner mines, which the German sappers had to find. Because by this time the Germans had already met with these radio mines and already knew. Mining was thorough. At great depths, with concreting. And the operation itself was of such a thorough nature that the local residents, who were used by the Germans in search of radio mines, could not give the German counterintelligence, the Abwehr, any lead.

With a radio signal from Voronezh, superimposed on the amplitude of the signal of the 14th symphony of Dmitry Shostakovich, on November 14, 1941, Ilya Grigorievich blew up this radio mine. And this house housed the commander of the garrison and the army, Georg von Braun, a relative of the famous inventor of the V-1 and V-2. When such a commander dies, the Fuhrer must be reported. When the Fuhrer was informed that Georg von Braun had died on a radio mine in Kharkov, Hitler said: "Nonsense! Keitel, this is nonsense! They, he says, in the battalion, in the company and even in the regiment do not have the necessary radio equipment! This colossus on clay feet has radio mine, do we have one?" No, they tell him, we don't have radiomin. "Show me the radio mine." They showed him. Then he ordered Canaris to come and asked who invented this mine. Canaris named Bekauri. "Where is he, and is it possible to give the task to Skorzeny so that he steals him?" No, they say, my Fuhrer, he is no more. Beria paid off with him on some issues. "Make a mine in three months for me to look!" And the Minister of Industry Mines was present during the conversation. Well, since no one objects to the leaders in such an environment, they answered - "Yes!" Three months later, as expected, they arrived and began to report. We - Schacht reported - can, my Fuhrer, make this mine. It will be even smaller, but there are serious difficulties. Which? Need gold. Well, we have gold, he says. But platinum, silver, molybdenum, tungsten, which were necessary for the structural elements of this mine, they came in small quantities through Sweden. Schacht said: My Fuhrer, if you can allocate a quota for this mine, then we will make according to the available drawings very soon. Within three months we will launch into production. Then the Fuhrer asked Keitel: Keitel, what significance does this radio mine have for the course and outcome of the war - strategic, operational or tactical? Keitel says: My Fuhrer, tactical. Then, he says, let's not waste time. By the way, Shakht, where they have these strategic reserves of these metals, does it fall into the zone of action of our troops. I, my Fuhrer, cannot answer this question. I know how to use these metals. You, my Fuhrer, have more accurate information on this matter. Yes, I have, he says, the information is more accurate. Materials are mainly in Norilsk. Keitel, we will make this mine when Norilsk is ours. Gentlemen, I consider the meeting closed. By the way, who is the head of the radiomining operation?

By

The head of the operation, and he was already widely known, since German intelligence worked very well in Madrid, one of the largest experts in guerrilla warfare, a participant in the civil war in Spain, Starinov Ilya Grigoryevich. Can it be liquidated? It is possible, but it will require a lot of effort and your sanction is needed.

Thus, at the highest political level, this operation had a serious political resonance. But since it was necessary to go to major leaders, including Stalin, no one wrote a presentation on the Hero of the Soviet Union. Once again, it was not enough to remind about themselves who wanted to take risks.

- For this operation, he not only did not receive a Hero, as far as I know, but he almost shot. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev helped. He went out to Stalin and ...

- Yes. I said that the delivery was very difficult, he went through difficult moments. How could this end? Success or a tragic end - in those conditions, no one could say anything definitely. Because one was in charge of the ammunition, Beria was in charge of the bridges, and hence the inconsistency. And Khrushchev must be given credit for having the courage to pick up the HF receiver and call. I think that there are few people who could support in difficult times. Because the risk of how such a conversation would end was great.

- You were one of Ilya Grigorievich's graduate students. What kind of relationship did you have as a teacher and student? What did he pay attention to, was he a good teacher, a teacher? In a word, what is Starinov like as a teacher?

- Well, I'll say this. Even now, at the turn of his 99th birthday, he sometimes gives two-hour lectures. Reads from memory. He still has a huge, I emphasize this, a huge amount of memory. I will not say that our relationship has always been so smooth and even - I myself am a debater. What did I buy and what did I make sure of? History is the hardest subject. History is created and written by people. Therefore, without going into depth, I would say that in any era, history is corrected by order of the top. And under Soviet rule, there were many silences in history. I am grateful to Ilya Grigorievich for teaching me how to work with archives.

- Pyotr Ivanovich, you are familiar with Ilya Grigorievich. What kind of person is he?

Well, I am not only familiar with Ilya Grigoryevich, for more than 30 years, one might say, I have been under his scientific, practical influence. I know him both in science, and in discussions, and as an author of books, and even in everyday life. Like this.

- So what is he like - a modest, immodest, admiring, addicted person?

In everyday life, he is, of course, an ultra-modest person. Material values, comfort, some kind, the acquisition of some thing never attracted him, I have not seen anything like this in these 30 years. But as for the cause, to which he devoted his whole life, here he is incredibly obsessed and has huge connections not only in the former Soviet Union, but also abroad. There is such a Spanish section. And he corresponds with them, and they treat each member very tenderly, because gradually the ranks are melting away. I was present once when he spoke to Dolores Ibarruri from Madrid. While in Spain, he learned Spanish in a year and speaks it quite well. She asked him if he had the opportunity to come to Madrid. Then he could not for health reasons.

He is very sociable. But all his communication, to be completely frank, is mainly around the problem that he has been dealing with all his life since 1924. He does just that. He served in the engineering and railroad troops. He was an employee of the GRU and PGU. I once asked him: "Ilya Grigorievich, who do you consider yourself to be?" And he replied: "I am a partisan." That is, he served in various units, he was the commander of the 5th separate engineering brigade. General post. And to the question, he answered "I am a partisan."

- The concept of a partisan by Ilya Grigorievich is much broader than what we mean. Partisans are people who, without any discipline, fight where they want, shoot where they want, do not bear any responsibility to the population for the consequences of their actions, performing the tasks that, let's say, some party or government has set for them. Ilya Grigorievich has a slightly different approach to the concept of "partisans" and to partisan actions. How can you characterize it?

- This question is incredibly interesting from the point of view that Ilya Grigorievich at the very beginning, when this specialty fell into his soul, had the opportunity to communicate with prominent military leaders of that period. And he was and is under the strong influence of Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze. And Frunze, as you know, what you said, he called not "partisans", but "partisanism". For example, like the Chechens, they are not partisans. They have partisanship, robbery and so on. Ilya Grigoryevich believes, primarily under the influence, as I said, of Frunze, Tukhachevsky, Putna, and so on, that partisans are those who are controlled, receive a task and act in accordance with the solution of the tasks of the main forces, that is, the army. They can never play a major role. They always contribute to the solution of the main task both in place and in time - at the fronts. That is, the main thing is the controllability of the guerrilla struggle. And all his life, where possible, and in his writings - Ilya Grigorievich has textbooks, monographs, manuals, collections of characteristic examples - he carries out this idea that only controlled movement can be effective and useful. Otherwise, a local partisan leader who has acquired this or that fame degenerates into a bandit, as, for example, was the case with Makhno or other partisans who, having no stable leadership, degenerated into militants, became anarchists. Ilya Grigorievich always stood in the position of organized management. Management by the General Staff or its units on the fronts.

- In the most difficult time, in December 1941, when he proposed doing such sabotage and partisan actions, Stalin did not accept him, and his idea was simply rejected. He almost got capital punishment.

- The fact is that this is, of course, true, but perhaps not entirely true. There are different opinions about Stalin today. For him, the autumn and early winter of 1941 was a most difficult time. And he could study any proposal that could change the situation on the fronts. And Ilya Grigorievich really sat in his waiting room for a long time, waiting for a call. He came to him with a plan for a strategic operation to disrupt the communications of the rear of the German troops in the occupied territory. Because the development of events at the front depended on how the enemy was supplied with ammunition, fuel and other necessary means. If he had reported to Stalin, it is not known how further events would have developed. They could take on a completely different character. But this did not happen, because the most difficult, most difficult situation on the fronts, I think, did not allow Stalin to accept it. He knew who Starinov was. And he instructed Mehlis to conduct a preliminary conversation. Mehlis, of course, is known from history, what kind of person. And he told Ilya Grigoryevich - he also knew him - that here you are expressing a whole series of crazy thoughts. "The armies are surrendering, the fronts are retreating, and you are proposing to stop the German offensive with some kind of mines. You can only "load" the leader with your idea. And I would ask you not to raise this issue anymore. We forgave you for a lot in Spain when you said that this is not the case with us, and this is not the case in the preparation of the partisan movement. This time we will not forgive you. I would like this 46

the conversation influenced your attitude to the matter. "Of course, it is difficult to say how events would have turned. I recently talked with Ilya Grigorievich. I say: Ilya Grigorievich, what if Stalin had received you? I think that he knew, and knew well, many questions of the partisan fight. According to Tsaritsyn, on a number of other events. Communicating with Voroshilov, with Budyonny, he discussed many issues one way or another. Ilya Grigorievich answered: if there was success, then they would attribute everything to the leader and, I think that until the end of the war I would not have lived. Because the people who gave the right decisions in those days - their outcome was known. He now has the opinion that this could be positive for the Fatherland, but personally for him it would end sadly.

Anna Kornilovna Obrucheva

All these years, amazing women walked side by side with Ilya Grigorievich. This outstanding person and companions chose unique ones for himself. They were related by the same character traits that were inherent in Ilya Grigorievich - devotion to his work, reaching fanaticism, cheerfulness, courage and love of freedom.

Ilya Grigorievich met his first wife Anna Kornilovna on a train going to Spain. She was appointed translator of Alexander Prokhopyuk (Starinov traveled to Spain under this name).

This brave woman became not only a reliable assistant to Starinov. She participated in most operations. She worked as a translator, a nurse, and made mines on an equal footing with everyone else. She became the soul and inspiration of the squad. Both were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

They got married after Spain. During other wars, she was waiting for him, like many women. Together they lived for fifty years.

Shortly after the beginning of the fascist rebellion in Spain, Spanish students from the International Lenin School, with whom I worked, began to leave. In parting, they invited me to come to them in Spain.

Having learned that several volunteers had left for Spain, I began to seek a direction to Spain as an interpreter, as I knew English and Spanish. After a meeting with the director of the International Leninist School, Claudia Ivanovna Kirsanova (Emelian Yaroslavsky's wife), my request was granted.

Suddenly, a strange woman came to my apartment. Introduced herself: "Urvantseva". And I warned that everything that will be discussed, I should not disclose. Soon she invited me to her service and asked me to fill out a large questionnaire.

Urvantseva read it carefully, did not say anything, but I already guessed what it was. associated with a possible business trip to Spain.

A few days later she came to me and said pleased:

- Well, it's good that I found you at home. Get ready, let's go to the comrades who want to talk with you.

It was so unexpected that I was a little confused, but, looking at the plump, good-natured and smiling Urvantseva, I calmed down.

Half an hour later I found myself in a large institution, not far from my apartment. He was talking to me tall, stately, with large features and thick with military hair, as I later found out - G.L. Tumanyan, my profile was in front of him.

- So, are you ready to go on a long business trip? he asked, affectionately looked at me friendly.

- Ready!

- And the daughter?

- I will arrange a daughter, relatives and friends will look after!

Our conversation did not last long. Guy Lazarevich

was not verbose, but it was felt that he already knew a lot about me, everything was simple and clear. We warmly said goodbye, and I realized that this was not the last meeting. Again I was warned not to tell anyone.

Some time passed, and exactly at the appointed hour I was again in the office Tumanyan, where there was another stranger.

We were introduced, and I learned that I was appointed as his translator.

Meeting with A. Porokhnyak (Starinov): - I

hope you are satisfied, comrade Porokhnyak? - Guy Lazarevich asked the stranger.

- Yes, yes! .. of course, - straightening up in a military way and avoiding my eyes, he answered. Looking at my future boss, I still did not understand what he would do in Spain.

Porokhnyak was in a new, civilian suit, and it was noticeable that he was shy of him - in he guessed the military. This, apparently, was noticed by Guy Lazarevich.

- You are no longer a military engineer of the 3rd rank, - he said, - but a citizen ... Alexander Porokhnyak.

Soon, we, along with others leaving for Spain, were received by the commander - S.P. Uritsky.

Semyon Petrovich, with some ~~talked~~ of inner enthusiasm, warned that there were many difficulties and dangers ahead, but we must definitely justify the high trust placed in us. He recalled the great trials that our people endured in the war against the White Guards and foreign invaders in 1918-1920.

Finishing the conversation, Uritsky said:

- I hope you will do everything to help the Spanish people defend freedom and democracy in the fight against fascist rebels and interventionists!

We spent the night in Warsaw, drove through Czechoslovakia, to Vienna. The next day we arrived in Paris by express train. We were met and helped to get acquainted with the capital of France. On the evening of November 22, we finally left for Spain.

About Berzin

The next day, Porokhnyak and I were received by a senior military adviser, whom everyone affectionately called "the old man", although he was a little over forty years old.

On the way, Porokhnyak talked a lot about the Leninist, a courageous warrior and a talented intelligence officer, Yan Karlovich Berzin, but I was worried when I went to see him, and, as it turned out, in vain. Everything was easier than expected. The gunpowder asked for Madrid.

- Will not work! The situation has changed. I leave you here... I'll have to start small...,
- said the old man.

Then he spoke about the losses of the Nazis near Madrid, about the impregnability of the defense of the capital.

- It is important for you that there is no solid front line in other areas, - said Jan Karlovich, smiling. At this time, an assistant entered and

reported that two more had arrived, giving their names.

- Very well! - welcoming, said the senior adviser. - Meet: Porokhnyak, Obrucheva, and this is Sproglis and Citron. Comrade Porokhnyak, help Sproglies with mines, they can be made on the spot from improvised materials, as you taught partisans in our schools.

In parting, Berzin said:

- The Spanish people are very good people, they need help to defend their freedom and independence. Let's go to General Yvon, he will arrange everything.

On the way, Porokhnyak told me about how Pyotr Kyuzis (that was actually the name of Ya.K. Berzin) took part in a raid in the spring of 1906 with the aim of requisitioning funds for party needs. V.I. spoke positively about these operations in the Latvian region. Lenin. During this operation, Berzin was wounded and captured by the police. Then he was not yet seventeen, and this saved him from execution, but he was hidden in prison. After leaving prison, Kyuzis worked actively in Riga, writing anti-government leaflets and distributing them. His underground party work was interrupted by a new arrest and deportation to the Irkutsk province. The First World War began. Petr Kazius got fake documents, turned into Jan Karlovich Berzin and fled to Riga, where he continued to work in the Bolshevik party underground, participated in the Great October Revolution, in the armed defense of Soviet power.

Porokhnyak talked about his meetings with Berzin in the early thirties.

Berzin made a big impression on me. Something in him was sincere, charming, and at the same time so determined that it was impossible to forget.

When later we learned about the exploit of Sorge, the role of Jan Karlovich in the formation of this hero-scout.

Contrary to our expectations, General Yvon turned out to be a Soviet man. He did everything so that Porokhnyak, as Berzin said, immediately began to work with a small group of partisans, and turned Porokhnyak into Rudolf Wolf, and me into Louise Kurting. Unfortunately, later this conspiracy often helped us not so much as hindered us ... The Spaniards knew that we were Russians, and were surprised that we were not Ivans and Marys, but Wolfs and Louises.

The next day, we, with the newly minted Rudolf, went down to the hotel lobby. The day promised to be hot, and I put on my hat. Before entering the hall, a security guard stopped me and politely said:

- Signorita, let me give you some good advice. Remove and leave your hat here. Listen to me! And what's good, the anarchists will take you for a fascist, and then you won't be in trouble.

I came back and left the hat once and for all. She put on a black beret.

xxx

By the evening of the second day, after the group left the enemy rear, Mikhail Koltsov came to visit us. He was very like a Spaniard in dress and behavior, and he spoke Spanish like a true castellano.

The news of the arrival of Mikhail Koltsov at the base alarmed its entire staff. Koltsov was well known at that time not only by us, the Soviet people. His press appearances inspired the Republicans in their struggle against the rebels and fascist interventionists. Everyone wanted to see this combat "novinar", as Ivan Bolshoy called it.

- Please introduce me to the participants in the train crash near Cordoba, - Mikhail Koltsov contacted me, having learned that Rudolf was not at the base.

I complied with his request and a friendly conversation began, but everyone remembered Domingo's order to keep his mouth shut. They spoke freely about the weather, about how wet and tired they were, but no one said where they warmed up and rested. They explained that they had set up a large mine to destroy all the Nazis on the train.

Mikhail Koltsov was very interested in the military actions of the International Brigades behind enemy lines.

- Do all foreign comrades know Spanish? Koltsov asked Domingo.

- No! The captain waved his hand. - Two Yugoslavs, Italians and French, understand, can explain themselves, while others, when they entered the detachment, knew a few dozen words and nothing more, and now everyone can explain themselves.

- And what about the local population? Can immediately notice that foreigners?

- Our groups take everything they need to the rear and do not turn to the local population. Only Spaniards are involved in our work among the population and relations with it, - Domingo answered.

- Well, what if someone falls behind at night? Koltsov asked.

So far no one has been left behind. - There is a compass. Come out!

- Why did you join the partisans? Koltsov turned to Juan Grande. B - Because that he came to Spain to fight against the Nazis, - he answered.

- But, you can also fight at the front, there are also a lot of fascists there, it's easier for foreigners there, you don't even need to know the language! - asked Mikhail Efimovich.

- No! In the rear of the fascists it is easier to hit and, most importantly, you hit him where he does not wait and when he himself is on the sidelines. At first I did not understand this myself, but when I saw it, I realized that the rebels in trains and cars were like snakes in cages. Beat them until they crawled out, Juan argued.

Koltsov jotted down notes, but did not ask any more questions on the subject. I haven't heard of anything he talked with Rubio, but noticed that he was pleased with this conversation.

- After the destruction of the train with the flight crew, can the rebels in hot pursuit find and destroy you at your base? Koltsov asked Domingo.

- We will not return to the base behind enemy lines, and the Falangists have short hands to the bases in our rear. In addition, we increase vigilance, relying on the people. With his help, we have already caught several enemy spies. Vile, cowardly creatures, - answered Domingo.

- It's right! But you are not all right with the security. For example, I was not asked for any documents.

- No need! - Domingo calmly answered, - you are known, but a stranger will not wander to us. Our guards have already detained more than one suspicious person and handed it over to the commandant's office, and we are accommodated in the houses of the clergy, and they, these houses, are like small fortresses.

Despite all persuasion, Mikhail Koltsov did not stay overnight. I was in a hurry.

The next day, Ilya Ehrenburg arrived at the base, with a secretary and a portable typewriter. The guest was in no hurry and agreed to spend the night with us.

Domingo began to show Ilya Grigorievich his household, and, first of all, led him to the horse saboteurs.

- What kind of rider is this? - the writer asked in surprise when he saw eight-year-old Antonio sitting on his father's thoroughbred trotter.

- This is my son! Domingo answered proudly.

In honor of the guest, a dinner was arranged, which was attended by almost all who were on base.

Dinner turned into a friendly meeting.

Ilya Ehrenburg showed present placed in photos and obituaries, fascist and pro-fascist newspapers.

- They mourn for the destroyed, complain about the partisans, - the writer noted.

"When the enemy cries and complains, we are having fun," Domingo replied.

- Enemies write, friends write, too, - said Ilya Ehrenburg. - Our friends understand that the more partisans will destroy the rebels in their rear, the fewer enemy warriors will be at the front, the sooner there will be victory.

Finally, tired but satisfied, the writer went to rest.

In the morning he said goodbye to the partisans and left, saying:

- I will write, but with full observance of secrecy.

"Very well," said the captain.

"Just so that it doesn't go sideways for us," asked Rudolfo.

Ilya Erenburg did indeed write about the train wreck, fulfilling his promise to us.

- Yes! Great conspiracy! But now we are recognized and could not blame the local partisans," said Domingo, when I translated to him an essay by Ilya Ehrenburg, published in Izvestia on March 23, 1937.

Angel Poso Sandovan

Angel and I met at Ilya Grigorievich's house. Before leaving for Spain, Angel went to say goodbye to Ilya Grigorievich. The meeting took place on May 8, 1999. In addition to Angel, the meeting was attended by several people, one way or another connected with the Spaniards.

- Angel, that in Spain they know about the 14th Corps, which Ilya actually created Grigoryevich?

Angel: You know, I myself was surprised when, speaking at the University of Madrid, among the many questions that I was asked was this: What happened to the 14th partisan corps? When I reported that the founder of this corps - the Soviet adviser - was alive, it made a huge impression on the young students. Send questions. The fact is that in Spain the war officially ended on April 1, 1939. Officially. But many Spaniards did not give up and went into the partisans. Among these partisans were Starinov's students. This is now remembered, because after forty years of Francoism there was a huge interest in our history. The Francoists strangled not only the country, but also history. And when I said that the partisans from the 14th Corps not only took an active part in the liberation of France, because the first partisans in France were Spaniards, this

made an impression. By the way, and then, even among the partisans of Fidel Castro there were partisans of the 14th Corps. - Pupils of Ilya Grigorievich?

- Pupils of Ilya Grigorievich. So remember him. After the fall of the Spanish Republic, the Spaniards fought: 27 commando brigades in France. They participated in saving Paris and Marseilles. They were very active in Italy and, together with the Italians, helped the Italians liberate almost the entire north of Italy and captured Mussolini himself. They fought in Belgium, fought in Yugoslavia, where there were many experienced Yugoslavs who went through the combat path of partisan struggle in the 14th Corps.

The first de Gaulle tanks that entered Paris bore the inscriptions "Madrid" and "Don Quixote". These are de Gaulle's first tanks. I can add. On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began, and already on June 27, a group of Spanish volunteers - 150 internationalists - were already wearing the uniform of the Soviet army, although we did not even have passports. We were stateless and had to report every three months to the OIR. But we believed that it was our duty, because we beat the Soviet comrades who helped us during the Civil War. And pilots, and tankers, and gunners. You know, the largest military leaders also passed through Spain - Malinovsky, General Kuznetsov. I must say that the first word I learned in Russian was "comrade". It was an instructor who taught me how to handle "Maxim" - a machine gun. Therefore, when the Patriotic War began, we had no choice. Although before that we already had some disagreements with the Soviet government. We did not understand the non-aggression pact. So that we communicate with these fascists, with the executioners of Guernica? But the time has come, the First Separate Special Purpose Motorized Rifle Brigade was created at the Dynamo stadium. The Spaniards entered it, but not only the Spaniards. There were internationalists - Germans, Italians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Bulgarians, Hungarians and so on. By the way, I have now been specially invited to the opening of a memorial plaque at the Dynamo stadium, where there will be an evening, if I may say so. This will be a different conversation, because we Spaniards have been fighting for a long, long time to be allowed to erect a modest monument to our guys who gave their lives for the Soviet homeland. And it turned out just blasphemy when they opened a monument near Novgorod to the legionnaires of the Blue Division. Who helped Hitler, who defiled Peterhof, who helped strangle Leningraders during the blockade. But we, that is, our guys who fought for Soviet power, could not erect a monument to our own ... Later I will say, I don't remember how in Russian. Illegitimate victories, so to speak. We began to seek permission under Gorbachev. Then there were many still living veterans. We only asked for permission. Refusal. We turned to the first secretary of the city committee ... of the Moscow city committee of the party. Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. Refusal. By the way, with great words, that is, guys, how well you are doing that ... On the 50th anniversary of the victory, they turned to Luzhkov. We wanted a modest, small monument. We were asked to say exactly what we want. After numerous refusals, we received a letter from the Moscow City Council, where it was written that no monuments would be erected in Moscow until 2020. We said that we would not live to see that time. In short, in Madrid, not far from the capital, a monument was erected to the Soviet volunteers who died in Spain. 187 people died in the Spanish War. They are by name, in Russian and in Spanish. This is such a monument. Luzhkov made a counterproposal. Of course, he says, I was a boy then. On Poklonnaya Hill, on the Walk of Fame, the first monument will be to the Spaniards. But why not a small chapel? I say, what does the chapel have to do with it? Most Spaniards were non-believers, communists. What's with the chapel? But no money was found for the chapel either. So far they haven't done anything. It's a shame not only for us. For the common cause that we defended. And even more so when there were people who allowed a monument to the Nazi thugs to be erected on Soviet soil.

Very Beautiful monument. Spaniards no

XXX

- Ilya Grigorievich, did you know the husband of Anna Ivanovna Vieske?

- I mourned his death. This is great... This is a hero of heroes.

- And who was he?

- Spaniard. He was my saboteur. He was still young, and I do not know what he would have become in peacetime. Oh, he was a hero, namely a hero who could damage the enemy, staying alive.

- And how did you meet him?

- And I met him ... I took him to me through Domingo Ungria.

- Anna Ivanovna, how did you meet him?

AI: I graduated from the Pedagogical College in 1942. And schools in Moscow did not work. And the district committee of the Komsomol sent me to work at the Lokomotiv stadium in a children's sports school. There was a card system then, it was impossible to exist without cards, so I went. Moreover, the district committee of the Komsomol entrusted me with such work. And inside the stadium

Lokomotiv was a very large school and an international brigade was formed in this school. There were Spaniards, Vietnamese, Bulgarians, Czechs. And I met him there, and my friend introduced me.

- But as?

AI: My friend did not work for some time, and it was difficult to exist without cards. And she asked me: Anya, introduce me to one of the Spaniards. I don't know anyone, I don't talk to them. She says okay, okay. In the evening we will go dancing with you. I answer no. (At that time I entered the Pedagogical Institute at the Faculty of Geography). I have astronomy today, I can't miss it in any case. I don't go to dances at all, I don't have time, I work, but in the evenings ... But nevertheless, she went and met a Spaniard. On the second day I go to work, and she sits with him on the bench. We said hello and I passed by. After a while, she says to me: He has a friend, he walks with us all the time, let me introduce you to him. I again refused because, firstly, he is a foreigner, and secondly, I simply do not need it. I had a young man who was at the front. No no. She says: Well, at least once go with us, at least somewhere, to the movies or to dances. Well, somewhere once. And she brings ... We had such a little room, a desk. She brings him in and says: Meet me. He says: Volodya. I immediately had a doubt: Volodya is a Russian name, and she introduces me to a Spaniard. I answer: Nina. He: And your name is not Nina. Me: Your name is not Volodya either. Because there was a conspiracy at that time, they were not allowed to reveal their name, and they were who Grigory was ... He was both Grigory and Volodya. He says: Well then, go to hell with Madre. I say: Well, you too. It was our first acquaintance. A year later... Well, how are they being formed, leaving for the front in partisan detachments. Then they come again for a while, then leave again. So the year went on.

A friend is getting married to her Spaniard and I'm invited to the wedding. I tell Mara, I can't go because I have nothing to go. I only had one dress. She says I have one dress too. Let's change with you. You will be in mine, and I will be in yours. We switched, and I came to this wedding. And Jose - that was Volodya's name - apparently remembered me. We sat diagonally across the table. And he invites me to dance. Angel, I think it was the only Spaniard who couldn't dance? Yes? And, in general, the Spaniards are cheerful, cheerful people, and they know how to dance and sing. What's more, they have an excellent ear for music. He knew only one song - "Through the valleys and the hills" and not a single song, there is no rumor. He ruined all my shoes. And my shoes were new. We sold a card for soap, tea, coupons and bought shoes. The only shoes were, and he ruined them. And he says: Here I will bring from the task, we bring a lot, they give us, there is nowhere to go, I will buy shoes, don't worry. Well, of course, no shoes were bought.

And after this wedding, they again leave for the front. Another year has passed. They have a son, Federico. And they invite me as a godmother, and José is invited as a godmother. We meet with him again. Fate. Yes. We met again. He says: Anya, let's get married, and we will soon have a child. I say - no, I'm studying at the institute, the war is not over yet ... In 1945, this boy turns one year old. Again we meet. Apparently, it was fate for us to get married. When I brought him to meet my mother, she immediately said: Anya, you will not marry him. Can't speak Russian...

- Really couldn't?

AI: Well, in general, he spoke Russian poorly. And then he was curly and black. She says some kind of black man, she looks like a black man. And the director of the pedagogical school influenced our wedding. I lived at the Pedagogical School, because dad was given a room there. He worked as a stoker. We lived in this room. She says You know, Anya, you invite him for a conversation, I want to talk to him. Well, I invited him, she talked to him. Then he says: Well, why are you friends with some boys. Look what a solid person. He is nine years older than you and such a combat characteristic. He fought in Spain, fought here. I think he is a very worthy person.

We're going to sign. There was a registry office near our house on 9th Sokolnicheskaya. We arrive there. I say: "You know, Jose, I've changed my mind. I need to graduate from the institute, let's better another time." He replies: What are you! I have already announced to everyone in part, everyone is already congratulating me. What position are you putting me in? No, we'll sign. Signed. On December 31, 1952, he received Soviet citizenship. He celebrated New Year 1953 as a citizen of the Soviet Union. This calmed me down a bit.

- Ilya Grigorievich, how did Jose fight?

I.G.: He fought like this: if he was given a task, then you could be sure that it will be fulfilled.

- Did it happen that he did not complete the task?

I.G.: No. In the most difficult conditions, in the North Caucasus, when the likelihood performance was not high-percentage, he was performing.

How did he manage to stay alive?

IG: And he is so quick-witted. Smart, resourceful and resilient. IN Our business requires intelligence and endurance. He had both.

- Tell me, was Anna Ivanovna a worthy wife to him?

IG: I think it's better not to find it.

AI: Thank you.

- Did you have children?

AI: In 1946, a daughter was born. And at our wedding there was the wife of one of the Spaniards - Carmen. And she danced very beautifully, very much. Spanish dances. And my mother fell in love with this woman. And he says: Anya, if you have a daughter, then we will definitely call her Carmen. A daughter was born, and they really named her Carmen. Mom says to me: Anya, we are from Ryazan. In a Christian way, we must baptize her in the church. She went to church to negotiate. On Preobrazhenskaya Square, where the metro was built, there was a very beautiful little church. Very. It was taken down, unfortunately. Mom comes to the priest, brings a metric. It says: Vieska Karmen Hozeevna. Do you understand? Batiushka says: You know, she is a Catholic with you. We have no right to baptize her in the Russian church. Mom says: How is it? I am from Ryazan. Mother - Ryazan. We are Christians. And the father says: no, it doesn't matter. Here baptisms cost 75 rubles, and you will pay 150. Then we will baptize you. Then we will baptize your daughter and granddaughter. After baptism, she was given the name Katerina. Russian. But after that, the mother did not go to church for ten years. How so? So you can buy God? If you can't, then you can't. Baptized - took twice as much.

So my daughter is a baptized Katerina, and so is Vieska Karmen Khoseevna.

- Were you happy?

AI: I was happy. Why - because he is very responsive. He is a very good person. But only he was in very poor health. Literally in 1949, he fell ill with tuberculosis. And I was sick for many years. Why? First, he was in a concentration camp in Spain, in France he was in a concentration camp. And in Spain he was generally sentenced to death. He was replaced by 30 years in prison.

Angel: Is it in '34? Jose Vieske - participant in the October uprising of miners in Asturias. The miners then rebelled and within two weeks established Soviet power. This uprising was brutally suppressed by General Franco with the help of the Moroccan legion. José Viesca is one of the participants in this uprising. Husband of Anna Ivanovna. He was first sentenced to death, and then nevertheless released from prison with the victory of the Popular Front in 1936.

AI: Yes, in 1934, exactly. And in the concentration camp, when the republic was defeated, his imprisoned, he spent two years in a concentration camp in France. And of course health was undermined.

- And four years of war in Russia.

AI: Yes, and then in Russia. And so health, of course undermined. **- Ilya Grigorievich, tell me, did Jose ever complain about his health, when did you fight?**

IG: I don't remember anyone complaining about their health. An amazing thing. I myself was never in the Civil War due to illness. And during the Great Patriotic War, I did not know illnesses for almost four years.

- Did you ever get sick?

I.G.: Impossible. Something will hurt, and you will take some funds yourself and you will not go anywhere.

- Well, the most important medicine is alcohol?

I.G.: Yes.

Erkebek Abdulaev Before my

second trip to Afghanistan, "grandfather" Starinov showed me a Yugoslav magazine with an article about the underground war in Vietnam. The thought immediately flashed: but something similar exists in Afghanistan! The fact is that, perhaps, since the time of Alexander the Great, Afghans have been digging underground tunnels-water conduits - kyarizes. In this sultry, sun-dried country, you can survive only at the expense of groundwater. And therefore, from generation to generation, peasants dig wells, sometimes up to 50 meters deep, connecting them

between each other by underground passages. Almost every village has a widely branched network of karezes around which life-giving moisture oozes, merging into thin streams and coming to the surface somewhere hundreds of meters away to give life to orchards and vineyards.

But kyarizes at all times and during all wars served as a reliable refuge from a stronger enemy. From the very beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan, the Soviet Army also faced the problem of underground partisans. True, our sappers did not stand on ceremony, using explosives and gasoline to the point and out of place, leaving behind huge craters in the places of blown up wells. Water, of course, stopped flowing to the fields, and the peasants, left without food, went to the Mujahideen.

According to intelligence data, dushmans constantly improved the systems of underground communications. However, we had few specific schemes of underground structures at our disposal. However, it could not be otherwise. After all, disparate self-defense detachments, often fighting not only with us, but also among themselves, built these passages and shelters as they pleased and strictly kept their secret from enemies and friends.

The huge apple orchard where the school was located was riddled with a network of unexplored karezes. This led me to the idea to include the topic of underground warfare in the training plan for the Afghan special forces.

In the first set, we had only 28 cadets. All of them are brave warriors, former Mujahideen, with two to six years of combat experience, including against the Soviet Army. But even these hardened fighters did not burn with the desire to climb underground. Even more so, more than any booby traps or a dagger strike from around the corner, I was afraid of snakes and scorpions, with which any Afghan well is teeming with.

Our lessons consisted of two parts: brief theoretical preparation and field training with the use of military equipment.

We started with engineering reconnaissance of the approaches to the wells and with the deployment of two cover groups. Before the use of explosives, the cadets had to shout loudly into the well (taking precautions so as not to get a bullet from below) the demand to go to the surface to everyone who was there. Then two RGD-5 grenades should have been thrown. F-1 fragmentation underground is not as effective. After that, it was supposed to repeat the order and warn that the karez would now be blown up.

The depth of the well was determined either by the sound of a thrown stone falling, or by means of a solar "beam" directed downward by a mirror. If invisible zones were found, a grenade was thrown on a rope of the required length. And only after that, an explosive charge was lowered on the detonating cord.

^{IN} Captured Italian anti-vehicle mines, which were in abundance, were usually used as a charge. As soon as the mine reached the bottom, a second charge weighing 800 grams was lowered on another segment of the detonating cord 3-4 meters long. Both cords were connected together at the top, and a UZRGM fuse from a hand grenade was attached to them. In order not to accidentally fall into the well, they simply pressed it down with a stone or clung to a driven peg.

It took about three minutes for a trained crew of two to prepare to blow up a 20-meter well. After that, it was necessary to pull out the ring, and release the bracket of the grenade fuse, and after four seconds an explosion was heard. Demolitionists, who had only to bounce from the charge by 5-6 meters, had only to dodge the stones, as if from the mouth of a volcano, flying out of the well.

The trick of this method of detonation was that the upper charge exploded a fraction of a second earlier than the lower one and tightly clogged the well with gases. The shock wave of the lower charge, reflected from the upper cloud of gases, rushed back down and into the side passages and tunnels. The space between the two charges was in a zone of lethal excess pressure: this technique we called the "stereo effect".

Returning from a business trip, I again came to "Grandfather" to discuss with him the results of his idea.

Irina Ilyinichna Ilya Grigorievich Komarov

is surrounded by many people who were his closest associates, dear to his heart students and, of course, who know Ilya Grigorievich better than me, who have more right to share their thoughts about him as a person and as a professional.

Where would I start my story about Ilya Grigorievich? For some, he is the founder of the Russian special forces, for others, he is the leading theorist of guerrilla warfare. For me he

the man who survived! He survived in situations where many people broke down. And not only withstood, survived, but fulfilled the main commandment of a soldier - he retained his combat capability.

I met Ilya Grigoryevich Starinov in 1995. An article was published about him in the Soldier of Fortune magazine, in which I worked, and together with its author, we went to take the fee and magazines to Ilya Grigorievich. At that time, I associated Starinov weakly with some school memories: they told us something at school, but what ...?

We were warmly welcomed by Ilya Grigorievich and his wife Tatyana Petrovna Matrosova. They were invited to visit more often.

This meeting was followed by others. By that time we had already created the Vympel almanac. Then one of the students of the "grandfather" - that's what they call him behind his back - Erkebek Abdulaev offered to publish a book by Ilya Grigorievich in Vympel. Starinov was ninety-two years old when we began work on his manuscript of "Diversant's Notes". But Starinov already wrote poorly at that time. Led up the eyes. So we started working with a voice recorder. He dictated the notes, and then they were transcribed. The deciphered notes were again read to Ilya Grigorievich, and he corrected them again. Thus the first book was born. So the second was born, so the third was born. He wrote them not for glory, but for those who today defend their Fatherland and those who will defend it tomorrow.

Preparing for publication his book, "Notes of a Saboteur", and later "Delayed Action Mines", I had the opportunity to get acquainted not only with the personal archive of Ilya Grigorievich, but also with those numerous documents that are scattered in many military archives.

Behind numerous reports, memorandums, letters with a request to sort it out, the image of a person of phenomenal working capacity and often striving to defend the correctness of his position is revealed to his own detriment.

As a researcher, Ilya Grigoryevich had a unique opportunity to examine the results of sabotage actions of partisans immediately after the liberation of the territories. Entire volumes of such surveys have been preserved in his personal archive. Therefore, no one knew better than him who, where and what blew up. And the conclusions that he made based on the results of these surveys would not be forgiven by any other specialist, only him.

There is not a single person who played a role in the life of our country, whom Starinov would not know, and who would not know him. This list is huge and amazing! These are Makhno and Budyonny, Yakir and Berzin, Stalin and Khrushchev. By the way, Brezhnev was under his command for some time. He was well acquainted with the leaders of the Comintern, Georg Dmitrov, Palmiro Togliatti, Dolores Ibarruri. He remained in correspondence with the latter until her death.

By the way, when the current king of Spain ascended the throne, he sent Ilya Grigorievich an invitation to settle in Spain, where he was allocated a four-room apartment in Madrid. However, thanking His Majesty, Starinov said that at his age one does not change the Motherland.

What struck me during the period of work on the book and continues to amaze me to this day is the depth and sharpness of his thought, the fundamentality and originality of ideas that are not always accessible to the understanding of his younger interlocutors.

Many have now rushed to revise history, but is this right given to anyone? It seems to me that there is hardly another such person who participated in four wars, not only prepared the number of students who would make up an army. He was involved in the development of decisions not only on a tactical, but also on a strategic level. Moreover, he considered these events not from the point of view of a person who wants to show his place in history, and even more so not from the point of view of a person who wants to denigrate someone. He sought to give the key to the right decisions to the new generation.

If there is already a tendency to revise history, then it may be worth restoring justice to this person today. Today is such a time that we need it more than he does.

By the way, over the past few years, his students have repeatedly applied to various authorities about conferring the title of Hero on Ilya Grigorievich.

Once I asked him, if you were awarded the title of Hero of Russia today, how would you react to this. Ilya Grigoryevich, after a pause, threw the phrase: "Why?!"

I sometimes think about the secret of his longevity. There are five of them. The first is an obsession with what you do. The second is restlessness and curiosity. The third is kindness and philanthropy. The fourth is love for the Fatherland. The fifth is love for a woman.

PART 6

Prologue

In 1967, the author of this book managed to stay for almost a month visiting the People's Hero of Yugoslavia, Major General Ivan Harish. The meeting took place 30 years after the joint participation in the anti-fascist struggle in Spain.

Ivan Harish left Yugoslavia as a young man and worked in Argentina, where he learned to speak Spanish. Two years later, fate brought him to Canada, where he mastered English and French. At the end of 1936 he arrived in Spain.

In early January 1937, he joined the partisan formation commanded by Domingo Ungria. He quickly mastered the basics of organization and tactics of partisan operations, mastered the ability to inflict damage on the enemy, preserving and increasing his forces. In the formation of Domingo Ungria, Ivan Harish went from my translator to adviser to the sabotage brigade of the 14th partisan corps. When the Spanish Republic fell, Ivan Harish was interned in France. When France fell and the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, Ivan Harish fled the camp and reached Yugoslavia through Germany and Austria. Here he organized a small sabotage group and in September 1941, with the help of a makeshift mine, derailed a military train from a high embankment opposite the village where the Ustashe lived (Croats who assisted the Germans). During the war, the sabotage group of I. Harish turned into a partisan detachment, and then into a partisan formation, which inflicted significant damage on the Nazis. The exploits of Ivan Harish were highly appreciated by the people. He was awarded the title of General and People's Hero of Yugoslavia.

In our conversations with him, Ivan Harish told me that more than a dozen American pilots, whose planes were shot down over the territory of Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania, landed behind enemy lines in public, went to the location of the Yugoslav liberation army. This was by the fact that the pilots of the downed aircraft had maps and were well prepared for operations in the parts facilitated occupied territory.

Chapter 1

At the end of October 1944, in the morning in the small but picturesque Hungarian town of Szeged, piercing air raid signals were heard. There was an ever-growing engine of Soviet aircraft flying from the west. The soldiers and officers of the headquarters of the N-th German army hurried to the shelters. hum

Planes flew to the side, but there was no end. Outside squads heard the engines of a noticeably descending aircraft. Suddenly, hysterical hum rays searchlights in the sky and, crossing, lit up a lonely car. Tracer bullets streaked towards the plane. It seemed stuck that they were penetrating the airship, and it was flying, descending, as if it was already indifferent to both searchlights and tracer bullets.

Barely reaching the railway junction, the plane fell on the cars, and a fire broke out. A few minutes later, when the fiery tongues engulfed and devoured the trains of one park, fountains of flame suddenly flared up almost in the center of the station tracks of the junction. The fiery tongues reached the ammo train.

Explosions began - sometimes weak, sometimes strong. They seemed to put out the fire, but soon even larger flames began to appear again, and the entire railway junction turned into a huge conflagration.

There was a shootout on the outskirts of the city, but soon everything calmed down, only vehicles were sent to put out the fire.

The command of the garrison did not immediately learn that during a Soviet air raid on military facilities in the Budapest area, one of the aircraft was badly damaged by anti-aircraft artillery fire. The navigator, Lieutenant Mikhail Ogurtsov, was wounded in the chest by fragments of shells and died, one of the two engines and a radio station were disabled, fuel was leaking from a broken tank.

On-board mechanic technician-lieutenant Ivan Dobryakov, a master of all trades, did everything possible to reach his own on one engine, but it was damaged and it was impossible to squeeze full power out of it.

Realizing the impossibility of returning to the base, the commander of the ship, Captain Semyon Petrovich Buntsev, made a decision: the crew to leave the plane with parachutes, and send the damaged combat vehicle to the nearest major railway junction of the enemy.

The crew complied with the order, and everyone left the plane. The captain jumped last when searchlights were already piercing the sky.

"This afternoon, fellow soldiers' friends will find out that Captain Buntsev's plane did not return to base. The fate of the crew is unknown. Olga Kretova? - thought the commander of the ship, descending with a parachute.

Chapter 2. Alone behind enemy lines

Dobryakov was lucky enough to land unnoticed in a large garden. Assembling the parachute, the onboard mechanic gave conditional sound signals, but there was no answer. Voices were heard in the street, someone was talking, someone was walking, loudly tapping with forged heels.

Suddenly, gunfire broke out nearby. Dobryakov's heart skipped a beat. "Have they really noticed one of ours," he thought, and, hiding the parachute under bush, quickly ran to where the shots had just come from.

Having run out into the street, Dobryakov almost came face to face with two gray figures in helmets that seemed to have grown out of the ground. Decided in fractions of a second. The enemy soldiers did not expect a meeting, and the appearance of the pilot stunned them. Dobryakov was ahead of them. Before the Nazis came to their senses, he fired one after another two short bursts from the machine gun. As if knocked down, without a cry, the gray figures fell on the pavement and all around was quiet. The board mechanic wanted to run across the street, but stopped and, one by one, dragged the corpses of the Nazis into the garden, from which he had just left.

"It will be more correct, they won't find it right away," the mechanic reasoned and, taking three grenades, he ran across the street, climbed over the stone fence and began to make his way through the garden to where he heard the shooting. He often stopped, listened, gave prearranged sound signals, but no one responded, and someone else's speech was heard in the distance. Suddenly there was a strong explosion, then a somewhat weaker one.

"Is it really at the railway junction," thought Dobryakov. These distant explosions, and only now he noticed the reflection of the glow of the fire, visibly cheered up the mechanic. Slowly and carefully he walked through the garden, still hoping to find his own, imitating at times the prearranged signal - a double bark, but in vain.

Approaching the outer fence of the garden, the pilot stopped. It was getting light. Two fire engines and two wagons with soldiers rushed down the street at high speed, and Dobryakov stood alone and looked at them from behind a high stone fence.

What to do? In the city, apparently, there are many enemy troops, and he is alone. In I, surveying the surroundings, the mechanic stopped his attention on a dilapidated two-story building. Apparently, a large-caliber bomb hit the house, and one wall of it collapsed, exposing the preserved furnishings of the rooms. On the second floor, near the internal wall pierced by fragments, there were a piano and a sofa. In the basement, under the undestroyed part of the house, a bright light made its way through the dark curtains of the window. Dobryakov decided to hide in the ruins of the house. Hiding among the plantations, unnoticed by anyone, he crawled up to the house, through a half-blocked window he disappeared into the basement under the destroyed part, where there were no signs of the presence of people.

Finding himself in the basement, Dobryakov breathed in the sour smell of spoiled vegetables, mixed with a nasty mouse stink. Something stirred in the darkness, a squeak was heard. The mechanic stopped at the window and listened. A faint light penetrated the basement through a half-blocked window, and when his eyes got used to the twilight, the flight engineer went along the wall to inspect his shelter. In the basement there were a lot of vegetables in barrels, in bulk on racks and on the floor. On one rack, he found apples. Most of them had gone bad, but Dobryakov picked out a few by touch and quenched his thirst. Continuing his reconnaissance in the darkness, he felt for the door, but it did not open, apparently, it was closed or littered from the outside. After reviewing the basement, Dobryakov again went to the window. Explosions were heard from afar, and sometimes separate shots and short bursts were heard very close.

Dobryakov could not believe that he was left alone behind enemy lines. He kept peering into the garden, listening, waiting for something and thinking about where his friends in arms were now: Temkin, Kretova. As a precaution,

he decided to fill up the window so that an uninvited guest would not use it and carefully pulled several bricks towards it. He left only small cracks and through them for a very long time watched what was being done in the garden.

Chapter 3

Dobryakov did not know that the crew commander Anatoly Temkin was not far away in the mansion of the Germans.

The events experienced by Temkin took place with such speed, as if in an action-adventure movie. Leap into the dark. The jerk of the opened parachute. Landing directly on an enemy patrol on the outskirts of the city. Like a pack of angry dogs, eight Nazis, almost simultaneously with a cry, rushed at one paratrooper and grabbed him.

Glancing angrily at the prisoner and his soldiers, the commander suggested that one unprepossessing soldier take off his fur boots, the fat man to take the fur coat, and he himself took prisoner's watch.

The corporal and four soldiers led Temkin into the city. The appearance of the prisoner was unsightly: his hands were tied behind his back, a tunic without a belt, riding breeches and socks without shoes.

The escorts led the prisoner past a dilapidated house, in which the rooms exposed by the explosion were visible, turned a corner and approached a high white stone fence. The sentry called the duty officer, and he let them into the yard. They were stopped at the preserved beautiful mansion, and the corporal left to report. Soon he came out together with a full, tall man in a raincoat and ordered to bring the prisoner. Temkin was led into a room where, as if warming up, a lean, slender, tall officer with the rank of major was walking around, with a cigarette in his mouth. A flabby Hitlerite with a large, balding head was sitting at the table. His mouth was half open, his lower lip hung down, revealing large yellow teeth, his eyes looked angrily at the newcomer, and so angrily, as if he wanted to pounce on Temkin. There were several bottles on the table and some nice-smelling snacks.

"Untie him," the major ordered the guards.

The major came close to Temkin. A thin, well-shaven face, a pleasant smell of expensive perfumes, Anatoly noticed an attentive sharp look from under frowning whitish eyebrows, a barely noticeable excitement. It seemed that the Nazi at times looked soothingly and kindly at the exhausted prisoner, but then in his eyes and on his face, behind the fake smile, one could see either malice or contempt.

Finally, taking a step forward and looking straight at the captured pilot, the major spoke to him. in Russian with a slight foreign accent.

- You, I see, are a pilot, not a saboteur, as I was informed. What a score. Saved and now you are dealing with your colleague. I am also a pilot and was also shot down behind enemy lines. Do not be afraid! We respect brave people and nothing bad will happen to you. Did you jump from a downed plane?

Temkin nodded.

- Your position, rank, surname?

"You know that from my documents," answered Temkin.

- They don't answer. Who left the plane with you and who stayed there, I hope you tell me before we know it ourselves?

- I left the plane first, - answered Temkin, - I don't know about the others.

- You are our prisoner, we release you from your oath. What you say, no one will know. If you tell valuable information, we will give money and let you go free, if you want, we will send you home to your mother. If you don't speak, the end will be bad, your mother won't see her son. And forget about the oath, you surrendered, and surrender according to your laws is treason. Your newspapers write: - Better death than captivity. You are smart, you want to live. You can live and live well if you keep talking. Where is your flight uniform? - asked the major, as if he had not noticed before what the prisoner was brought in.

- Your soldiers have taken! answered Temkin, still agitated.

- It's a misunderstanding! You can't do that, it's so bad. You can't take things from a prisoner. I will order you to return. What things did our soldiers take from you?

- They took the watch and everything that was in the pockets - money, a letter, documents, - said Temkin Major.

- What a misunderstanding! Everyone will be back! I will order the guilty to be severely punished.

And the major called the soldier, ordered him to immediately go to catch up with the guards and bring him corporal who delivered the prisoner.

Temkin stood and thought about what else the Nazis would do. The major was completely different from many of the Nazi officers he saw on the posters, which he had read and heard about. In front of him stood a delicate, smart, cleanly dressed and well-shaven officer, he does not scream and does not torture, but wants to give him all the things taken from him, but the pilot knew that in front of him was a fascist intelligence officer, perhaps more vile and treacherous than others the Nazis.

- Well, now, Lieutenant Temkin, you can be free.

- Now you will be fed, rest, your things will be returned to you and you will be sent to other prisoners. Before parting, we'll talk again. - And the major turned away from Temkin, as if he had not been in the room. He pressed the button and when a soldier came, he gave him an order and Temkin was taken to a small but well-furnished room. Leaving the prisoner in a room with a German soldier, the big man went to the major and received instructions from him. Returning, he set the table and invited Temkin to eat and drink with him while his things were brought. Tall man showed him a place and sat next to him on the right, a soldier with the face of a eunuch sat on the left.

- Eat, there is no poison, we will eat with you, - the tall man said in a dull voice.

No matter how hard Tiomkin tried to calm himself, he did not have an appetite. To him I was thirsty, but there was no water.

- The water here is bad, - the big man explained in a language barely understandable to Temkin, - we will drink beer, it is like water.

Wanting to quench his thirst, Temkin began to drink beer. After drinking a little, he felt that the beer was fortified. Noticing Temkin's intoxication, the soldiers began to treat him to a strengthened one and drank along with him. In Temkin he felt that he was a little tipsy, but he stopped in time and began to drink less, trying to get his guards drunk. When the meal was over, the tall man took Temkin into a small room where there was a bed, a table, and two chairs. There he gave him paper, pointed to the ink, and said:

- Census all your thing, I'll give it away.

After Temkin left, the officers began talking among themselves:

- It is necessary to use the prisoners, but I can't talk to them like you do, and you can't talk to the Russians, - answered Rabbe. - You did not work on their territory and now you can invent various tricks, but I cannot. I'm too angry at all the Reds, and therefore I can't be alright with the prisoners. The very sight of them infuriates me.

Rabbe could not speak any more, the look of his large bloodshot eyes began to wander, as if he was looking for where the prisoner had gone. With trembling hands he poured and drank a large mug of beer in one gulp, quickly got up and, seeing himself in a large mirror, said sullenly:

- Here, my dear novice intelligence officer, look - I'm only 40 years old, and I'm already turning gray and bald, - and he sat heavily in a chair, - this is the result of a three-year struggle against Soviet partisans and saboteurs.

- But now we are no longer in this terrible Russia, it is calmer here. In now we are dealing with anti-fascists, their agitators and saboteurs. It's not the same anymore.

Major Wolf almost said: "It's not like fighting against well-armed partisans, saboteurs, the communist underground." He knew that Rabbe would become very irritated at these words, and therefore he stopped in time.

Major Wolf knew the true reasons for Rabbe's special hatred for the prisoners. At one time, the Sturmbannfuhrer tried to carry out "interesting" operations with the help of prisoners. Once he "processed" one prisoner and transferred him across the front line to the rear of the Soviet Army with the task of delivering packages to Soviet officers whom he wanted to destroy. The packages contained secretly written directives with the following content:

- "Crow from the Falcon". "In view of the disruption of radio communications, we are forced to send you a courier in whom you can completely trust. Your latest data on the state of the division turned out to be very valuable. By all means, establish contact with us. We listen to you for the first ten minutes of every hour in the dark. The cipher is unchanged. Let us know by radio or by courier when you can listen to us and when it is most convenient for you to transmit information for us. Falcon. "

The prisoner memorized all the information he needed about the addressees. He was categorically warned that if he did not deliver the packages, the Soviet command would be informed that the prisoner had given a subscription, pledging to work in favor of the Gestapo. In Fearing that the recruited would chicken out and not hand over the packages, Rabbe ordered the prisoner to be transferred so that he was caught when crossing the front line.

The soldier in trouble agreed, but let Rabbe down.

Fearing that the packages would be found during the search and he would be caught red-handed, the defector threw them before he went to the location of the Soviet troops. The captured soldier who escaped to freedom reasoned that the Gestapo was much more important than their agents, who held more prominent posts than he, and therefore the Nazis would not tell anyone about him. Happy packages,

sent to Rabbe by two Soviet officers, were picked up by German soldiers, and in the evening they returned to him again. The Gestapo man understood what was the matter and became furious, but decided to send another prisoner with a package before exposing the prisoner who had deceived him. And so that he would not throw them away again before the search, he sewed them into clothes without warning the person being thrown. The prisoner was supposed to, on the instructions of Rabbe, find the officers to whom the packages were intended, and transfer the password he had memorized, after which he would receive a task from them and go deep into the country to conduct reconnaissance. Rabbe again took care that the new contact was detained and searched, and then, according to his calculations, he would frankly confess and compromise the Soviet officers there.

The recruited "runaway prisoner", as Rabbe calculated, was detained at the forefront. An experienced border guard whom he came across for questioning, having discovered the packages during the search, noticed that the defector himself was surprised by the find. The defector locked himself up for a long time, but the fact was obvious: two packages with encrypted letters were found in his clothes and he confessed everything, naming the names of the officers to whom he was supposed to appear and receive their further instructions. An experienced investigator gave the defector the opportunity to appear at the addressees, but the first addressee, the division's chief of staff, Colonel N., detained the "agent" and handed him over to his destination. The second addressee nearly shot the traitor. The Soviet investigator did not fall for the bait, and Rabbe's idea failed.

He wrote Rabbe appeals to the partisans with a call to stop the fight and with promises to provide them with work in their specialty, but again to no avail. The commander of the Fugas partisan detachment sent him a mocking reply that he willingly agreed to stop all struggle against the fascist guards and work in his wartime specialty - to derail military trains - even if the Gestapo did not interfere with him, and he would not touch security.

And Rabbe did not compose anything else, he lost his taste for combinations.

Major Wolf was a young intelligence officer, he took from the Jesuits their insidious methods to get into the souls of people, his motto is - the end justifies the means. He had strong nerves, artistic abilities. On people who did not know him, he could give the impression of a direct generous, very humane and charming person. Not everyone could immediately recognize that his pleasant appearance covered the meanest soul.

After the defeat of the Nazi troops near Stalingrad, Major Wolf lost faith in the victory of Nazi Germany and decided to link his fate with American intelligence. For half a year of work in intelligence on the Eastern Front, he became convinced of the ever-increasing strength of the Soviet Army. In his opinion, there was only one way out - to open the front in the West, capitulate to the Anglo-Americans and give them the opportunity to reach the eastern borders of Germany and thereby save it from the penetration of Russian troops. He believed that the Anglo-Americans would only scold, and one could not expect mercy from the Russians. But he carefully concealed his thoughts even in the most frank conversations with friends. He preached in every possible way the need to push the allies against each other, always stressing that then "we will quickly defeat our enemies."

Having lost faith in victory, Major Wolf began to capitalize on a currency that would not be subject to either confiscation or inflation. In such capital, he considered agents in the rear of the Soviet Army, and he intensively began to recruit them.

Major Wolf and SS Sturmbannführer Rabbe were friends, often went to each other to share impressions and information. Major Wolf handed over to Rabbe those whom he could no longer use for intelligence purposes. Rabbe was a great master of killing - Obersturmführer Klaus Müller, his death machine, took everyone to be destroyed on his last journey.

- It's time for me to go home. I beg you to ask this type how many people jumped out of their plane, - Rabbe turned to Wolf.

- Be calm, I will achieve it, - answered Wolf.

After a short pause, Rabbe stood up heavily, wished success and said goodbye.

After seeing Rabbe off, Major Wolf drank a glass of cognac, ate a sandwich, and called his assistant - Lieutenant Adolf Schwartz. He, as always, appeared with a work card.

"The corporal has arrived, delivering the prisoner," he reported.

- Let me in! I'll show you an interesting number.

The major looked so sternly at the corporal who entered that he shuddered.

- Where are the things of the Russian officer? he asked sternly.

- Distributed among the needy soldiers.

- Immediately deliver everything to me, every single thread. When you need it, I will give it to you. Who took his watch?

- I, - admitted the corporal.

- Let's come here and run for the rest of the things.

The stunned corporal handed over the watch, looking at it as if it had been given to him by his wife. Turning around like a scalded man, he ran out of the mansion and ordered the return of Temkin's things.

When Temkin was brought in for interrogation for the second time, the major and the same smart as him the young lieutenant looked at the watch that gleamed on the prisoner's wrist.

- Well, everything seems to be all right? the major turned to Temkin.

- Yes, so far in order, - answered Tiomkin, who seemed tipsy.

Let's meet and get started. Are you a communist?

- No, non-partisan.

- Why?

- Long business. I didn't want to apply and disturb the ashes of my parents.

- Why?

- Their biography is inappropriate.

- Why?

- They were numbered among the kulaks.

- Amazing. We managed to detain another member of your crew. As you will soon see, it was in vain that we were not warned in time.

The major pressed the button and Dobryakov's parachute was brought into the room.

- Do you know?

- No, - answered Temkin. - Not my parachute.

- Not yours, so whose?

- Don't know!

- Fine.

The major pressed a button, and an elderly thin man in civilian clothes entered. With yellowed fingers he held several photographs. The major took them in his hands and showed one of them to Temkin.

Temkin's hops vanished as if by magic. He saw himself in the company of the Nazis and read over photo is a fabricated appeal on his behalf.

"Bastards! Scoundrels! Provocateurs! Reptiles," the pilot thought indignantly, and the major calmly walked around the room, rubbing his hands. And when Tiomkin calmed down a little, Wolf said to him:

- Don't worry. Why be sad? If you tell me the truth about what I will ask, then no one will see this picture, and you will get the opportunity to live and return home, but if you lie or remain silent, yours will read this call.

And he began to read:

"Comrades and brothers in arms! You have entered a foreign land. Stop! Enough blood. Stop! Otherwise you will perish." And what an ending! "The German army treats us well, go over to her side! See you soon!" And the picture is good! The Soviet pilot clinks glasses with the SS. In Wonderful! The handwriting is so well forged that no one will ever discover the forgery."

As in a dream, Tiomkin listened to the major's murderous words for him. The thought flashed to rush at the provocateur, but the escort stood alert on the side, ready for a flash of anger from the captive.

Overcoming indignation, the Soviet pilot remained calm and thought hard about how to get out of the situation that had arisen, so as not only not to become a traitor, but so that even his enemies could not say the same about him.

"Your life and honor are in your hands," the major continued ingratiatingly. B - Decide. You have two options: tell us everything and live, or die like a traitor cursed by his people.

And Temkin stood and thought.

- I'm waiting. I'm waiting for your reasonable answer, - reminded the major.

- Well, if I tell you everything - what is the guarantee that you will not send this fake again or do not make another provocation.

- Let's speak frankly: it is in our interests not to extradite you, but to throw you back, so that no one would ever think that you were captured by us.

- Caught. There is nothing left for me. Agree. Give me water, - Tiomkin barely squeezed out.

- Here you go! that's another matter.

Temkin was given sparkling water to drink.

And the questions began. The major and his assistant asked, Temkin answered.

- You claim that you jumped alone, but whose parachute is it? the major asked again.

- Mr. Major, I jumped first and, in my opinion, no one else could jump. And the parachute is not familiar to me.

The major began to clarify the location of the airfields. Temkin showed them on the map location.

- But there are models, not planes, and you say that this is a real airfield? - asked the major.

- It's true, there used to be mock-ups, but now fighter planes have been transported there, and in place of the mock-ups there are already real planes, also small, but I saw a lot of them nearby in the woods. Previously, no one was detained close by, but now they began to detain, - Tiomkin assured the Nazis.

"If he lied, it would be bad, if it was true, it would be good," said the major.

"I know," Tyomkin replied.

The lieutenant put the airfield on the map. When he asked Temkin about another airfield on which his unit was based, he said that there really were planes on it, but there were only three of them left, the rest were based on another airfield. Yes, next to the real guns near the airfield there are wooden ones, he convinced the officers.

They looked at each other.

- Why are you telling lies? Are there real guns out there? the lieutenant asked.

- Yes, and there were real guns, I used to see them, but now they have been taken away and put wooden, - answered Temkin.

Temkin spoke so boldly and with conviction that the Germans believed him.

For a long time they interrogated Temkin, but he was already so excited that he told the interrogators more and more about military facilities. The scouts were especially interested in the warehouse of aerial bombs and carefully marked it on the map.

Judging by the mood, the major and another officer were satisfied with the results of the interrogation. Temkin was painfully worried about what had happened. Everything happened so quickly and irreparably! He firmly knew that military secrets should not be given out to the enemy, he himself taught others to keep them and knew how many soldiers captured by the Nazis spat in the face of their tormentors and died without saying anything. But he didn't because of the picture and fake signature. He made another move. And in the memory of Temkin, the image of his first military mentor, Alexei Grigorievich Chizhikov, came up.

"And Kotovsky, when it was necessary, pretended to be the commander of the bandits," - Temkin justified his behavior.

When the interrogation was over, the major glanced at Temkin, as drunkards sometimes look at an empty bottle. The prisoner caught his dismissive look and felt something unkind.

And the major decided how to use the prisoner in the future, who could no longer give him anything to supplement the data on the Soviet Army.

Seeing the pliability of Temkin, the major immediately decided to take over the addresses of people whom he could use in the future by blackmail in his own interests, using for this purpose the captured pilot who was at his disposal.

- With military questions over. If you showed us everything truthfully, in a day or two we can let you go and, if you want, transfer you to yours. And now I ask you to write us personal data about your relatives with your own hand, indicating your last name, first name, patronymic, age, place of residence, appearance, occupation.

And the major listed as many as thirty points by heart and forced Temkin to write them down, then sent him to the room where he was given water and photographed along with the jubilant Nazis.

"What a scoundrel," thought the prisoner, "he wants to find out the addresses of my relatives, send spies or saboteurs to them there, and leave me here as a hostage. No, until the spies get there, our Berlin will be taken. Well, pipes," he decided. "I'll give you such relatives that it's better not to. The most important thing," he thought, "is not to confuse when repeating."

And he began to write data not about his relatives, but about the relatives of his neighbor known to him - police captain Stepan Yegorchuk. When he finished, he even somehow felt better at heart: let them come.

"Stepan has a concept in his passports, he will expose him at once," he thought.

When he handed over the data on relatives, the big man sent them with a soldier to the major.

Lieutenant Schwartz entered the room and said:

- Now you will be taken to the room. Then you will come to me, and I will give you good food and wine. You will sit there for a while like a prisoner of war, and then we will send. If you want - to work, if you want - to Russia.

- And how can you send me to Russia, they will arrest me there, - Tiomkin asked.

- Don't be afraid! This is our business. You will see your mother. We ourselves will let you run where we are we will straighten the front, we will leave you there. No one will know that you were our prisoner.

Tiomkin again had confidence in salvation. The Germans believed him. Late in the evening, he noticed that the sentry had gone away, and without a moment's hesitation, opened the window, looked around - no one was visible, and began to quickly leave this house. By morning, he safely approached the intended forest.

Chapter 4

Buntsev landed on the outskirts of the workers' settlement, one and a half kilometers from the railway junction. Looking around, he noticed Kretova with relief. At this time, the plane crashed into the station and a fire started there.

"Where can we hide our parachutes so that no dog can find them," Olga whispered. - The material is very good, it's a pity to drown in a filthy place. Anyway, as long as we have nothing to carry, we will take the domes with us, and hide the traces.

Kretova quickly cut off the traces from the parachute canopies with a knife. They hid the strings and straps in the ground, removing the turf with a knife. Focusing on the glow of the ever-increasing fire at the railway junction, Buntsev and Kretova went in a westerly direction.

"It's not in the air for you," thought Buntsev, walking in his fur boots. "You won't develop speed on your own two feet, you won't go far, and if you don't find food, you'll completely disappear," the captain rhymed to himself, striding heavily after radio operator.

Experienced partisan Olga Kretova felt quite confident behind enemy lines in Hungary. After joining her detachment with the troops of the Red Army, Kretova asked to be sent to conduct partisan struggle outside the Soviet Motherland, but she was sent to the regular troops. Now, thanks to an accident, she got behind enemy lines. She walked, straining her ears and peering around, so as not to fall on the enemy. Both the captain and Kretov were thinking about Temkin and Dobryakov. Where are they? What's up with them? They walked in silence until they came to the road. At this time, new strong explosions began at the node.

"Let's take the road north," Kretova suggested. - Now they are not up to us.

"We'll have to go through - confuse the tracks," Buntsev agreed, "while our last hit.

And they went to the northeast. We walked along the road for about half a kilometer. Towards
car lights came on.

"We'll have to give way," said Buntsev. "And cover
your tracks," Kretova put in. - And they left the road, moving quickly to the side.

- Lie down! Lie down, otherwise they will see, - the radio operator begged.

"Oh, it's not in the air for you," Buntsev thought again, stretching out on the wet ground.

A powerful passenger car quickly swept past them. Buntsev and Kretova got up, shook off the dirt from their clothes as best they could, and again went out onto the road in a southeasterly direction. We walked along the road for another three hundred meters, and when we saw a small field road going in a northwestern direction, we turned onto it.

Dawn began. And the glow of the fires at the station dimmed. Clouds of dark yellow smoke went up into the sky.

"We must find shelter for the day as soon as possible," Olga whispered.

The terrain was flat and there were no thickets or other cover nearby. There was tall corn ahead. That's where the pilots went. The cobs were already harvested, leaving tall stems in the field.

Kretova noticed the boundary and stopped.

- Comrade captain! Here. Mezha. Traces are hardly noticeable, and they are easy to disguise.

They began to move deep into the cornfield. More than 300 meters passed. When it became noticeable that the corn was running out and the mowed field was farther on, Kretova stopped.

- Now let's go to the side. -

They turned 20 meters to the left, then walked back 100 meters to the road, left again and came almost to the edge of the cornfield and stopped. They could see what was being done in the mowed field, and they remained invisible in the corn, less than three kilometers from the railway junction on which they had dealt a crushing blow, less than one kilometer from the estate.

- Olga! Get in! It's time to rest. Quite confused traces. This will not help us much when we will search.

"You can sit down and rest," the radio operator agreed. Now, if they follow in the footsteps, then we will notice them before they see us, and we will be able to follow them.

Putting one parachute on the ground, the pilots sat down and involuntarily listened to what was happening nearby. They distinctly heard the rumble of motor vehicles moving along the road. From time to time from the station came the horns of locomotives, auxiliary trains, the howl of fire engine sirens. There are no signs of strangers nearby.

Kretova settled down on a parachute, took off, cleaned her boots and set them to dry. Then she took out her emergency supply and invited the captain to the table.

The pilots were hungry, but there was no food. It turned out that there was no water, and the transferred experiences affected. They were worried about the fate of Temkin and Dobryakov.

The earth was saturated with autumn rains and the radio operator dug a hole with her Finnish which soon began to fill with water. So the problem of water supply was solved.

Having refreshed themselves, Kretova and Buntsev again sat silently and listened.

Despite the sleepless night, the captain and radio operator could not sleep.

- It would be more like night - and to the assembly point in the forest, - said Kretova, looking at her watch.

"And you look less at the clock, but go to sleep and the night will come sooner," Buntsev answered her affectionately.

It seemed to him that only now for the first time he saw his radio operator so close. Her open, tired face with blue under her eyes seemed to him more beautiful than when they were on their own land.

Olga, noticing the captain's long attentive look, lowered her head, took off her cap and began to straighten her hair.

For the first time, Captain Buntsev met Kretova in early June 1943, when he stayed for a day at a partisan airfield 500 km from the front line. Kretova, together with her squad leader, arrived at the airfield to receive ammunition.

The nights were short, and the planes did not have time to deliver cargo to the partisans, take the wounded and return back in one night.

Having free time, Kretova began to help camouflage Buntsev's plane. So

they got to know each other.

In the spring of 1944, the partisan detachment, in which Kretova was located, joined forces with the Red Army. All attempts by Kretova to get back behind enemy lines as part of a partisan detachment or organizing group were unsuccessful. There were many partisans who wanted to continue fighting behind enemy lines, but they were sent behind enemy lines

a few, mostly experienced miners with a large personal account, eminent radio operators, and Kretova was a miner without a personal account, a radio operator with little experience.

When the war began, Olga was only seventeen. She had just finished ten years in Barnaul and was preparing to enter the Polytechnic Institute. The war was both far and near. There was no blackout, but trains with mobilized were sent to the front. Kretova applied to the military registration and enlistment office, the district committee of the Komsomol, but no one sent her to the Red Army.

From the reports of the Soviet Information Bureau, Olya learned about the fighting of the partisans behind enemy lines, and she was drawn to the partisans. The environment has spoken. Her father, Vasily Kretov, and many of her father's friends fought in the rear of the White Guards in 1918-1920. My daughter often listened to their stories. In the autumn of 1941, Olga said goodbye to her parents and reached Moscow by passing trains. She got accepted into the school. I learned to be a miner, but the demand for miners among the partisans decreased - many good demolition workers were practically trained behind enemy lines. Kretova began to train as a radio operator. IN

Buntsev recalled the path he had traveled, recalled how he delivered goods to the partisans, took out the wounded and children to our rear, spent the day at partisan "airfields" behind enemy lines, landed on unexplored sites when the same lights beckoned him into a trap, recalled the stories of the partisans, regretting that did not pay attention to their tactics. He did not rule out that he could be shot down behind enemy lines, but he did not think about what he would do there then: how, where to go. Now it seemed to him an unforgivable omission to be with the partisans, along with the partisans, and not to know all the intricacies of partisan tactics.

Previously, the combat activity of partisans seemed so simple to him that, if necessary, every military man can immediately become a good partisan, but then it turned out that even his clothes, so comfortable on an airplane, turned out to be unsuitable for operations on the ground behind enemy lines: the high boots got wet and heavy and nowhere to dry. Swollen from a fine autumn rain and a fur jacket. It's good that you took parachute canopies with you, otherwise you'll get wet all day on the wet ground. But the remnants of a modest emergency reserve have been eaten, what to do when they do not find Dobak and Terkin at the assembly point?

"It was good for the partisans in their native land," thought the captain. "Everything is their own there: both people and land. not be detected. So try to walk here, make your way to your own."

He remembered the stories of two partisans who escaped from fascist captivity, walked several hundred kilometers in Germany, almost a thousand kilometers in Poland, and still reached their own.

"Well, my radio operator is an experienced partisan, and therefore God ordered us through all obstacles go out to your own, thought the captain.

Kretova did not sleep and experienced her helplessness, she felt guilty that she had not thought of getting a portable radio station just in case, in order to be able to contact the earth.

"And the partisans I had a" Severok "- that would come in handy, I handed it over to the warehouse, and he, perhaps lying there unnecessarily, she thought.

The day dragged on endlessly. In the afternoon, when Olga remained in guard, Buntsev fell asleep. In a dream, he saw himself on a plane landing at his native airfield, but was awakened by Olga. Nearby were single shots and shouts in a foreign language.

- Are they looking for us? - asked the commander, and they prepared for battle.

Shots were heard so close that they could hear the whistle of bullets flying by. One of the bullets flew over Kretova's head, and a corn stalk, killed by a bullet, fell in front of her. The pilots listened intently and remained silent.

- It is not clear why they shoot corn so much and stupidly? Don't they think that a whole platoon is here, - Olga whispered, clutching the machine gun in her hands more tightly.

Buntsev was silent. He felt uneasy on earth. It was clear that they would not be able to repel an enemy attack or leave if they were detected. And the shooting stopped, then started again. Again there was a conversation, screams. Finally, the shooting ended, the engine of the car roared, and soon there was silence, and only in the distance at the node were the horns of locomotives heard.

- Unclear. Is the search over, Buntsev whispered.

- Maybe. Parrots. They thought who would run out or fly out.

The pilots did not know that eight enemy officers from one of the burnt echelons were reveling on the occasion of getting rid of death, waiting for the restoration of traffic, practicing shooting and not suspecting that they were having fun in the neighborhood with those who defeated the railway junction. They arrived in cars, parked them only two hundred meters from the place where Buntsev and Kretova were hiding. Having drunk solidly for joy, they shot and drove towards the city.

The threat has passed.

"Where are Temkin and Dobryakov now?" Kretova asked.

"Perhaps they are waiting for us at the assembly point," answered Buntsev.

After recovering from the experience associated with the appearance of lovers to shoot, they refreshed themselves from their meager supplies and began to discuss a plan for further action. A decision was made: before going to the forest to the assembly point, it was necessary to get food so that one could wait at the assembly point without appearing in front of anyone. We discussed the details of food production for a long time. The main difficulty was that the clothes unmasked them, and they had no money. Finally, Buntsev made a decision. As soon as it got dark, they came out of hiding and went to the farm. They walked slowly, stopped, listened, and again cautiously moved on. The farm was small. A faint light filtered through the curtains in the windows. Footsteps and incomprehensible voices were often heard in the street. I had to wait when the lights went out in all the houses, except for one, the largest. We decided to go into it.

As agreed, Buntsev took off his headdress and put on Kretova's cloak. They knocked on the window overlooking the street. The owner immediately responded and asked something on incomprehensible language.

"Hir is golden," replied the captain. - The owner said something else, but did not open the door.

- Yes, I told you that Ukraine is not for you. You don't know what he says, you can't answer and, of course, not a single eccentric will open the door to strangers.

- Nothing, now open. The farm is small, there are no German soldiers, and where there are none, we can be masters there and in the rear, "Olga whispered.

And Buntsev believed this fragile girl, who held her machine gun at the ready. But before he could force the owner to open the door, they heard the angry barking of a large dog in the house.

- This creature can spoil the whole thing for us, we will have to move away.

They walked away from the house. But before they had even gone fifty paces, they heard the barking of a dog that had run out into the street. In Even faster began to leave the ill-fated house. But the owner turned out to be not one of the cowardly ones, and after the dog went out with a gun to the porch. Having received reinforcements, the shepherd dog began to pursue the troublemakers more resolutely.

"You should shoot her, the damned one, but you shouldn't draw attention to yourself," Buntsev whispered.

And the dog, as if sensing danger, began to lag behind a little and, finally, grumbling, returned back.

Buntsev and Kretova stopped. Olga looked at her watch - local time it was only 20.35.

"We have at least two hours left for preparations. After 23:00 we can no longer show anywhere. Comrade captain, - the radio operator continued, - soon we will need to cross the railway, let's make a couple of kilometers to the side and thereby show a false direction, and prepare some food from the railway workers, somewhere in the booth near the crossing, there the people are poorer, dogs, they probably won't, but we won't offend them.

An hour later they came to the railway and went along it in an easterly direction to until they came to the moving house and stopped near it.

The railroad, as the pilots expected, was not guarded by anyone. Soon the lights of the train appeared. At the crossing, a red light came on and short bells were heard. The watchman came out of the booth. He escorted the train and, making sure that everything was in order, returned home when two armed men came out to meet him: Buntsev in Kretova's raincoat, and Kretova from a parachute, painted with grass and smeared with earth so skillfully that at night you can't distinguish it from a real raincoat .

In broken German, Kretova asked for bread, bacon, or butter, and in return offered a gilded watch bracelet. The watchman picked up the chain, looked at Kretova and explained that he did not have enough bread and other products to

the cost was equal to such a thing. Squinting, the watchman asked who they were and where they were going. Buntsev and Kretova began to impersonate mobilized people who had fled the German army Slovaks.

- Now a lot of people run, but a lot of people get caught and die. Yesterday they caught two... - the watchman began to tell, also in broken German.

Although Buntsev and Kretova did not understand well, when they heard that two had been caught yesterday, they looked at each other and, stopping the watchman, began to ask what these two looked like. Fortunately, many signs did not converge: they were almost the same height, and Temkin was taller than Dobryakov. The bell rang. There was a train. However, he did not go to meet him at the Crossing Guard, but invited the newcomers to the house, the pilots, having exchanged glances, refused. They didn't want the watchman to see them in the light. In Kretova, she to convince the watchman to take the bracelet and give them food, ~~because~~ it costs ~~less~~ ^{more} ~~in~~ she showed on her fingers that they had to go for another whole week, and they didn't want to go to anyone else. The watchman took the bracelet and entered the house. A woman's voice was heard. Painful minutes passed. Finally he went out and brought out a whole loaf of white bread, a large piece of smoked ham.

The pilots began to quickly pack food and did not notice how the caretaker's excited wife suddenly appeared. She touched Kretova's hand and began to insert the bracelet into it. Olga began to refuse, but the elderly woman resolutely insisted that Kretova take her bracelet and a whole bag of apples. The pilot did not see in the dark how tears appeared in the eyes of an elderly woman. It was she who remembered her brother Santo, a worker from Miskolc. In 1936 he left for Spain and, perhaps, now, like these unfortunates, he needed a piece of bread, or maybe ... and she wiped her tears with a handkerchief.

Saying goodbye to the watchman and his wife, Buntsev and Kretova went north to Bratislava. When the booth was out of sight, they stopped. They listened. Nothing suspicious.

- Well, this is not a landowner for you, but the proletarians of all countries, they are against the Nazis, - said the captain. - But, on the other hand, we have no reason to believe that they will not tell anyone about our meeting. Now there is nothing to connect them.

- If they did not take anything, then, being honest people, they will not tell anyone anything. If someone is a scoundrel, the bracelet will not hold him, - Kretova noticed. - Well, now let's figure out how to cover your tracks. It is not air here, but earth, and, unfortunately, traces remain.

"But there would be no happiness, but misfortune helped. So it is with us. Although it is drizzling, it washes away our traces on the pavement, so we will have to find a paved road in the direction we need, and try to arrive at the collection point as early as possible so that the traces have time to "catch a cold," the experienced partisan thought.

It was not possible to find the road in the right direction, but a field with a stable turf, and they turned in the direction of the collection point.

They walked for a long time in the dark. Stopped, listened, walked again. Nobody noticed them.

Approaching the forest at 250-300 meters, the pilots stopped, lay down and began to study environment. Nothing suspicious. Everything is quiet.

"What does this mean? Who is there in the forest, where the assembly point is appointed. In their own? An ambush? Or is there no one?"

It was already well after midnight when Buntsev and Kretova entered the forest and, noiselessly stepping, listening to every rustle, they went to look for the appointed place.

Chapter 5

When Captain Buntsev's plane flew up to the Szeged railway junction on one engine, it was packed with military trains. Among the other echelons, almost in the center of the junction, there were two trains side by side: one with tanks, the second with looted equipment. In the alarm all at once alerted. Whoever had the opportunity tried to get away from the knot full of echelons. Those who could not leave were anxiously awaiting the start of the raid. As part of the echelon with the looted property there was one car with people stolen to hard labor from the invaded robber hordes of the Nazis. Among the foreign workers of countries where there were several Soviet women. In different ways, they got into the nets set up by the Nazis, and now they were sitting in a full car, cursing the day when they broke away from their motherland. Among them were two girls: anti-fascist the Kuban Cossack Shura Nechaeva and the daughter of a Donetsk miner Nina Malkova. They were members of the underground organization Iskra. They got into the same carriage, became friends and long ago decided to run away, yes

to run away in such a way that they would repay the enemy for everything they endured, so that the fascists paid for their sweat, for all the mockery of them with blood, but for a long time there was no suitable opportunity.

When the anti-aircraft artillery opened fire and panic began, the head of the convoy, not distinguished by his courage, left reliable sentries in the echelon, and he himself, with especially valuable technical personnel, quickly began to move away from the flammable echelons.

"Let's try to run," Nina whispered to her friend when they, along with others, foreign masters remained in a locked carriage.

Shura nodded in agreement.

"Everything is according to plan number two," Malkova whispered and went to the end of the car, to the sentry.

He walks, but his legs give way, they do not want to obey. When we planned, agreed, everything seemed somehow simpler, safer, but now, when we need to act, our legs have become like strangers. It seemed to her that she was about to stop, could not stand it, would not approach the sentry and turn back. But she walked and walked.

- What do you need? - asked the sentry, looking intently at the approaching one.

It seemed to Nina that the sentry guessed what they were up to and that was why he looked so wary.

At this time, they distinctly heard a knock on the door at the opposite end of the carriage.

- You are asked by someone from other doors. The big boss asks, - Officer. Demands to open the door for him, - said Malkova, not recognizing her own voice.

The sentry, having checked the reliability of the lock of the door, put the key in his pocket and went with the girl through the car to the other door.

Malkova walked ahead, and it seemed to her that an irreparably terrible thing was about to happen. When the sentry was walking along the carriage past her friend, Shura suddenly rushed at him, hit him hard on the head with a spittoon. Following her, three other girls rushed at the Nazi at once. The attack was well thought out in advance, and now everyone acted decisively and desperately. The sentry's corpse was shoved under the lower bench. Twenty-four slaves were free. They had a key at their disposal, they took the Hitlerite's weapon and, using the blackout, quietly left the car. There was no one in the Circle. The station was on fire.

- Let's add a light! Nina suggested.

- Let's add it. No wonder I worked at the fuel and lubricants warehouse of the machine and tractor station.

Malkova quickly opened one of the tanks, and gasoline flowed violently from it. Having moistened a handkerchief with fuel, she wrapped a stone with it, walked away, lit it and threw it under the cistern. Suddenly, a wide flame illuminated the girls, singing them a little, and a few minutes later the tank exploded, and it seemed that the fire ended there, but soon the car raged and explosions began.

Breaking free, Shura and Nina felt a huge responsibility towards their friends released from captivity. In Only five of them were initiated into preparations for the escape, the rest fled from the car, taking advantage of the panic. According to the plan, it was necessary to make our way to the north, to the mountains, and there - to the Slovak partisans, but now everyone was worried about the question: where to go? where to hide for the day?

Shura was more experienced than the others. She drove horses at night in peacetime. The darkness didn't scare her. The liberated were divided into two groups. One group was led by Nina and Shura, the second group was led by silent Stefa from Bratislava. For the day, both groups settled in corn behind the railway village. Those who escaped to freedom had no documents, no skills, and only one machine gun for all.

The echelon burned to the ground, and no one guessed the true culprits of the fire. No one took an interest in the "dead" prisoners. The day went well. Evening came. We decided to go further separately in two groups. They said goodbye and parted ways. The girls had no food, but they could not find anything in the fields, the cobs were already harvested. And so, when they approached the first small settlement, they decided to get food there, but the dog barked, and the girls moved away. They walked all night, going around all the residential areas, and by morning, exhausted, they found themselves in an open field and hid again in the corn for the day. A peasant found them there and, having learned what was the matter, showed them an unharvested strip of corn. Satisfying hunger and making a small supply, lay down to rest. But it started to rain, and soon they were soaking wet, and there was no place to dry their clothes. And so the fugitives succumbed to the temptation, with the onset of darkness, to go to the village and come in to dry their clothes, which they agreed with their benefactor. As it got dark, he came to the girls and took them to his house. There the twelve wet ones dried off and slept, but lingered too long and stayed for the day. The owner hid the girls in a barn, where they sat safely for the whole day, which seemed to them incredibly long. The second evening came, and the girls left their hospitable hosts.

Chapter 6

While observing, Dobryakov discovered that the house was guarded by a sentry, who occasionally passed by the gap from which he watched.

"I wonder who they're guarding? Isn't it me? They're probably looking for me," he thought, and didn't without foundation.

Around noon, one of the Nazi platoons involved in the search for pilots cordoned off the garden in which stood a dilapidated two-story house where Dobryakov was hiding.

The Nazis secretly settled down behind the fence, and three policemen, suitably equipped, were sent to the house. Quite by chance, they approached the gap from the opposite side, from which Dobryakov was observing.

Standing at the almost blocked window, Dobryakov peered and listened to the rustle of footsteps. approaching people, and suddenly, almost above the window, he heard Russian speech in a half-whisper:

- Stop, you see, the sentry walks!

And then out loud: Who's there? Come out! Yours have

arrived! Dobryakov was stunned by surprise, but it seemed to him that it was only heard. He caught a suspicious accent. It was clearly not a Russian or a Ukrainian who spoke Russian.

The vigilance developed over the years had an effect, and although he was always waiting for his own, he overcame the desire to respond. And he sat motionless. My heart was beating fast, but not from joy, but from imminent danger. But those who came passed by the gap. Dobryakov could see boots and overcoats, but no faces were visible. And he again heard Russian speech with an unpleasant accent.

"Maybe someone got screwed over here?"

- Hey, you, black-eyed, why are you walking around there uselessly? Go, check the cellars, - again commanded the unknown.

Dobryakov broke out in a cold sweat. Thoughts swirled like that.

"Is it the end?" he thought. Dobryakov

heard from the partisans that gangs of traitors were operating in the rear of the Nazis.

"Could it be traitors here too? Reptiles!" he thought. "And I almost responded." Soon he heard a command

in German and the voice of the one whom one of the traitors called a lieutenant.

"They are here, and we have nothing to do. All around march!

Dobryakov wanted to throw a grenade at the traitors, but he restrained himself, moved away from the gap and weary sat down in a corner behind the barrels.

A faint light shone into the cellar from a boarded-up window. Again the German command was heard, then footsteps. Dobryakov froze, sitting on the floor. When everything was quiet, he got up and went to the window. There was no one to be seen in the garden. The mechanic felt tired and returned to the corner.

Chapter 7. Ivan Mikhailovich Dobryakov

The tired pilot lay down in the dark behind the barrels and began to think about a way out of a difficult situation. He recalled how he and Tiomkin ended up behind enemy lines in September 1941. Their aircraft, after a raid on enemy targets, was so badly damaged that they also had to jump out with a parachute. Upon landing, they ended up at the location of the 40th Army. The military unit where they landed was surrounded, and they were captured along with it. The prisoners were taken to the west. There were few convoys. They brought them to some village and stopped to rest. The guards allowed the locals to feed the prisoners. Treated them politely, laughed, joked. After a short rest we went further west. The head of the convoy rode a horse and spoke to the prisoners in Russian with a large accent:

- You will be very happy in Germany. Well done guys for giving up.

For the night they were placed in a large building of the village school. There were no enemy troops in the village, and on the way they did not meet any troops. The school building was overflowing with prisoners. The transition was long. The prisoners and escorts were tired, and when everyone settled in, the people finished off the remnants of the food that they were given in the village during the day. Drinking water was brought in buckets. At night the doors were closed, two sentries were stationed at the doors, the rest rested in the neighboring

classes. The prisoners also lay down on the floor. Only a small group, led by platoon commander Semyon Zorin, did not sleep. Long after midnight, the sentries at the door fell asleep. Zorin with two Red Army soldiers suddenly attacked them and neutralized them. With their weapons, a group of several people broke into the classroom and seized the rest of the weapons. As a result, the guards were captured. They woke up all the former Red Army soldiers, and Zorin invited everyone to join the partisan detachment and go into the forest.

You will have to arm yourself with the weapons that will be found on the battlefields. The pilots immediately went along with Zorin, and a significant part of the Red Army soldiers dispersed in different directions.

A week later, Zorin had a detachment of 60 people, while the guards from the prisoners also became partisans. There were no Germans in the villages. Local communists and Komsomol members came to the detachment, who also decided to fight the enemies. The German command learned about the creation of a partisan detachment, but the partisans were vigilant and set up an ambush. The punishers were defeated, and the detachment was replenished with new weapons.

October came and the storm began. The partisans decided to move east along the rear of the enemy, suddenly attacking his rear units. The population supplied the partisans with the missing food, clothing, shoes, and brought the picked up weapons. There were already over a hundred people in the detachment.

In early December, three excited peasants came to the detachment and brought leaflets in which it was written: drive the Germans into the cold, set fire to the houses in which the enemies were housed. The peasants asked not to burn their houses, then they would have nowhere to live. There were more and more of these walkers. They said that the Germans use these leaflets to recruit local men to become policemen in order to protect their homes from partisans. Zorin and his assistants decided that these leaflets were a German fake, but they were soon able to make sure that they were not.
So.

And the frosts were getting stronger. Partisan intelligence established that there was no solid front line, and Zorin decided to join forces with the Red Army. In mid-December, they went to the location of our troops. We arrived on a sleigh. And they brought all the wounded. During this time, the former German escorts became good partisans. Some of them died in clashes with the Nazis.

Dobryakov recalled that they did not then have experienced partisans, trained saboteurs. I also remembered the case when, having decided to attack the German garrison, they cut the communication wires, and the Germans called for help on the radio, and they had to hastily retreat.

Zorin's detachment, having safely left the German rear, was one of those few partisan formations that were formed from Soviet soldiers who, due to the prevailing situation, found themselves behind enemy lines, which did not include a single commander and political worker trained in special educational institutions in the early 30s.

The platoon commander only read a lot about the partisans of the civil war, when the partisans solved their tasks by a surprise attack on the enemy, but he himself was not ready for such a fight so as not to engage in a military clash. Zorin was drafted into the army in the fall of 1939 and did not know that in the Red Army at the end of the 1920s, hundreds of commanders and political workers were intensively trained to conduct partisan operations according to the principle: to inflict damage on the enemy, preserving and increasing their forces, without engaging in direct action. fight with the enemy. But, unfortunately, by the autumn of 1939, there were almost no such personnel left in the Red Army; they were repressed in 1937-1938.

From the

author In the first months of the Great Patriotic War, from its first days, partisan actions began behind enemy lines. The first detachments were created in the occupied territory, later they began to be trained in the rear of the Red Army, but this training was short-lived and clearly insufficient. The partisans had no means of communication. And these formations, according to the apt expression of the Hero of the Soviet Union, ^{hastily prepared} Major General M.I. Naumov, at the first collision with the enemy they burned like moths over a fire. So, in Ukraine, in 1941, several hundred partisan detachments and sabotage groups with a total number of about 35 thousand people were transferred and left during the withdrawal of our troops. By the end of June 1942, only 30 partisan detachments with a total number of slightly more than 4 thousand people got in touch with the UShPD. And only by the spring of 1943 in the Ukrainian partisan formations, the number reached 30 thousand people. In 1942, Ukrainian partisans caused 202 train wrecks, and in 1943 over 3,500.

At the first clashes with the enemy, two regiments formed in Kyiv ceased to exist: one - under the command of the captain of the border troops E.K. Chekhov in the amount of 110 people, the other - under the command of major of the border troops E.E. Chips in the amount of 70

1070 people. Died in unequal battles and their commanders. And all because the enemy could increase his efforts during the battle, receiving reinforcements, and no one could come to the aid of the heroic partisans. The same fate befell the six Leningrad partisan regiments. But most of all, the partisans suffered when they tried to "drive the Germans into the cold," as this made it possible for the invaders to involve the population in the protection of settlements. At the same time, partisan formations with well-trained commanders, such as S. Kovpak, G. Linkov, Eremchuk, F. Danilov, and others, successfully operated behind enemy lines without setting fire to villages occupied by the Germans. The actions of the partisan formation F.D. Gnezdilov, who, being wounded, ended up behind enemy lines. Having recovered, he formed a small detachment from the encircled and, armed with weapons picked up on the battlefields and skillfully acting, by the beginning of 1942 he commanded the F. Dzerzhinsky regiment. On February 23, this regiment was renamed the regiment named after the 24th anniversary of the Red Army, and by April 1942 it had 2363 people.

If in 1937-1938 all measures for the deployment of a partisan war in the event of enemy aggression had not been eliminated, then the Soviet partisans would have cut off the enemy troops from their sources of supply, and the aggressor would not have reached the Dnieper.

If, during the war, Stalin had been guided by Lenin's position that partisan actions were not revenge, but military operations, then the leadership of the partisan forces would have been entrusted not to underground party bodies, but to military specialists who would plan the partisan movement and comprehensively provide the partisans. In fact, there was no unified leadership of the partisan forces: there were cases when some recruited partisans into detachments, while others destroyed them.

The partisans did not receive the funds they needed. Their needs for sabotage were not met even by 10%. During the war years, the partisans did not receive even 500 tons of explosives, and at the same time they carried out over 18 thousand train wrecks, for almost half a year in 1943-1944. disabled the railway section Ternopil-Shepetovka. The partisans were not allocated the required number of aircraft to deliver goods, and hundreds of tons of bombs were dropped with little efficiency on enemy railways ...

In May 1943, aircraft of the 16th Air Army dropped about 500 tons of bombs on the Orel-Bryansk, but the movement of trains was not completely stopped.

Chapter 8. Ivan Mikhailovich Dobryakov (continued) He recalled the stories of

Kretova, as well as the stories of partisans whom they met behind enemy lines when they delivered ammunition to them. And what they didn't do there and how they didn't get there, he recalled, but all this was on their territory, and here he is sitting in the basement of a city unfamiliar to him, where the population does not know the Russian language and for decades was brought up in the spirit of hatred for the Soviet state .

He also recalled that the Hungarians, during the civil war against foreign interventionists and the White Guards in 1918-1921, participated in the struggle for Soviet power, created Soviets in their own country, and when the Francoist intervention in Spain began, thousands of them, led by Mate The Zalka came to the aid of the Spanish Republic.

He recalled that not only partisan detachments, consisting of Soviet people, but also Spaniards, as well as Hungarians, Slovaks, and even Germans, were operating behind enemy lines on our territory. Many of the Spaniards with groups went behind enemy lines several times on different fronts. He knew that the Spaniard Francisco Gullon commanded a partisan detachment named after him. K.E. Voroshilov in the temporarily occupied territory of the Leningrad region, where the Spanish fascist "blue division" labored ingloriously.

Dobryakov recalled the books he had read about Russian partisan actions abroad during the campaigns of Suvorov, the campaign of Russian troops in France after the defeat of Napoleon in Russia.

"But in those days," he thought, "it was easier for partisans to operate behind enemy lines. damned Gestapo, not a solid front."

He recalled Kretova's story that many partisans, having united with the troops of the Soviet Army, sought to be sent back behind enemy lines. And when they were told that almost the entire Soviet Union had been liberated and that soon there would not be a single enemy soldier on our soil, they asked to go to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and some - to Hungary, Romania and even Germany.

There, - they said, - there are also mountains and forests, and our friends will be found. If, - they said, - in the First World War, Russian soldiers, escaping from captivity, marched all over Germany without weapons, then with weapons and with our experience we will be able to derail trains on their territory. "And some nevertheless achieved their goal.

From everything he read and heard about escapes from captivity, about the military affairs of partisans behind enemy lines, Dobryakov tried to remember the tactics of their actions: how they moved, hid, got food, conducted reconnaissance and fought the enemy. But, unfortunately, he used to prefer to listen to something else. He did not think about the possibility of partisan operations behind enemy lines on his territory.

Remembering individual episodes where there were interesting tactics, he began to fantasize. He already saw himself in the forest, where Temkin, Kretova and their commander, Captain Buntsev, were waiting for him, with whom he would break through the front line and report to his unit. Inspired by the stories of the partisans, iridescent thoughts were replaced by gloomy ones. It seemed to Dobryakov that the unfamiliar city was filled with Nazi troops, Gestapo men, and traitors.

"That's how ridiculous it turns out," he thought, "soon the war ends, and I'm here alone behind enemy lines, in an abandoned basement. As soon as the Nazis discover it, life is over, all dreams of studying, of the future, have disappeared. And how mother will cry, sisters and two little brothers, especially if they find out that they are "missing."

He began to recall how the hero of Nikolai Ostrovsky, Korchagin, overcame difficulties.

"I am a member of the Komsomol," thought Dobryakov, "and Lenin taught to overcome all difficulties, and he himself showed examples of how they should be overcome."

And he saw the image of Lenin, whose portrait he carried with him along with photographs of his relatives and beloved girl.

Soon he fell asleep unnoticed. In a dream, he dreamed of partisans, a battle near Budapest, then some snakes. He dreamed how he got lost in the forest near his village and, when night fell, did not know where to hide, he was worried about his mother's feelings.

Finally, Dobryakov saw a huge bear in a dream. The bear slowly walked towards him. He tried to run, but his legs would not obey. The bear was approaching. From fright, Dobryakov woke up and raised his stiff head. It was heavy, like lead. In the darkness, he heard a squeak, fuss, and remembered with horror where he was and what had happened to him. Stretching his legs, he slowly stood up. There were no cracks in the window opening.

"What is it? Night, or was I walled up while I was sleeping?" he thought.

The clock on his arm ticked steadily, but he did not dare to strike a match. Quietly he went along the wall and with difficulty found the half-blocked window with his fingers. He stopped.

"Where is the sentry, what time is it? How is the city guarded? How to get to the collection point? Three unknowns."

He listened to the night rustles, did not find anything suspicious and decided to go out. Fixed the weapon. Once again he listened, the sentry was not heard. And he carefully selected some bricks and climbed out of the cellar. He breathed in the fresh night air, listened, carefully and noiselessly crawled away from the house.

It was dark, drizzling light rain, and Dobryakov quietly crawled along the wet grass, realizing that if they find him, he is dead.

Finally he was in the bushes and was able to rest.

The engines of some cars were humming in the city, and, what especially worried him, - distant barking of dogs.

There were no signs of people or dogs in the garden. Having landed with a parachute, Dobryakov lost his bearings and now decided to go in the direction where there were fewer car horns, assuming that the largest number of cars was either in the city center or on the highway. Silently he approached the fence, but, hearing the rumble of engines, did not overcome it. Soon a car with dimmed headlights and a high awning passed by. Before she had time to hide, Dobryakov heard the clatter of forged boots. The mechanic had three grenades at the ready and a machine gun with an incomplete disk of cartridges, but he froze and betrayed his presence in no way. A platoon of Germans passed by the pilot.

"Oh! - he thought, - there is nowhere to go, otherwise he would have treated him with a grenade, but slashed from the machine gun, so few people would have remained."

And the downcast, apparently tired soldiers had already passed by without any security measures. They felt completely safe. The roar of the engine was heard again. Dobryakov was unbearably thirsty, and he returned to the dilapidated house, but found no water. He went up to the fence again and, not noticing anything suspicious, quietly climbed over it, quickly ran across the street, jumped over another low fence and found himself again in the garden. In the depths of a large garden stood a lonely house. A bright light shone through the cracks in the shutters.

"What a mess," thought Dobryakov. "I also ran across the street, but here it's impossible to walk through the garden, and I have to hurry so that I can be in the forest by morning."

And he went along the fence. Although this doubled the distance to the next street, it was safer, as he understood.

He walked slowly, stopped and listened. When he came to the fence overlooking the next street, which he had to cross, he stopped and distinctly heard the sounds of a waltz. There were no signs of protection. Ivan Mikhailovich decided to go to the house and look for water. The closer he crept up to the house, the louder the voices and music came. Here he noticed a barrel under the drainpipe. Thirst overcame caution, the pilot carefully approached the boiler and began to drink water. Before he had time to drink, the door opened and a German officer with a woman came out of the house. The Nazi turned on an electric flashlight and the rays of light began to wander around the garden. It was impossible to run. Dobryakov froze in place, preparing for battle. Fortunately, no one noticed him. Cheerfully chatting, the couple went to the exit.

After sitting out, the mechanic went to the fence, not noticing anything suspicious, climbed over it and found himself on the street. In Heeded and quietly, but quickly, passed through it. But the next fence was so high that he could not overcome it. Footsteps and conversation were heard in the distance - someone was walking along the street. There was nowhere to go, and Dobryakov crossed the street again, hid behind the fence in the garden, where he drank water. He walked along the fence until the impenetrable fence ended opposite. Once again I crossed the street, overcame a low fence and found myself in another vast overgrown garden. He did not find anything suspicious in it and quickly, unnoticed by anyone, reached the opposite side of the site, but he could not cross the street.

A high white fence was visible ahead, and against its background the pilot noticed the first patrol. He stopped in thought. The silence of the night was suddenly broken by heart-rending cries, swearing, urging cries. Dobryakov's sharp hearing distinctly distinguished Russian words dear to him, intertwined with groans and cries. The mechanic's skin went cold.

"Bastards. No torture," he thought.

Soon the massive gates opened, and the lights of a car appeared in the distance, from which faint groans and rare loud cries of the Germans could be heard. Coming out of the gate, the car stopped on the road, only six meters from the lurking mechanic. Then a passenger car appeared, and a terrible van drove after it. Dobryakov was numb. In front of his eyes, the Nazis took away the car with their victims, and he, an armed pilot, is hiding in the dark and does nothing to save the unfortunate, who, perhaps, went on their last journey in a closed car. When the terrible cars disappeared, the onboard mechanic, shocked by what he saw, tried to get out of the garden, but to no avail: either patrols or cars walked along the street. With horror, he noticed that it was dawning. The long night passed very quickly for him. During the whole night he only got drunk and moved from one garden to another. If they don't wait for him at the assembly point, what will he do without a map, without food? There were no shelters in the yard and garden, except for thickets of bushes.

Dobryakov chose the thickest bushes and settled down in them for the day. Soon he felt cold, especially where his clothes were soaked. Dobryakov laid a dry newspaper between his wet clothes and the body, ate the remnants of his emergency supply and curled up.

The day seemed extremely long to him, as if the earth had stopped moving around him. its axis. But he had to lie still so as not to betray his presence in any way.

Until noon everything went well, and he was already getting used to his position. I felt weakness from fatigue, nervous tension. The crackers had already been eaten, and the juicy, slightly bitter grass had to be chewed. He wanted to sleep, but he understood that this was impossible, and he considered various plans.

At noon, the Nazis, who were in a neighboring house, drove horses into the garden and began to graze them. So close, Dobryakov saw enemy soldiers only in photographs, and prisoners. And here they - alive, cheerful, with weapons - were very close and had fun with the horses.

Maybe, This were transport unit soldiers who have never been in combat. Perhaps they had children, cursed Hitler and the war he started. But if these soldiers were carriage convoys of the 2nd category, they were no less dangerous for Dobryakov hiding in the thickets than the tankers of the "tigers". If one of the careless-looking soldiers, for some reason, enters the bush where the pilot was hiding, then he will not be saved.

"If you send one or two carriage-carriers to the next world, then everything will end and, you disappeared without a trace," thought Dobryakov. From such reflections, his drowsy mood was swept away like a hand.

However, fortunately for him, the Nazis did not go through the bushes, but indulged themselves and left the garden, leaving the horses to graze. At last it became evening. In the evening came the grooms for their horses. And at that time it was necessary for one horse to approach the thicket, where the mechanic was hiding.

"Is it possible," he thought, "the horse will betray me before it gets dark and I become invisible again?"

Dobryakov silently leaned towards the horse, poked it in the head with a twig, and it reluctantly she leaned back and walked away from the bushes.

After dark, the pilot crawled out of the bushes and began to climb out of the garden. We had to hurry to the forest to the assembly point. Today was the deadline for the meeting. He walked around the white stone wall from which the heart-rending cries of the previous night had come. Only in the second half of the night did he manage to get out to the outskirts.

"Where to go next? Where is the forest? Today I will not get to the assembly point without a map," he thought.

If earlier Dobryakov considered the main task to get out of the city occupied by the enemy and turn up at the assembly point, then, having gone to the outskirts, by the end of the night he had already lost time and did not dare to go through an area unknown to him, fearing that he was late and dawn would find him where cannot be safely hidden. And he decided to spend one more day in the city. He was seduced by a lonely barn. There were no dogs, no Nazis nearby. The barn was open. One half is stuffed with fragrant hay, the other half is filled with straw. Scrap metal was neatly stacked near the barn. On top lay a German metal helmet pierced by shrapnel.

Dobryakov carefully entered the barn and climbed into the most remote corner, littered with straw.

In the morning in the courtyard he heard a conversation, the cries of children. In addition to the Hungarians, the Germans apparently also came to the yard. Their abrupt, guttural speech clearly differed from that of the Hungarians. Among the inhabitants of the courtyard, he heard a pleasant girlish voice. Nobody entered the shed. In the afternoon, the tired Dobryakov could not overcome his drowsiness and fell asleep. In the dream, he was working in the fields, threshing wheat, inhaling the wonderful smell of fresh straw. Slept for at least five hours. When he woke up, he remembered that he was behind enemy lines, and in his heart he scolded himself for his carelessness. It was already dark and quiet. The pilot went to the barn door, but could not open it, it was locked from the outside.

What was the purpose of locking up the barn? Maybe they noticed him sleeping and locked the door, ran to inform the Nazis?

"Here's a fool, overslept," thought Dobryakov.

After examining the gate, he found that from above through them you can get out. The pilot silently climbed onto the upper edge of the doors, squeezed them out a little and, thanks to good sports training, pulled himself up on his hands and found himself free.

"Before you leave the city, you need to stock up on food," Dobryakov thought. But how do you approach strangers?

He knows German very poorly and only a few phrases, and only a few words in Hungarian. This means that they can immediately expose and hand over to the enemy. "But," he recalled, "there are soldiers of various nationalities in the enemy's army. It would be nice if I introduce myself as one of them. Just don't use Russian words in the explanation. Now, you need to somehow change the form," the mechanic decided.

He remembered the German helmet lying near the scrap metal, but with disgust refused even the thought of wearing it.

Dobryakov knew that scouts often use the uniform of the enemy, this sometimes helps them out of difficult situations, and the partisans were forced to wear it due to the lack of another.

"I'll manage without a uniform. I'll turn the headress back to front, and I'll get by with that," - thought Dobryakov, heading towards the house.

It was completely dark outside. He went to the window and watched. Weak light filtered through cracks in the shutters. In the house, occasionally, a man, an elderly woman, and a girl with a pleasant voice spoke to each other in a language he did not understand. There were no Germans in the house. Dobryakov knocked on the window. The owner asked something, but he did not answer. The light in the room went out. Soon he knocked again.

The fear of the owner to leave the house reassured Dobryakov. So, he was not mistaken: there were no Nazis in the house. Then he knocked on the window again, and when the host again asked some question in German, he answered:

- Ih soldat.

This time, a tall, well-built elderly man in blue overalls came out of the house. He stood for a moment, shifting from foot to foot, apparently getting used to the darkness, then repeated his question in German.

- Ikh zoldat, - the pilot repeated and showed with gestures that he wanted to eat.

- Rus? - unexpectedly asked the owner.

Dobryakov mechanically nodded his head and immediately realized that he had done wrong, had given himself away to an unknown person. The owner signaled to wait and soon came out with a slender girl, apparently his daughter. She gave Ivan a slice of bread, boiled corn and a small piece of lard.

Then she quickly spread her hands to the side, repeating sadly "grossnain, grossnain."

Dobryakov put everything in his pocket, thanked him as much as he could for the food and he was deeply moved that he turned his cap over and showed the owners a red star.

- Rus. Bun Council. Lenin bun, - the girl said somehow touchingly and gave a sign that he was waiting for her. A minute later she came out with a bottle of wine and a bag of dried fruit and handed them to Ivan.

Chapter 9

In the darkness of the night, Buntsev and Kretova with difficulty reached the assembly point, but they did not find anyone there. After sitting in the young pines during the day, with the onset of dark time, they again began to look for their own, but to no avail. No one answered the prearranged signals, and there were no signs of the presence of people. Buntsev could not come to terms with the idea that Temkin and Dobryakov would not come and decided to stay in the forest for another day. This time we settled down for the day at the edge of the forest, having the opportunity to observe the approaches to the forest.

The second day seemed tiresomely long. The concern for the missing friends made itself felt. In the afternoon Kretova fell asleep. Soon a small herd of cows and sheep grazing in the field came close to the forest, and two shepherds - an old man and a boy - settled down on the edge and began to eat. They had a dog with them. Buntsev watched the meal from a distance, trying not to move. He was very afraid that the dog would find them, and not without reason. The dog, sensing strangers, pricked up its ears and began to bark in the direction of the location of the pilot and radio operator. No matter how soundly Kretova slept, she heard the barking of a dog and woke up.

"We'll have to move further into the forest," the radio operator suggested. - One could

still try to neutralize the shepherds, but the damned dog silently neutralize difficult.

"But you can't wait until she calms down either."

And they began to quietly retreat into the depths of the

forest. Buntsev and Kretova came to a small clearing surrounded by bushes. Here they are and stopped.

- Today we will leave here without warning our people that we were here and where we are going. You can't write on a tree and we didn't agree to leave it under a tree, and there aren't very many trees here, "added Buntsev.

- We agreed, did not agree, but I told Vanya Dobryakov how we established communication through mailboxes.

- But they're not here.

- It will be necessary to do, that's all. We can leave a note under this big oak tree at the collection point.

- And how to tell that there is a note?

- Let's put rotten things that shine at night, and under them a note. About such methods also spoke.

After waiting for the evening, Buntsev and Kretova went east. They walked tensely looking and listening.

An hour later, a small farm or estate appeared ahead. They came closer and stopped. B Listened. Soon a car drove out of the farm. We quickly moved away from the country road and lay down. The car passed by with a masked light.

"The partisans would have captured it for sure, but we missed such prey," whispered Kretova.

Peering into the farm, they concluded that this was not a farm proper, but an estate, beyond which begins not the forest, not the park.

- Shouldn't we go through the estate. Look how carelessly they live," said Kretova.

And as if in response they heard the barking of dogs in the estate.

- Here you are, Olga, and noted - Buntsev whispered.

"It's all right, Comrade Captain. Let's go around and as soon as we reach the right road, Let's go towards ours.

And they went. The dogs calmed down at times, then barked again. IN

It was already well after midnight, and after waiting for the traffic to stop, they crossed the road and went to look for a place for a day's rest. We walked until dawn and, not finding anything better, stopped for the day again in the harvested, but not mowed corn.

A fine autumn rain was drizzling, but they settled tolerably on the damp ground, using a parachute for bedding.

Chapter 10. "Languages"

The short autumn day seemed to Buntsev and Kretova, like all days behind enemy lines, incredibly long. At first, both of them could not fall asleep for a long time, then, as it was established according to the schedule, Kretova fell asleep, and the captain gave her the opportunity to rest, protecting her sleep. Only when Buntsev began to feel so sleepy that there was a danger of succumbing to the temptation to fall asleep, taking advantage of the fact that no one could be heard nearby, did he wake Kretova. Now, overcoming sleep, Olga was awake. And although it was already time to prepare for the night exit, she did not wake her commander until

it got dark.

"For four days now we have been behind enemy lines," said Olga.

- Yes, time flies, and we still do not even hear signs of the front line. The trouble is that we are not we know where ours are now advancing, - the captain answered.

- Or maybe we should rush north to the Slovak partisans? From there we will contact our own people, and we will be evacuated by air, as we once evacuated the wounded partisans, "Kretova suggested.

- You, Olga, are drawn to the partisans. Where are we going to find them? No! We'd better go to meet our troops. It's more true. On the way of the "language" we will catch and clarify the situation along the way.

"But we have already got used to the rear of the enemy a little and we can create a partisan detachment in the mountains ourselves," Kretova objected.

- No, Olga, rather to the unit, and there again the plane and - to bomb the enemy. After all, it was not for nothing that our Tolya Temkin used to say: - fish need water, and pilots need the sky. Let's go to the base across the front, - the captain concluded decisively.

After supper, they packed up their heavy possessions, which seemed to them heavy, and set off on their way to the east. About three hours later, they approached the highway, along which small columns of automobiles and single cars occasionally passed.

- We have a good road. Let's go a little way so that we can't be seen, but so that we can you can see what is happening on the road, - suggested Kretova, and the captain agreed.

Walking on soft, wet ground was tiring. I wanted to sit down and rest. And along the road the lights of cars flickered, motorcycles occasionally rushed by, and no one detained anyone, no one stopped anyone, no one, apparently, guarded the road. Walking through the field, they came across a wire fence separating two adjacent plots of land.

"A wonderful find," exclaimed Kretova in a whisper.

- What did you find? Buntsev asked.

- A thorn, a real thorn.

- And what is she to you?

- Let's try to catch the language, but ride in a car.

Are you thinking about being weird again?

Relax for a minute and I'll take a look.

Buntsev was already tired and therefore willingly agreed to rest.

A brisk radio operator quickly found the end of one wire and began to tear it off the half-rotted stakes. The job was not easy. Her hands were already covered in blood, but she stubbornly tore off the wire. Seeing her perseverance, the captain got involved in the work, and after ten minutes they already had about 30 meters of small pieces of good-quality barbed wire.

"Well, what are you going to do with them now?"

- Catch the "language", yes, maybe we'll catch the car.

Here ahead appeared the lights of a single car. Kretova quickly laid out pieces of barbed wire across the road, disguising it with grass. They stepped aside and lay down. Lying on the damp ground, Buntsev and Kretova, with bated breath, watched the lights of the approaching car. We didn't have to wait long.

"This time the fate of my experience is being decided," thought Kretova.

The car swerved, slowed down and stopped. The pilots looked at each other. Kretova's heart skipped a beat.

"Hurry, hurry," she whispered.

Approaching the car for 100 meters, in the headlights they saw that the driver had already jacked up the car and was removing the damaged ramp. On the side stood a medium-sized soldier, nonchalantly watching the work of the driver. There was no light in the car, and Buntsev was afraid that other Nazis could be there.

Everything worked out for the pilots in the best possible way: there was no one on the road, the driver was busy with work, a lone military man was standing, visible in the light of sidelights. Buntsev and Kretova cautiously crept up to the car. At this time, a tall military man got out of the car. The soldier started up and stood at attention. All this was visible to the pilots remaining in the dark.

"Big boss," thought Buntsev.

He, too, was fascinated by the idea of capturing language. The Nazis were clearly visible. There were no signs of movement on the road. The car door was open and no one got out.

Suddenly, two short bursts pierced the stillness of the night. Behind them is a cry: "Hyundai hoh!" Two Nazis sprawled on the road, and the driver stood with his hands up. When Buntsev and Kretova ran up to the car, the driver asked for something in a trembling voice, turning to Kretova. The soldier lay without signs of life. The officer, apparently wounded in the stomach and leg, was lying on the ground. When Buntsev illuminated him with a pocket torch, he tossed and turned, trying to draw his pistol, but Buntsev got ahead of him and disarmed him. Now they are busy with the driver. Kretova quickly searched him, took the pistol out of its holster and put it in her pocket.

"And now, so that he does not run away, we will tie his legs and hands," said Kretova.

- Only faster.

Buntsev pulled out his trouser belt, tore off the buttons, and now the driver stood with his hands up and his trousers down. Buntsev showed the driver to put his hands behind his back, and quickly and firmly tied them with a trouser belt. The driver has now been disabled.

Leaving the radio operator with a bound driver, Buntsev carefully searched the unconscious major, took off his overcoat, tunic and headgear, dragged him and the soldier's corpse into a ditch and covered them with a soldier's overcoat.

The driver was put into the car on the floor in front of the seat, on which Olga was comfortably seated. When everything was ready, Buntsev switched on the clutch, started the engine, the obedient Mercedes smoothly moved forward.

- Olga, what are we going to do with the "boiled tongue"? Buntsev asked.

- Let's go to the side, and we'll see. Will not answer - there will be kaput.

The captured driver understood what the conversation was about, and in broken Russian began to ask that he not be killed.

- And the "language", it turns out, understands us, apparently, visited our land, - Kretova noticed.

Towards appeared the lights of a column coming from the east.

- Olya, ahead of the column. There is nowhere to turn.

- Let's go on a collision course, - said the radio operator.

Increasing speed, he went to approach the column.

"Will they stop?" both thought.

- Olga, make sure that the "tongue" does not take it into his head to betray us.

"He won't peep from me if he wants to live," Kretova answered.

When the first car flashed past, Buntsev slowed down the gas and felt complete confidence in the successful outcome of the meeting with the column. Cars were carrying broken equipment, some of them were ridden by soldiers, apparently guards.

Having missed the column, Buntsev stopped the car near a small bridge. There was a stream below.

It was still four hours before dawn, but Buntsev felt so tired as he drove his car past a large convoy in an oncoming course that he already had the idea of throwing the car under the bridge into the stream. But he immediately put that thought aside and decided to use the machine as much as he could. Resting, he began to examine the documents. Among them was a map with a communication diagram. They asked for language. He confirmed the assumption. The murdered Major Hauser was indeed an officer in the signal troops.

At this time, Kretova turned on the receiver. They spoke German. She started looking another wave, and suddenly, oh my God, my native language! She was ready to hug and kiss the receiver.

"It's too early to leave the car, the map with the communication scheme must be delivered to our people as soon as possible," Buntsev said and drove forward along the road, which, according to his orientation, led to the front line.

- And listen to the latest news, - said Olya.

Soon the lights of cars appeared ahead. There were more and more of them. The column began to move, turning on the camouflaged headlights.

Suspicious stop. Checkpoint, he thought.

- We'll have to from the gate - a 180-degree turn, - he said and, turning the car around, drove in the opposite direction, looking for the exit to the side. Before reaching the bridge where they stopped, he turned right onto a country road, and stopped, turning off his headlights. The column with the troops passed by, suspecting nothing.

- This is not your motorcycle. You can't hide with such a transport," Buntsev muttered, looking to the car. - We drove a little on it, but you can't get enough trouble with it.

He looked at his watch - it was already 3:30 local time. It was about three hours before sunrise. In the Road was every minute. There was only one way out - to immediately get rid of the car and go as far as possible to the side of the road and settle down in a shelter for a day.

- Olga! Tell me, like an experienced partisan, where to put the car in order to get rid of it.

- Break it on a pole on the road, and throw it, - the girl answered.

- It's not so easy to break it against a pole without breaking yourself.

- Well, just hit a little, maybe someone will pick it up.

"Let's try to drive along a country road, maybe we'll find a convenient place to get rid of her," Buntsev suggested and drove away from the main road.

Soon silhouettes of houses appeared in the darkness. There was a village ahead. Orienting on the map, the captain found that they were not far from the dam.

He drove a little further, and indeed ahead the road passed along the dam, but, unfortunately, it was lined with stone pillars on the sides, so it was impossible to lower the car down the slope. And time passed, the clock showed already 4.20 local time. Buntsev decided to drive ahead to look for an exit to the dam, and soon he found it. But when he began to turn the car around, an armed man in a paramilitary uniform ran out of the village, he was shouting something in Hungarian.

"That's not enough yet," the captain said aloud.

The man ran, holding the rifle in his hand like a stick. Buntsev prepared for the meeting. An armed man ran up, panting, and began to explain in broken German that there was no road to where the car had been turned. Suspecting nothing, the guard stood with his rifle lowered to his foot and waited for instructions, mistaking them for the Germans. Quickly assessing the physical capabilities of the enemy, Buntsev knocked out the guard with a strong blow.

"To finish off an enemy soldier who has been knocked to the ground," Buntsev thought, "but they will find a corpse, and there is a pursuit in the tracks, it is difficult to hide during the day, there are no forests. A corpse can bring death, and a living guard can provide valuable information."

- Olga, quickly process this eccentric, put a gag in your mouth, but tie your hands and confuse your legs, until he wakes up," ordered the captain.

The prisoner came to his senses before Kretova managed to bring him to a safe state. He said something, but the radio operator so impressively showed him that he was silent, otherwise he would be kaput, that he closed his mouth and obediently let his hands be tied and his legs confused.

"Wonderful! Such a steep descent that we can now drown the car and leave," Buntsev thought. And when Kretova finished with the guard, the captain took the confused driver out, took his greatly increased property, turned the car around, disengaged the clutch and, resting against it, directed it down the slope to the pond. Seeing the car picking up speed slip into the water, the captive driver screamed, and his face was such horror as if she had driven through him. The limousine disappeared from sight, only the bubbles rising to the surface still reminded of a drowned car.

A large farm remained on the shore - two prisoners, surplus weapons, remnants of food and two soaked German overcoats.

- Comrade Captain, let's go along the stream, it's easier to hide the tracks here and you can find some shelter sooner, less than two hours are left before dawn. We'll have to unravel the prisoner, otherwise you won't get far with them. "We'll tie them together," suggested Olga.

The prisoners were tied together, loaded with extra weapons without cartridges, two overcoats heavy from dampness and went. Kretova walked in front, followed by prisoners tightly bound with wire. Buntsev brought up the rear

Five kilometers from the dam, they found a small peninsula overgrown with shrubs. There we decided to stop for a day, having previously confused the traces.

"No one will come here without work," Buntsev thought, "and it's convenient to defend here."

They settled down for the day and the captain noticed that the balance of power was not in their favor - when one of them rested, both prisoners could be awake.

Having eaten with the prisoners, Buntsev and Kretova began interrogating the "tongues". The stout, fair-haired, open-faced driver of Signal Corps Major Karl Westphal, who was of average height, turned out to be an Austrian. According to him, he participated in the Vienna uprising, after the arrival of the Nazis he worked underground, his older brother died in 1937 in Spain in the war against the Nazis, whom he hated, but he had to serve them. His father was a prisoner in Russia, where he learned to speak Russian well, from him the children learned not only to speak a little Russian, but also to respect the people who overthrew the autocracy and the landowners and capitalists. Karl assured that he dreamed of getting to Russia, but the damned Nazis came, and everything turned upside down. He went to work in Germany, where he got married in Chemnitz.

- I understand, - he said, that you can not trust me, but give me a case and I will show, - Karl finished his biography. Then he told everything he knew about the situation in the rear and at the front.

"That's it, the fascist army, there are many animals in it that cannot be spared, but there are also those that can be pardoned," thought Buntsev.

The driver could still come in handy. It was more difficult with the Hungarian security guard. He did not understand German well, and Buntsev and Kretova knew very little Hungarian words, but they also found an opportunity to explain themselves to him, using Karl as an interpreter.

At first, the prisoner did not so much answer on the merits of the questions asked, but scolded Hitler, the Nazis, Salashi. It turned out that the prisoner mistook them for Soviet intelligence officers. The bold actions and uniforms of the Soviet pilots left no doubts among the prisoners.

From the hard-won testimonies of the prisoners, they established that there were still about 40 kilometers to the front line, that all settlements were guarded by the enemy even where there were no his troops, defensive work was being intensively carried out in many places, that partisans were operating in the rear, attacking even on the Gestapo. The prisoners asked them not to kill. The guard even cried. As the pilots understood, he was very worried about his family, who were waiting for him for breakfast in the morning, and the Austrian was still grieving about the drowned car.

"Thousands and thousands of wonderful people are dying in the fight against the Nazis, and here one thinks about a failed homemade breakfast, and the other thinks about a drowned car," Buntsev remarked.

Buntsev and Kretova began to "agitate" the prisoners. They told them a lot and proved with gestures that the Nazis had already lost the war and everyone who did not jump off a drowning man in time

fascist ship, drown with it. There is very little time left, and we must hurry to take part in the fight against the Nazis.

The guard listened indifferently and looked at their gestures, but either did not understand, or was thinking about something else. Karl behaved quite differently. He offered his services: to show on the map, which was in the officer's field bag, where the headquarters, airfields were located - and offered to lead scouts there, and for everything he asked not to kill him, to take him prisoner. My father and other Austrians who were prisoners of war in Russia during the First World War praised the attitude of the Russians towards them.

A conversation took place between the pilots and the captured driver, the meaning of which was as follows:

"The Russians are kind and right people," said the prisoner. - They are brave warriors and did not mock the prisoners, and not like the Americans.

When he spoke about the Americans, his face expressed obvious hatred.

- What about the Americans? the captain asked.

- Americans are bombing housing, not real military installations. Are they afraid of anti-aircraft guns, or they deliberately drop bombs on the working outskirts.

- But you complain about the Americans, and the Nazis destroyed innocent civilians, burning them in ovens, killing them in gas chambers, bringing them to starvation. You did not protest against this, but drove an officer in your car, and, the devil knows, maybe you were on our land with him and ...

- No, no, - the driver interrupted him, - I was not on your land, but how could I protest when for the slightest protest - death. And I have two young children. Therefore, I was silent, shouting, as everyone shouted, "Heil Hitler!", But I am a worker, I understood that Hitler deceived some Austrians, intimidated others, and destroyed others. He promised us mountains of gold, and his satraps took everything. They took everything into their own hands, and as I was a worker, I remained. Before Hitler, I could still talk, feel like a man, and Hitler's Nazism made us obedient dummies, and many thousands of Austrians laid down their heads or went missing to make the rulers of the new empire even richer. Yes, and "Heil" shouted that he was dead, and went to their gatherings. And if I didn't go, I wouldn't be alive now. Those who did not shout "Heil" died in prisons, but among those who shouted and went to meetings, there were those who quickly began to see clearly from fascist demagoguery, there were also those who walked and shouted along with the Nazis, but worked underground.

- But the end of fascism is already visible, and there are still many fools from those to whom fascism could bring nothing but hard labor, who still defend Hitlerism going to the grave, -
the captain noticed.

- Yes, there are fools and a lot. Previously, they were fascinated by the prospect of becoming masters, but now they are frightened by extermination by the Reds, spreading tales that the Reds will either destroy all Germans or drive them to Siberia and there they die of hunger and exhaustion.

- And they believe it?

- The fact of the matter is that they believe. And how not to believe! How much grief and misfortune was brought by the war started by Hitler, how many thousands of civilians were barbarously destroyed where the Nazis appeared. Therefore, many are afraid, some are afraid that the Russians will not spare either the guilty or the right, others are afraid because they themselves or their children and husbands destroyed innocent civilians.

- It's all rubbish! Nonsense! The perpetrators of our troubles, and your troubles, will suffer their well-deserved punishment, but the innocent and deceived have nothing to fear, "said Buntsev and, looking carefully at the prisoner, added: That's it, Karl. Russians are not vindictive. We destroy the enemy only when he does not surrender, but we do not touch the prisoners. You will live if you do not take it into your head to run away or give us away by shouting and other actions.

Then beware: I shoot accurately. The prisoner squirmed in gratitude.

"No, I won't bother you, I'll help you," he said firmly.

- But, helping us, thereby you will harm the Nazi army.

- Yes. I have no return to the fascist army. I'll be charged and hanged for the major's murder.

- Well, if you managed to extradite us, then you will not only not be hanged, on the contrary, will be awarded.

The prisoner was even offended and said:

The major was unfair to me. He often humiliated me.

Karl was very sorry that his car was drowned, he would have carried Russians on it. When Buntsev began to explain to him that in a car they could not pass through checkpoints and settlements - they could be detained, the driver explained: a pass was put on the front windshield on the left. Signs were put on the body on the right and left that the car belonged to the signal troops, and they were never stopped anywhere and no one checked their documents.

- I know very well where and how to pass so that they don't detain or even stop. Four years went with different officers. There were thoughts of leaving for the partisans, but I was afraid: they would take the car away, and they would shoot me.

Buntsev and Kretova, after listening to the prisoner, looked at each other - they both thought about one thing: is he lying Austrian.

"Well, why didn't you tell me about it right away?" Now the partisans would already have or fled closer to the front line.

- Yes, as you grabbed me, so I did not immediately come to my senses. I thought you were without my help get around. But you can also get another car that suits you, and you know how to do it.

- It is not always and not everywhere easy to get cars, as you think, - the captain remarked. - If you help us, then it will probably be easier to get a car.

- Of course, I will help. I will do whatever you say.

Are you thinking of becoming a partisan? the captain asked.

- Oh yeah! I will help the partisans, and then I will learn myself, "said Karl convincingly that it was possible to believe in the sincerity of his words.

"A partisan involuntarily," Buntsev thought, and decided to take him. "There are a lot of things started up. Let him wear it for now, and then it will be seen," he decided.

- Amazing! He wants to fight against Hitler. So we will give him that opportunity. Let's change him into a major, then he can be useful, - suggested Kretova.

- You, Olya, all for your partisan tricks. And perhaps it's really useful to have your own German major, "Buntsev supported him.

When Kretova's proposal was explained to the captive driver, he was sincerely frightened and began to convince that the major would not come out of him, and if he was caught in this uniform, then by all means will hang.

"That's what we need, so that he was afraid of being caught by the Nazis," thought Buntsev.

- Do you think that the Nazis will catch us, so they will have mercy? he asked Carl. - No! But we will not be hanged because we will not surrender alive. Once you have decided with us, then you can not retreat. If you are with us, then listen to us, and if you are against us, then ... We do not want you to get to the Nazis, but we want you to be a real major in the future free Germany, if necessary.

Many more pilots talked to Carl. They wanted to believe that he was telling them the truth, but they were not so naive as to believe the prisoner immediately without confirmation by deed.

- That's Carl! Now we will make you a major, and then, for the sake of a fortress, we will put you to sleep tied up for the day. You understand yourself that we cannot believe you until you prove it by deed, and in the afternoon we cannot risk leaving an unverified person unbound hand and foot. So forgive us our vigilance.

And the pilots, having dressed the driver as a major, again tied his hands and feet. Captain Buntsev invited Kretova to rest, while he himself remained on duty.

Chapter 11. The punished traitor Having said

goodbye to the kind-hearted Hungarians, Dobryakov, without incident, by morning approached the forest - the place where the crew gathered. Here he saw a man among the bushes and immediately recognized him as his friend. There was no end to the joy.

Two people, exhausted by night crossings and experiences, settled down in those very young pines in which Kretova and Buntsev had been more than a day ago. Despite the hunger, they ate without appetite, drinking wine. In the afternoon, on one tree, Temkin noticed a cut with the letters S.B.O.K. and pointed them out to Dobryakov. The mechanic was delighted.

- They are alive and were here. Right here, in this place.

He began looking under the tree for a note, but found nothing. During the day it was calm in the forest and on the approaches.

The discovery of traces of the commander and the radio operator excited the friends so much that, despite tired, they couldn't sleep.

"It's a pity that the traces are broken. Where are they to be found now?" thought Dobryakov.

XXX

Having covered herself with an overcoat and raincoat, the tired radio operator was fast asleep and did not hear the peals of the approaching cannonade.

To ensure her safety during his rest, Buntsev did not let the prisoners sleep. He was worried about the thought of what to do with the prisoners? Even unarmed, they are a danger: if an enemy appears, when it is necessary to freeze, they can betray them to the enemy with their noise, and in case of any mistake, even attack from behind. Now they lie tied up, perhaps trying not to betray their intentions in any way. There are three options: liquidate, leave tied up on the spot, take it with you and deliver it to the location of your troops, the captain thought so. But he immediately rejected the first option; the enemy is destroyed when he does not surrender - this is an axiom of Soviet soldiers. Whether it was in your rear, there was no need to think. And here the enemy is all around, and the slightest danger, a mistake can lead to death.

Looking at the prisoners, Buntsev tried to penetrate their thoughts, to find out what they think, who they really are. He began to study their papers, but they told him little. In Karl's documents, he found him taken with his family, his wife and children separately, and many family photographs. There were pictures of Karl with some officers, he found letters, but he could not read them. The security guard's documents contained one ID and some kind of note, which the pilot also could not read. Having studied the documents, Buntsev tried to talk to Karl and the guard, but learned little new from the conversation. The prisoners as soon as possible scolded Hitler, Salash, the Nazis, but how to check how sincere it was.

Olga woke up and made the captain lie down to rest.

"Be careful, keep your eyes open, don't fall asleep in any case," Buntsev warned radio operator.

- Be calm. Everything will be OK. I won't break.

Forcing the prisoners to turn away and not turn in her direction, Kretova took up her partisan affairs.

Putting things in order, watching the sleepers, she sat down. But soon she was so sleepy that against her will she closed her eyes, bowing her head. For a second, she really passed out, but, catching herself on this, the girl opened her eyes with a huge effort of will. Glancing at the prisoners, she immediately noticed that the guard was not sleeping. Seeing that he was being watched, he shuddered and again pretended to be asleep. Olga's drowsiness vanished as if by magic. She decided to pretend and watch the prisoners. Putting her head more comfortably on the bag and covering her face with her hand, she could watch them unnoticed by the prisoners.

For some time the prisoners lay quietly and seemed to be sleeping, but then the guard opened one eye and, making sure that the sentry was sleeping, tried to free his hands, trying to rub the rope against a stone. Either the rope was weak, or the large stone lying near the guard was sharp, but he succeeded. Having freed his hands, the guard wanted to unravel his legs, but Karl prevented him. The prisoners were tied up in such a way that Charles had to be released first. When the guard began to untie the Austrian's legs, he woke up, and, realizing what was the matter, to the surprise of Kretova, who was ready to jump up and deal with the deceivers, did not allow himself to untie his legs, shaking his head negatively. The guard thought about something for a moment, then lay down next to Karl and began to whisper in his ear, but the captive driver continued to shake his head negatively. Turning away, the guard began to try to dig a stone out of the ground, but on this his activity was interrupted. Quickly jumping up, Kretova stunned the guard with her butt. The blow was so strong that he no longer came to

consciousness.

Having finished with the guard, Olga listened - it was quiet around, the captain was sleeping. She continued to act as sentry, listening to the distant artillery barrage. And only when it began to get dark, she woke Buntsev and told him about the incident.

- There he is dear, - the captain said, looking at the insensible body. Buntsev went down to the stream, washed himself and returned cheerful.

- Well, don't you want to leave? - asked Captain Karla, whom Olga freed his mouth, arms and legs, but he seemed somehow miserable in the form of a German major, which did not suit the former driver.

"No, I have nowhere to go," replied the Austrian.

- Well done! I did not succumb to the provocation, - Olga added.

"All right, if so, then stay and help us," said Buntsev, turning to Austrian and patted him on the shoulder.

They loaded a heavy bale with various property on Karl, returned the pistol to him and, leaving the guard and his rifle in place, went towards the front line - to where the distant artillery cononade came from.

Chapter 12

Two hours later, Buntsev and his group went to the main highway. At that time, a car column was moving along it in a westerly direction. Against the background of the sky from the ground, the silhouettes of cars filled with various cargo were clearly visible.

"If vehicles loaded with various property are coming from the front, then they are definitely retreating or preparing to retreat," Buntsev decided.

But one had to look at the column only from a distance, since two, although armed, people could not do anything with it. At last the long column passed. Everything seemed to stop on the road, only in the darkness of the night, somewhere low in the air, the unique sound of U-2 engines was heard.

- Cornflowers. The kings of the night. Honestly, they are," Buntsev said happily. - The road is passing us (we were guided during a forced

downtime), the movement is rare, we are so tired of dragging our feet through the mud, we take the risk of walking along the side of the road, maybe someone will come across, with the help of Karl we will drop off and go ourselves, - Olga Buntseva whispered.

It was convenient to walk along the hard roadside, but only constantly had to look back, so that the car does not suddenly catch up.

- It's coming, - the captain warned, noticing a faint light rapidly approaching from behind.

A few seconds later, a passenger car swept past the pedestrians lying behind the ditch. car. A minute later, a red light appeared in front of her. The car stopped.

- Relocation. There's a railroad on the map. Will have to bypass.

- Let's go! It's not the first time for us," Buntsev replied cheerfully. Bypassing

the crossing, the group went to the railway, 200 meters from it.

- Everything is quiet! There are no signs of protection, - Olga whispered after a thorough study of the situation in the crossing area.

Safely crossing the road, the group was about to leave, but, having heard the noise of a moving train in the distance, Buntsev decided to linger and find out what the train was carrying. Three minutes later, a military echelon passed by group B: a weak light burned in the passenger cars, vehicles and guns stood on 12 platforms.

"Let him go downhill," said Olga.

- This one is already late, but we don't have mines, and you won't let the train derail with your bare hands, - replied the captain.

- When there is no guard, you can skillfully launch without mines with the help of improvised means. Let's go in the direction of the crossing, look for a tool and "bomb" the train, - suggested Kretova.

- Olga! We have nothing to bomb with, and no one will put a tool on the road for us, but if we had found it, then with our strength and experience we would not have separated the rails until morning.

- No! We don't need to separate them. There is an easy way, just to find a suitable rail, well, at least a rail three meters long. Then we would quickly bring the track into such a state that not a single train would have passed, - the radio operator answered.

"But the trains light the way ahead and will notice your rail," the captain retorted.

- We will not leave any rail on the way, we will make everything more reliable. Well, let's take a little walk along the path away from the crossing and see. Maybe we'll figure out how to "bomb" the train without bombs and mines.

Buntsev agreed and they went.

- What a find! - the radio operator stopped them, pointing to a small stack of rails, on which lay a piece of rail about four meters long.

But when they tried to move him from his place, it turned out that his strength was not enough ... Buntsev helped lift the rail. In Kretova she began to look for something else, and soon brought a stone weighing about a pood.

- Look! A large column approaches the crossing. This is a wonderful combination. We will work, and the crossing watchman will be busy with cars, - said Kretova quietly, finally entering the role of a partisan.

She explained the essence of the method. Buntsev quickly realized what was the matter, and all three set to work. There was no security. I had to stop work, listen, peer into the darkness. But the car column slowly walked through the crossing, and three pairs of hands were preparing to meet the next enemy train.

When the work was finished, again all three froze, listened, and the column still kept walking.

"If the guards don't find it, the train will definitely go off the rails," she answered confidently. radio operator.

But finally the column passed, and the group headed for the highway. On it occasionally passed individual vehicles. But it didn't take long to get on the road. In the distance, two lights appeared, which approached faster and faster, and it became clear that these were the headlights of two motorcycles. Behind him appeared the lights of cars. The caravan was moving again. I had to step aside.

Watching from the side, they could only count the cars. The motorcade was moving with some cargo. Apparently, it was poorly guarded, but the forces of the group were so small that it could not do anything with the column. The ambush attack could not succeed. And the group missed the convoy, counting 68V trucks. One car from the column stopped and stood on the side of the road. Olga noticed this. The driver began to fiddle, but something went wrong with him, and Buntsev's group saw how a soldier stopped a single car passing by with a red flashlight.

"How easy it all is to do," whispered Buntsev to Kretova. - It can be seen that there are few partisans here and the enemy is not yet frightened.

"Maybe we should try using the red light," Olga suggested.

- I think, yes. We have a flashlight and a German major, - the captain answered.

We stopped and carefully developed an operation to capture the car.

However, the first car turned out to be a van. It was decided to skip it. Following the van judging by the course, it seemed easy.

- Well, Carl! show your skill, - clapping friendly on the shoulder, captain advised the "major" on the implementation of the plan of operation.

"He is very uncertainly waving a lantern. He will not stop the car, but only scare him, and then anxiety, pursuit," the partisans thought.

Olga looked at the commander. He watched Carl closely.

The car stopped. The decisive seconds arrived. Karl went to the right door. The light came on in the car. The passengers of the limousine now could not see what was happening around, and the partisans saw those who were riding in a limousine.

When Indignant at the door for presenting documents, Karl was ~~opened~~ ^{refused}, forgetting that he was in the uniform of a major and said that everything was in order and they could go.

The chief lieutenant of the communications troops saluted, and the car rushed forward, carrying four Nazis who escaped death.

Karl felt that the danger had passed.

"It's a pity that the passengers slipped away," the radio operator remarked.

When everyone calmed down, they heard the sound of an approaching train. Everyone stopped and waited. All three of them had a great desire to see the results of their work.

- What is this? Is it really a passenger one, - the radio operator asked from behind, seeing the lights of a train approaching at high speed to the place of sabotage.

"Really, instead of shell explosions, we will hear the groans of children and women? So it would be better if he passed without derailing," thought Olga.

But then the lights of the locomotive jumped up, and something rattled under it, as if the train began to be pressed. There was a crash of smashed wagons.

The technique worked, but everyone was in a depressed mood. Everyone was silent, thinking that instead of hitting the enemy, they made many innocent victims.

Suddenly, a white flare soared into the sky, followed by another, a third. In the light of rocket fires, they clearly saw the results of their work.

The locomotive and several wagons were lying down a slope, soldiers jumped out of the wagons left on the way, like from wasp nests, and shooting began in the area of the crash. Everyone was heartbroken.

- Hooray! Bombed! Olga shouted. - The best echelon is hard to find. With manpower, but important - in passenger cars, - Buntsev rejoiced.

- Well, Carl! Things are going great! Count on your account a dozen or two killed Nazis,
- said the captain and patted the novice partisan on the shoulder.

Carl stood stunned, half bewildered, half preoccupied.

"We should leave soon," he said, pointing in the direction of the train.

But it was difficult to walk along the wet, sometimes viscous field, and it was dangerous and also difficult to walk along the road, as we often had to get off the asphalt and hide so that they would not be seen from cars passing along the highway.

"You won't go far on your own two feet," the radio operator explained to the former driver.

Impressed by the destruction of the train, in which the former driver of the Nazi army, dressed in the uniform of a major, was directly involved, Karl changed dramatically. His movements became more confident. He realized that his fate was tightly connected with the fate of the partisans.

He began to convince that it was necessary to return to the road, where he would stop and pick up a single car.

Buntsev agreed, and the group went to the highway.

Before they could get out onto the highway, they saw the lights of the darkened headlights of a lonely car. The captain again explained to Karl the plan of action with a different balance of forces.

Carl stepped aside. The flashlight blinked demandingly, and the car obediently stopped. Doors creaked, lights came on. There were four people in the car again. Only instead of a German chief lieutenant with a driver sat a Hungarian sapper captain.

- What's the matter?

- Verification of documents!

- Please...

Carl fiddled with the papers in his hands. He was not a private, he was a major and dealt with a Hungarian officer!

"Please get out of the car," Karl said to the sapper captain.

- Is something wrong? the captain was worried.

"Get out of the car and follow me," Karl ordered. - Everyone get out. The soldiers will stay near the car.

The Hungarian obediently commanded the soldiers who were traveling with him to leave the car and, crouching down, got out first. The driver turned off the engine.

- Fast! Karl ordered.

The driver hastily ran around the car and stood next to the captain.

- Hyundai hoh! - said Buntsev, coming out of the darkness.

- But I'm a company commander...

- Hyundai hoh!

The captain looked around in confusion. The German major held him at gunpoint. SS an officer with some soldier raised their machine guns.

- Please! the captain muttered.

The soldiers raised their hands before their commander. They knew: it is better not to mess with the Germans. You never know!

The SS man snatched the pistol from the captain's holster. A German soldier was picking up abandoned Hungarian rifles.

- But I'm in a hurry ... - the captain began to hint.

- Take off your overcoats and tunic! - ordered some woman standing next to the SS officer.

- Lord! the captain pleaded.

- Shut up!

We are not to blame for anything! - timidly said one of the soldiers. - For what?

- God! exclaimed another. - God!

"No one will shoot you," the woman said. - Remove the tunic! Do not be afraid!

- What are we ... - said the first soldier. - If you have to...

He was already pulling off his tunic. Looking at him, the others hurried as well.

The Germans were whispering about something.

"Brothers," said the major, approaching the Hungarians. - I am a Hungarian like you. We do not harm you wish. It's not the Germans with me. These are Russians. Do you hear?

The soldiers froze in disbelief.

"Look," said the major. He extended his hand to the Hungarians with a cap, on which a red star lit up. - See?

The unclothed soldiers looked at the star as if spellbound. The captain yelled and ran away. Buntsev was on the alert this time...

Then the soldiers believed.

- Russians! one said. - Advijë! Comrades!

- Go home! Karl told the soldiers. - Don't go back to your unit. Go away!

"Yes, now you won't come back," one of the soldiers threw. He looked at Kretova ripping off her epaulettes. - How will you get back?

"Take us with you," said another. - You'd better take us with you.

"We can't," Carl said. - Disperse. And know: Hitler kaput. Red Army soon free the country. The war is over.

- Let him ask if there is a checkpoint ahead! Buntsev asked Olya. - Hurry up!

The driver was the best informed. He stated that the nearest checkpoint is four kilometers away, and if you drive in the opposite direction, there is a checkpoint eleven kilometers away. The bridge is being repaired only on the third kilometer.

- Who repairs?

- The soldiers of our battalion and the local population.

- No Germans?

- No.

Buntsev made the decision without hesitation.

- Take us with you! - the Hungarian soldier asked again.

- Get out! Karl said. - You see, everything will not fit in the car. - Get out!

- Where are we in this form !?

- Hide with the peasants. Go away!

- What are they about? - asked Buntsev.

- This one really asks to take him with you, - Karl answered.

- Nowhere! - cut off Buntsev. But suddenly he lowered the door handle. - Although... What's his name?

- Laszlo Kish, - answered Karl.

"Let him sit down," said Buntsev.

They got into the car.

- Touch! - Buntsev ordered Karl, who sat down for the driver.

The car sped along the road to the east. Four kilometers passed without incident. The Nazis on oncoming cars and motorcycles did not pay any attention to them. Nobody overtook them. Suddenly, a red light flashed up ahead. It was too late to stop and turn around. Karl turned on the full light and, seeing that the barrier was blocking the road, he began to slow down, preparing for a fight with the controller. He signaled with a familiar hand, demanding to raise the barrier. The watchman jumped up, but Karl attacked him with such selective abuse that the soldier, saluting, stepped away from the limousine and raised the barrier. The car moved smoothly.

Karl, wiping sweat, said to Kretova:

- That's what it means to know the rules and the language.

We drove three miles. At the first crossroads, we turned onto the road going southeast, to the direction from where the occasional artillery fire could be heard.

Soon, having left on a hill, we saw a red signal ahead again.

- Is it a checkpoint again? Buntsev whispered.

- No. Something different, - said the radio operator.

Slowing down, the captain turned on the sidelights and began to observe what was happening near the lantern.

"There's only one soldier here," Laszlo explained. - He indicates a detour.

- What about ahead?

- A broken bridge ahead. Work is going on there.

- We won't get stuck on the detour?

- Our captain was afraid to get stuck...

- Let's go straight! Buntsev decided. - Carl, ask the guards to open the barrier.

The barrier was open. The sentry did not dare to object to the German major.

- Well, now - God save! Buntsev said.

The car moved slowly along the highway, going around hastily sealed craters. Under burnt-out trucks littered the slopes.

Ours have worked! Buntsev said. - Likho!

A river with a broken bridge appeared. People were crowding around him. One waved a lantern pointing down the stream.

"There's a floating bridge," Laszlo explained excitedly. - Gotta go there...

The floating bridge was barely visible on the black, rain-swollen river. The car slipped to the bridge, he went under the wheels ...

- Who works here? How many soldiers? Buntsev asked.

"Twenty soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Ferenc and a mobilized population," said Laszlo.

Is there a barrier on the other side?

- Yes, sure.

- Is there a soldier there too?

- Yes.

- And the lieutenant?

- Hm! If he is here, then he is sitting in a tent, but most likely he has gone to the village to the women, - said Laszlo.

"Stop at the barrier," Buntsev ordered Karl.

They safely crossed the river, entered the highway and reached the barrier.

It cost nothing to disarm the sentry. He recognized Laszlo, stretched out before the German major and a minute later he was standing without a rifle, dumb and helpless.

"Tell the people that the work is stopped," Buntsev ordered Laszlo. - And tell the soldiers that they can disperse.

"But... they might not believe..." the Hungarian hesitated.

- Believe. Order the men to come to the car without weapons. Our major will talk to them.

"I'll go with you," Carl said. - Let's go...

The Hungarian soldiers, hailed by Karl and Laszlo, approached the car with obvious pleasure.

Karl announced that the soldiers could go home. The Hungarians were excited.

Mobilized residents began to run.

- Hey, damn! Buntsev said and got out of the car.

The joy of the Hungarians at the sight of a man in an SS uniform vanished. soldiers retreated from the tall SS man.

- Do not be afraid! shouted Laszlo. - Guys! Do not be afraid! These are Russian spies! They cocked Captain Sexard! The Russians are already here! You can disperse!

- Wright! roared a soldier. - Wright! Kaput war!

Kretova touched Buntsev by the sleeve.

- These are sappers... Do they have explosives?

Laszlo immediately replied that there were explosives in the warehouse.

"We must take it," said Kretova. - Take everything you can. Fuses, fuses... Carl!

Carl, talked to Laszlo, he called three friends. We talked. They ran into the darkness.

The soldiers still continued to crowd around the car, looking at the Russians, and some, who had recently approached, still could not understand anything.

"Keep your weapons ready," said Kretova. - We act risky ... It is impossible so ...

However, the soldiers showed no hostile feelings. It can be seen that they drank to their fill war. And the locals have already begun to disperse.

Laszlo and his friends brought two boxes of tola, fuses, a circle of oily shiny Fickford cord, and grenades.

"The lieutenant is not here," Laszlo said breathlessly. - Of course, I went to the village.

"He might come after learning about the Russians," said Kretova. Let's go, Comrade Captain.

It turned out that Laszlo Kish knew the roads well and, having traveled about three kilometers, Buntsev got on the road leading to the north, where, according to the Hungarian, the area is convenient for the partisans, and they have their bases there.

Not a single car came across. This worried Kretova very much. Where there is no movement, a single car is more noticeable. But then they came to a crossroads. A column passed through it. A nervous tremor ran down the captain's spine. In the column there were anti-aircraft guns with crews for them, vehicles with ammunition. Cars with their worst enemies passed in front of them.

- Olga, didn't they knock us out?

- Anything is possible.

And they continued to look at the passing cars. On the road, according to all reports, an entire anti-aircraft artillery division of the enemy was passing by, and two Soviet pilots were watching him from the side, from a plane shot down by the enemy. The forces were unequal, but, looking from the side at the enemy column, they were considering an attack on it.

- Comrade captain, let's bomb the column.

- Late, it seems, otherwise they would put charges on the way. However, we have a car, we can overtake. Do one small charge with a short flicker cord, and a couple of large charges with long cords.

And he told her his plan.

As soon as the convoy passed, Buntsev brought the car onto the road, overtook the convoy without difficulty and, having passed a small bridge, abruptly stopped the car, ran out onto the bridge and put on it a flashlight with a red light. The trick worked: the column stopped,

and thus time was bought for setting ahead of her charges. Peering around, the ship's commander discovered heaps of rubble. Powerful charges were installed in two of them, and when the column started off, Laszlo ignited the incendiary tubes.

The limousine started off, and when the enemy column, judging by the lights, caught up with the charges, Buntsev ordered to throw a small charge with a short incendiary tube onto the road.

Ten seconds later, a flame shot up and an explosion of a small charge was heard, and after it the sounds of large explosions flew to the limousine, but the limousine was already far away and continued to move away from the enemy column, which suffered significant damage.

- That's great, let them remember ours, - Olga rejoiced. Violently rejoiced at luck and Laszlo Kish. Buntsev also felt deep satisfaction, only Karl did not show his enthusiasm in any way and even somehow fell silent.

- You're something, Carl, hushed up. Or do you feel sorry for the Nazis? Buntsev asked him.

"I don't feel sorry for the Nazis, but I really feel sorry for the drivers," he answered.

- Most of all I feel sorry for the innocent children who die in the war, die only because Hitler and the German imperialists wanted to conquer and destroy other peoples. The sooner the German fascist troops are defeated, the fewer innocent victims there will be, and therefore, Karl, wherever possible, it is necessary to smash the Nazi troops, and the only salvation for everyone who does not want to die with the fascist bandits is to get away from them and, in order to get rid of the horrors of war as soon as possible, beat them, - Buntsev concluded his speech.

- We had such daredevils who did not want to fight themselves, and persuaded others to do so, but there were others: they reported, and good people died, and the rest were frightened, and already talk about the war was conducted under the slogan "Heil Hitler!" . Only two of my friends, though zealously shouting "heil!", but one wrote here and there on the fences "Death to Hitler" and "Down with the war", and the other drew caricatures, - Laszlo Kish began to tell, but his story was interrupted by the captain.

"Look, there's a city ahead," he said.

There was a village ahead. Buntsev stopped the car, and no matter how Karl tried to persuade him, the captain did not dare to drive through the city. He clearly understood that if someone stopped them in the village, they had nowhere to hide, especially since the enemy had probably already learned about their affairs and strengthened the guard.

There was no detour. We consulted and decided it was better to abandon the car. Buntsev turned the car around and, having dispersed it, drove off the road, and it got stuck in the soggy ground.

Chapter 13

Four partisans armed and loaded with trophy property went into the field, bypassing the city. Half an hour later, we came out onto a passing narrow road paved with gravel and walked along it, having previously cleaned our shoes of dark dirt adhering to them.

The area, heavily crossed by small ravines and streams, resembled to the captain of the ravines of his native land - Tulshchina. Just look, your native village will appear ...

One dream occupied Buntsev - rather to his own people, to deliver the documents as soon as possible, otherwise they might lose their significance.

We entered a large ravine with exposed edges. On the opposite side, long low buildings and a tall brick chimney were visible against the sky, the top of which had been hit by a shell. There were no signs of people nearby.

"An abandoned brick factory," Buntsev immediately identified.

At such a time, no one is up to the brick. And among the bricks you can find a place for a day. Having overcome a steep ascent, they entered the yard, littered with bricks and broken bricks. And here are the bomb craters. It was ours who bombed someone here.

There was no other choice, dawn was approaching. We decided to stop here for a day and started looking for shelter. There were many dark cells in the ruins of the brick factory, but it was necessary to find the most hidden one with an emergency exit, cover the tracks and prevent the enemy from using dogs.

After a long search, they hardly entered the preserved chamber, where bricks were once fired. There was a small hole in the wall through which it was possible to observe what was happening in the yard, but through it was impossible to see what was happening in the cell. We decided to stay there for the day.

Friends sealed up the entrances with bricks, masked them with dust and settled down for a day. They lit a pocket torch taken by a thrifty radio operator in a captured car. The blue light pleasantly illuminated the uncomfortable shelter, and the soul became lighter.

- Well, now, Olya, let us refresh ourselves from our meager reserves, and we will rest after righteous works, - said the captain.

After a day in the open air, in the rain, they even felt some comfort in a dusty stone box, and the radio operator in an oriental style began to set the "table" on the floor, using the remains of the parachute dome as a tablecloth.

- Eat and drink enough, but the dishes are bad. We'll have to drink together in turn, - said Olga, pointing to Buntsev's mug and Karl's aluminum glass.

- It would be that, but how - we will manage, - the captain answered.

Olya filled the "glasses" from a trophy flask and handed it to Karl and Laszlo, but they refused, and offered, on the contrary, the Russians to drink first.

- No, Olya, I can't drink, I'm entering the service. You drink for a safe passage through the front line, but little by little. Cognac is good to drink with a cold and at home, so we'll come to our people, and we'll drink there as it should be, "said the captain, returning the filled mug to Karl.

"Look, Comrade Captain, what a teetotaler you have become," Kretova said jokingly.

"I'm not a teetotaler, but I don't drink during my working hours," answered Buntsev.

- Yes, are we going to drink now, we will warm up a little, according to the law, 100 grams every day it is necessary, - Kretova did not lag behind.

"I'll drink my rightful portion when I change my post," and the captain gave it back cup.

Breakfast went unnoticed. Olga began to clean the "table". Laszlo helped her.

Dawn broke, but thick fog limited visibility to only a few tens of meters. Buntsev climbed into the next cell.

The tired partisans prepared to rest in order to gain strength for operations at night. Who undressed, put in order clothes and shoes. Karl managed to shave in the semi-darkness.

The peaceful activities of Captain Buntsev's group in the shelter were disrupted by a sudden cannonade. The distant but strong cannonade alerted everyone.

- Began! Ours are coming! Kretova said.

In the beginning of the cannonade, the characteristic sounds of motorcycle engines were heard, then commands in German were also heard. Turning off the light, everyone involuntarily grabbed their weapons.

A few minutes later, several motorcycles drove into the factory yard. The Nazis parked their cars at the walls of the building, while they themselves fled in all directions. One rushed towards them. Everyone froze, holding their weapons at the ready.

The Hitlerite who came used the adjacent room as a toilet and thereby disguised and covered them, albeit not quite pleasant, but a reliable veil.

When the enemy soldier left, Laszlo grabbed Olga's hand and shook it happily, making it clear that for now the danger had passed. But at that time, from where the damaged brick chimney stood, short, muffled bursts of automatic weapons were heard, followed by a grenade explosion, again grenades, and then the loud nasal voices of the Nazis. All four asked themselves the same question: what happened? They felt that some kind of misfortune had happened.

Ignoring the danger, Karl went to a littered pothole in the outer wall and began to listen through the crack to what was happening on the territory of the plant. And he heard the terrible news:

"Zwei Russisch Zoldaten Kaput," Karl said sadly and quietly, and began to explain how he learned from the conversations of the Nazis that two Russian reconnaissance soldiers had a dilapidated pipe as an observation post, had a radio station and informed their own about the enemy by radio. used

"That's who they were looking for: scouts, not us," thought Buntsev.

Everyone honored the memory of the fallen heroes in silence and swore in their hearts to take revenge on the hated Nazis for the death of fearless soldiers.

In the ensuing silence, Buntsev and his comrades heard the ever-increasing rumble of Soviet aircraft engines and no longer felt alone. None of them came to

head the idea that their own aircraft can drop bombs and get into the room where they are hiding.

The Nazis feared that the Soviet intelligence officers called the aircraft on themselves, and therefore, having heard the rumble of approaching Soviet aircraft, they ran to hide in pits outside the factory. All four felt a clear relief and confidence in the successful outcome of their day. But Soviet bombers only flew over the plant to carry out their combat missions deep behind enemy lines.

Half an hour after the rumble of the planes died down somewhere in the distance, the Nazis again appeared in the courtyard of the brick factory, and this time not only on motorcycles, but also on cars and tractors. German speech was almost continuously heard through the growing cannonade. But this time the partisans felt much more confident than when the enemy unit first appeared at the plant.

But no matter how sleepy all four of them, despite Buntsev's proposal, for a long time not one couldn't sleep. Everyone was waiting for new troubles.

In the afternoon, the radio operator was the first to fall asleep, soon Karl fell asleep too. Laszlo also allowed Buntsev to sleep, and he himself was left alone to stay awake, although he was steadily falling asleep. When the captain let others rest and could no longer resist drowsiness himself, he woke up Karl and Olga and left them to serve, warning the radio operator that in no case should he be left alone to stay awake. Despite all the screams of the Germans in the yard, the clang of caterpillars, the close explosions of shells, Buntsev immediately fell asleep.

The sleepy Karl was drawn to sleep, but Olga did not violate the captain's instructions, and as soon as Karl began to fall asleep, she woke him up so as not to be left alone. When Laszlo woke up, the "major" fell asleep, and she was on duty alone with a young Hungarian.

Towards evening, Kretova and Laszlo heard close, booming gun shots not from front, but from the rear.

As soon as dusk fell, Kretova carefully opened the gap and began to observe. Ahead, to the east, the city was visible, illuminated by numerous fires. Behind, behind the brick factory, close-range gunshots were heard.

Buntsev woke up, began to study the situation.

At this time, the battery again fired several shells at our troops.

- Interesting - he thought - we are ahead of the enemy artillery. Behind us is a whole battery, and we are probably between the artillery and infantry of the enemy. Great, so the Germans draped in a day.

- Comrade Captain, - Olga asked anxiously, - we seem to be under the nose German artillery. Ours are probably very close now?

And she told what she saw and heard.

"This will obviously be our last night behind enemy lines. It must be spent in such a way that our every action was a blow to the enemy," thought Buntsev.

They ate quickly. A dark autumn night has come. Artillery fire ceased. Unforgettable sounds of engines grew in the air - the masters of the night expanses, the tireless U-2s.

Chapter 14

The rest of the day and the joyful feeling of the closeness of their troops lifted everyone's spirits.

In complete darkness, brick by brick, they began to dismantle the entrance to the next room, which was littered with them. They managed to make a hole without much noise, but when they began to crawl out, Karl accidentally fell to the floor along with several bricks, and a treacherous roar was heard throughout the building.

Everyone froze, waiting for possible trouble. But the enemy soldiers who were nearby either did not guess the cause of the roar, or did not hear it and continued to go about their business. After waiting 3-4 minutes, the captain led the group between the stacks of bricks into the yard, and when not a single Nazi was visible nearby, they quickly crossed the empty yard and carefully began to move away from the ill-fated plant.

Buntsev and his partisans felt free again, and everything they had experienced during what seemed to them a long day was behind them. Ahead, in the east, in the city, numerous glows of fires could be seen, and from there came a continuous cannonade. It was drizzling a little rain.

Car engines rumbled from the direction of the brick factory. Commands and hurried conversations were heard.

"This is probably the artillery going to drape," Kretova suggested.

They went along the country road known to them. At the very first crossroads on the road leading to the city, they saw a sign with the inscription: "Akhtung! Akhtung, di minen! Di minen!" On the side there was a pole with a pointer, on the arrow of which was the name of the settlement and a cat was drawn.

There was a clanging sound from behind. Buntsev, as if recollecting himself, pulled out the peg.

- Olga! Faster. What are you worth?

Kretova understood what was happening and quickly dragged the peg with the signs to the other side. They pulled out the pointer arrow and set it in a new direction. Now the non-mined area has been marked as mined.

Having done their work, they went along the road, and behind them the roar of engines and the clang of tracks of gun tractors grew.

- Stop! Let's see where they go, - said Buntsev.

The cars stopped at the fork. Through the roar of engines, German abuse could be heard. After consulting, the Nazis apparently came to an agreement. Again there was the clang of caterpillars and the rumble of engines. Suddenly, breaking the silence of the night, a flame shot up high. A large explosion shook the air. The group stopped.

"Gotcha, darlings, you won't drive at night," the radio operator shook her fist.

Soon, one after another, there were two more muffled explosions.

"Boon, boon," Laszlo said happily, pointing in the direction of the explosions.

- Let's go to the big highway - there we will not do such things yet, - Olga rejoiced.

A few minutes later we approached the main highway and lay down. There was almost no traffic on the road. But from the side of the front, several lights appeared. Soon a convoy of trucks and cars, covered in front and behind by armored personnel carriers, passed by the group.

"They're ticking, you bastards," whispered Olga.

The rumble of Soviet aviation appeared in the air and quickly grew.

- Now our people will give them to drink, - she added, peering into the sky.

The enemy column was moving without side guards. At times, overtaking the column, motorcyclists and cars rushed by at high speed.

None of them suspected that Soviet soldiers and their friends were not far from the road. They saw how the Nazis retreated to new defensive lines, from where they had to be driven out again, but so far they could only observe and record. Buntsev wrote down the time, the composition of the passing column. No sooner had one column escaped than another followed. Empty cars were coming towards her - perhaps in order to take out the stolen property. Every now and then, connected motorcyclists scurried from city to city.

Do ours know about the retreat of the enemy that has begun? And if they don't know, how do you tell them? After all, his group can neither stop the flow of cars, nor inflict a sensitive blow on it. She is too small for this and not adapted.

"Comrades," whispered Laszlo.

And he began to show with gestures that he should go to the city and shoot at the enemies there, and in the morning hide and wait for the enemy to withdraw.

- No, Laszlo, you should not climb into a strange, unfamiliar city. We need space to move freely. Although there is panic in the city, we can be shot down not only by the Nazis, but also by our own. The uniform of one is German, the other is Hungarian. We do not know the password. We do not speak German. In general, we should not meddle there, Buntsev concluded his thought.

Everyone agreed with the irrefutable arguments of the captain.

The rumble of the engines of Soviet aircraft was growing. Night bombers passed along the road to the head of the convoy and there they heard deaf explosions of air bombs. The clouds lit up with bloody fires. Tankers and gasoline were burning, ammunition trucks were exploding. Low

The clouds were streaked with spotlight beams, numerous bullet and shell paths plowed through the air. Buntsev's group watched with admiration the actions of the Soviet falcons.

The automobile convoy, which had not yet been hit by our aircraft, apparently, on someone's orders, began to turn onto a country road, and individual cars rushed forward towards the glow of the fire. It was as if U-2s were patrolling over the highway. Soon the traffic on the road stopped, and if it were not for the artillery and mortar skirmish somewhere east of the city, one would think that the front line was already far behind.

"What to do," Buntsev decided, still admiring the bombers nocturnal actions
- where to go to look for a site for crossing the front?

Finally, the car column passed by the group and the armored car that was closing it disappeared from sight. Buntsev, wasting no time, picked up the group, and they almost ran across the road.

Now the way to the east was clear. But, having crossed the road, the captain noticed a lone wagon on it, traveling from the direction of the city. He had the idea of capturing it and thus to some extent making up for the unpleasant impression, dissatisfaction caused by inactivity during the passage of the column.

"This is just a happy find. We need languages and guides so badly, but here they themselves go into our hands. Don't capture a lonely cart at night! .

The captain led the group almost at a run back to the road, explaining what was happening along the way. A lone wagon trotted towards the group that had come onto the road. Buntsev was afraid that they would not be disturbed, and urged Karl to go faster towards the cart.

As soon as the major caught up with the cart, he stopped it and ordered the three German soldiers riding on it to show their documents. When they got them out, Buntsev with a group just emerged from the darkness and ordered in a stencilled way:

- Hyundai hoh!

Three soldiers, seeing the machine guns pointed at them, meekly raised their hands.

- Olga! Quickly connect them together, do not spare the wires - there is a whole cart of them.

Kretova and Laszlo quickly dealt with the frightened soldiers. Buntsev got into the cart and drove the horses away from the road. Following him, the partisans led the prisoners.

We stopped about 150 meters from the road and began interrogating "tongues". Captured soldiers turned out to be messengers. They removed the field wires and drove to the unit.

Laszlo and Karl questioned them in detail about the situation at the front, trying to find out where it was safest to cross the front line.

Kretova busied herself with inspecting the wagon, dropping the spools of wires.

- Olga! You leave a couple of coils just in case, but don't accidentally throw away the right tool.

- Be calm, comrade captain, I won't drop anything you need. Look, the signalers are armed to the teeth: three machine guns, eight grenades.

Having finished interrogating the prisoners, the group learned that the enemy was retreating, and they would soon come here Soviet troops. The prisoners said that the enemy troops retreated only along the roads.

His troops are close, and therefore Buntsev decided to lead the "languages" with him.

So that the prisoners had less incentive to escape, he decided to repeat the operation on the transformation of the Nazis into Germans.

- Olya, bring the prisoners into civilian form.

And Kretova began to process them. The German soldiers were very dissatisfied with the tailoring work of the radio operator, but the Laszlo machine gun aimed at the prisoners reminded them of the need to obey. Olga, like an experienced theatrical costume designer, quickly "demobilized" the German soldiers, and they looked like dervishes. For reliability, they were firmly tied with wire to each other. Now they no longer had the opportunity to scatter, and there was nothing to run away - the Gestapo would still deal with it.

"Well, what a good-natured people we Russian people are," Buntsev reasoned to himself, looking at the prisoners. "We caught three enemy soldiers, and there is no harm from us. And how they mock our soldiers who were captured. Maybe these three killed civilians, and now they are vying with each other trying to answer, trembling with fear for their lives.

they do not look like prisoners of the first year of the war. How our victories repulsed their arrogance, weaned them from campaigns for living space.

And Buntsev remembered that even at the beginning of 1908, Lenin pointed out that "partisan actions are not revenge, but military actions." And indeed, maybe these three Germans, having settled in the signal troops, really already hate Hitler, who interrupted their peaceful life. Maybe these Germans will turn out to be real people and they will fight against the Nazis together with us.

Car lights appeared on the road in the distance. Buntsev led his group towards the highway. They walked across a wet plowed field.

The horses pulled the heavy cart with difficulty. Olga got tired of urging the exhausted horses, and she jumped off the wagon. I had to straighten the horses and use them as riding. Buntsev wanted to put a radio operator on one, but she preferred to walk. All the necessary trophy property was loaded onto the prisoners.

Leaving the wagon in place, the group moved on. Captain Buntsev rode ahead, followed by captive soldiers, bound together, loaded with cartridges, machine guns without disks, coils of wires, tools, and behind them were Kretova and Karl, the procession was brought up by Laszlo on another horse.

"It's not for you to ride horses on your collective farm. That way they can be discovered from afar, and you won't go anywhere on this clumsy heavy bityug," Buntsev soon thought and dismounted from his horse.

Laszlo followed him. They left the horses. Maybe they will be preserved and then useful in the household, the captain thought, frightening the standing bityugs.

We walked along the impassability, drenched in sweat, exerting all our strength, not paying attention to either the mud or the light rain. Buntsev and his comrades knew that they were moving slowly and that time was running fast. They were frightened by the prospect of staying a day behind enemy lines in close proximity to the front line. At stops, listening to the skirmish, Buntsev asked the prisoners the direction of movement, and the group walked again. But on their way they met a stream about 4-5 meters wide that had spilled from continuous rains and stopped.

- It's worse than the road. Here you can't wait until the water passes, you can't jump over, and you can't see the crossbars near.

"Now the horses would come in handy," said Kretova sadly, looking at the muddy water, then on the prisoners, and they showed that the stream was small - knee-deep.

- Not the Volga during the ice drift, but a stream. If necessary, we will bathe, and we will pass. Well, in the meantime, we still have time, let's go along the stream, maybe we'll find a suitable ford or some abandoned bridge. You, Olga, give us a piece from the emergency reserve, Buntsev suggested to her in conclusion.

Before Laszlo and Karl had time to ask the prisoners about the stream and the possibilities of crossing it, Kretova had already cut and gave everyone a small piece of good-quality lard and a small slice of stale bread.

From the interrogations of the prisoners, Laszlo learned that there was a bridge not far downstream, on a small country road, it might be possible to cross it when there was no movement. The bridge, according to the stories of the prisoners, is not guarded by anyone.

- Comrade captain, why should we look for bridges. Let's put one Fritz on a leash, and let him measure, since they brought us here.

- Look, comrade Kretova, how ruthless you are. There is no bathing Fritz in cold water needs, they carry the load for us.

And Buntsev led the group downstream, as recommended by the prisoners.

- Comrade captain! Maybe the Fritz are deliberately directing us into a trap, the further we go downstream, the more water in the stream, and suddenly the bridge will be guarded, and they will yell when we get closer to it.

- Don't look in that direction! If we go up, we will again approach the main road, and on it even a small bridge can be heavily guarded. The farther we go from the main road, the fewer troops we will have at the front in such mud, and it will be easier to go over to our own. As for the trap, you need to look both ways.

Having passed a little, we heard the rumble of engines and the clang of caterpillars ahead and to the right.

"Here, bastards, they're walking without lights, which means they're trying to escape unnoticed," thought the captain.

Judging by the hum of the engines, Buntsev determined that the convoy was moving slowly, perhaps due to the poor condition of the road.

When the group approached the bridge about two hundred meters, the captain stopped it.

- Well, here we are. There are no less cars here than on the main road, - Kretova whispered to the captain. And, looking angrily at the prisoners, she added: she would still have to force them to look for a ford.

- Do not worry, Olga! You hear how the shooting is approaching, maybe the last Nazis are retreating along the bridge! But take care of the prisoners: now they can let us down. I'll have to put it on the ground, and put gags in my mouth so that they don't shout.

No matter how the prisoners proved that they would neither scream nor run, Buntsev this time turned out to be inexorable, and they were laid on the ground with their hands and feet tied, with gags in their mouths. Leaving Kretova and Laszlo with them, Buntsev and Karl went on reconnaissance to the bridge.

"Well, dregs. The stream is small, and the bridge is large, taking into account the flood of the stream during the flood, and even guarded," thought Buntsev.

At the entrance to the eastern shore of the structure, twin sentries walked around, and their silhouettes were visible against the sky when they were not covered by vehicles, tractors and guns. Artillery units apparently retreated along the bridge, observing the strictest light and sound camouflage: the vehicles were moving with the lights completely turned off, the soldiers on the vehicles and guns did not betray their presence in any way.

Zorky Buntsev pushed Karl, pointing out to him the soldiers he had noticed under the bridge span. Upon careful observation, the captain noticed that the soldiers were burying something. A suspicion arose in his head - if the bastards really want to blow up the bridge.

And as if to confirm this thought, he noticed two more soldiers who were approaching object and unwind something.

"The wires are failing, they are thinking of blowing them up as soon as they let their own through."

In Buntsev's imagination, the possible consequences arose: forward Soviet units approaching the enemy, and in front of them the bridge flies into the air and the enemy breaks off. But there may be an even more unpleasant option: Soviet tanks, carried away by the pursuit of the enemy, burst onto the bridge and take off into the air with him, the units following them are showered with a hail of stones and concrete.

"No, we won't let you blow up the bridge," Buntsev decided.

Apparently, having finished the work, the soldiers came out from under the bridge and four of them began to move away from where they had just stretched the wires, two remained on the road directly near the object.

"It's impossible, it's downright criminal to be near the bridge and let the enemy blow it up after the withdrawal of enemy troops, and even, perhaps, when our forward units approach it. No and no! It's better to die yourself, but not let the enemy blow up the bridge," decided Buntsev.

"But how not to let it blow up? Approach imperceptibly to the wire laid along the road, and even in the presence of soldiers left near the bridge - it is unlikely.

Well, what if you can cut the wires? They will find the break, fix it, or detonate the charge in some other way. Short circuit wires? But again they can notice a short circuit and eliminate it. They are not so bad as not to foresee the possibility of damage to the wires. And he had a new idea - to blow up the bridge himself. Not such a large stream and not such an important structure, and ours can quickly build a temporary crossing.

"Where would it be more useful," he thought, to the enemy - blow up the bridge under passing cars and not give him the opportunity to withdraw equipment and get out from under the blow of our troops.

Having made a decision, Buntsev hurried to his group. All approaching shell explosions. Returning, the captain began to select for himself everything necessary for the operation he had conceived: an incomplete coil of wire, wire cutters, a couple of fuses for grenades.

What are you thinking, Comrade Captain? Maybe, with the help of the Fritz, we will cross the stream, and we will go to our own as soon as possible.

- We can always cross, Olga, but now the point is not to cross ourselves, but to prevent the Nazis from taking their equipment across the stream over the bridge and thereby help their troops. Here, comrade Kretova, are all my documents. And here are the documents of the enemy. Just in case, be ready to deliver them to your own. Now, without any noise, move away from the bridge for another two hundred meters and wait for me, and if I linger after the explosion for more than a quarter of an hour, act on your own.

- Comrade captain! Don't go alone! I will go with you! Karl and Laszlo with the prisoners will step back and wait for us.

- No, Olga, it's easier to get close alone, and so that I don't waste time, you yourself explain everything to our friends when you move another two hundred meters from the bridge. Now wish me luck and I'll go.

Karl and Laszlo, having learned that Buntsev would go to the bridge, and realizing that he was going to go alone, strongly protested. Buntsev had to yield and take Karl with him.

"You didn't take me like that, but you take Karl," Kretova was offended.

"But he might eavesdrop on something important that neither you nor I can.

It was drizzling a little rain. The autumn night was so dark that after walking five steps, Buntsev no longer saw the rest of the group.

All the approaching explosions of mines and shells, of friendly troops, enemy artillery fire drowned out any extraneous noise and even the rumble of engines on the road. Buntsev and Karl, bending down, walked along the stream to the bridge. It seemed to the captain that too much time had passed from the moment they left, when they finally approached the object at such a distance that the vehicles moving along the bridge and the guns attached to them became clearly visible from below. Buntsev and Karl lay down in a wet hollow. The bridge was now guarded not by two, but by four soldiers. They were located 10-12 meters from the object, and, as it seemed to the captain, the sentries could clearly see not only what was happening on the bridge, but also around it. But Buntsev was wrong. Standing on the road, the German soldiers, getting used to the darkness, really saw well what was happening on the bridge and on the road on the approaches to it, but, being at the top, they did not see anything that was happening below, in the floodplain of the stream, and they did not special need to monitor the floodplain of the stream, which, on the approach to the bridge from the east, was tightly blocked by anti-personnel mines, the presence of which the captain did not even know.

Having overestimated the enemy's ability to observe the floodplain, Buntsev decided to get to the bridge alone. Karl did not agree to let him go alone, but he found a way out, leaving him his fur jacket. Taking with him a coil of wire with checks of grenade fuses tied to it, the captain crawled to the bridge. The closer Buntsev crawled to the charge, the stronger his heart beat. He could already clearly hear the conversations of the Germans on the bridge, but it was impossible to stop, he was in a hurry.

All his actions were aimed at getting to the bridge unnoticed. Finding himself under the bridge, the captain listened for several seconds, peered into the darkness, and, not finding anything suspicious, began to grope for the wires and the charge. The weak, previously imperceptible wind now became unbearable. Chilling from the cold, the captain felt for two wires and, finding a charge on them, pulled them out and inserted the grenade fuse. Now the enemy's miners could not let him fly into the air along with the bridge. And along the bridge, rumbling, cars left, taking away guns.

Having strengthened the fuse, Buntsev began to carefully crawl away. Karl was waiting for his boss and friend, and as soon as Buntsev crawled up to him, he gave him a flask of cognac. The captain drank a few sips greedily, put on his jacket, and together they crawled about fifty meters from the bridge. Having unwound the second coil of wire, they stopped. Judging by the rumble, the enemy was still retreating across the bridge. Friends lay down over the hill.

"Enough, otherwise they will leave," the captain thought and pulled the wire, looking in awe
bridge, fearing that the fuse would fail.

There was no explosion. The captain began frantically to choose the wire further.

Suddenly, a huge column of fire erupted, then there was a deafening explosion, and the debris of the bridge, along with the gun, flew into the air. Concrete, stones and metal fell to the ground with hissing and squealing. Several fragments fell nearby, splashing the captain and his assistant with earth. When the fall of debris and fragments stopped, Buntsev and Karl shook hands in joyful excitement. Karl again took out a flask and, opening the cork, gave it to Buntsev, who drank several large sips of cognac, and they went to the group.

Following the captain's instructions, Kretova began to take the prisoners back, quietly moving away from the bridge. Having passed about one hundred and fifty meters, the group stopped in a hollow. When the flame of the explosion shot up, Kretova's heart beat with joy. She was glad that the escape route of the enemy's equipment was cut off, but at the same time she worried about the fate of the performers. And Kretova peered into the darkness, waiting for Buntsev to appear.

Suddenly, in the area of the former bridge, as it seemed to the radio operator, there was a grenade explosion. Heart so it sank. But no shooting, and one after the other two more grenade explosions.

"What does it mean?" thought Laszlo and Kretova, peering into the darkness, to where the bridge had been.

It seemed that a lot of time had passed, but Buntsev and Karl were still not there. Finally, the radio operator heard steps and, straining all her attention, all her will, soon saw a person so dear to him.

Overjoyed, Olga rushed forward, and such a touching meeting took place between her and the captain, as if Buntsev had arrived not after a dangerous operation just completed, but after a long separation.

- You just drink some wine and warm up. Now you can't refuse. And Olya gave him a flask of wine. The captain took a few sips and passed them to Karl.

The destruction of a small bridge during the passage of the batteries of the retreating German infantry regiment over it dramatically changed the situation in the area where the Buntsev group was located.

According to the plan, at night the German infantry regiment was to withdraw to the western bank of the nameless stream, to gain a foothold on it by dawn, destroying the bridge, and to prevent its restoration with artillery and mortar fire. The premature explosion of the bridge, and even with significant losses for the enemy, overturned all his plans. As a result of the explosion of a large charge, the battery passing over the bridge was almost completely destroyed. Two battalions with all means of reinforcement were cut off. The enemy did not have time to restore the bridge across the stream. It was impossible to move off-road on the ground saturated with water from the autumn rains. The Germans decided to use the last opportunity and save part of the cut off equipment by transporting it over an impromptu bridge, which they decided to build where a dirt road passed through the stream, sending a detachment of sappers and an infantry platoon for this purpose.

Having learned about a strong explosion behind enemy lines, in the area where there was a bridge across the stream, the commander of the advancing rifle regiment of the Soviet Army, Colonel Mitrofanov, assuming that one of the vehicles with ammunition exploded, ordered to intensify artillery shelling of the bridge area.

Despite the soggy, sticky ground, noticing the retreat of the enemy, the Soviet units began to pursue him.

Artillery shelling of the bridge area began. Some shells whistled over head, others exploded between the group and the bridge.

- Comrade captain! Let's go quickly away from the bridge, but across the stream - to our own people, - suggested Kretova.

But he did not have time to answer. About twenty meters to the right, a shell exploded and fragments from whistled over the lying group.

- Behind me! - Buntsev ordered, and everyone ran to the fresh funnel and lay down in her.

The cloying smell of exploding TNT wafted through the funnel. The captain ordered with a captive helmet and two bowlers, quickly clear the funnel of loose soil.

- Now, Olya, we will wait for our own.

"And if dawn catches us here," the radio operator asked frightened.

- Look! Look! You see these bright oscillating, then flashing, then disappearing lights. These are our tanks.

The shells howled a little to the side and burst from the side, from behind. Machine-gun fire was approaching. It was definitely dawn.

"If our people don't come up to the stream and force it," thought Buntsev, "then it's all over." It was already too late to move forward.

The funnel cleared of loose soil was prepared for defense.

When the artillery fire almost stopped and was moved deep into the enemy defenses, Buntsev and his group heard a distant Russian "Hurrah!" Leaning out from behind the parapet, they saw the retreating lines of the enemy and the Soviet units pursuing them ahead of the stream. Three tanks burst forward and went to the destroyed bridge, but then a flame shot up under one, there was a dull explosion, and the tank, shuddering, stopped.

Buntsev saw how, near a platoon of Germans, breaking away under the cover of slowly retreating chains, they headed for the stream, apparently trying to reach the western, command bank.

Goosebumps ran down Buntsev's back from excitement. A whole platoon of the enemy was advancing on them with machine guns and mortars.

- Olga! Laszlo! - he showed them a platoon approaching the stream.

"It would be nice to make Karl shoot too," the captain thought, "but the damn Austrian will again begin to offer to do without a fight."

He showed Karl to keep an eye on the prisoners.

Less than a hundred meters remained from the funnel, where the Buntsev group was located, to the Nazis.

Olga and Laszlo burned with impatience.

- Comrade captain, let me cut, - the radio operator whispered.

- Hush, wait for the command.

Approaching the stream, the enemy platoon rushed into the water. When most of them had already crossed and the rest entered the stream, Buntsev gave a long line. Olga and Laszlo followed him. Wet Nazis swept along the shore under the destructive fire of three machine guns. Some of them remained in the stream. Only a dozen surviving Nazis managed to escape to the side and lie down behind a hillock, leaving a mortar and two machine guns and about half a dozen dead and wounded. Now the retreating chain of the German company could no longer count on support from the western bank. The Nazis began to hastily retreat to the remnants of their platoon, which hid from Buntsev's group behind a hillock and from there entered into a firefight with it. Seeing the confusion and firing behind enemy lines, the advancing Soviet rifle company, under the command of Captain Yegorov, shouted "Hurrah!" rushed to pursue the enemy.

- Hooray, - Buntsev and Kretova shouted like an echo in response - Laszlo supported them, but immediately grabbed his chest and found blood.

He was handed over to Karl for assistance. Having no effective support from the rear, the thinned enemy chain threw down her weapon and raised her hands up.

The remnants of the German platoon that crossed to the western coast began to crawl away, trying to quickly get away from the coast, but they were noticed.

- Flow, bastards - Olga whispered, pointing to the Germans running across two hundred meters.

The automatic fire of Buntsev's thinned group nevertheless forced the Nazis to reduce their ardor and lay low. They were pursued by Soviet units. Having crossed the ford, they appeared in front of the funnel occupied by Buntsev's group. The captain and Kretova rushed to meet them.

Seeing a radio operator in a cap with a red star and Captain Buntsev in his leather jacket, and with him a wounded Hungarian soldier, a red-haired German in an officer's overcoat, with a machine gun, but without a headgear, which the quick-witted Karl took off in a timely manner, and three tattered ones, one of which was wounded in the leg, the squad leader, an elderly sergeant, who fought from the foothills of the Caucasus to the Hungarian plain, was at a loss for a second - he had never seen such a picture, and then asked:

How did you get here before us?

Chapter 15

Already in the late afternoon, Temkin and Dobryakov heard a noise - someone was walking, and not alone. They got worried. And between the bushes they saw armed men. Friends were stunned when they heard Russian speech.

- Yes, these are our partisans! Dobryakov exclaimed.

- Yes exactly! Temkin confirmed. They rushed towards them.

Seeing people running towards them, the partisans stopped. One of them exclaimed:

- Tolya, is that you? Where are you from?

- It's a long story. Where are you from? -

We are from the Volyansky unit. We are making a raid on Hungary.

Soon commander Volyansky himself came up. He recognized Dobryakov, whom he knew, when he delivered the goods to him. Friends joyfully rushed into each other's arms.

03/24/2000

PART 7. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

The command of the enemy troops had to partisans, at myself V the rear was practically create a second front for the struggle of troops. This With distracted by large forces in the general state of seriously affected the outcome of the war. on the German front and in the final account on

Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections.

Chapter 1. Definition of concepts, the role and significance of guerrilla warfare

The classic definition of the concept of "partisan war" was given at the beginning of the 19th century by the famous Russian partisan and poet Denis Davydov. He wrote: "Guerrilla warfare consists of neither very fractional nor paramount enterprises, for it is not about burning one or two barns, not disrupting pickets and not delivering direct blows to the main forces of the enemy. It encompasses and crosses the entire length of the paths, from the rear of the opposing army of that space of the earth, which is determined to supply it with troops, food and charges, through this, blocking the flow of the source of its strength and existence, it exposes it to the blows of its army, exhausted, hungry, disarmed and deprived of the saving bonds of subordination. ".

This definition remains true against the aggressor in modern wars without use of weapons of mass destruction.

Opportunities and success of economic, partisan military, War is associated with a number of social and natural-political, technical geographical factors. These factors, according to their causal essence, can be divided into objective, which do not depend on the partisans, and subjective, depending on the composition of the partisan unit, the degree of its preparedness and security, the quality of the leadership of the partisan forces.

The political situation is a decisive factor for the emergence and development of guerrilla warfare. The essence of the political situation lies in the attitude of the population towards the guerrillas and their enemy, in the ability of the people to take part in the fight against the enemy and in rendering assistance to the guerrillas. The origins of the partisan movement, its scope and strength are predetermined by spiritual power, patriotism, the ardent desire of the masses of the people to see their homeland happy, free from internal enslavers and foreign invaders. The ranks of the partisans are replenished voluntarily only by their own, that is, loyal people. Without it, there will not be enough bases; without it, the partisans cannot escape in any fortress. For the fortress of the partisans is also its own people, who will prompt, and indicate, and help, and help out, and strengthen the partisan detachment with new forces.

As was often the case at the front, if only one soldier remained from a company, it was believed that the company was dead. And when there was one partisan from the detachment, a new partisan detachment almost always grew up and even turned into a partisan unit. This is especially clearly seen from the actions of our partisan paratroopers in Czechoslovakia. What bases did Kvitinsky's detachment, Shukaev's formation, landing groups have there: Velichko, Volyansky, Yegorov, Popov, Khimich, Astakhov. What bases did all these and many more of our Ukrainian partisans have there, in Czechoslovakia, in Poland, besides the people's base, although they all turned from groups and detachments into formations of many thousands?

And what bases did the raid partisan formations in Ukraine have, operating every day in a new area?

Misunderstanding that the base of the partisans is the people, attachment to the front, inability to break away from it for their wide, unrestricted maneuvers in the operational and strategic depth of the enemy rear - this was the reason for the failures of the first partisan detachments.

The guerrilla movement arises in the course of the war. In the armed struggle against neo-colonialist, racist and other reactionary regimes, the guerrilla movement, as a rule, arises long before the start of the armed struggle, before the start of the uprising, and takes a long time to prepare. Historical experience teaches that the success of the liberation (partisan) struggle depends to a decisive extent on how carefully it is prepared, how much it stems from a nationwide political crisis and how much it relies on the revolutionary and patriotic upsurge of the people, and sometimes on the political situation in other countries. which can in one way or another affect the course and final outcome of the struggle. The nature of the guerrilla war, its direction, scope and effectiveness as a whole depend on the specific historical challenges facing the participants in this liberation movement and the ways to solve them. Together, these conditions give rise to the most effective guerrilla struggle.

tasks,

Significant impact on the scope, depth and effectiveness of guerrilla warfare
They also have heroic-patriotic traditions and freedom-loving peoples.

A decisive role in the outcome of a guerrilla war is often played by the presence of an organization capable of leading the people's liberation struggle. Historical experience convincingly shows that popular uprisings and guerrilla wars fail even under all other favorable conditions in the absence of a single organization capable of leading the popular masses and successfully leading their struggle. In modern conditions such organizations can be religious, national or social parties.

However, not only the presence of a special body of military leadership of partisan forces plays a role, but also its quality. The experience of partisan struggle in the Second World War and subsequent national liberation wars convincingly showed that the command of the actions of partisan forces must be created in advance and staffed with personnel with the necessary training. Mistakes in guerrilla leadership were often costly and reduced the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare. Therefore, those leaders of the national liberation movements acted correctly, who in advance created a competent military leadership of the partisan forces, as was the case, for example, in China, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Cyprus and a number of other countries. This fully justified itself.

However, just as the most competent headquarters is useless in the absence of ordinary soldiers, so the military leadership of the guerrilla forces certainly cannot be considered a guarantee of success. Who are these people who operate in partisan detachments?

Partisans are direct participants in actions that cause damage to the enemy in manpower, military equipment, disrupt the management of the population and troops, reduce the combat capability of enemy troops in other ways, conduct reconnaissance, etc.

Participants in the guerrilla movement and guerrilla warfare are also all those who, without directly participating in the actions of the guerrillas, provide the guerrilla forces with everything necessary for struggle and life. Note that such participation in guerrilla warfare is usually more dangerous than participation in combat operations of detachments, which, having inflicted damage on the enemy, can get out from under his blow, while their assistants remain in place and often suffer heavy losses. Therefore, it is clear how unfair it is that many worthy local residents who ensured the actions of Soviet partisans in the Great Patriotic War were not awarded.

The readiness of the broad masses of the people for guerrilla warfare against foreign and domestic enslavers can only be realized most effectively with **proper advance preparation**.

Preparation for guerrilla warfare against reactionary and colonial governments, as well as preparation for it in the event of an enemy invasion, includes the spiritual and political preparation of the population, the creation of special leadership bodies, the organization of guerrilla forces, their preparation, planning of actions and comprehensive support.

The preparation of partisan forces for warfare includes: the creation of leadership bodies, training of personnel, the formation and arming of groups and detachments both on enemy-controlled territory and outside the country, up to the organization of the production of explosives, mines and grenades and simple means, the organization of covert control .

An essential element of this preparation is the development of options for an action plan in depending on the probable situation, under the conditions in which they can begin.

Consequently, the preparation of the partisan forces for the fight can be considered complete when materially secure controlled partisan formations are created, as well as variants of plans for their actions, depending on the possible conditions for the deployment of the war.

Such training under ordinary peaceful conditions requires a considerable amount of time (sometimes from 2 to 5 years). It must be comprehensive and cover as many regions of the country as possible, so that then, by sudden simultaneous actions, cause confusion in the enemy and prevent him from suppressing the partisan forces at the very beginning of their activity.

As an example of wise advance comprehensive preparation for guerrilla warfare in the event of enemy aggression, one can cite the preparation for it in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and early 1930s. So, only in the Byelorussian SSR in the first half of the 30s there were six partisan detachments of 300-500 people each, sabotage groups were created and trained at large railway junctions and in cities. All of them were provided with weapons, ammunition and explosives, given their rapid growth. Unfortunately, all this was liquidated in 1937-1939. A similar picture was in Ukraine and the Leningrad military district.

What are the characteristics of guerrilla warfare? This:

- a peculiar concept of the enemy, which includes both his troops and institutions, authorities at various levels, the dominant political organizations of the enemy, various organizations of accomplices and their military and paramilitary formations, etc.;
- the achievement of tactical, operational and strategic goals, throughout the entire war or most of it, with small, limited forces and means against enemy forces that are superior to partisan forces in numerical and military-technical terms;
- the diversity of the nature of the objects (military, transport, industrial, warehouse, etc.) on which partisan forces strike;
- the absence of a front line and actions in the territory controlled by the enemy, the absence of a certain form of clothing among partisans (and only if necessary, the use of signs and stripes showing belonging to partisan formations);
- predominant strikes on selective objects, disconnected territorially, but united by their significance;
- the irregularity of combat nutrition (weapons and ammunition) of the partisan forces;
- extensive use of local resources of various kinds for partisan forces;
- great difficulties with the transportation and treatment of the wounded and sick;
- the objective need, along with military action against the enemy, to constantly improve contacts with the population, carry out accessible social events, protect the population and establish people's power, starting from grassroots bodies with varying degrees of democracy, and thus involve the people in the war of liberation.

Guerrilla warfare can hardly be successful without knowledge and application of the theory of guerrilla warfare. The impetus for the development of the theory of the art of guerrilla warfare at the beginning of the 19th century was the effective actions of the Guerillas against the Napoleonic troops in Spain, as well as the actions of Russian partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812.

In 1821 in Russia, for the first time in history, the work of the hero of the partisan war D. Davydov, profound in content, was published: "Experience in the theory of partisan actions." In it, with skill, all questions of the organization of guerrilla forces, the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare were outlined. Many provisions of this work by D. Davydov have not lost their significance in our time.

In 1858, the work of Major General N.S. Golitsyn "On partisan actions on a large scale, brought into the correct system and applied to the actions of armies in general and our Russians in particular", which outlined the issues of the strategy of guerrilla warfare and protecting the rear from enemy partisan actions.

Issues of guerrilla warfare are reflected in the works of military researchers West, including K. Clausewitz and G. Jomini.

In 1884, the work of V.N. Klembovsky "Partisan actions", which was then reprinted three times during the years of the civil war.

In Soviet times, a number of very interesting works were also published, such as the book M.A. Drobov "Small war: partisanship and sabotage" or P. Karatygin's work "Partisanship".

The success of their actions largely depended on how correctly the theory of organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare was developed, to what extent it corresponded to practice, how well the leaders and commanders of guerrilla forces mastered it. The backwardness of theory, its inability to timely reveal new phenomena that affect the possibilities and effectiveness of guerrilla warfare, cost great sacrifices and sharply reduced the effectiveness of guerrilla operations in past wars.

However, it is not enough to have and systematically improve the theory of the art of guerrilla warfare; it must become the property of those who conduct or will conduct guerrilla operations.

Chapter 2

century

The great Russian commander Generalissimo A. V. Suvorov wrote: "Without a lamp of history and tactics of darkness," implying that without knowledge of the past, numerous mistakes can hardly be avoided, especially in the art of war. Guerrilla warfare is as much a branch of military science as any other and, as such, needs to be studied and has a long and glorious theory.

If we analyze all the liberation wars waged by the peoples, it becomes obvious that partisan movements, as an active form of armed resistance to foreign invaders, occupied a very prominent place in this patriotic struggle.

History knows such wars of liberation, when partisan formations were the only force that opposed the regular army of the conqueror, many times superior to the partisans.

Such an example is the struggle of the Spanish people at the beginning of the 19th century against the army of Napoleon. The regular Spanish army, almost without loss, in six days, was defeated by Marshal Murat, who was at the head of an 80,000-strong army. And the Spanish royal family - the Bourbons in full force voluntarily arrived as a prisoner to the winner. And suddenly, quite unexpectedly for all of Europe, Spain flared up with a fierce, uncompromising partisan struggle against the French conquerors.

The winner of Europe did not manage to cope with the Spanish Guerillas. To reach Madrid, capture it and capture the ruling dynasty, he needed 80,000 troops, and for the six-year occupation of Spain, he needed more than 200,000 troops.

The emperor encountered an even greater scale of partisan struggle in Russia. It is known that out of 600 thousand troops that went on a campaign against Russia, Napoleon brought only 130-140 thousand to Borodino. And Napoleon attributed these losses to a large extent due to guerrilla warfare. In a letter to Marshal Berthier, he wrote: "Note to the Duke of Elchingem (Ney) that he loses more people every day in foraging than in battles."

When the Russian troops left Moscow, M.I. Kutuzov strengthened the spontaneous people's partisan movement with military partisan detachments, sending to the rear on Napoleon's communications up to 20 military partisan detachments numbering from 200 to 2500 each, thereby including the forces of the army and the people in a single plan to achieve victory over the enemy. It was a brilliant experience of joint operations of mobile military and local peasant partisan formations behind enemy lines. The successful actions of the army partisan detachments contributed to the rise of the people's forces and the development of the partisan movement.

After the transition of the Russian army to the counteroffensive and the flight of the French from Moscow, the guerrilla war along the communications lines of Napoleon's retreating troops became nationwide. If the role of the partisan struggle in the Patriotic War of 1812 during the period of the enemy's offensive from the border to Moscow, was expressed in the fact that Napoleon was forced to leave large garrisons on his communications, expend his forces on guarding carts and couriers, then during the retreat of Napoleon and his pursuit, the role of the partisan The war was to disrupt the planned withdrawal of enemy troops, to deprive them of food and "saving bonds of subordination."

All this was of great strategic importance. Despite the careful organization of the rear and the allocation of significant troops to protect it, Napoleon was unable to protect his communications from partisan actions.

In the second half of the 19th century, with the advent of railways, the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare increased even more. In the North American Civil War (1860-65), it was the railroads that served as the main object of partisan actions. The destruction of railway tracks, bridges and other structures proved to be the most sensitive for the enemy.

The growth in the size of armies, their increasing dependence on supplies from the deep rear, the development of railway transport increased the role and importance of partisan operations, and the appearance of crushing explosives and the improvement of methods for their detonation significantly increased the combat capabilities of even small detachments. The guerrillas began to inflict damage on the enemy without entering into a combat clash with him. This was achieved by the destruction of unguarded sections of railways and small artificial structures.

New potential opportunities for partisanship emerged during the Franco-German war of 1870-1871. In January 1871, French partisans (france tireres) by blowing up bridges in the rear of the German army besieging Paris, sought to interrupt the railway connection for 15 days. According to N. Petrovich, the actions of such partisan detachments forced the Germans to allocate a quarter of the active army, that is, about 100 thousand people, to protect their rear.

Due to the specific features of the First World War during it, guerrilla actions took place mainly in non-European theaters of war. In Europe, the actions of the Serbian partisans (comitajs) can be noted as the most objective. With a total number of no more than six seven thousand people, they forced the Austrian command to keep an army of 70 thousand people in the occupied country, sometimes even removing additional troops from active fronts.

Partisan actions acquired a huge scope in the Civil War. According to the German press, in the summer of 1918, up to 200,000 partisan rebels operated in Ukraine. And by the time the Austro-Hungarian occupiers were expelled from Ukraine, 300,000 were already fighting with weapons in their hands.

In Siberia, entire partisan fronts acted against the Czechoslovak rebels and Kolchak: the North Kansky, the Stepno-Badzhaysky, and the Shchitkinsky. There were vast areas: Altai, Angarsk, Zabaikalsky, Ussuri, which were sometimes called partisan republics.

By the autumn of 1919, more than 200,000 fighters, who were assisted by the majority of the working population of Siberia and the Far East, acted against the American-Japanese interventionists and the White troops of Kolchak alone in the ranks of the partisans. In the Far East, the partisan movement contributed to the final expulsion of the Japanese-American interventionists.

In the rear of Denikin in Ukraine in the autumn of 1919, more than 100,000 rebels operated. By November, the activity of the partisans, led by the Bureau behind the front, had increased so much that the enemy was forced to withdraw from the front and throw on the Donbass, Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson the elite units of Shkuro and Slashchev.

Numerous partisan detachments operated against the interventionists (Americans, British, French) on the outskirts of the young Soviet Republic, numbering over 50 thousand people in their ranks in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. In the Arkhangelsk province - up to 20 thousand, in the Urals - up to 30 thousand and in the Far East - up to 50 thousand people.

Most of the partisan detachments, as these areas were liberated by the Red Army, were merged into regular units. There were also reverse cases, when, due to necessity, military units switched to partisan methods of struggle, finding themselves behind enemy lines.

It is impossible not to note the effectiveness of Makhno's actions, who, during the November 1919 counteroffensive of the Red Army, literally paralyzed Denikin's rear and captured the main supply base of the Volunteer Army, cut off all the railways in its rear. (By the way, I met Makhno. He was an excellent organizer).

To suppress the Tambov uprising, the participants of which actively used the methods of partisan struggle, it was necessary to use troops with a total number of more than 120 thousand, which with their firepower supported 9 artillery brigades, 4 armored trains, 6 armored aircraft, 5 armored detachments and 2 air squadrons. Only with the use of elite units of the Red Army was it possible to suppress the partisan movement. Tukhachevsky himself, who commanded these troops, wrote that he had to fight "with the entire local population," and these were "not battles and operations, but, perhaps, a whole war."

Thus, the guerrilla struggle during the Civil War undoubtedly had a huge impact on its final outcome. It should be noted that the specificity of partisanship at that time was determined by two points: the high speed of movement of the partisans (they could use horses to change them at the crossings) and the ability to attack the enemy at a time when he was isolated from his main forces and, therefore, could not count on their help. Under these conditions, the most effective were small detached detachments, whose advantage was elusiveness. In the future, this experience of the Civil War had both a positive and a negative impact on the process of organizing partisan struggle during the Great Patriotic War and on its effectiveness.

Chapter 3

In 1935, fascist Italy attacked Abyssinia. The plan of the Italian command was to defeat the small Abyssinian army (10 thousand people) and, having captured the capital before the rainy season, end the war in one and a half to two months. In fierce battles from October 3, 1935 to May 5, 1936, the Italian fascists managed to break the resistance of the Abyssinian troops. But the Abyssinian people, who had risen to the liberation war, thwarted this plan. The outbreak of partisan struggle continued even after the official end of the war. Mussolini was forced to keep up to 200 thousand troops and more than 300 combat aircraft in Abyssinia to conduct punitive expeditions against the Abyssinian patriots. During the Second World War, the guerrilla struggle in Abyssinia flared up with renewed vigor. It ended with an armed uprising of the people and the restoration of the national independence of the Abyssinian state in 1941.

But, without a doubt, the most brilliant page in the history of the guerrilla struggle in the pre-war period is the guerrilla war in Spain. More than anything, she influenced the development of partisan and sabotage art. On July 18, 1936, the famous phrase "Over all Spain, a cloudless sky" heralded the beginning of the rebellion of the "right"

Falangist generals against the legitimate government of the Spanish Republic. The rebels were supported by fascist Germany and Italy, in a short time they supplied them with about two thousand combat aircraft, 1200 tanks, two thousand guns, rifles, machine guns, shells and cartridges. Well-trained pilots, tankers, artillerymen and other military specialists went to Spain from these countries.

The number of the Italian expeditionary army reached 200 thousand people, the German legion "Condor" - 50 thousand. This intervention largely changed the course of the war. As the regular republican army retreated under the onslaught of the phalangists and interventionists, partisan detachments and groups began to operate in the territory occupied by the rebels. Volunteers from 56 countries came to the aid of the Spanish people, primarily from the Soviet Union.

The numerical and qualitative growth of the armies involved in the conflict on the side of Franco, combined with the actions of counterintelligence, significantly narrowed the ability of the partisans to fight the enemy in open battle. On the other hand, these armies have become much more dependent on various supplies - from fuel and lubricants to ammunition. For the first time in the 20th century, this opened up completely new opportunities for conducting a sabotage war, and many of the sabotage techniques worked out during the Spanish Civil War were then replicated and used in various countries at different times.

The Spaniards, who last guerrillaized during the Napoleonic Wars, more than 120 years ago, had neither the skills nor the specialist saboteurs capable of solving the specific tasks of guerrilla warfare in the rear of the modern regular army. Seeing this, senior adviser Yan Karlovich Berzin managed to send well-trained, experienced commanders and graduates of special schools from the USSR to Spain. They began their activities as advisers and instructors of small reconnaissance groups, then turned into sabotage groups.

The actions of the partisans, who used improvised sabotage weapons, were so successful that when our unit, commanded by Domingo Ungria and (where I happened to be an adviser) derailed a train with the headquarters of the Italian aviation division, the General Staff of the Republican Army created a special battalion for sabotage operations in rear of the enemy.

Then, in July 1937, after street sabotage that disrupted the communication of the Madrid rebel front with the South for 6 days during the Brunet operation, the General Staff of the Republican Army turned the battalion of Domingo Ungria into a special brigade for partisan operations behind enemy lines. At the same time, the personnel of special battalions operating behind enemy lines were given one and a half salaries, summer rations and uniforms as they wore out.

And in October 1937, in connection with the successful actions of the partisans, the 14th partisan corps was created as part of the Spanish Republican Army, which, disrupting the rear of the enemy, assisted the troops in their operations at the front and contributed to the strengthening of the partisan movement in the territory occupied by the enemy.

Despite the fact that the fascists knew about the existence of special units in the Spanish Republican army designed to disrupt the work of their rear, they knew all their main means and methods, the command of the fascist army could not organize reliable protection of the most important communications. The Nazis spent so much effort protecting their rear that their numbers exceeded the number of republican special units and local partisans by 20-30 times. At the same time, the losses of the Spanish special units were 150-200 times less than the losses of the enemy.

The guerrilla forces in actions to disrupt the work of the rear of the rebels essentially replaced aviation and already in the autumn of 1937 diverted more than 110 thousand enemy soldiers and officers to guard communications and other important facilities. By sabotage on communications and other objects, the partisans inflicted significant damage on the enemy in equipment, other materiel, and even manpower.

The fall of the Spanish Republic in the spring of 1939, as a result of the betrayal of the defeatists and anarchists, led to enormous sacrifices for the Spanish people and their armed forces. At the same time, thanks to their maneuvering tactics, units of the 14th partisan corps almost did not suffer, which then left in two directions - to Algeria and France.

After the occupation of France by the Nazis, this corps, under the command of deputy commander Antonio Buitrago, escaped from the camps and began fighting along with the French partisans. Corps commander Domingo Ungria found shelter in the USSR and actively participated with me in the partisan struggle in the temporarily occupied territory of the Soviet Union.

The significance of the guerrilla war in the rear of foreign invaders and rebels in Spain in 1936-39 is determined by the creation of new forms, methods and technical means

partisan struggle. All this helped to paralyze the rear of the fascists and forced them to stop sabotage, since all the forces intended by the enemy to operate in the rear of the republican troops were used to protect their own rear.

The guerrilla war in Spain was also of great importance in the training of personnel of the International Brigades. Approximately 400 foreigners fought in the partisan formations of Spain. After the defeat of the Republicans, they returned to their countries - Italy, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, having gained experience and skills of a new guerrilla war, which was a great contribution to the deployment of the partisan movement during World War II. So, the chief of staff of the 14th partisan corps, L. Ilich, worked as the head of the operational department of the main headquarters of the French partisans and franchisors. Many members of the International Brigade participated in the partisan struggle in the USSR, Poland, Albania, Belgium, and France. Even after the Second World War, many veterans of the guerrilla war in Spain participated in the guerrilla struggle against the imperialists and colonialists in Algeria, the Portuguese colonies, in Latin America.

The Spanish partisans who emigrated from the country turned out to be truly necessary when it was nevertheless necessary to organize a partisan movement in the territories of the Soviet Union occupied by the Wehrmacht. In the partisan formations that I happened to command, there were 356 Spaniards - experienced, skilled fighters. The Spaniards operated in the German rear as part of the guards miners and the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes (OMSBON). They became instructors in special partisan schools. Former unit commander Juan Menendez, with a group of other Spanish specialists, taught the paratroopers the tactics of guerrilla operations. Juan Antonio Ramirez was the deputy commander for sabotage of a large partisan formation in Ukraine.

The significance of the guerrilla war in the rear of foreign interventionists and Falangist rebels in Spain in 1936-1939 is determined, firstly, by testing new forms, methods and technical means of guerrilla struggle and, secondly, by training cadres of Interbrigado partisans, who, as we see, During the Second World War, they made a great contribution to the deployment of guerrilla warfare. If not for Spain, the scope of the partisan movement in Europe would never have reached such strength. It is safe to say that **the modern guerrilla sabotage war was born in Spain and from there spread to other countries.**

It is impossible not to mention another war that greatly influenced the development of modern guerrilla-sabotage warfare. I'm talking about more than twenty years of national liberation war of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders (1937-1945) and the army of the Kuomintang (1928-1949), in which the guerrilla struggle was of exceptionally important - strategic importance. It ensured the widespread deployment of a mass movement aimed at fighting the invaders, which had a positive effect on the course of World War II, created the conditions for the expansion of enemy troops and raising the spirit of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), contributing to its numerical growth and military success.

Chapter 4

The experience of guerrilla warfare, accumulated in the 1910-20s by the Russian army, was developed by Soviet military theorists and laid the foundation for the military doctrine of the young state. In conditions when Russia was surrounded by enemies, with a constant threat of attack, it was partisan formations that could play a big role in ensuring security.

Until 1933, the Army was told that in a future war with its maneuver operations "a major role will belong to ... partisan actions, for which it is necessary to organize and prepare for their implementation on the widest scale."

A huge merit in organizing the preparation of the country's armed forces for the conduct of the guerrilla war, which widely unfolded in the USSR in 1922-1932, rightfully belongs to M.V. Frunze. Back in July 1921, M.V. Frunze's article "The Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army" was published. In it, Frunze emphasized the importance that preparations for conducting a guerrilla war could acquire for the organization of the country's defense. "If the state pays enough serious attention to this, if the preparation of this "small war" is carried out systematically and systematically, then in this way, - the author noted, - it is possible to create such a situation for the enemy army in which, with all their technical advantages, they will be powerless in front of a comparatively poorly armed, but full of initiative, bold and determined enemy.

According to MV Frunze, an obligatory condition for the success of a "small war" was the early development of its plan and the creation of prerequisites for the success of its broad development.

It was based on the Leninist idea that "partisan actions are not revenge, but military actions" and the doctrine of M.V. Frunze. He formulated the norms and conditions for guerrilla warfare:

"The methods and forms of waging war are not always the same. They change depending on the conditions of development and, above all, on the development of production. Military tactics primarily depend on the level of military equipment.

We see the second means of combating the technical superiority of the enemy army in preparation of guerrilla warfare in the territories of possible theaters of military operations.

But an indispensable condition for the fruitfulness of the idea of a small war is, I repeat, the advance development of its plan and the creation of all the data that ensure its broad development. Hence the task of our General Staff should be to develop the idea of a small war. "Preparation for a guerrilla war

In January 1930, I was sent to work in the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Ukrainian military district, located in Kyiv, in the department that was preparing for the partisan war. By that time, I had experience in mine-blasting operations of the civil war, experience in training demolition miners of the railway troops, participating in the preparation of railway sections in the border strip for the rapid construction of barriers in case of an enemy invasion. I made a number of proposals for mine-blasting and developed several models of mines. They were highly appreciated by I.E. Yakir, who paid great attention to preparing for a guerrilla war in case of enemy aggression.

I.E. Yakir spoke in special partisan schools where personnel were trained, attended exercises where partisan detachments and sabotage groups "operated". He determined the location of hidden, prepared in advance partisan bases, and even once he himself was present when laying in the caches the means of struggle needed by the partisans on one hidden base prepared in advance. Much attention was paid to preparations for a guerrilla war by K.E. Voroshilov, A.I. Egorov, Ya.K. Berzin, V.K. Blucher, I.P. Uborevich, V.M. Primakov and other military leaders.

In 1929-33, as a specialist, I had the opportunity to participate in the training of partisan personnel in five special schools, including the central school, where K. Sverchevsky was the head and where foreign personnel were trained. Some of them then organized guerrilla warfare in the countries occupied by the Nazis, including Poland, Italy, France and, above all, Yugoslavia.

Along with these schools there were schools in Kyiv, one in Kharkov, one in Kupinsk. In the latter, personnel were trained for operations abroad. I trained two Chinese groups there: I taught the techniques and tactics of sabotage to two Chinese groups.

The training of specialists was carried out with the expectation of turning them into commanders during the war. At the same time, partisan detachments, organizational and sabotage groups were being prepared, capable of operating in unfamiliar terrain, including outside the Soviet Union. These partisan cadres were trained in raiding and parachuting.

In the cities and on the railway sections to the east of the fortified areas, well-trained underground saboteurs equipped with special means were planted. They were carefully hidden. Being infinitely devoted to the Soviet power, they not only did not show this loyalty in any way, but, moreover, for outsiders they even appeared to be offended by the Soviet power. These saboteurs disguised training in special schools either by business trips to build roads, or by improving their specialty, when assistant drivers received the right to drive a steam locomotive, etc.

The commanders of subdivisions and units of the Red Army, who had undergone special training and retraining, if necessary, could proceed in an organized manner to partisan operations, covertly base and move in the territory occupied by the enemy, leave the enemy blockade, use improvised means to inflict damage on the enemy.

The training of partisan personnel was combined with the improvement of methods and means of fighting behind enemy lines.

Taking into account the difficulties in supplying the partisan forces, especially at the beginning of the war (and we knew this from the history of our struggle against the interventionists and the White Guards and from the experience of our foreign comrades, for example, in China), significant stocks of the means of struggle needed by the partisans were created at hidden bases west of the line fortified areas. It was a far-sighted move. If the enemy troops reached the fortified areas, partisan bases with a large supply of means of struggle would be in their rear.

Partisan formations were involved in combined arms exercises. There were also special gatherings. So, in 1932, secret meetings took place near Moscow.

exercises - Bronnitsky maneuvers. The scope of the case can be judged from the following data. In Belarus, six partisan detachments were trained, each consisting of 300 to 500 people. In addition, underground sabotage groups were created and trained in border towns and railway junctions. 50,000 rifles, 150 machine guns, a lot of ammunition and mine-explosives were laid in underground secret warehouses. In Ukraine, at least 3,000 partisan commanders and specialists were trained, and a lot of weapons, ammunition and mine explosives were laid. Similar work was carried out in the Leningrad Military District.

In preparation for a guerrilla war in the event of enemy aggression, I also had the opportunity to participate in clarifying mobilization plans for deploying a war behind enemy lines. These plans were developed at the headquarters of the Ukrainian military district and at the IV Directorate of the General Staff. Great preparations for guerrilla warfare were also carried out along the lines of the OGPU, and especially along the lines of the road transport departments of the OGPU on the border railways. The organs of the OGPU were mainly preparing for the subversive actions of the partisans of the underground, and along the line of the NPO, the troops were trained for partisan actions and the preparation of partisan formations that could operate on unfamiliar territory. I know that the local Party organizations of the border regions and republics also provided assistance to the OGPU bodies in the selection of subversive personnel.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks did not give guidance in preparations for partisan operations behind the lines of a potential aggressor. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus and the Leningrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took part, which was expressed in helping the intelligence agencies and the OGPU in the selection of personnel, their employment in the desired area, as well as in the provision of premises. There was no participation of local party organs in the training and mission of the partisan formations. Inside the partisan formations, as in all the Armed Forces of the USSR, there were political workers who did not replace commanders.

As far as I know, until 1933 the leadership of the partisan forces operating behind enemy lines was planned by the command of the military districts by radio from the rear of our troops. It was assumed that the partisan formations would create and lead the underground, which would carry out their tasks.

As a result, the command of our units and formations in the early 30s was not afraid to be behind enemy lines. If it was impossible to break through to their main forces, they could proceed in an organized manner to partisan operations, striking at the rear of the enemy. And, of course, they were sure that next to and with them in the enemy rear there would always be patriots ready to provide any help.

Preparations for a guerrilla war in the event of enemy aggression in the early 1930s were carried out under very difficult conditions: forced collectivization, dispossession of the middle peasants and famine played a negative role. Measures were taken to save trained personnel from starvation: they were given jobs at sugar factories, timber industry enterprises and construction sites, but still the losses were great. Nevertheless, by 1933, everything was prepared so that in the event of enemy aggression, suddenly and simultaneously, such a large-scale controlled partisan operation would be paralyzed, as a result of which all communications of the western regions of Belarus, Ukraine and Bessarabia, occupied by the enemy, would be paralyzed, as a result of which the troops at the front would be left without replenishment, ammunition and fuel. Repression

In 1933, supporters of the theory of war on foreign territory won. (During the repressions against the military in 1937-38, the warehouses were liquidated, and many foreign-made barrels were thrown away like scrap. Everyone who was involved in the preparation of a small war was repressed in 1937).

In May 1935 I graduated from the railway department of the Military Transport Academy of the Red Army and was appointed deputy military commandant of the Leningrad-Moskovsky station. I would certainly have died, since I worked under the direction of I.E. Yakira, Ya.K. Berzin, accompanied by M.N. Tukhachevsky and V.M. Primakov, who were declared enemies of the people and shot. I'm lucky. In November 1936, I managed to get to Spain, where I became an adviser and instructor to the partisan formation under the command of D. Ungrii, who, in 10 months of our joint work, turned from the commander of a sabotage group into the commander of the 14th sabotage corps of the Spanish Republican Army.

At the beginning of November 1937, I returned to my homeland and was stunned when I learned that all my bosses in all the lines where I served and studied were repressed.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army S.G. Gendin introduced me to the Commissar of Defense. K.E. Voroshilov approved my activities and promised new awards. Two weeks later, Gendin was arrested as an enemy of the people, and I stayed at the Baltschug Hotel, awaiting appointment.

After a long wait, I was invited to the NKD.

There was, as they say, a conversation with predilection. I was told that advance preparation for a guerrilla war in the event of enemy aggression was not a good deed, but the idea of enemies of the people, such as Yakir, Uborevich, and others. I tried to prove the need for this preparation, referring to the fact that it was carried out on the basis of the provisions of B. AND. Lenin, proposals by M. V. Frunze. He said that the participants in the civil war, party members and Komsomol members were mainly involved in this case. The interlocutor smiled slyly. The conversation was long, and I was given the opportunity to "think". I went outside.

Everything was like a nightmare. It became clear to me that the partisan cadres we had prepared in advance, with rare exceptions, had already been repressed. I was seized by such fear as I had never experienced - neither at the front, nor behind enemy lines. In the war, I risked only myself, and here people close to me were put under attack.

As it became known later, dozens of times more well-trained partisan commanders and specialists died from repressions in the 1930s than during the entire Great Patriotic War. Only those who fell out of sight of Yezhov's apparatus survived. Basically, these were participants in the national revolutionary war in Spain (A.K. Sprogis, Troyan, N.A. Prokopyuk, etc.) and those who changed their place of residence unnoticed by Yezhov's henchmen. It was they who became the heads of those schools that formed the partisan cadres of the Great Patriotic War.

The repressions of 1937-38 dealt a crushing blow to the country, which affected the course of the war; they disabled about or even more than 40 thousand officers. This is three times more than what the Wehrmacht lost on the eastern front during the entire first year of the war. The repressions led to the fact that in the Red Army many divisions, units, and even more formations and associations were commanded, to put it mildly, by unprepared people.

Particularly great damage was inflicted by these repressions on our preparations for guerrilla warfare in the event of enemy aggression. All partisans, underground saboteurs, were completely repressed. I do not know any of the underground saboteurs trained by us who would not be repressed. Of the two dozen surviving officers who were trained by us from the commanders and political workers of the Armed Forces and partisans of the civil war, two died during the Great Patriotic War, and more than one thousand were repressed.

It was these repressions and the incompetence of the leadership of the partisan movement during the war that led to the fact that the partisans did not solve their main task - to cut off the enemy troops at the front from their sources of supply.

Nevertheless, had it not been for the training organized by M.V. Frunze, we would not have reached the scale of partisan operations that were carried out in the last years of the war. And if the personnel had been saved, then it would have been possible to deploy mass controlled actions immediately, and not two years after the start of the war!

Frunze in his doctrine remained faithful to the Leninist principle that: 1) guerrilla warfare is not revenge, but military action. Consequently: 2) it must be planned by the General Staff, and not by party institutions. The third most important provision of the Frunze doctrine consisted in the advance preparation of a guerrilla war.

Chapter 5

The Great Patriotic War, as already mentioned in the first book, found me in the position of head of the department of mining and barriers of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army. Returning from a business trip at the end of June 1941, I headed the operational-engineering group on the Western Front, whose task was to set up barriers. Soon I learned that the party organs of the republics and regions, on the territories that the enemy had invaded, began to create partisan detachments and, almost without any preparation, throw them behind enemy lines.

Partisan actions began from the first days of the Great Patriotic War, contrary to historical experience and mebusanovki to prepare for a partisan war in the event of enemy aggression.

In his address to the Soviet people on July 3, 1941, Stalin also called for guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. He said: "In areas occupied by the enemy, it is necessary to create partisan detachments, mounted and on foot, to create sabotage groups to fight against parts of the enemy army, to kindle guerrilla warfare everywhere and everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telegraph and telephone communications, set fire to forests, warehouses and convoys. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupt all their activities. "

The posing of the question of the methods of guerrilla warfare in Stalin's speech surprised me. Firstly, there is no one to create partisan detachments in areas occupied by the enemy, not to mention

about all the difficulties of this case. This should have been done even before the occupation of the territory. Secondly, partisans cannot set fire to wagon trains and engage in battles with parts of the enemy army. After all, in combat contact, the enemy has the opportunity to build up his forces, receive reinforcements during the battle, while the partisans, having very limited resources, cannot do this. In addition, after all, enemy troops are equipped, as a rule, much better than partisans! How can untrained, poorly armed people (after all, these partisan detachments would be created on enemy territory) fight with units of a regular enemy army? This appeal by Stalin aimed the partisans at fruitless partisanism, and not at partisan warfare in order to cut off enemy troops from their sources of supply. Thirdly, the call to set fire to forests behind enemy lines was harmful to the partisans and useful to the Nazis. If anyone else had said that the partisans should set fire to the forests, then he would no doubt be considered a provocateur or a fool.

It was in the first quarter of the 20th century that partisans had equal, and sometimes even greater, maneuverability than the most mobile units of the enemy, for example, cavalry, and therefore could be based and raid on any terrain and at any time of the year. The motorization of troops, their saturation with a large number of rapid-fire weapons, the increase and improvement of aviation, created a sharp superiority of regular troops over partisans in speed of movement and weapons. Now the most favorable for the partisans was the area that would be inaccessible to motorized troops and had extensive shelters from enemy aircraft.

In domestic conditions, such an area, without a doubt, was forests, which were the main base of the partisans. And these own bases should be burned?

Stalin clearly did not take into account the counter-guerrilla measures of the enemy. Meanwhile, taking into account the experience of past wars, especially the experience of fighting partisans in Spain in 1936-1939, the German General Staff, even before the attack on Poland, provided for a whole system of such measures. Special troops and bodies were created for the counter-partisan struggle, which acted according to a predetermined plan. In the course of past campaigns, the Nazi punishers gained a lot of experience, which they later used in the occupied territories of our country.

Guerrilla actions in the rear of a strong enemy specially trained for counter-partisan struggle, they demanded comprehensive preparation of partisan forces and optimal planning of their actions. Nothing like Stalin was envisaged in his speech. Moreover, in the same speech, he demanded "during the forced withdrawal of Red Army units ... not to leave the enemy a single kilogram of bread ... Collective farmers must steal all cattle, hand over the grain for safekeeping to state bodies for export to the rear areas, bread and the fuel which cannot be taken out must certainly be destroyed."

The situation was quite different in the territories left by our troops in 1941. A significant part of the Soviet land was occupied by fascist invaders before any evacuation of even the most important defense enterprises began. Soon after the enemy invasion, the evacuation of industrial equipment, agricultural machinery and collective farm livestock and food from those areas threatened by the occupation began. At the same time, almost only workers and engineering and technical personnel were evacuated from local residents. Very few railway workers were evacuated and all the collective farmers remained in place. Thus, the bulk of the population did not evacuate.

In such conditions, the export and destruction, instead of distribution, of food, and, above all, grain, doomed the population of the territories temporarily occupied by the enemy to starvation. The literal implementation of these orders would only lead to a sharp increase in the number of collaborators, would cause hatred among the local residents for the Soviet government and the army, and would push many into the service of the enemy. After Stalin's speech, the hasty formation and transfer to the rear of the enemy intensified without proper preparation of partisans, detachments and sabotage groups. Meanwhile, their main task was not even formulated: to cut off enemy troops from their sources of supply.

What was the real guerrilla tactics? Undoubtedly, the means of armed struggle influence both the possibilities and the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare; M. V. Frunze wrote about this. On the eve of World War II, the appearance of numerous military equipment (tanks, motorized infantry, aviation, radio communications) had a decisive influence on partisan operations.

On the one hand, as a result of this, the partisans, as already mentioned, lost a very significant advantage over regular troops in maneuverability on the ground, accessible to armored units; aviation could not only help the enemy troops in detecting large detachments of partisans, but also directly influence the partisans; radio communications made it often useless to cut telephone wires before an attack

partisans on the headquarters, warehouses and other objects of the enemy, reduced to a minimum the isolation of individual enemy units from his main forces.

Troops and cargo transported by road and trains were completely unable to prevent the explosions of mines planted on the roads. Only very strong guards using technical means of protection can prevent the mining of communication routes, however, such guards, as a rule, are created after the start of mass sabotage. Therefore, it is very important to mine these objects with mines of various types before creating such a strong defense.

As far as motor transport is concerned, even in Spain it was confirmed that not only railways, but also automobile columns, even accompanied by tanks, are very vulnerable to partisans. The convoys could not send military guards, and the Francoists did not have enough strength to purposefully guard the roads.

Having inflicted a fire strike on the column, the partisans "finished off" it, if it was within their power, or left for the area where pursuit was excluded. By using guided mines to hit car columns, the partisans could generally remain invisible and therefore invulnerable.

Even the appearance of aviation in many countries benefited the partisans. If enemy aviation hindered the actions of partisans, then for the first time in history our own made it possible to supply partisan formations with everything necessary over the head of the enemy, deliver various means of combat, instructors, specialists and leaders to the enemy rear, and evacuate the wounded.

The advent of radio helped the partisans even more, since it made it possible to maintain reliable communication with their leadership bodies and immediately transmit intelligence about the enemy.

Technological progress has given the partisans the opportunity to disable road and especially rail transport, influence the enemy's lines of communication, and destroy his troops during transportation without coming into combat contact. But for this it was necessary to ensure the supply of partisans with special mines and explosives (B). The partisans could not solve the problem of closing the night and day traffic on railway lines and highways, as Stalin demanded, at the expense of trophies and ammunition and weapons picked up on the battlefields. Special mines usually do not lie on the ground, and as for trophies, it should be noted that partisans have much less opportunities to take trophies than regular troops. Stalin clearly did not understand this. Such a setting was not a forced measure. Let's run ahead. When the possibilities for supplying the partisans increased, on August 18, 1942, the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement (TSSHPD) P.K. Ponomarenko, after another conversation with Stalin, gave a radiogram to a number of partisan commanders. In this telegram, they were oriented towards supply through trophies, pointing out that "supplying the partisans from the center", allegedly, "is not only difficult, but can also lead to incarceration."

All the technical means and capabilities described above, all the experience accumulated in Spain, could and should have been used to protect their country, and not be guided by the views of partisan activity frozen at the level of the Civil War and Stalin's calls like "burning forests."

On July 13, 1941, by order of the people's commissar of defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, I was concurrently appointed head of the Operations and Training Center (OTC) of the Western Front, whose task was the most minimal training of partisan detachments and sabotage groups, their material support and transfer to the rear of the enemy. All this took no more than seven days. I note that in the 30s, future partisans who had at least a year of combined arms training were trained for as much as three to six months.

The partisan formations we were preparing were in dire need of radio communications, special mines, weapons and ammunition. Something we hardly got, hoping that the command of the guerrilla forces would soon be created, which would be engaged in planning and ensuring guerrilla operations.

Only a month after the start of the war, on July 18, 1941, a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops" appeared. However, it did not bring clarity. It did not say a word about the preparation of partisan formations, the organization of communications and supplies, the involvement in the partisan struggle of military personnel who, due to the prevailing situation, ended up behind enemy lines and could not break through to the main forces of the Red Army. And this decree did not set the task of cutting off enemy troops from their sources of supply.

And most importantly, instead of the control of partisan forces, which was well developed in the early 30s and tested in Spain, it was proposed to "deploy a network of our

systems

Bolshevik underground organizations in the occupied territory to direct all actions against the fascist occupiers. "This was an obviously impossible installation, which led to the death of many courageous communists. It contradicted the experience of guerrilla warfare in China and Spain, and was soon refuted by domestic practice. In addition, such there was simply no network of Bolshevik underground organizations to lead the struggle behind enemy lines, and it could not be created even in a year. The fact is that the Nazis provided for measures to combat the party and combat partisan underground. All citizens of the USSR who changed their place of residence after June 1941, they were registered with them or even immediately subjected to repression.

The hastily organized underground made up of people who were known as communists, and even more so the leaders of party organizations, turned out to be very vulnerable and the underground workers in most cases died if they did not go to the partisan formations (secretaries of the underground regional committees and district committees of the CPSU (b) turned, as a rule, to the commanders and commissars of these combat units).

Even the experience of exercises in the early 1930s convincingly showed that when conducting a full-scale guerrilla war, it is impossible to do without operational-military bodies for directing partisan forces with powerful radio centers.

The July resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks also did not stop the hasty formation and mass transfer to the enemy rear of poorly trained, poorly armed and almost not equipped with reliable means of radio communication partisan detachments. The guerrilla war of Soviet patriots, as Hero of the Soviet Union M.I. Naumov, "it was carried out not only ineptly, but also mismanaged, one might say, neglected." In addition, the misfortune of the first partisan detachments and formations was also rooted in the fact that they were used in the front line of the enemy. "... Untrained, not equipped in a front-line manner, not at all adapted in any respect to a positional mode of action, the partisans often died without causing significant harm to the enemy, without destroying his communications. And there only strengthened, taking advantage of the silence, the administrative bodies of the occupiers".

And yet, even under such, the worst of all possible circumstances, with huge losses and low efficiency, the actions of the partisans were very sensitive to the Wehrmacht and visible to distant allies. "Behind the lines of the German fronts," W. Churchill wrote, "partisans appeared who waged a brutal war against the Germans, disrupting their communications. The Russian railway network captured by the enemy turned out to be unusable." With a fairly strong exaggeration, these words serve as a reminder of those gigantic potentialities, who lurk even in poorly prepared and ineptly conducted guerrilla warfare. Losses

By the autumn of 1941, 18 thousand partisans were transferred to the occupied part of the Leningrad region, including 6 partisan regiments with a total number of up to 8 thousand people. By winter, no more than 4 thousand of them remained.

In Ukraine, by the fall, 2 partisan regiments, 883 partisan detachments and 1,700 reconnaissance and sabotage groups with a total strength of 35,000 people were preserved. By June 1942, only 30 partisan detachments numbering 4043 people remained, and only in April 1943 the number of Ukrainian partisans reached 15 thousand, and in January, when the number of NOAU reached 400 thousand, the number of Ukrainian partisans did not exceed 48 thousand people.

The situation was no better in Belarus, where there were exceptionally favorable conditions for waging a guerrilla war: vast forests and swamps, people devoted to their homeland.

On August 1, 1941, there were 231 active partisan detachments on the territory of Belarus, with a total number of over 12 thousand people. At the end of summer and autumn, the sending of partisan detachments behind enemy lines continued, and by the end of the year 437 partisan detachments and groups, numbering 7254 people, were created and sent to Belarus. On January 1, 1942, 61 detachments remained. Thus, by January 1, 1942, less than 4% of partisan detachments had survived in Ukraine, less than 10% of detachments and groups in Belarus, and about 25% in the occupied Leningrad region.

The situation was much better in the Smolensk, Kalinin, Orel and Moscow regions, where there was more time for the preparation of partisan formations (although also no more than 2-3 months).

The partisan forces were our "second front" and their number without rear support reached 150-240 thousand. This front was at one time commanded by Marshal K.E. Voroshilov. Then the front was left without a commander and the chief of staff of this front was a career political worker P.K. Ponomarenko, who did not command a company and did not graduate from the military academy. The Belarusian partisans were "commanded" by the head of the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement P.Z. Kalinin, who in the Red Army would not have been trusted with a platoon, but he was instructed to command an army, the number of which in 1943 exceeded 100 thousand armed partisans. And the war behind enemy lines is very difficult. At the front, the enemy

you are usually only ahead, and behind enemy lines it is dangerous from all sides. The fronts were commanded by such marshals as K. Rokossovsky, I. Konev, R. Malinovsky, G. Zhukov, I. Bagramyan and others. It is impossible to win without mastering the art of war, and in guerrilla warfare, it is precisely the art of war combined with political support that is also needed. Therefore, it was advisable to entrust the command of partisan forces to people with special training, and party workers to deal with political support.

As early as July 1941, participants in the guerrilla war in the rear of the fascist interventionists and rebels in Spain made a proposal to stop the transfer of partisan formations that did not have proper training to the rear of the enemy, to shift the emphasis on the formation of special units from carefully trained people to send them to the rear of the fascist invaders in order to cut off enemy troops at the front from their sources of supply.

Given Stalin such an indication, it would be possible in a short time to put out of action the enemy's extended communications passing through areas very favorable for partisan operations. However, despite numerous proposals, he did not.

Nevertheless, the ideas of a more effective organization of guerrilla warfare, for example, never left my mind. Once I shared my thoughts with the secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U N.S. Khrushchev, who in the fall of 1941 was also a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front. As it turned out, Khrushchev was ready for such a conversation: at one time, something similar was offered to him by M.K. Kochegarov is a former head of one of the partisan schools in Kyiv and a participant in the war in Spain. Khrushchev informed the Military Council of the Front about my considerations and, on his recommendation, sent them to Stalin in the form of a document signed by me and General Nevsky. For his part, Khrushchev wrote a personal letter to Stalin, in which he asked him to receive me for a talk on this issue.

In December 1941, I was already sitting in Stalin's waiting room, but he did not receive me and sent me to L. Mekhlis. As soon as I began to state the main provisions, Mekhlis abruptly interrupted me:

- Don't talk about that! This is not what is needed now." He paused and exclaimed ironically:

- Deep enemy rear, communications! Have you fallen from the sky? Don't you know that the enemy stands near Moscow itself?! It must be taken into account that winter has come, and it is necessary to fully use the advantages that it gives! We need to freeze the Nazis! All forests, all houses, all buildings where the enemy can hide from the cold must be burned! Do you understand?

I cautiously noticed that the forests do not burn in winter and that they are a base for partisans. And if you burn villages - our own people will lose their homes.

The objection only added fuel to the fire. Mekhlis called me and Nevsky grief theoreticians and blind men. He demanded that the Moscow region be turned into a snowy desert: wherever the enemy poked his head, he should only stumble upon cold and ashes.

Upon returning to the second home of the NCO, where I was staying, I again remembered the words of Mekhlis I had just heard and was horrified. Sweat even broke out on my forehead ... After all, in a speech on July 3, 1941, Stalin called for setting fire to forests behind enemy lines ...

The next day, I reported to Khrushchev on HF that Mekhlis had received me instead of Stalin, and how he reacted to our proposal with Nevsky.

"Comrade Stalin is very busy," Nikita Sergeevich said diplomatically, "but I'll call Comrade Voznesensky.

And indeed, a few days later, the head of the engineering troops of the Red Army, Major General L.Z. Kotlyar and I were invited to the chairman of the State Planning Commission N.A. Voznesensky. It was proposed to take with them samples of circuit breakers and fuses, which were discussed in the report addressed to Stalin.

Voznesensky was smiling and looked very young. He offered to sit down, he himself sank into a chair last. After a detailed discussion, the needs for special non-retrievable slow-moving anti-train mines were identified. Already in the spring of 1942, they began to enter the troops in significant numbers.

Chapter 6

The reason for the huge losses suffered by the partisans, as well as the low efficiency of partisan war in 1941-42, I see in the following errors:

1. Strategic mistakes of the military leadership, as a result of which the Patriotic War dragged on for nearly five years.

2. Repressions that destroyed experienced, well-trained personnel and liquidation necessary measures in case of enemy aggression 3-4 years before the war.

3. The leadership of the military operations of the partisans was entrusted to a person who had neither military nor special training.

4. Unprepared formations were thrown behind enemy lines.

5. The partisans were given overwhelming tasks that could only be solved by combat clashes, which is wrong in principle.

6. There was no planning for the actions of the partisan forces, which is due to the incompetence of the leaders of the headquarters of the partisan movement.

Let's take a closer look at these errors. Errors of the military leadership in determining the tasks of guerrilla warfare

All the strategic mistakes made were the result of forgetting the provisions formulated by M. V. Frunze.

The first mistake was the substitution of the military organization for party bodies.

On July 18, 1941, the leadership of the partisan struggle was entrusted to the party organs, and behind enemy lines to the underground party organs. This great strategic mistake led to the removal of the General Staff from the leadership of the guerrilla war behind enemy lines, to heavy losses in the first year of the war.

Stalin did not distinguish between the concept of the activities of the CPSU in leading the partisan movement and the leadership of the war in the rear of the Wehrmacht. Hence the lack of a unified purposeful leadership of the war in the rear of the Nazis. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, contrary to all guidelines during pre-war preparations for a guerrilla war in the event of enemy aggression, took upon itself and entrusted to local party organs the functions of military leadership of the war behind enemy lines that were unusual for them.

During the years of the civil war, V.I. Lenin, the Central Committee of the party took measures to establish a centralized military-operational leadership of the partisan struggle. For this purpose, the Central Headquarters of Partisan Detachments (TsShPO) was formed, created at the direction of Lenin at the operational department (Operod) of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. After the signing of the Brest Treaty, for conspiratorial reasons, the headquarters was renamed the Special Intelligence Directorate of Operod. His former boss S.I. Aralov noted in his memoirs that Lenin attached great importance to the work of the partisan headquarters and the special intelligence department, whose activities were controlled and directed by the Central Committee of the RCP (b).

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the military councils of the fronts, the Central Committee of the CP(b)U and the Central Committee of the CP(b)B, the regional committees of a number of occupied regions turned to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and personally to Stalin with proposals to create a military-operational body to lead the struggle in rear of the enemy. But Stalin did not show decisiveness in this matter.

For some time, the Directorate for the formation of partisan units, detachments and groups as part of the People's Commissariat of Defense was created, but it did not show itself in anything special and was abolished in December 1941.

The second mistake is the lack of advance preparation of troops for guerrilla warfare.

The oblivion of the provisions of M.V. Frunze on the preparation of troops for guerrilla operations and the elimination of measures for the advance preparation for a guerrilla war led to the fact that, it would seem, under favorable conditions for conducting guerrilla warfare, about four million Soviet soldiers, finding themselves due to the current situation behind enemy lines, were taken prisoner.

The third mistake is the "Drive the German into the cold" policy.

"Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Soldiers of our army and navy! I appeal to you, my friends!" - so began on July 3, 1941 on the eleventh day of the war, Stalin, who came to his senses, began his speech. And then he demanded from "friends" who were subjected to Nazi aggression, "during the forced withdrawal of Red Army units ... not to leave a single kilogram of bread to the enemy ... Collective farmers must steal all cattle, hand over the grain for safekeeping to state bodies for its export to the rear areas, bread and fuel, which cannot be taken out, must be destroyed unconditionally."

By this Stalin thought to make it difficult for the Nazi troops to advance inland. But in reality, this requirement of the leader helped the occupiers a lot, even considering that it was not fully implemented. Stalin knew that the Finns did this when their troops retreated during the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939-40, but Stalin did not take into account that the pace of the offensive of the Red Army troops was small and the enemy had time

not only steal cattle, but also evacuate the population from the territory that was under the threat of occupation. Moreover, during the retreat, the Finns burned everything they could in the settlements they left and mined some of the surviving buildings with slow-motion mines. The winter was cold, and after a series of mine explosions in the surviving buildings, our troops were already afraid of them occupy.

Devastating the abandoned territory during the withdrawal, the Finns could not hope for the return of the abandoned lands. The devastation of the territory during the withdrawal of the command of the Finnish army was complemented by the actions of their partisan snipers and various kinds of mines. All this constituted significant difficulties for the Red Army.

Another thing is the situation on the territory left by the Red Army. A significant part of the Soviet land was occupied by fascist invaders without any evacuation of even very important enterprises. Soon after the enemy invasion, the evacuation of equipment from industrial enterprises, agricultural machinery, and collective farm livestock began. Workers and engineering staff were evacuated along with the equipment to the East. Very few railway workers were evacuated and collective farmers remained in place.

Instead of distributing foodstuffs, and above all grain, to the population, Stalin demanded that everything that could not be taken out during the withdrawal of troops be destroyed. Thus, the "beloved leader of the people" doomed the population in the abandoned territory to starvation.

If Stalin's demand had been fulfilled, then almost the entire population of the left-bank regions of Ukraine and the occupied territories of Russia would have died out during the occupation.

The fourth mistake - the task of cutting off the enemy from the source of supply was not set.

During the Great Patriotic War, the dependence of troops at the front on the sources of its support increased sharply. The saturation of the armies with a large number of artillery, armored vehicles and rapid-fire weapons made the troops dependent on their uninterrupted supply of a large amount of ammunition - fuels and lubricants (fuels and lubricants). The army of a million people also needed a large amount of food.

Consequently, in the Great Patriotic War, the role of transport increased, which was supposed to deliver to the troops at the front everything necessary for combat and life. The main types of transport in the last war were railway, which provided the supply of everything the troops needed from supply sources to military bases, and automobile, which delivered everything the troops needed from supply stations. In an emergency, when ground transport could not deliver goods to the troops, for example, surrounded, the troops were supplied by air. But air supply during the Great Patriotic War was relatively small and could only be carried out with air supremacy. As a rule, the supply of encircled troops by air was accompanied by large losses of aviation, and was short-lived.

During the Great Patriotic War, when the Nazi troops invaded deep into the territory of the country, their situation could turn out to be worse than the troops of Napoleon, who occupied Moscow. Why? Yes, because rail transport was more vulnerable than horse-drawn times of Napoleon. The partisans could have an impact on horse-drawn transport only by ambushes, the destruction of bridges, and the roads themselves were not vulnerable. Heavily guarded carts could only be destroyed or even captured as a result of a military clash.

During the last war, there were already means that made it possible to disable road and especially rail transport without engaging in combat with the troops being transported. But, unfortunately, despite the courage and bravery of the Soviet partisans, despite their nationwide support by the population, during the Great Patriotic War it was not possible to cut off the enemy troops from their sources of supply, although the partisans were also tasked with plans to stop traffic on the railways and night traffic. Vehicles were compiled and approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The partisans, sparing no effort, showing courage and courage, initiative and endurance, could not completely close the Wehrmacht's supply routes on the Soviet territory it occupied and thus put its troops at the front in front of a catastrophe.

Partly as a result of an incorrect strategy, the Patriotic War was stretched out over five years.

Elimination of measures taken earlier in case of enemy aggression

Repressions that destroyed experienced, well-trained personnel and the elimination of measures taken earlier in the event of enemy aggression 3-4 years before the war were the main catastrophic mistake made in the course of preparations for war.

According to Lieutenant General A.I. Todorsky repressed:

Of the 5 marshals of the Soviet Union - 3B

Of 2 army commissars of the first rank - 2B Of 4 army
commanders of the first rank - 2B Of 12
commanders of the second rank - 12B Of 2
fleet flagships of the second rank - 2B Of 6
flagships of the first rank - 6B Of 15 army
commissars of the second rank - 15B Of 67 commanders
of the second rank - 60B
Out of 28 corps commanders - 25B Out
of 199 division commanders
- 136B Out of 397 brigade
commanders - 221B Out of 36 brigade commissars - 34

If you count only the highest staff, from marshals to army commissars
of the second rank inclusive, it turns out that out of 46 people 42 were put out of action.

No defeat ever leads to such a monstrous loss of command personnel. Only the complete surrender of the country after a lost war can have such consequences. Just on the eve of the decisive battle with the Wehrmacht, on the eve of the greatest of wars, the Red Army was beheaded. Stalin's repressions of Soviet officers before the war so greatly weakened the armed forces of the Soviet Union that they, with superiority in the number of tanks, aircraft and guns, were defeated. In the first months, the Nazis managed to approach Leningrad and Moscow, occupy the Baltic states, Belarus, almost all of Ukraine.

If thousands of experienced, well-trained specialists had not been repressed in our country, from the first days of the war, hundreds of detachments similar to those of S.A. would have begun to operate behind enemy lines. Kovpak, G.M. Linkov, F.D. Gnezdilov and others, and by November 1941, the Wehrmacht troops at the front would have been reliably cut off from their sources of supply. It is no secret that in the first year of the war not a single partisan detachment under the command of experienced or well-trained commanders died behind enemy lines. Moreover, these detachments for the first year significantly damage the enemy. Most of the experienced and well-trained commanders fought the whole war behind enemy lines, inflicted great damage on him, from the commanders of groups and small detachments they turned into commanders of partisan brigades, divisions and so-called partisan formations. Among them are such as twice Hero of the Soviet Union S.A. Kovpak, A.F. Fedorov, Heroes of the Soviet Union G.M. Linkov, V.M. Yaremchuk, D.K. Karitsky, A.M. Grabchak, S.A. Vaupshasov, V.Z. Korzh, K.P. Orlovsky and many others. For example, military engineer G.M. Linkov with minimal losses on his part. The incompetence of the leadership of the partisans

The leadership of the military operations of the partisans was entrusted to a person who had neither military nor special training.

Stalin did not fully understand the meaning and possibilities of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. The Supreme, as well as the head of the main Directorate of formations E.A. Shchadenko and ex-People's Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov did not take into account in a timely manner the changes and capabilities of the partisans in comparison with their capabilities in the civil war.

During the years of the civil war, the partisans solved their tasks of fighting the enemy with surprise raids and ambushes, possessing greater maneuverability than their opponent. Before the raid on the enemy garrisons, the partisans, cutting off the wire connection, as if isolated them from the outside world, and those who were attacked could not receive support.

A two-hour conversation between Stalin and Ponomarenko in December 1941 ended with the Supreme Commander instructing him to immediately begin organizing the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and head this headquarters.

As a career political worker P.K. Ponomarenko began to select cadres of senior staff of the headquarters "from among the workers of party bodies, political workers of the Red Army and border troops, who had already proven themselves in the organization of partisan detachments, as well as the necessary specialists in radio communications, mine-blasting, intelligence, etc. This important task was solved with the help of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and party organs of the republics and regions. So it was in fact. Such a selection of personnel of the TsSHPD led to the fact that he could not provide optimal planning for the operations of the partisan forces. The plans of operations developed by the TsSHPD and the headquarters of the partisan movement subordinate to it were not plans for organized military operations, but rather resembled the resolutions of party organs on sowing and harvesting. Political workers who did not undergo special partisan training (there were no more political workers who had such training - they were repressed long ago) had neither experience nor knowledge to guide the actions of partisan forces.

Sad but true - P.K. Ponomarenko was such a Stalinist hardening partocrat who believed that he knew everything and could do everything. What had a particularly negative impact on the effectiveness of the guerrilla war in the rear of the Wehrmacht was his steady implementation of the clearly erroneous instructions of the "great leader", his lack of knowledge of military art, and hence the underestimation of the need for solid special partisan training of commanders and leaders for war behind enemy lines.

Moreover, several years after the Great Victory, Ponomarenko argued that rigid centralized planning of partisan actions was harmful. While the plan will be brought to the executor, the enemy may already disappear. But the main objects of partisan action are railways and roads, communication lines are the most difficult for the enemy to defend, and partisans with minimal losses or even no losses will be able to disable them precisely with optimal planning. Only when planning the actions of partisan forces can the enemy be forced to go on the defensive.

In a conversation with Stalin, P.K. Ponomarenko suggested moving from long-term training of singles or groups of classic saboteurs to widely organized, systematic mass sabotage work, decisively eradicating handicrafts and disunity.

Experience convincingly proved that it was well-trained saboteurs who inflicted more damage on the enemy and, as a rule, without losses on their part. The former head of the TsShPD did not understand the significance of the mass training of classic saboteurs. Moreover, he did not understand that the most excellent specialists in mine-blasting business can be very mediocre saboteurs if they do not understand that sabotage behind enemy lines in their implementation is very different from mine-blasting work carried out when their troops withdraw.

I know dozens of classic saboteurs from the demolition troops of the engineering troops, who only after special training became excellent saboteurs. Something else is also known. A demolition worker with extensive experience in the headquarters of the engineering troops of the Red Army, who did not have special partisan training and had not been behind enemy lines, made a proposal to undermine the rails with 100-gram thick pieces. The head of the TsShPD, after checking at the training ground near Moscow, signed the instruction and ordered a huge number of these checkers, but it turned out that behind enemy lines, where conditions were completely different, the partisans could not always ensure that the checker fit tightly to the rail head and the necessary powder, as a result, often after the explosion of a 100-gram checker, the rail head remained intact and, moreover, sometimes there were only cracks or even spots on the rail. And "silently" instructions were given to undermine the rails with 200-gram checkers.

In the letters, including the author of these lines, there was a proposal to create special sabotage brigades to strike at enemy communications. Stalin did not respond to these proposals in 1941. By that time, experience had shown that the fight against parts of the enemy army was reduced mainly to the collapse of trains, undermining cars and armored vehicles with mines, and only under favorable conditions - inflicting damage on the enemy by actions from ambushes. Fights between partisans and units of the Wehrmacht in its rear for partisans are associated with greater losses than battles with at the front. In its rear, the enemy can increase its efforts during the battle, uninterruptedly providing ammunition. The partisan regiments, which were created to fight enemy units in his rear, did not have these conditions. Therefore, 2 Ukrainian and 6 Leningrad partisan regiments, having entered into a military clash with the invaders, despite the heroism of the personnel, were defeated.

Fulfilling the instructions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the head of the TsShPD launched a stormy activity, primarily in organizing and communicating with partisan formations operating behind enemy lines. A powerful central receiving and transmitting radio center was quickly created, and a radio school was deployed.

When the work on the creation of the headquarters of the partisan movement was carried out and all the planned activities were proceeding at an increasing pace, unexpectedly at the end of January 1942, the Supreme Commander ordered the liquidation of the created TsShPD. The question arose of what to do with the already created bodies, schools, including the radio school. P.K. Ponomarenko found a way out - the central radio school was transferred to the budget of the Council of People's Commissars of Belarus. Covert actions are the basis of guerrilla tactics

The partisans were faced with overwhelming tasks that could only be solved by military clashes, which, in principle, is wrong. If all the losses of the partisans are taken as 100%, then it turns out that they suffered more than 90% of the losses in open battles.

Covert actions and skillful conspiracy were successfully used by partisan forces in the temporarily occupied territory. And it was precisely the hidden actions of the partisans, as even our opponents admit, that did not allow the enemy to feel safe in the occupied territory.

If all the damage inflicted by partisans on the enemy is taken as 100%, then it turns out that even according to the materials of the headquarters of the partisan movement, more than 85% in manpower and more than 95% in

material means was inflicted by covert actions of partisans. With the use of mines, without engaging in battle with the enemy and rational planning of operations, the ratio of losses was up to 1 to 250 in favor of the partisans, in open (especially protracted battles) the losses of the partisans were greater than the losses of the enemy. **For partisans, open combat is the most disadvantageous activity.**

Partisan formations were often based precisely near enemy garrisons and the largest cities. For example, partisans in Spain were based for a long time only 2 km from a strong garrison guarding a large hydroelectric station, Cordoba, Grenada were located, where there were large garrisons. Soviet partisans were based near large garrisons cities of Odessa, near Bryansk, Minsk, Vitebsk, Pinsk, Orsha, Gomel, Kiev, Rovno, Nezhin, Chernigov, in the Kiev, Kharkov, Minsk. In Paris there were large forces of partisans who liberated the city from the invaders before the Allied troops arrived there.

If, in the initial period of the war, Soviet partisans conducted only open hostilities and relied on the force of arms, and did not know how to conspire and conduct covert actions, then hundreds of sabotage, organizational, and other small groups would die without causing significant damage to the enemy. So, if K.S. Zasloukov with his small group would have started with open hostilities, then he would not have inflicted huge damage on the enemy with the help of "coal mines" (and without losses on his part). So it was with other Heroes of the Soviet Union G.M. Linkov, V.M. Yaremchuk, A.M. Grabchak, A.I. Izhukin and many others. So it was with twice Heroes of the Soviet Union S.A. Kovpak and A.F. Fedorov.

It should be noted that already in July 1942, Soviet partisans occupied entire regions and "territories" behind enemy lines, the total perimeter of which was 2-2.5 times the length of the Soviet-German front, the number of armed partisans was 50 times less than the number of the Red Army, and in terms of armament, the partisans could not be compared with the regular troops of the Red Army. In the summer, the enemy had the strength to launch an offensive in the south and reach the Volga and the North Caucasus. At this time, the partisans expanded their territory, since the main enemy forces were engaged in battles with the Red Army. At the same time, by covert actions, the partisans forced the enemy to throw almost all the forces allocated for the counter-partisan struggle to the defense of communications and to the fight against the underground partisans in cities and other settlements held by the occupiers. Significant forces diverted the raiding detachments and formations.

Partisan detachments were based on terrain inaccessible to heavy equipment or secretly; did not succumb to the provocations of the enemy, and where possible, avoided open hostilities, tried to act covertly, used conspiracy and a variety of weapons. The partisans inflicted especially great damage to the enemy with special sabotage means on the lines of communication, during transportation. Front without a commander

Actions partisan forces were not optimally planned, due to the incompetence of the leaders of the headquarters of the partisan movement.

what is connected

...

Seven months have passed since the war began. The enemy occupied a huge territory, and the partisan struggle behind enemy lines developed very slowly, despite the patriotism of the people, and the presence of a large number of people who wanted to beat the enemy in his rear. Thousands of poorly or completely unprepared volunteers were transferred, and they, having no connection, seemed to disappear in the occupied territory.

In January 1942, in Belarus, where there were exceptionally favorable conditions for partisan warfare, only 59 partisan detachments were operating, while in five western regions, there were actually no partisans until the spring of 1942.

It was believed that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was in charge of the partisan struggle as a whole, but in fact, the intelligence agencies of the Red Army, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, political agencies, and in some places showed initiative and engineering troops. It also happened like this: some planted agents behind enemy lines, others, unknowingly, destroyed it.

Chapter 7. Overcoming the Crisis In the

spring of 1942, the Germans went on the offensive on the Southern Front and the Red Army suffered heavy losses. The partisan forces, having no radio communications and sabotage means, nevertheless reduced the capacity of the railways, inflicted damage on the enemy, creating unbearable conditions for him, which affected the combat capability of the enemy troops.

And so, on May 30, 1942, a decision was made by the State Defense Committee to create the TsSHPD and the headquarters of the partisan movement subordinate to it in some occupied republics and regions. All of them were located in the rear of the Soviet Army. It was perfectly rational. And now partisan formations, individual detachments and groups were directly led by the corresponding headquarters. Wrong installation on manual 117 has been dispelled

partisan forces through underground organizations. True, "underground" regional committees were operating behind enemy lines, headed by party secretaries, who openly wore military uniforms, up to the general's, red flags flew over many "underground" regional committees, and Soviet newspapers hung nearby on stands. Moreover, in Moscow and near Moscow there were "illegal" Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Ukraine and Belarus. They were guarded by NKD officers in military uniform.

Until the autumn of 1942, the TsShPD was a collegium consisting of the chief and representatives from the NKD and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army. Then P.K. Ponomarenko became the sole head of the TsShPD.

Being the commander of the 5th Separate Engineering Brigade (OIB) for special purposes, on June 10, 1942, I, together with its commissar A.I. Bolotin reported to the commander of the Kalinin Front, General I.S. Konev a proposal to create special brigades for operations on enemy communications. The front commander, having approved the proposal, sent it to Stalin. Upon learning that this letter had reached the member of the State Defense Committee K.E. Voroshilov, Konev sent me and Bolotin to Moscow. Voroshilov received us in the presence of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.I. Kalinin. He also approved our proposal, the essence of which was to create from volunteers airborne, engineer and railway troops on each front a brigade, assistance of local ~~partisans~~, should disable ~~the enemy with the~~ communications. For the first month, the formation, preparation and planning of the operation was planned, for the second - the transfer of units behind enemy lines and the installation of non-retrievable anti-train mines with long deceleration periods, for the following months - the optimal mining of new areas with delayed-action anti-train mines, covering them where necessary, the destruction of small bridges and the undermining of rails, and in the case of insurmountable protection of the path in favorable terrain - the shelling of locomotives from anti-tank rifles, strikes on road transport from ambushes and mining. Some units were planned to be transferred across the front line on foot, primarily where there were corridors in the front line; the rest - by air. For the first month of the operation, about 1,000 sorties would be required, and subsequently 400-500 sorties per month. Two months after the creation of the brigades, it was planned to paralyze the railways and greatly disrupt the operation of the enemy's road transport.

On the advice of Kalinin, Voroshilov called GKO member G.M. Malenkov and, having outlined to him the essence of our proposal, asked him to accept us. Malenkov, having received us, carefully read the note, agreed with it and offered us, together with the head of the engineering troops of the Red Army, General M.P. Vorobyov to prepare a draft order of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR on the creation of special brigades for operations on enemy communications. The next day, the documents were presented to Malenkov, he approved them and sent us with them to the Chief of the General Staff, General A.M. Vasilevsky to issue an order. But no such order was issued. On August 17, 1942, another NPO order was signed - on the creation of separate guards battalions of miners for operations on enemy communications. However, these battalions, together with the partisans, still could not block the occupiers from supplying ammunition, fuel and lubricants, and replenishment.

The guards miners showed courage, courage and ingenuity, interacted with the partisans on the ground and made a worthy contribution to disrupting the work of enemy transport. However, their capabilities were not fully used due to the lack of radio communications, a centralized management of their actions. Separate of them, the guards TsShPD. battalions of miners are essentially military partisans, but they were not subordinate to the

At the end of July 1942, I was recalled to the disposal of the head of the TsShPD, not even giving me the opportunity to hand over the brigade, and on August 1 I was appointed head of the Higher Operational School for Special Purposes being created at the TsShPD, and in early September, concurrently, I was appointed assistant to the head of the TsShPD for sabotage.

On September 5, 1942, the order of the people's commissar of defense I.V. Stalin "On the tasks of the partisan movement" developed by the TsShPD appeared. It finally formulated that: "The Red Army heroically repels the onslaught of the enemy and inflicts crushing blows on him. powerful continuous strikes by partisan detachments against the enemy from the rear. The popular partisan movement on our territory, temporarily captured by the German invaders, is becoming one of the decisive conditions for victory over the enemy." And the following tasks were set before the partisans: "arrange railway disasters, undermine railway bridges, destroy garrisons, headquarters and other military institutions and warehouses, destroy bases and weapons depots, the enemy, guard transports of ammunition, food, destroy communication lines, attack enemy airfields, to capture or exterminate representatives of the fascist occupation authorities. Tasks were set to conduct reconnaissance." There were many tasks, but the main task was to "close the paths

transportation" seemed to be dissolved in many other tasks that were set before the partisans.

More about K.E. Voroshilov - commander-in-chief of the partisan movement

The next day, September 6, 1942, the post was established - Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, to which was appointed a member of the Politburo of the CPSU (b) Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov. For a long time he was closely engaged in preparing for a guerrilla war in case of enemy aggression. However, in 1937-38, with his active participation, almost all well-trained partisan cadres were repressed, hidden partisan bases were liquidated, and no one dealt with the issues of alleged partisan actions behind enemy lines. Now he reaped what he had done.

However, Voroshilov nevertheless tried, as was envisaged in the early 1930s, to militarize the partisan forces and start carrying out sudden large-scale operations of the partisan forces in order to close the paths for the supply of enemy troops and cut them off at the front from sources of supply. The Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement took measures to equip the TsShPD with experienced military personnel.

TsShPD and subordinate republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement carried out a lot of work on the training of partisan personnel: radio operators, saboteurs, intelligence officers. Radio communication with partisan formations was established. Measures were taken to supply the partisans with the means of combat and communications they needed. But due to the non-allocation of aircraft for the delivery of goods to the partisans, they were in dire need of mine-disruptive means, anti-tank missiles and other types of weapons. To improve the management and provision of partisan forces, General A.K. Sivkov, H.D. Mamsurov and the author of these lines made a proposal to militarize the partisan formations and introduce support for their actions on a par with the Red Army units to fully supply the planned operations of the partisan forces. The commander-in-chief signed a memorandum on this issue, but the head of the TsShPD - P.K. Ponomarenko refused to sign it. This proposal was not supported by Malenkov and the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky. However, preparations for a crushing blow to the enemy's communications continued intensively.

As P.K. Ponomarenko, speaking about the activities of the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov, "thanks to his authority, energy and perseverance, many important issues of the partisan movement were resolved, especially in logistics and air transportation for part fighting guerrilla."

It was as a result of the measures taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement that already in the 4th quarter of 1942, the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army (GIU) delivered 40,000 slow-acting mines, 30,000 anti-train, 12,000 motor vehicles, 40,000 ampoule, 15,000 lever, 15,000 small magnets nyh min, 45,000 anti-personnel, 25,000 wheel locks".

Under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief, the partisan movement took concrete measures in order to still militarize the partisan formations, and in the spring, when the black path was established, sudden operations of large partisan forces, which were already planned to include individual guard battalions, completely paralyzed the movement on iron and night movement on highways in order to prevent the enemy from supplying and replenishing his troops at the front, and thereby make it easier for the Red Army troops to defeat the Wehrmacht troops, which will be left without ammunition, without fuel and lubricants, despite all attempts to save the roads from partisan action.

And suddenly, on November 19, 1942, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement was abolished allegedly "in order to make the leadership of the partisan movement more flexible, in order to avoid excessive centralization." In reality, the centralization of the leadership of the actions of the partisans was clearly not enough. Separate guards battalions of miners, for example, remained at the disposal of the chiefs of the engineering troops of the fronts and acted independently and independently of the TsShPD.

Zigzags: headquarters and commander of the partisan movement

In fact, the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief by the partisan movement was due to the fact that K.E. Voroshilov nominated not partocrats to all key positions in the TsShPD, but experienced military leaders who had experience in commanding troops, knew how to plan the actions of troops, quickly realized the great possibilities for optimal planning of partisan forces, since the main objects of their influence - communications - do not maneuver like troops on front, and sudden operations with the massive use of non-retrievable anti-train and transport mines of instant and delayed action will be insurmountable for the enemy.

PC. Ponomarenko felt hurt. His proposal to grant partisan commanders maximum independence, objections to the militarization of partisan formations, the creation of partisan divisions and corps,

which would consist mainly of sabotage groups, consolidated into companies, detachments, brigades and even corps, did not stand up to criticism. Moreover, the head of the TsShPD more than once expressed the idea in a narrow circle that the partisan movement should not be commanded, but led. And it is led by the Central Committee of the party. "That's right - the communist party led the partisan movement, but the partisan forces that arose as a result of the partisan movement must be commanded. This also came from Lenin's teaching that "partisan actions are not revenge, but military actions" .

By the way, Stalin and Ponomarenko called the partisans people's avengers and often called them to revenge, which made it difficult to achieve the main goal of the partisan war - to close the deliveries of the invaders and thereby leave their troops at the front without ammunition and fuel. This Ponomarenko either did not understand or did not want to understand, and once he expressed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief the idea of guiding the partisan movement by the party and greater freedom of action for the partisan leadership, which knows better behind enemy lines where, when and how to carry out assigned tasks. The action plans of the partisan forces must not tie their hands with the plans drawn up at the headquarters.

In essence, the head of the TsSHPD advocated such partisan actions that turned to partisanship.

What grounds did Stalin have for such a decision? The success of the guerrilla war could once again raise the authority of the disgraced marshal. Eliminating the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, Stalin essentially took over the leadership of the partisan movement as the head of the Communist Party and as the Supreme Commander of all the Armed Forces, and the partisan forces were our second front. Stalin certainly knew that the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko had neither a military education nor special partisan training, but the Supreme Commander himself had no idea what kind of training the commanders and specialists of partisan formations needed.

Unfortunately, Panteleimon Kondratievich himself, as a true partocrat, considered himself the leader of the partisan struggle, who understood the meaning and meaning of organizing their incapacitation by the partisans. However, judging by his behavior and the content of his post-war publications, the head of the TsSHPD did not study the works of world-renowned practitioners and theorists of guerrilla warfare D. Davydov, General Golitsyn, Klembovsky, Gerschelman, and others. He obviously did not read the closed works of Karatygin and others, according to which trained partisan cadres until 1935. Guerrilla warfare guidelines during pre-war preparations justified themselves in Spain, Yugoslavia and other countries. Briefly, these settings were as follows:

1. For a guerrilla war in case of enemy aggression, it is necessary to prepare in advance and comprehensively. At the same time, all troops must be prepared if the need arises to go over to guerrilla operations.
2. Guerrilla actions should be sudden operations, and not scattered actions of individual groups and detachments.
3. Since partisan actions are a special type of military action, they must be carried out on the basis of military art by people who have special military training.

An example of such actions was the partisan war in Yugoslavia, which began after the organization of the headquarters of partisan detachments. And when everything was ready for a sudden major operation, the partisans attacked the fascist invaders.

The elimination of the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement led to a sharp possibility of carrying out sudden crushing Voroshilov blows to reduce enemy communications. Being the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, Marshal K.E. essentially turned into the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan forces, since, being a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he could quickly coordinate the actions of partisan formations not only led by the headquarters of the partisan movement, but by detachments and groups led by the NKD, GRU and chiefs of engineering troops. After the liquidation of the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, the head of the TsSHPD, in fact, remained only with the partisan formations led by the headquarters of the partisan movement. And this led to the fact that sometimes up to a dozen diversions were carried out in one direction in one night, but only one diversion caused a break in traffic in the sector, the elimination of the consequences of which was the longest. The rest of the sabotage had little or even no effect on the throughput of the sections and only led to the expenditure of forces and means to eliminate the consequences of the sabotage.

After the abolition of the post of the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, the activities of the TsSHPD began to fade as it was. Only painstaking and very useful work continued to establish radio communications with partisan formations. Planned, but poorly provided autumn-winter operations. The directorates of the TsSHPD were transformed into departments and very experienced and energetic workers left the headquarters: generals Sivkov and Khmelnitsky.

Meanwhile, near Stalingrad, the German army suffered a crushing defeat and the winter offensive of the Soviet troops was successfully developing.

In February 1943, the offensive operation of the troops of the Bryansk Front began. It seemed that the liberation of Belarus would soon begin, and liquidationist sentiments appeared in the TsSHPD, and not without reason. After all, many of his employees, like the head of the TsSHPD himself, were connected with Belarus in their pre-war work. March 7, 1943 TsSHPD was abolished. However, the expected result of the winter offensive in the central direction did not work out. The Germans even managed to keep Smolensk and Orel.

April 17, 1943 TsSHPD was restored, but the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, who led the partisan actions in Moldova, was no longer subordinate to the TsShPD.

On November 26, 1943, the regional center of Belarus, Gomel, was liberated, and on January 13, 1944, the TsSHPD was finally abolished, and that was the end of the remnants of the centralization of partisan forces on the territory of the USSR still occupied by Nazi Germany.

Note that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, contrary to the statements of Marshal G.K. Zhukova, only received reconnaissance and operational reports from the headquarters of the partisan movement, but did not actually respond to them.

All these perturbations, underestimations and zigzags in the leadership of the war in the rear of the Wehrmacht, in ensuring provide their troops at the front, complemented by a the planned operations, made it possible for the occupiers to disruption in time, despite the heroism of the partisans. Chapter

8. The Wehrmacht could have been defeated in 1943

As already mentioned above, in an order dated September 5, 1943, People's Commissar of Defense Stalin set the partisans the task of "closing the enemy's supply routes." The fulfillment of this task would lead to the catastrophe of the enemy troops. They would be left without ammunition, fuel, without replacements and could not maneuver.

In an order dated February 23, 1943, Stalin, already as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, ordered "to fan the flame of partisan struggle behind enemy lines more widely, destroy enemy communications, blow up railway bridges, disrupt the transfer of enemy troops, the supply of weapons and ammunition, blow up and set fire to military depots, enemy garrisons, not to let the retreating enemy burn down our villages and towns, to help the advancing Red Army by all means, by all means." attack on

There was no longer a strict requirement to "close the supply routes" in this order. In an order on May 1, 1943, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union I. V. Stalin ordered the partisans: "to strike powerful blows at the enemy's rear, communications, military depots, headquarters and enterprises, destroy the enemy's lines of communication ... mercilessly take revenge on the German invaders.. . To help the Red Army with all our might."

Completing these tasks it demanded, first of all, the centralization of the leadership of the partisan forces and the optimal planning of their operations with comprehensive support.

However, the Headquarters actually removed itself from the leadership of the war in the rear of the Wehrmacht.

And meanwhile, as we have already said, the measures taken by Stalin did not contribute to the fulfillment of the main task set by him "to close the supply routes." As a result, by the spring of 1943, the partisan forces did not have a unified military leadership. The headquarters actually removed itself from the leadership of the war in the rear of the Wehrmacht.

So the operational plan of combat operations of Ukrainian partisans for the spring-summer period of 1943 was approved by the "illegal" Central Committee of the CP(b)U only on April 7 and sent ... to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which approved this plan only on April 26. At the same time, the State Defense Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution on the delivery of 260 tons of ammunition, weapons and mines to Ukrainian partisans. The delivery of goods to ensure the combat plan of the Ukrainian partisans dragged on until July 1, which led to a forced downtime of 15,000 partisans.

Despite all the zigzags and turmoil, the partisans led by the TsSHPD, which had a stable connection with partisan formations with a total number of over 100 thousand people, had exceptionally great opportunities to close traffic on the railways in the rear of the enemy group "Center". These partisan forces could have received significant assistance from the guards miners, formations led by the NKD and the GRU.

The ability of the partisan forces to complete the task - to close the enemy's supply routes - although they were greatly reduced by the elimination of centralized control and the reassessment of the possibility of supply through trophies, was still great.

Head of the transport service of the Wehrmacht G. Potgisser writes, that the fate of railway transport in the occupied territory was determined by the partisans. The experience of partisan operations on the railroads of the occupiers convincingly showed that the invaders did not have the strength to secure the railroads against the partisans. As of January 1, 1943, the enemy's railway network in operation was over 22,000 km. The partisans carried out sabotage almost without loss in areas where there were less than 2,000 enemy soldiers per 100 kilometers. Only the most important sections of the roads, where partisans were active, were protected in this way. If the partisans committed sabotage in all areas, and the enemy would bring the density of guards up to a regiment per 100 km, then the total number of guards of the railways in the occupied territory would exceed 400 thousand people, but such guards, as experience has shown, still would not save the railway the road from partisan saboteurs.

As was known from the intelligence and testimonies of captured Germans, the most critical position of the enemy was with locomotives. When the Red Army troops withdrew, the locomotives were evacuated or put out of action. The Nazi command was forced to collect locomotives on the roads of the occupied countries of Europe, not shunning even the most outdated ones, and drive them to the east. The so-called ersatz steam locomotive "M-50" appeared, which began to be produced by German steam locomotive construction plants for the "eastern" railways, unsuccessfully trying to replenish the locomotive fleet, which was catastrophically decreasing from the blows of Soviet partisans, aviation, resistance forces in the West, as well as from wear in difficult conditions. The Germans also had the opportunity to involve Soviet railway workers in the repair of locomotives, 510,556 of whom worked in the occupied territory in January 1943.

The commander-in-chief of the partisan movement and the leadership of the TsSHPD understood what an Achilles heel the railways represented for the Wehrmacht: they were the only mode of transport that could deliver from Germany and Western Europe everything necessary for the Nazi troops operating on the Soviet-German front. Locomotives and trains in motion were the main targets, strikes against which the partisans could solve the problem with the least expenditure of forces and means - to stop the movement on the railways and inflict huge damage on the enemy in the transported goods and manpower.

The greatest break in the movement could be achieved by destroying large and medium bridges at the same time, but this was sometimes associated with heavy losses, since significant bridges were heavily guarded. It was possible to completely paralyze the movement in winter by disabling the water supply in a certain area. The failure of communication lines made it difficult for transport to work, but did not stop it for long periods. Very tempting, simple and often quite affordable was the undermining of the rails. But the enemy had them in excess and, as a rule, the enemy welded and replaced the rails blown up at night and replaced them during the day, and then invented an 80 cm removable bridge and began to let trains pass through it.

German railway workers took measures to protect the locomotives from the explosion of anti-train mines. To do this, empty platforms were hitched in front of the locomotives, the speed of trains was reduced during the day to 40 (forty) km per hour, at night to 25 km per hour. This, in turn, caused an increase in the number of locomotives and the time spent by trains on the way, but did not exclude damage to locomotives on curved sections when partisans planted mines that explode only under locomotives or under loaded wagons.

Train crashes, as well as raids on them by our aircraft, had a moral effect on transported troops and thereby reduced their combat effectiveness.

Let us dwell on the question of the disintegration of enemy troops.

The fascist army remained combat-ready until the last days of the war. And the German army in 1917 decomposed during the year of its stay in the occupied Soviet territory. Soviet power was even established in Bavaria, and the troops of the interventionists in the civil war were rapidly losing their combat effectiveness. Why? Largely due to skillful policy towards prisoners and clever propaganda. There was nothing like it in the Great Patriotic War.

In a report on November 6, 1941, Stalin declared "it is necessary to exterminate all German occupiers to a single one, who made their way to our homeland to enslave it."

On November 7, 1942, the order "To exterminate fascist scoundrels" was issued, then on May 1, 1943 - "to mercilessly take revenge on the German invaders", on November 7, 1943 - "to ruthlessly destroy the Nazi invaders."

There were no such appeals during the years of the civil war, and the occupying troops were decaying.

The head of the TsSHPD understood the significance of "attacks on trains", but could not organize massive planned sabotage on the railways behind enemy lines due to his lack of proper training, and his excessive ambition. The strikes of the partisans on the enemy's communications, and indeed the entire combat activity of the partisan formations, were planned by the TsSHPD not as military operations, but as sowing work. further reduced efficiency

actions of the partisans, the inability of the TsSHPD to give them the right amount of mine-explosive weapons, anti-tank guns. This is not so much the responsibility of the TsShPD as the General Staff and Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which, while approving the plan of the TsShPD and the USHPD, did not timely submit aircraft to deliver goods to the partisans. All of them clearly underestimated the capabilities of the partisans in the very effective use of mine explosives and ammunition. So at the front, an enemy tank was blown up by only one anti-tank mine out of four thousand installed by sappers. Behind enemy lines, partisans spent an average of 4-5 minutes to destroy one train, and when using instantaneous high-speed mines, partisans spent only one mine in weakly guarded areas to destroy a train. Meanwhile, attacks on railway transport required a large expenditure of air bombs and were ineffective in destroying bridges, and during raids on railway junctions, they were often accompanied by significant losses, which sometimes exceeded the losses of railway workers and railway junction facilities. This was during German air raids on the Kursk railway junction in the summer of 1943.

By the summer of 1943, Soviet partisan formations with a total strength of over 120,000 people, having stable radio communications with the authorities, with optimal planning of their actions and the delivery of only 2,000 tons of mine-explosive means to them, could, within three months, produce at least 12,000 train wrecks, withdraw from building a significant part of the water towers on the railway, undermine several significant bridges and up to 50 thousand rails. But, having lost confidence in the possibility of closing traffic on the railways with train wrecks, the head of the TsSHPD proposed the so-called rail war.

The operations of the rail war did not reach the goal and, moreover, the number of trains delivered to the Wehrmacht not only did not decrease with the increase in the number of undermined rails, but, on the contrary, even increased. So, the more the partisans tore the rails, the less they caused train wrecks. This dependence was understood by the partisan commanders, including those of the Belarusian partisan formations, and, starting from September 1943, sharply reducing the number of undermined rails, at the same time increased the number of crashes and the enemy began to let trains go to the front less and less.

What is the reason for the failure of the goal of the rail war "to close traffic on the railways for long periods and thereby put the enemy troops at the front in front of a catastrophe.

The first and main reason is the incompetence of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the head of the TsSHPD.

They misjudged the enemy. The Germans took out the rails from the occupied territory of the USSR from the roads they did not need. This clearly contradicts the statement of the head of the TsShPD about the shortage of rails among the Germans. Hence, the order of the head of the TsShPD to undermine the rails "on spare, access, auxiliary and depot tracks" was erroneous. This led to the fact that only the undermining of rails on highways had an impact on the capacity of the roads. And, most importantly, the blowing up of rails by partisans "everywhere" on all other tracks caused great harm to the advancing troops of the Soviet Army. The rail war began and was mainly carried out during the offensive operations of the Red Army troops, when "the Soviet command took the necessary measures to disrupt the destruction of the transport economy by the retreating Nazis.

However, despite the measures taken by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the command of the fronts, it was not possible to save the railways everywhere from destruction by the retreating enemy. Orsha-Lepel, and thus made it difficult for the Soviet railway workers to restore the highways.

Yes, and on highways explosives were spent very irrationally. So, in one direction Smolensk-Orsha-Minsk-Brest on the night of August 3, 1943, a significant number of rails were blown up on almost all stages. To restore the track, 34 recovery trains were simultaneously involved in the Minsk Directorate of Eastern Roads. Up to 4-6 recovery trains worked simultaneously in one direction. The traffic capacity was affected only by the restoration of the track on one of the most severely damaged sections. For the rest, the damage inflicted on the enemy by undermining the rails in no way affected the throughput and the damage caused to the invaders was many times less than what the partisans spent on undermining the rails.

This is not the fault of the partisans. They followed orders exactly, showing heroism, and often undermined the rails, destroying the guards, while incurring losses. In August and the first half of September, the partisans spent 50 tons of explosives to blow up the rails. This was enough to cause at least 1,500 train wrecks, which would have resulted in a significant reduction in traffic capacity on the roads behind enemy Force Group Center lines.

In August 1943, the partisans lost 724 killed and wounded, mainly during the rail war.

During the rail war, partisans destroyed bridges, water pumps and committed sabotage on stations.

One of the acts of sabotage at the station between Minsk and Gomel, a tank car was blown up by a magnetic mine and 1 train with building materials, 2 with ammunition and 1 with Tiger tanks were destroyed by fire. The losses of the Wehrmacht from one magnetic mine turned out to be much greater than from the entire rail war.

The second important reason for the failure of the rail war is the distrust of the General Staff and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the reports of the partisans about the losses and damage of the invaders. Indeed, sometimes the partisans passed off the desired losses as real ones, but the data on the interruptions in the movement of trains from the action on communications were often even underestimated by them. The total data of the partisans on the breaks in movement from all types of sabotage in railway transport created the impression that, if their reality corresponded to the front, the Army Group Center could not receive a single train from June 1943, and the troops of this group received daily up to 50-70 trains. And the whole point was that the partisans gave data on breaks in the hauls between two intermediate stations. In one direction, sometimes there were even more than 10 traffic violations in one day, but only one, which was the longest, affected the throughput. The rest had no effect on the throughput, but caused damage to the enemy in the rolling stock, transported people and cargo.

A thorough study after the war showed that the sum of the break in the movement of trains from the actions of partisans on the hauls was 18,750 days, on sections it reached only 11,120 days.

The harmfulness of the installation of the head of the TsShPD on the widespread undermining of rails was that there were 11 million rails in the occupied territory on January 1, 1943, and the undermining of 200 thousand rails per month is only less than 2%, which was quite tolerable for the occupiers, especially if they were undermined to a large extent where the Germans themselves could not destroy during the withdrawal could.

The Supreme Commander, having approved the rail war plan, did not order the adoption of measures for its material support. The requested number of aircraft was not allocated in time. At the same time, in May alone, 500 sorties.

However, the experience of the partisans in the summer of 1943 once again convincingly confirmed that there were every opportunity to fulfill those tasks that Stalin approved back in December 1941.

So, the connection under the command of A.F. Fedorov from July 7 to August 10 completely paralyzed the Kovel junction, causing the collapse of 123 trains. IN

Indicative is the decommissioning of the railway section Shepetovka Ternopil. In September 1943, a large partisan detachment with a total strength of up to 450 people under the command of K.S. Bozhensky, with sudden raids, blew up several bridges, destroyed and mined the path in several places. As a result of systematic sabotage by the partisan Hero of the Soviet Union A.Z. Oduhi, the enemy failed to restore the site. For six months, the Germans did not manage to miss a single train. During the retreat, the Germans could not destroy the tracks in this section and take out the food they had prepared from the warehouses at the stations. Soviet troops captured a lot of food in this area, the railway workers quickly restored this area, and the partisans cleared it of the delayed-action mines they had installed.

In 1943, Ukrainian partisans, starting in April, could produce up to 2,000 train wrecks a month if they had received enough mines and explosives in a timely manner. Unfortunately, in three years (1942-44) Ukrainian partisans received only 34,562 various mines and 142,595 kg of tol by air. Only in December 1943, when the troops of the Red Army in the Ovruch region approached the vast partisan region, did mines and explosives begin to be delivered to the partisans by land through the wide Ovruch corridor.

The partisans made up for the lack of explosives by smelting tol from aerial bombs, but this did not save the situation.

It should be noted that during the Great Patriotic War, 24,837,500 anti-tank, over forty million anti-personnel, 1,437,200 special mines and 34 thousand tons of explosives were produced and delivered to the troops.

The situation could have been quite different in the summer of 1943 if the Commander-in-Chief partisan movement K.E. Voroshilov would have remained at his post in November.

TsSHPD was reorganized into the headquarters of the partisan forces with a political department, which was engaged in the political support of the partisan forces, as was the case in other branches of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In this case, as was the case, for example, in Yugoslavia, hundreds of thousands of Soviet people joined the ranks of the partisan forces, who ended up behind enemy lines without being drafted into the Red Army or who escaped from captivity. Separate guards battalions of miners began to act only on enemy communications as classic saboteurs who were able to crash trains on heavily guarded bridges with the help of mines seized by a locomotive, as well as mines installed on trains.

The main task of the partisan forces remained trains and vehicles, the main goal was to cut off enemy troops from their sources of supply. To do this, already having the necessary funds in abundance, it was only necessary to ensure their delivery by air to the partisans, for which it was necessary to rationally reduce the number of air bombs dropped for attacks on enemy transport, and at this expense to ensure the delivery of an additional 50 thousand tons of cargo and 2 thousands of high-class saboteurs-instructors. All operations should be carried out suddenly according to optimal plans in order to force the occupiers to spend as much manpower and resources as possible where delayed-action mines explode, and the partisans are already working in other areas where mines are just being laid.

In the Great Patriotic War, Soviet railroad workers who worked on the railways of our territory were very little involved in sabotage activities. And there were more than half a million of them, there were wonderful small magnetic and other mines, which made it possible to disable steam locomotives for a long time, undermine tanks, and burn rolling stock. Partisans can successfully carry out missions to be solved by combat only when there is confidence that the enemy will not put up serious resistance.

In the last war there were several attacks on headquarters and garrisons, when the partisans suffered heavy losses, but in the reports the losses of the Germans were exaggerated hundreds of times or more, and the losses of the partisans were hidden.

Attacks on garrisons, headquarters, the creation of unbearable conditions, individual terrorist acts, such as the murder of the Gauleiter of Belarus, cost the population very dearly, often led to the defeat of the underground and only increased the vigilance of the invaders, without affecting the combat capability of the troops at the front.

Throughout the war, Soviet partisans destroyed or captured 52,958 trucks, cars and special vehicles, burned or blew up 9,514 road bridges.

If the partisans had more explosives, they could inflict much more damage on the occupiers by hitting vehicles. It should be noted that bridges were burned and blown up mainly on dirt roads, mainly in order to prevent the penetration of convoys into the territory controlled by the partisans.

The partisans committed sabotage behind enemy lines and on river transport, and even disabled the Dneprobug Canal. By the way, the invaders tried to use the river transport for the export of timber and almost never used it for military transport.

By January 1, 1943, the fascist aggressors occupied about 1 million square kilometers of Soviet land, on which there were at least 50 million Soviet people, including at least two million people of military age. At that time, there were less than 150 thousand people in the partisan formations and more than 500 thousand worked on the railways operated by the occupiers. Over 300 thousand people could have become partisans, but there were no weapons. Everything on the battlefield has already been cleared away. It cost the partisans, as they say, "more expensive to get weapons and ammunition." Attacks on headquarters and garrisons, as a rule, quickly depleted ammunition supplies, and there were not always trophies.

It took only 2.5 thousand tons of weapons and ammunition to arm 200 thousand from the partisan reserve. For a long-term closure of traffic on railways and at night on automobile roads, it was necessary to deliver to the partisans a total of about two thousand mine-explosive and incendiary means every month. This is only for the first 3-4 months of the operation, code-named "Kaput to the occupiers." Then the enemy will be demoralized and the expenditure of funds for cutting off enemy troops at the front from their sources of supply will decrease. When carrying out an operation to put the roads out of action, it is necessary to take into account their restoration by our advancing troops. Therefore, even the rescue of objects that are difficult to restore from their destruction by the retreating enemy troops should be envisaged and the locations for the installation of delayed-action mines, which may not work until the enemy withdraws, should be fixed.

In Yugoslavia, in more difficult conditions than in our occupied territory, thanks to the centralized competent leadership, the heroic partisan detachments during the war turned into the legendary People's Liberation Army, which, even before the approach of the Soviet Army, liberated more than half of the country and diverted all the time of the Great Patriotic War to themselves large forces of the Wehrmacht, paralyzed

rail and road traffic in the occupied territory and thus saved the people from extermination by the fascist barbarians. Soviet partisans can also be proud of their exploits, but they could have done much more for the Red Army, if there was a centralized competent leadership headed by the General Staff and properly trained military leaders. If...

In the winter of 1941-42, the airborne units of Kazankin and the partisans of the Belov Cavalry Corps, acting in small groups, tried to cut off the enemy's troops from the enemy's central group from their supply sources and thereby leave them without fuel and ammunition, which would have led to the catastrophe of Nazi Germany back in 1942, but parts of Kazankin and Belov, not prepared for partisan actions, themselves turned out to be "surrounded" behind enemy lines.

If it weren't for the tragedy of 1937, thousands of commanders well prepared for partisan warfare would have been preserved in the troops and the troops who found themselves behind enemy lines at the beginning of the war would not have been captured, but would have moved in an organized way to partisan actions and the Germans themselves would have been trapped, cut off from their sources of supply. Commander-in-Chief Headquarters and Guerrilla Warfare Strategy

Former member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal G.K. Zhukov in his book "Memoirs and Reflections" writes that "The Headquarters directed all military operations of the armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, built up strategic efforts in the course of the struggle at the expense of reserves and the use of the forces of the partisan movement. The working body ... was the General Staff. And further he claims that "If in the first year of the war there was still no proper organization and centralization in the leadership of the partisan movement, then subsequently the Stavka managed military operations behind enemy lines confidently and firmly. This was done through the Central Headquarters created under it on May 30, 1942 partisan movement... There was a real opportunity to direct the actions of all the forces of the partisan movement in the interests of the army, to coordinate the interaction of partisan detachments with the operations of the fronts.

The general tasks of the partisan forces were set by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. In accordance with the situation, they were specified on the ground by party organizations and bodies of the partisan movement.

Meanwhile, as I know from my work as an assistant to the chief of the Central and deputy chief of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, in reality, throughout the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command did not actually control military operations behind enemy lines. The General Staff, as a working body of the Headquarters, did not have the proper influence on the use of partisan forces in the interests of the fronts. In the presence of the Central, Republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement, the general tasks for the partisans were set by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin as the People's Commissar of Defense and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, central and regional committees of the Communist Party, whose territory was invaded by the enemy.

However, in the presence of the Central and subordinate partisan headquarters, military operations behind enemy lines were conducted by special partisan formations led by the intelligence agencies of the Red Army, as well as the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the miners of the engineering troops.

Combat operations behind enemy lines were carried out by Soviet partisans in the Great Patriotic War for 46 months. The central headquarters existed for only 18 months, while for the last 7 months the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement was not subordinate to it. The headquarters was indifferent to the zigzags in the leadership of the partisan forces.

In the presence of the headquarters of the partisan movement, they developed operational plans for military operations for certain periods of time, as well as individual operations only for the partisan forces subordinate to them. These plans were approved by the leading party bodies of the republics and regions, and then submitted to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and to the Headquarters. There, as a rule, they were approved without any changes, but, with rare exceptions, the plans were not financially supported and in most cases were not carried out, but no one was ever responsible for this. So, on April 7, 1943, the "illegal" Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, which met in Moscow and was actually completely legal, approved the operational plan of combat operations presented by the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement in the spring and summer of 1943, which was then sent to The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and not to the Headquarters, and only on April 26 the plan was approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. At the same time, the State Defense Committee (GKO) adopted a resolution on the material support of the partisans of Ukraine. While they planned, approved the plan and financially ensured its implementation, large partisan formations were inactive. Spring passed, and in the summer this plan was carried out in an insignificant part.

The situation was even worse with the operations of massive undermining of the rails, which were planned by the TsSHPD.

In July 1943, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin approved the operations of the "rail war" for the simultaneous massive undermining of the rails, but did not provide it financially, and as a result, instead of "disrupting the enemy's operations on the fronts", as it was supposed by the plan, during the operation "rail war" in August 1943, the enemy managed to deliver more trains to the front than in June, while the efforts of the partisans were directed to the train crash. Operation "Rail War", approved by the Headquarters, turned out to be harmful not for the enemy, but for our railway troops, who, on the territory liberated by the Soviet Army, restored sections of railways that the Germans did not need, destroyed by partisans. But more on that ahead.

The central headquarters of the partisan movement from the very beginning of its existence, and the Ukrainian one from March 1943 until the last days, sent intelligence and plans of operations to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, which were approved by Stalin either as Supreme, or General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, or chairman of the GKO. Plans for the material support of the partisans, with rare exceptions, were not carried out. The Supreme Commander did not define the strategic goal of guerrilla warfare - to cut off enemy troops at the front from their sources of support. This had a negative effect on the results of the actions of the partisan forces.

According to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, "the tasks of the partisan movement were to create an unbearable situation for the Nazis, to destroy the enemy's manpower, military equipment and materiel, to disorganize the work of his rear, to disrupt the activities of the military authorities and administrative bodies of the fascist occupiers."

About the main goal of the guerrilla war - not a word. The creation of an unbearable situation for the occupiers often resulted in severe disasters for the population. Often, in order to "create an intolerable situation, terrorist acts death of a large number of patriots and often made it difficult to fulfill the carried out by partisans" led to the main task - disrupting military transportation.

Marshal G.K. Zhukov argued that the scope of the listed tasks of the partisans, their importance suggests that the partisans could only act in an organized manner, with entire formations and detachments. In reality, actions by entire formations and detachments took place during raids or during sudden raids on enemy weak garrisons and warehouses, but the partisans inflicted the greatest damage to the enemy with small losses and, as a rule, without any losses at all, by sabotage using mines and explosives, especially non-recoverable anti-train mines. The use of automatic anti-train and anti-vehicle mines gave the partisans the opportunity to inflict great damage on the enemy without engaging him in battle. On the contrary, acting in entire formations and detachments, they often suffered heavy losses. At the same time, the partisans could not conduct long-term battles with the enemy, outside their region or region, since during the battle they did not have the opportunity that the enemy had to build up efforts and organize replenishment of ammunition. On the other hand, the partisans had a very large opportunity to destroy troops and military equipment and other means during transportation in trains. And experienced partisans skillfully used these opportunities. Zhukov's assertion that the daily leadership of the partisan forces in the localities was carried out by the underground organizations of our party is not true either. In fact, the partisan forces in the field were led not by underground party organizations, but by the command of partisan formations, detachments that led at the beginning of the war the party bodies that led the partisan formations, and were not underground, as many erroneously interpret, but after the creation of the headquarters of the partisan movement they began to lead the partisan forces.

The commanders of especially powerful formations G.K. Zhukov calls P.M. Masherova, Z.A. Bogatyr, I.E. Anisimenko, D.T. Burchenko, who were commissars of brigades and formations. At the same time, such commanders who had extensive experience, like G.M. Linkov, A.E. Andreev, V.A. Kvitinsky and many others, G.K. Zhukov does not mention. Someone entered G.K. Zhukov, commander of the sabotage group M. Huseynzade, among the outstanding leaders of underground party organizations and commanders of partisan detachments and formations, who did everything possible to fight enemy forces, skillfully interacted with our regular troops. M. Huseynzade's group in Yugoslavia did not interact with our troops.

How little attention the Headquarters paid to partisan forces is evident from the fact that the 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and a member of the Headquarters throughout the war, Marshal G.K. Zhukov had no idea about the size of the partisan forces. In his memoirs, he writes that "in the occupied regions of the RSFSR, according to far from complete data, there were 260 thousand people's avengers in organized detachments of partisans (in Ukraine - 220 thousand, in Belarus - 372 thousand)". In fact, the total number of partisans throughout the occupied territory of the Soviet Union did not exceed 250 thousand, and in Ukraine only 47,789 people at a time.

The General Staff was the main working body of the Headquarters for the leadership of the armed struggle, but its former chief, in his memoirs, speaking about the work of the General Staff, says nothing about the leadership of Stalin and the General Staff in the partisan war in the rear of the Wehrmacht. 127

And this is no coincidence. The Chief of the General Staff or, in his absence, performing these duties, receiving reports and other materials from the Central and Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, did not actually react to them. Yes, as can be seen from the memoirs of Army General S.M. Shtemenko, who began serving in the General Staff in 1940 and from 1943 until the end of the war served as chief of the Operations Directorate, there was not a single officer in the General Staff who would deal with issues of guerrilla warfare.

During the Great Patriotic War, I had a chance to talk a lot with K.E. Voroshilov on these issues. He is the only member of the Headquarters who, in the pre-war years, was preparing for a guerrilla war in case of enemy aggression. Before being appointed Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, as I know for sure, I was afraid to turn to Stalin on issues of the movement without the support of other members of the Headquarters or the Politburo. Yes, and being the Commander-in-Chief of Stalin was very afraid.

The then attitude of the leadership to the guerrilla war was reflected in the Field Manual of 1943. In it, for the first time, in paragraph 17, those erroneous concepts were formulated that laid the foundation for the attitude towards the partisans. Supply

In the Draft Field Manual of 1943, it is written that trophies are the basis for providing partisans. Crimean partisans in the autumn and winter of 1942/43 were dying of hunger at the moment when the aircraft dropped bombs on enemy communications. The effectiveness of these bombings was minimal. The guerrillas could have derailed enemy trains with great success, but they were starving to death. It was easier for them to undermine the train than to get a loaf of bread. In fact, captured ammunition and weapons in partisan formations constituted an insignificant part of their needs. Weapons and ammunition completed in the Soviet rear, the detachments received at the points of formation. In the early years of the war, partisans procured weapons and ammunition in the fields after the battles. The local population helped them a lot. But in the reports, the commanders of the partisan formations, weapons and ammunition picked up on the former battlefields, were passed off as trophy ones.

The main supply of the partisans since the summer of 1942 was the delivery of means of struggle to the partisans through the front line by air or through the corridors in the front line. So, during the war, Ukrainian partisans received 12,622 machine guns, 3,507 rifles, 1,255 machine guns, 272 mortars, 492 anti-tank rifles and 20 cannons, over 13 million rounds of various cartridges and many other means of combat, in addition to December 1943 - March 1944 they received 776 tons of means of struggle through the Ovruch corridor. For Belarusian partisans, captured ammunition accounted for no more than 5% of all the ammunition they used up.

The attitude towards insufficient provision of partisans with weapons, ammunition and other means of struggle, which was actually carried out by the Headquarters, sharply reduced the capabilities of partisan forces in the fight against the enemy. And with centralized competent planning of the operations of partisan forces and their proper support, in the summer of 1943 they could completely paralyze the enemy's railway communications and stop night traffic on roads, as the former head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement P.K. Ponomarenko wrote about. G.K. Zhukov and the war in the rear of the Wehrmacht

Member of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander Marshal G.K. Zhukov spoke about the results of the actions of the Soviet partisans: "In 1943, the partisans blew up 11 thousand trains, damaged and disabled 6 thousand steam locomotives, about 40 thousand wagons and platforms, destroyed over 22 thousand cars and more than 900 railway bridges. The organizers of these actions were local underground party organizations".

Unfortunately, due to the lack of explosives, the partisans could not destroy the railway bridges, but only damaged them, and often very weakly. In 1943, the actions of the partisans were not led by local underground party organizations, but mainly by the headquarters of the partisan movement. In addition, separate partisan formations led by the Main Intelligence Directorate and the NKD, as well as guards miners, operated behind enemy lines.

Underground party organizations did not have any means for mass sabotage in the rear of the Wehrmacht. In 1943, the means of struggle were delivered to partisan formations, including underground ones, from the rear of the Soviet Army, mainly by air and in some cases by land.

From the work of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, it can be seen that the Stavka essentially did not pay due attention to the partisan struggle in the rear of the Wehrmacht, having in 1943 great opportunities to fully provide the partisans with mine-explosive means by reducing the dropping of bombs on enemy railways. This could lead to the cessation of railway traffic in the rear of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR and the cessation of the night traffic of enemy vehicles and create for the Germans in the summer of 1943 situations close to disaster.

Bridge over the river Pavia was bombed by dozens of planes - he survived. They gave it to the partisans - they destroyed it. In May 1943, 500 sorties were made to the Orel-Bryansk sector,

they also bombed the Bryansk railway junction. The traffic was slightly disturbed - less than the blowing up of one bridge by partisans.

In December 1941, Stalin agreed with P.K. Ponomarenko that "Systematic sabotage can close traffic on railways, night traffic on highways and make daytime traffic inadequate. This will force the enemy to withdraw dozens of divisions from the front to guard communications, which ultimately will hinder sabotage, but will not eliminate them."

Stalin did not object, but offered to solve this problem at the expense of the trophies obtained by the partisans, which was clearly impossible. Experience convincingly showed that the effectiveness of the use of mine-explosive means by partisans to undermine bridges, cars, train wrecks is hundreds of times higher, and it is associated with fewer losses on our part than bombing attacks on enemy rail and road communications. But throughout the war, air strikes against railway communications increased, and the partisans could not close traffic on the railway lines from the spring of 1943 only because of the lack of mine explosives and the lack of optimal planning of operations. Underground or partisan?

Partisan actions in the conditions of the Second World War were complex military actions using special means, giving the partisans the opportunity to inflict damage on the enemy without entering into battle with him. The management of partisan actions already required the availability of radio communications.

The underground party organizations did not have in their composition either the necessary cadres of commanders or radio communications. And in general, underground party organs were created at partisan bases and during the withdrawal of our troops, and could only lead those formations that they or with their participation had created.

Underground party organizations had nothing to do with more than 90% of what the partisans did. Rather, they themselves were led from partisan zones, districts and territories, where there were no governing underground bodies.

During this period, the partisans were in dire need of mine-disruptive means and, with sufficient provision of them, they could already in 1943 cut off enemy troops on the Eastern Front from supply sources. Stalin in the Great Patriotic

On June 20, 1941, I was at the headquarters of the Belarusian military district and saw the suppressed officers who were worried about the concentration of Wehrmacht troops ready to attack.

The head of artillery of the military district, General A.N. The cry with which we became friends in Spain told me bitterly: "The Germans are clearly preparing for an attack, and we were ordered to send a number of guns concentrated at the training ground for construction. They reported to Moscow. They answer:" Comrade Stalin knows and says do not give in panic."

In the border military districts near the border, a huge amount of ammunition is concentrated, even weapons and fuel and lubricants, which were not essentially covered by the troops. I met a car column that was going to Bialystok after it was occupied by the enemy. During the withdrawal of our troops, I destroyed the fuel reserves, which we could no longer use, and even more so there was no way to take them out.

The destruction of food during the withdrawal, the requirement to "drive the Germans into the cold" by setting fire to the settlements in which they were located, helped the occupiers a lot. They carried on propaganda that all this was being done by the Soviet government because it no longer thought of returning, otherwise why destroy what could be preserved for use upon return.

Moreover, the demand for the destruction of unexported grain and the theft of collective farm cattle helped to attract to the side of the enemy people who had lost faith in the victory of the Red Army, especially relatives of those who suffered during the repressions during collectivization.

History does not know such a massive use of the population and prisoners of war in the fight against their troops, as it was during the Great Patriotic War. Over one million two hundred thousand Soviet people of almost all nationalities participated in the war against their homeland in the police, as well as in military formations. Many prisoners of war are military formations created by the occupiers in order to break out of starvation captivity and, at the first opportunity, go over to the side of the partisans, as did the brigade under the command of Gil-Radionov, which, having destroyed the occupiers and hardened traitors who were in it, completely went over to the side of the partisans, turning into the 1st anti-fascist brigade. Many police officers, risking the lives of their families, also went over to the side of the partisans. So in Belarus, over 26 thousand policemen went over to the partisans.

Left without food and other means of subsistence, the Soviet railway workers, in order not to die of hunger, were forced to work for the enemy. In total, over 500 thousand people worked in the temporarily occupied territory in the winter of 1941-42

individual saboteurs who underwent special training which restored and provided the movement of Soviet railway workers, trains. And only training inflicted significant damage on the invaders. The group on the railway headed by K.S. was especially successful. Zaslonov, A.E. Andreev. But there were only a few such groups, and communication with them was practically not maintained. And if, during the withdrawal of our troops, food that could not be evacuated would be distributed to those who, due to the prevailing situation, remained in the occupied territory, there would be fewer of those who worked for the enemy.

The destruction of grain and other foodstuffs during the withdrawal of the Red Army hampered the deployment of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.

The picture could have been much worse if all Stalin's demands were met in full. Then a sea of population would begin behind enemy lines, which was what the invaders needed, and there would be no one to disrupt the work of enemy communications. So basically the partisans could only eat at the expense of the local population. Factors of guerrilla warfare

Experience has shown that there are certain factors that determine the conduct of a guerrilla war against an aggressor.

1. Its advance preparation, as pointed out by M. V. Frunze. From the warehouses mentioned above, the Ukrainian partisans were able to get much less than was laid down when they were created. For two years, the partisans were able to get only 120 tons of tol. The rest was confiscated in 1937. The same thing happened in Belarus, where before the war 50,000 rifles were laid in caches.

2. Frames!

3. Attitude of the population. Initially, we could not count on significant assistance from the population, as we retreated and the population was suppressed. The beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops inspired the population to replenish the partisan detachments and to help the partisans.

The Second World War convincingly showed that guerrilla warfare - war behind enemy lines - is also a military art, although it has its own specifics. Since guerrilla actions are military actions, they are subject to many laws of military art.

Part III. THE THEORY OF GUERRILLA WAR

multiplies another's power by force, both inspire the confidence of the one who gets the power."these virtues for it is obtained by skill or "Woe to the one who Not at

Niccolo Machiavelli.

Chapter 1

By training partisan cadres during the war, by checking partisan actions, by removing minefields after the war, I was able to evaluate the effectiveness of many partisan operations that I organized or knew about. I was convinced that starting from 1943, the second front was fully operating against the enemy - this

were partisans.

Traditionally, they mistakenly evaluate the significance of Stalin's order No. 227 on the creation of detachments. They didn't save the day. No! They only increased the number of surrendered prisoners. Not barrage detachments, but the courage and courage of the Soviet soldiers ensured victory, despite the mistakes and crimes of Stalin. In the course of the war, without heavy losses, commanders and commanders gained the necessary experience.

Note that during the years of the war with the USSR, the Wehrmacht lost fewer officers, and mostly junior and middle ones, than our Army in 1937-38 as a result of Stalinist repressions. Two forms of guerrilla warfare

The guerrilla war was fought in two forms: from the underground and from the areas of deployment partisan forces.

As for the first form, the actions of Konstantin Zaslonov are indicative here.

He was trained at the A.K. Sprogis as part of a small group. After training was sent to Orsha. Before the arrival of the Nazis, he headed the depot in this city.

After analyzing the situation, Zaslonov realized that by fighting he would cause little damage and decided to wage an underground struggle. To this end, he came to the Germans and offered his services. There was a desperate shortage of personnel and he was asked to remain in the same position, that is, the head of the depot.

The results of his activities are as follows: from December 1941 to February 1942, he derailed 6 trains and damaged 170 locomotives. I later checked it myself.

The Germans began to guess, but did not understand who was behind it. They got to the point that they began to crush coal so that "coal" mines would not fall into the furnace with it. They could not repress anyone, since the main workers were Russians. Thus, one trained person with a small group of assistants managed to do much more than a whole unit.

And it was all he had - tol and fuses. That's what a professional does.

Another example of an underground organization is the actions of Colonel Vasily Ivanovich Nechipurovich. Almost all of his 208th division was captured. He went underground, organized a detachment, left the city with him and switched to partisan operations. Very soon, his detachment controlled a large territory.

Unfortunately, the lack of proper organization led to confusion among the partisan commanders and inconsistency in actions. Nechipurovich reported this to the center and ... was recalled. A case was brought against him.

The third example is the underground of A.F. Fedorov. Organized by a person who was a party worker, it could not be created in the city. They were known by sight. So they immediately went to the forests. They fought in uniform, did not hide and carried weapons. In fact, it was not an underground, but partisanship. In Odessa, the partisans were no longer underground.

Chapter 2. International partisan movement

When planning an attack on the USSR, the German General Staff knew about the preparations for a guerrilla war in the USSR in the second half of the 20s and early 30s. He knew that Soviet military specialists participated in the organization of partisan struggle in the rear of the Nazis and rebels in Spain in 1936-39. The enemy was preparing for a quick and brutal suppression of the beginnings of the partisan movement. However, in determining the probable actions of the partisans, the Nazi general staff clearly underestimated them, and overestimated the capabilities of their troops in the fight against the partisans.

The General Staff of the German Ground Forces believed that the motorization, mechanization of the army and the presence of radio communications in the troops will drastically reduce the capabilities of the partisans.

The partisans retained their superiority in maneuverability on terrain inaccessible to motorized mechtroops. And the presence in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union of powerful aviation and radio communications made it possible to provide the partisan forces with the means of struggle they needed, quickly receive valuable intelligence from the partisans and evacuate the wounded and sick partisans from the rear of the enemy to the rear of the Soviet Army.

The Nazis also knew about the presence of special sabotage means, but underestimated the possibility of their effective use by partisans.

The Hitlerite leadership also knew about the Stalinist repressions, which eliminated all measures to prepare for the partisan war, which helped the Nazis a lot, but, fortunately, several dozen experienced and well-trained partisans survived, who managed, overcoming the consequences of Stalinist repressions, to launch a partisan war with difficulty .

As a result of all this, the Nazi high command was unable to suppress the partisan movement, although it used much more forces and means than expected before the war to fight against the partisans, as well as to protect important communications and other objects in its rear.

The partisan movement began to develop especially widely after the defeat of the German fascist troops near Moscow. In the occupied territories of France, Greece, Yugoslavia and other countries, hundreds of detachments and groups began to operate, waging a guerrilla war.

An important role in the development of the French partisan movement, as in many other countries, was played by the wars of the 14th Spanish partisan corps, part of which, after the fall of the republic, was interned in France. After the occupation of France, the corps fighters broke out of the camps and went about their usual business under the command of Antonio Buitrago, formerly the deputy commander of the corps. By 1943, the corps already had 27 sabotage brigades, consolidated into nine divisions. Their actions spread to 2/3 of the territory of France, they participated in the liberation of a number of cities, including Marseille and Paris.

In France, as, for example, in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and other countries, approximately 80% of the commanders of partisan formations and specialist saboteurs were trained either by direct participants in the guerrilla war in Spain, or by instructors who passed through their hands. The former chief of staff of the 14th partisan corps, L. Ilich, was the head of the operational department of the main headquarters of the French partisans.

In Yugoslavia, the fascist aggressors faced, probably, the most organized guerrilla war in all European countries. In April 1941, German and Italian troops occupied Yugoslav land. Already in May, military committees were created under all national and regional committees of the CPY and the Supreme Headquarters of Partisan Detachments. Weapons and medicines were collected; young cadres were trained; measures were taken to return to the country the participants in the war in Spain, who were in French camps. Josip Broz Tito radioed to Moscow:

"May 13, 1941

Tov. Dimitrov

We organize combat detachments, educate our military cadres, and prepare an armed uprising in the event of an attack on the USSR.

In Yugoslavia, the partisan war began suddenly for the occupiers, partisan actions immediately covered large areas. At that moment, the Yugoslav partisans still made little use of special equipment, the forms of their struggle somewhat contradicted the main tasks of the partisan war. However, this did not lead, as in the Soviet Union, to catastrophic losses: the fact is that the partisans managed to achieve strategic surprise. The enemy did not have the strength to support their garrisons - all armed units in the rebel territory were too weak and were defeated. The results of this uprising were magnificent.

"September 28, 1941

27.11 held a meeting at the Supreme Headquarters of the partisan detachments of Yugoslavia. There were 20 representatives of headquarters and commanders of partisan detachments from all regions of the country. A plan was drawn up for further military operations and sabotage. Half of the territories of Serbia and Bosnia, as well as most of Montenegro, have already been cleared of the invaders. In the rest of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, there are large partisan units that hold individual cities and attack various strategic targets ...

Walter (I. Broz Tito)"

The structure of the centralized control of partisan units in Yugoslavia was effective and, in comparison with the Soviet one, more integral:

"The organizer and leader of all the partisan detachments of Yugoslavia is the Communist Party. The military leader is the Supreme Headquarters, to which the main headquarters of the provinces are subordinated. The commander-in-chief of the partisans Tito ..."

Such a fact is interesting. In April 1942, "brief biographical data on the most important leaders of the partisan armies unknown to us" were requested from Moscow to popularize the Yugoslav partisan movement. There were eighteen names on the list provided. Of these, nine were regular officers of the former Yugoslav army, five were officers of the international brigades in Spain, and only four were civilians before the war (and even then one was a reserve officer). In Yugoslavia, it was clearly understood that the military should lead the guerrilla war.

At the very beginning of the guerrilla war, its main goal was determined, which was then strictly observed: "Not a single gun, not a single rifle, not a single cartridge, not a single grain of wheat, etc., should fall into the hands of fascist criminals. Mobilize all your forces against turning our country into a supply base for the fascist mob..."

"The example of the Yugoslav people shows ... that the partisan struggle in the present conditions is the decisive and most effective form of resistance to the invaders.

The facts speak of this with complete conviction. The Yugoslav partisans, for example, disabled the country's lead and copper industries, on which the German occupiers had high hopes. The machinery at the enterprises was rendered unusable, the mines were blown up, the workers went into partisan detachments. This is not sabotage, which reduces output to a certain extent, but the complete elimination of one of the most important sources capable of feeding the fascist military machine.

... The destruction of railways is of particular importance. In this matter, the Yugoslav partisans achieved outstanding success. Not only are the German and Italian occupiers no longer masters of the railways of Yugoslavia, but in general they can hardly use them. The partisans blew up dozens and hundreds of bridges, destroyed the canvas

the most important highways, blew up a number of junction stations. With great difficulty, the German troops and the gendarmes of the traitor Nedić manage to maintain traffic on only one Belgrade-Nish railway line.

Winston Churchill in February 1944 told the British Parliament about the situation in Yugoslavia:

"The partisans, led by a skillful leadership, organized into detachments, were both an elusive and deadly force. Not only Croats and Slovenes, but also a large number of Serbs joined Marshal Tito, and now he has more than a quarter of a million people and a large amount of weapons taken away, with the enemy or with the Italians, and these people are organized into a significant number of divisions and corps.

The whole movement took on a certain form, without losing its partisan qualities, without which, perhaps, it could not have succeeded. Around and within these heroic forces a national unifying movement is developing. The Communist elements have the honor of being the initiators, but as the movement grew in number and strength, a process of change and consolidation took place and national concepts prevailed. In the face of Marshal Tito, the partisans found an outstanding leader who covered himself with glory in the struggle for freedom.

In the middle of 1943, the Axis were forced to keep about 33 full divisions and a large number of police formations in the Yugoslav region. The partisan forces and the NOAU cleared all of Albania and most of Yugoslavia from the enemy, including, together with the troops of the Red Army, they also liberated its capital, Belgrade. A number of formations of the NOAU penetrated into Hungary and Bulgaria and helped local partisans. And after the capitulation of fascist Italy, with the help of the same NOAU, several Italian partisan divisions and brigades were formed.

The partisan movement was characteristic of many occupied European countries. Even such a small country as Belgium had its partisans, who bravely acted on enemy communications.

The victories of the Soviet Army near Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge contributed to the further growth of the national liberation movement in the countries of Europe and Asia. By 1944, members of the Resistance, making extensive use of the experience of Soviet partisans, deployed large-scale military operations behind enemy lines and organized popular uprisings.

According to the most modest data, partisan forces in World War II managed to:

- to divert over 54 divisions and more than 1 million 200 thousand policemen and other traitors in Europe by the end of 1941, and by the beginning of 1944 more than 113 divisions and over 1 million 700 thousand police units, which, in the absence of partisans, could would turn into 150 infantry divisions. Consequently, the partisans diverted more forces to themselves than the second front in Europe;

- significantly disrupt the operation of the enemy's road and especially railway transport (partisan strikes on the enemy's railway transport are almost ten times more effective than the results of enemy air raids on the railways of the USSR and allies);

- seriously hinder the use of human and material resources in the occupied territory by the enemy;

- save millions of civilians from hard labor and extermination in death camps;

- save huge material resources from the removal and destruction of the enemy during his withdrawal;

- to help their troops in overcoming water barriers and mountain passes, in the liberation of cities;

- free from the invaders a significant part of the territory they seized in the USSR and other occupied countries.

The Slovak national uprising that broke out on August 29, 1944, raised by local patriots with the help of Soviet partisans, turned Slovakia into the arena of a national liberation war. Thus, the 60,000-strong army of Slovakia was withdrawn from the armed forces of the fascist bloc, which went over to the side of the partisan forces and participated in the battles already against the fascist German troops.

The revolutionary uprising in Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, ended the fighting with dignity. actions of the Bulgarian partisans.

During the war against the Japanese invaders in Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, national liberation armies grew up and became stronger on the basis of partisan detachments, which turned into powerful forces that liberated these countries from colonial rule.

oppression. Moreover, it was the flames of the guerrilla war that thwarted many of the plans of the Japanese militarists.

The fear of the armed people on the part of the Allied governments led to the fact that in October 1944 the Anglo-American troops landed on the already liberated territory of Greece and began a war against the Greek national liberation troops, who had previously fought against the Nazi invaders. And this struggle between the Anglo-American troops and the reactionary forces of Greece continued until 1948. The Americans acted in the same treachery with partisan forces in Italy, in the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands occupied by the Japanese.

To judge the scope and effectiveness of the partisan struggle during the Second World War, we present the following data.

By the spring of 1944, the number of partisan forces and the national liberation armies created on their basis in the rear of the fascist invaders exceeded one million three hundred thousand people. And these were for the most part well-organized groups, detachments, formations, and even entire armies, which had a clear moral advantage over the enemy. And the partisans largely compensated for the lack of aviation, tanks, lack of artillery and automatic weapons with their special tactics and sabotage equipment.

Partisans inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in other countries as well. French partisans only during the landing of the allies in northern France in the summer of 1944, according to the American command, caused more damage to the Germans by their actions on communications in two weeks than the Allied aviation in two months.

Issues of guerrilla warfare in the rear of the fascist and Japanese aggressors in the Second World War is devoted to many works of researchers.

What is the secret of the success of guerrilla warfare?

First of all, it is explained by the heroism of the partisans and the people, the effective tactics of the struggle and the skillful use of technical means. And all this allows the partisans to conduct combat operations with minimal human and material costs. In order not to be unfounded, let's confirm this with some comparative figures.

So, in the Second World War, the armed forces of the anti-Hitler coalition at the front spent more than one ton of ammunition per disabled enemy soldier and officer, and the partisans only used about 20 kg - that is, 50 times less. The partisans used automatic mines, especially anti-vehicle mines, even more effectively. According to the reports of the headquarters of the partisan movement and the materials of the check, as well as according to the documents of the enemy, it turns out that every fourth mine worked effectively. At the front, on average, about 4,000 anti-tank mines were spent on one blown up tank (when the partisans have only 4 mines!). And even more anti-personnel mines were spent on one enemy soldier and officer killed.

It should be noted that after the Second World War, the armed forces of many countries created anew special units for partisan and, above all, sabotage operations behind enemy lines, and there is an extensive literature on the basics of organization, tactics of partisan operations and the strategy of partisan warfare. Much of it is open. Knowledge of the fundamentals of the organization and tactics of guerrilla warfare is necessary for troops that can find themselves behind enemy lines and there, if necessary, go over to guerrilla operations.

Chapter 3. The art of guerrilla warfare is a serious science

The art of guerrilla warfare includes the organization and training of guerrilla forces, planning, comprehensive support and conduct of guerrilla operations. Gone are the days when partisans successfully fought against foreign invaders without any preparation. Military-technical progress - the development of transport, the emergence of armored forces, aviation, radio communications and, finally, weapons of mass destruction, the improvement of counterintelligence services make it difficult, but, as experience convincingly shows, does not exclude the successful conduct of a guerrilla war with proper preparation for it and the skillful use of available to the partisans of the means of struggle, and above all, the means that enable the partisans to carry out their tasks without engaging in combat with the enemy.

Moreover, the present state of industry, transportation, and means of struggle have sharply increased the importance and possibilities of guerrilla warfare.

The experience of the Second World War and subsequent national liberation wars convincingly showed that with modern means of struggle and communication, in order to achieve goals

guerrilla warfare, its leaders must master all the components of military art - tactics, operational art and strategy.

Guerrilla tactics constitute the theory and practice of preparing and carrying out actions by individuals, groups, detachments and formations in conspiracy, movement, overcoming enemy counter-guerrilla measures and carrying out assigned tasks (ambushes, raids and inflicting damage on the enemy without engaging in battle), as well as forced defensive actions.

The operational art or small strategy of partisan forces covers the theory and practice of preparing and carrying out operations that, in a war against an aggressor, are capable of cutting off enemy troops from their sources of supply using ground and underground transport, seizing bridgeheads when forcing rivers, water barriers, as well as other operations that contribute to the success of their regular troops.

In national liberation wars, sudden operations by partisan forces can stun the enemy and create conditions for the victory of the insurgents. The operational art of guerrilla warfare - the theory and practice of sudden, comprehensively secured operations of guerrilla forces capable of overcoming the enemy's counter-guerrilla measures and inflicting damage on him, are of great importance. The state of modern technology makes it possible to do this with relatively small forces using discreetly installed means capable of acting at a given time.

Guerrilla strategy - the theory and practice of preparing and conducting a guerrilla war. It is engaged in determining the strategic tasks of the partisan forces and the conditions and means necessary to fulfill them. The guerrilla strategy and practical activities of the leadership of the guerrilla forces should not allow actions that would alert the enemy in the course of carrying out operations, so as not to cause him difficult to overcome or even completely insurmountable counter-guerrilla measures before the completion of operations that achieve the set goal. Post-war progress and its impact on the possibilities of guerrilla warfare

Almost half a century has passed since the end of World War II. During this time local wars in the world did not stop and guerrilla wars broke out more than once.

But the most instructive are the actions of the partisans in South Vietnam, where the troops of a very powerful country, the United States, were defeated, and the actions of the partisans in Afghanistan, where the troops of another superpower could not save the regime of Cabral and Najibullah imposed from outside. At the same time, the Soviet troops suffered particularly heavy losses of seriously wounded soldiers who were blown up by mines.

The defeat of American troops in Vietnam and the failure of Soviet operations in Afghanistan were the result of the fact that the military and political leadership of these countries underestimated the new opportunities for guerrilla warfare that appeared as a result of military technological progress that occurred after World War II. Such opportunities are especially great for partisan forces organized and supplied by states possessing modern military equipment adapted for use behind enemy lines.

Historical experience convincingly shows that guerrilla warfare is very effective only in just wars of liberation. The same experience shows that individual and even massive terrorist acts do more harm to those by whom they are directed than to those against whom they are directed.

Chapter 4 victory over fascism.

Issues of guerrilla warfare in the rear of the fascist and Japanese aggressors in the Second World War is devoted to many works of researchers. Here are some of their assessments.

"The history of wars does not know a single example when the partisan movement would play such a role as it played in the last world war," Lothar Rendulich, a former Nazi army, is forced to admit. "In terms of its size, it is a impact that it had on colonel general that is something completely new in military art In view of the colossal the front-line troops and on the problems of supply, logistics and administration in the occupied areas, it became part of the concept of total war."

Heinz Guderian, commander of the 2nd Panzer Group and then Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, says that "as the war became protracted and the fighting at the front became more and more stubborn, guerrilla warfare became a real scourge, strongly affecting the morale of front-line soldiers."

This is also confirmed by the English researchers C. Dixon and O. Heilbrunn: "The damage inflicted on the German army by the guerrilla war cannot be determined only by the number of those killed and

wounded and the number of destroyed guns and warehouses. To this should be added the loss of combat effectiveness and striking power by the German army, the significance of which is difficult to assess in numbers.

J. Fuller writes even more vividly in his "Second World War of 1939-1945": communications, the guerrilla units played the same role as the flocks of submarines in the Atlantic Ocean.

Only Soviet partisans (according to the "History of the Great Patriotic War"):

- destroyed, wounded, decomposed or captured about one and a half million enemy soldiers, officers, officials of the occupation administration, etc.;
- made more than 18.000 train wrecks;
- 9400 locomotives were destroyed and much more of them were put out of action for a considerable time, about 42,000 cars and motorcycles, about 4000 tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled guns and artillery tractors, about 800 aircraft;
- destroyed and damaged about 2000 bridges on iron and about 8000 - on automobile roads, and inflicted much other damage on the enemy, which is difficult to express in exact numbers.

It should be noted that in terms of its effectiveness, guerrilla warfare, as it undeniably follows from the above figures, is comparable, at least, with a major military strategic operation that affects the outcome of the war.

It is hard to imagine how the absence of partisan struggle in the rear of the fascist invaders would have affected the course of the war. The enemy would have the opportunity to additionally use on the external fronts from 50 to 100 divisions of field troops and at least 100 to 150 divisions, additionally formed at the expense of police units, which were distracted by partisans in the last world war. The absence of partisans would enable the aggressor to make fuller use of the human and material resources of the territories he occupied. The enemy would not have felt interruptions in the operation of transport.

In fact, the guerrilla war was one of the most important factors in achieving the Victory, but at the same time, it alone would not have been able to achieve it in domestic conditions, just like the Red Army alone, without partisans.

The partisan movement began from the first days of the war, unorganized, with an erroneous directive about the formation of partisan detachments in the territories occupied by the enemy. It is also negative that the Field Manual of 1943 stated that the main unit of a partisan war is a separate, independently operating partisan detachment. Strategic mistake! An independent detachment chose a target for itself, went, completed its task, but attracted the attention of the enemy and prevented other partisans from completing a much more important task. Separate, independent actions of partisan detachments alerted the enemy and prevented them from carrying out operations that could be of operational and even strategic importance.

The commanders of the guerrilla formations understood the perniciousness of such an approach to guerrilla warfare. If, according to the data for June 1942, 241 separate detachments, 12 brigades and 58 brigade detachments operated on the territory of Belarus (the percentage is 77.5% of individual detachments for 22.5% of large formations), then in June 1943 - 129 separate detachments, 91 brigades and 456 brigade detachments (that is, 19% to 81%, respectively), and in June 1944 - 53 separate detachments, 102 brigades and 490 brigade detachments (8% to 92%).

In 1942, a partisan corps was even formed on the Kalinin Front, but was disbanded by the Center as a "bureaucratic superstructure" that interfered with the effective actions of the partisans.

As a result, in 1944, when almost the entire territory of our country was liberated, only well-trained sabotage groups continued to operate behind enemy lines, whose training was so high that even operating abroad, they could organize large partisan formations there. They could organize uprisings there (as, for example, the Slovak National Uprising), they were the detonators of the struggle in foreign countries. The most understanding of the possibilities of inflicting damage on the enemy, the commanders acted until the very end of the war and, in fact, met with the allies on the Elbe.

It is impossible not to admire the high professionalism of the actions of these partisan saboteurs. But alas, there were few of them. After the expulsion of the invaders, the bulk of the partisans remained in our rear, turned into infantry, some of them went to Soviet work, some to fight against the OUN-UPA gangs.

The second direction of development of the guerrilla movement and guerrilla warfare can be conditionally called "Western". What was it? Let's start with Yugoslavia. There's the main

a separate detachment was not considered a unit of partisan struggle. During the war, partisan detachments and groups turned into formations, then into divisions and corps, and finally became the NOAU, which, by simultaneous partisan actions on enemy territory and army actions on the front line, pushed the enemy back and almost completely liberated their country and even part of Italy.

In Italy, there were also large partisan formations that turned into a powerful army that swept away the fascist regime in the north of the country and even captured Mussolini. Even if there were no allies, the Italian partisans would have liberated their homeland.

What happened in France? In France, too, small formations of the Resistance Movement, led by de Gaulle and the anti-fascist military movement of the CPF, were transformed by merging into larger ones. These partisan formations literally fettered the enemy, making it difficult even to supply internally with massive sabotage. As a result, France not only did nothing to help Germany, but, in essence, could not satisfy its own needs. Only losses for the occupiers!

Thus, two paths have emerged: the first is the transformation of partisan formations into an army capable of conducting full-scale military operations, and the second is the separation of highly professional subversive groups from the bulk of detachments and groups operating behind enemy lines, capable of operating in almost any conditions and on any territory. The first is typical for countries that, for one reason or another, did not have a national army capable of resisting the aggressor, the second - for the state, whose armed forces, along with the partisans, fought against the invaders.

Which of these ways is the most promising - the future has shown, but here it is only worth noting that the answer to any question depends on the specific circumstances and the absolutization of the value of accumulated experience has, as a rule, not led to anything good.

Recognizing this, in September 1942, Stalin wrote in his order "On the Tasks of the Partisan Movement": "The defeat of the German armies can be carried out only by simultaneous military operations at the front and powerful continuous strikes of partisan detachments against the enemy from the rear ... The popular partisan movement on our territory, temporarily captured by the German invaders, becomes one of the decisive conditions for victory over the enemy."

Hear: only!

Hear: one of the decisive conditions for victory over the enemy!

In November 1944, Supreme Commander-in-Chief JV Stalin delivered a report: "The 27th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution." Then, on November 7, 1944, Order No. 220 was issued.

The report and the order noted the great victories of the Red Army and the merits of the allies in achieving huge victories over the fascist Wehrmacht. Stalin did not say a word about the help of the partisans to the troops of the Red Army and the allies in achieving these victories.

In conclusion, the order said: "The Red Army and the armies of our allies have taken up starting positions for decisive attacks on the vital centers of Germany. The task now is to crush Nazi Germany in the shortest possible time with the swift onslaught of the armies of the United Nations.

Comrade Red Army and Red Navy men, sergeants, officers and generals! workers
Soviet Union!

During the Great Patriotic War, we defended our Motherland from the invaders, finally eliminated the threat of the enslavement of the peoples of the USSR by fascist monsters, and now we are on the eve of complete victory.

The fact that the Supreme in his report and order did not note the merits of the Soviet partisans in victories over the Nazis, the partisans were very hurt. I remember the sad and bewildered expression on the faces of seasoned partisan saboteurs who were struck by the fact that the Supreme Commander forgot about their enormous contribution and about what he himself wrote less than two years ago.

Even more bewildering was the fact that no tasks were assigned to the partisans. But at that time, Soviet partisans were fighting independently behind enemy lines outside the Soviet Union, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and a number of other countries. This could not but lead to the fact that the partisan forces could be beyond worries about their supply and fate.

And then came the long-awaited day, the Day of the Great Victory. Great holiday, great joy - finally ended the war, which at times seemed endless. And the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself congratulates the people on the Victory. He speaks of those who forged this Victory, died at the fronts and worked for the front.

But not a word about partisans.

And so it has gone on since then, according to tradition: on May 9, the head of state speaks, speaks of the Victory and those who wrested it from the enemy - and is silent about partisans and saboteurs. It was as if they didn't exist. The country began to be called differently, the ideology, it seems, changed, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the Victory. President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin. He speaks well, for a long time. Not a single mention of partisans.

Both in scientific works and in school textbooks about guerrilla warfare - it is somewhat vague: there was something like that. Minor.

Let's look at this problem a little differently. At the end of the Great Patriotic War, 11 thousand people deservedly received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Of these, 234 partisans. And only 130 thousand - the medal "Partisan of War" (with a total number of partisans of at least 800 thousand people).

How so?

An analysis of the contribution of partisans to the Victory shows that at least 15% of the damage to the enemy was inflicted by them. Why, when they began to present for awards, did such a thing turn out? Ivan Nikolaevich Kondrashov, whom I knew before the war, was very worried that thousands of partisans were left without awards.

Sergey Vasilyevich Konitsky, who did so much to create a sabotage service in the Kovpak formation, has not yet been awarded.

Gnezdilov Fedor Danilovich, who in six months turned from a wounded soldier into the commander of an entire partisan regiment named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky - and this is in the first year of the war, it's time to give him a Hero! - not awarded.

Lots of names...

We had one twelve-year-old partisan boy, Tolya Zaporozhets. Nobody encouraged him. I took off my medal and handed it to him. There was another, Vitya Konyakhov, who started wrestling at the age of 14 and ended the war in Poland. Acted bravely...

Our Spanish friends who fought in the rear of the "blue division" did not receive any awards at all. They were landed so clumsily that at first they ended up in our rear. They really wanted to lay mines, but found that they were in the Vologda region. They were picked up and again thrown behind enemy lines - in winter, without skis and food! They, despite the extremely difficult situation, carried out a number of sabotage, but, in the end, were forced to return.

Let's ask why the partisans were somehow forgotten after the Victory.

Marshal G.K. Zhukov writes that when "the war was coming to an end, and it remained to carry out several final operations, I. V. Stalin probably wanted to be the only one at the head of these operations." Zhukov made this conclusion after Stalin's proposal to transfer the leadership of all fronts into the hands of the Stavka in the future. That is: Stalin wanted his fame and authority to increase as a result of the Victory. But it is well known that the more difficult the task, the more glory will be from its solution. The higher the mountain, the more glory to conquer it. The stronger the enemy army, the more glory to its winner. And the winners, as the writer Georgy Vladimov noted, under Stalin "we only had two: one with the address - "Moscow, the Kremlin, Comrade Stalin", the other - "the great Soviet people under the leadership of their native party", and even if not with everything here we can agree that the trend of that time was noticed correctly.

Now tell me, the victory over which Wehrmacht brought more glory to the Red Army and Stalin, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - over the exhausted, decomposed partisans, as it really was, or over some mighty and hitherto invincible. When Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper and a number of other rivers, partisans provided them with crossings - but is this mentioned anywhere?

If Stalin admitted that the partisans contributed to the outcome of the war, disrupting the supply of the Wehrmacht armies, decomposing them, presenting the enemy army to the Red Army as weakened, then one would have to admit that the German army during the fighting was not as strong as he wanted to imagine.

Without partisans, Stalin, his generals and the Red Army got more glory, it was more profitable from a political point of view - the allies made concessions faster. And the partisans preferred to be forgotten.

Thinking about this today, I think that the answer to all questions lies in the famous saying of Niccolo Machiavelli: **"Woe to the one who multiplies another's power, for it is obtained by skill or strength, and both of these virtues do not inspire confidence in the one who gets the power" .**

PART IV. GUERRILLA PRACTICE

Chapter 1. Exit from the encirclement (breaking the

blockade) If our inexperienced partisan groups perished on their own land, then well-trained partisans operated outside the USSR in the most difficult conditions, when there seemed to be no prospects for survival. Here's what my former chief of finance said.

In October 1944, as a result of direct betrayal by the bourgeois stratum during the popular elections in Slovakia, the Slovak popular uprising (according to the proposals of the Nazis and their overseas Anglo-American patrons) was to suffer a complete failure. So it seemed at first glance: Golyan and West (the Anglo-American henchmen who led the insurgent Slovak army) gave the command to end resistance. The liberated area ceased to exist. Parts of the Slovak army, unprepared for the transition to partisan methods of struggle, surrendered in masses, the soldiers, throwing their weapons, scattered to their homes. The partisan detachments and brigades holding more than half of the front line of the liberated region were threatened with destruction by this treacherous order, because they were not warned in time about the dissolution of the army and the termination of the defense of the region. The fascist units quickly spread along the roads and occupied settlements in the rear of the partisans, who continued to hold the defense in the sectors of the front entrusted to them.

The destruction of the partisan detachments at that moment was warned by the timely at that time he led the the intervention of Comrade Gottwald, who is the Czechoslovak fight people from the Soviet rear.

The order transmitted from UShPD by radio on the transition to partisan methods of struggle began to be immediately implemented by the commanders of partisan detachments and brigades (mainly consisting of Soviet commanders).

The transition to partisan methods of struggle was fraught with enormous difficulties: the Enemy, through his spies and traitors to the Slovak people, was well aware of the location, number and weapons of the partisans.

There were no pre-prepared bases of weapons and food in the mountains (with the exception of small bases laid by A.S. Egorov on his own initiative).

The accumulation of a large number of detachments in the areas of the former defense line made it difficult the maneuverability of the partisans and made it easier for the enemy to blockade them.

To avoid defeat, the partisans urgently needed to concentrate their forces. The difficulty of solving this problem lay in the fact that the fascist units were located not only in front of the former defense line of the liberated region, but also went to the rear of the partisans. The encirclement ring was shrinking every day and became more and more dense.

In this situation, the brigade commander comrade. Egorov ordered his deputy for intelligence, now Hero of the Soviet Union, comrade. IN AND. Klovov to withdraw from the brigade location area (Turchansky St. Martin) to the Banovce area a consolidated detachment of 800 people. Connect with the Jan Zizka Brigade in the Banovce area and, with their assistance, move to Moravia.

Considering that the main enemy forces are concentrated to break through the partisan defenses and reach their rear, and knowing well the situation in the rear of the fascist troops blockading the liberated area, the commander of the combined detachment decided to leave the encirclement through a stabilized front.

The exit from the encirclement was scheduled for the evening of November 2, 1944.

The partisans had to pass between the enemy garrisons and cross the open valley of the river during the night. Turkish. In order not to go astray and not lose the personnel, the commander decided to build a detachment in a column one at a time, since the narrow paths did not allow two or more people to walk in a row. Guides were placed in front of the column from among proven scouts who knew the area well. The commanders went ahead of their units. Scouts who knew the area well also followed each of the commanders.

The commander of the detachment ordered the commanders, in case of detection and shelling of the column by the enemy and the impossibility of continuing the journey in one chain without responding to fire, independently go out with their units to the assembly point designated in the mountain forests on the other side of the valley. Commands to whisper along the chain.

The first halt was appointed at the river, after about 1.5 hours of movement, for reconnaissance crossing places.

Cold weather and intermittent rain made it very difficult to navigate the narrow and uncomfortable path. Occasionally, the moon peeped through the clouds, illuminating a long line of people walking in complete silence. However, she did not particularly interfere, since against the background of the mountains it was very difficult to notice the partisans even from close range. The partisans reached the intended halt point safely and stopped without disturbing the formation of the column.

The detachment commander was waiting for a report from the reconnaissance sent by him ahead. However, there was no report, and the unclear and difficult situation did not allow us to remain in place any longer and required an immediate decision to ensure the transition of the valley and access to a large forest before dawn.

Having summoned scouts and several partisans from among the local residents, the detachment commander asked them about other possible crossing points and routes to the forests and decided to cross the river ford 8 km north of the halt. I had to go through virgin soil between the river and the highway, just 300 meters from the latter.

Settlements were bypassed, in order to avoid detection not only by the enemy, but also random encounters with local residents.

Already at the approach of the column to the new crossing point, the commander was informed along the chain that almost half of the column had lagged behind. The scouts sent by the detachment commander returned thirty minutes later, not finding the tail of the column. Dawn was approaching, and the commander decided to start the crossing without waiting for the approach of the lagging part of the column. At this time, machine-gun and mortar fire began a few kilometers behind the column. She, gradually flaring up, approached along the river to the area of the crossing. There was no time to lose, and the partisans, holding hands, crossed the river without undressing to the waist in the icy water.

Ahead, unexpectedly, the scouts discovered posts set up by the Nazis. However, they were ordered not to get involved in the battle in any case, if they could not silently remove the post. They found a convenient passage between the posts and led the entire column through this way, unnoticed by the enemy.

The column had already traveled about three kilometers when the fascists from these posts joined the general, then subsiding, then again flaring up indiscriminate shooting throughout the valley.

At the assembly point, in the forest, when the column left shortly after dawn, the commander of the detachment, fearing that he had become known to the enemy, ordered to leave a disguised post from among the most trusted and reliable partisans, and took the rest 6-7 kilometers deep into the forest to feed people and give them rest.

Before the partisans set out, the group commander arrived at the assembly point and with him two of the scouts sent by the commander to the area of the crossing point planned before leaving. Having crossed the river, they almost stumbled upon a strong ambush. Having sent two scouts back to warn the column, the group commander moved along the river in search of a new crossing point.

In one place they were noticed by the Nazis, who opened fire on them, which the partisans heard during the crossing.

The units that broke away from the column before the crossing approached the assembly point only on the 3rd day and, together with the post that was waiting for them, a day later joined the main forces of the detachment, which by this time were already in the mountains 40-50 km from the assembly point. Later, when the detachment gathered together, it became clear from the reports of the unit commanders, intelligence reports and the testimonies of the prisoners what danger awaited the partisans, and what was the plan of the Nazis to defeat the detachment.

The Germans, from spies and traitors who had made their way into the detachment, knew about the impending crossing of the valley and the place of the crossing. They planted large ambushes on the opposite bank for a long distance, and between them set up reinforced posts in order to press the crossing detachment to the river and destroy all the partisans. However, at first they did not know the location of the assembly point.

The Nazis managed to learn this later from a captured Slovak intelligence officer, to warn the detachment commander about the ambush sent the commander reconnaissance groups of the Nazis for the crossing.

Having established a gathering place, the Nazis organized combing the forest. They forced the local residents, mostly women, to walk in chains through the forest and shout "to frighten" the partisans. The "brave" Nazi warriors walked in groups behind the women, threatening them with weapons.

Such round-ups and combing of the forest, carried out by the Nazis for two days, did not give them anything, but delivered many unpleasant minutes to the partisans from the post, who were waiting for the lagging behind units. During this time, they could not build a fire to dry themselves, keep warm, or cook food.

It turned out that the rupture of the column was also not accidental. This was the work of one of the traitors sent by the Nazis to the detachment, which tore apart the column and disappeared into the darkness. However, their calculation failed here as well. The Russian paratrooper commander A. Tarakanov, who was with the lagging part of the column, immediately took command and quickly led the column to the forest, but not to the starting position, where, as he assumed, there was already an ambush, but 5 kilometers to the north.

He divided this part of the column into three groups of 90-100 people, and on the third day, each with its own route, crossed the valley and, using local residents as guides, reached the agreed gathering place.

The experience of this transition taught the partisans a lot. They realized that the enemy was sending enemy spies into their midst. The guerrillas increased their vigilance and exposed many of them. And, knowing this, the partisans in the future adhered to the following rules:

Always have a ready supply of dry products to go out at any time to
preparations for the transition did not declassify the moment of change in the location of the detachments.

Announce the exit 2-3 hours in advance, strengthening the surveillance of each person, with the obligatory report of the commanders on the disappearances (which often happened and forced them to change the routes and time of the exit).

Only headquarters should know completely about the route and tasks; unit commanders can only know about part of it half an hour before the release. At the end of each part of the route, in the event of detachment of units, liaisons from verified local residents were left with the password for this post-appearance). This made it possible very often to sharply change the direction of movement, avoid skirmishes with the enemy on the march and maintain contact with detached units.

Chapter 2. Release of prisoners of war fighters and commanders of the Red Army

On February 14, 1943, the command of the partisan unit M.I. Naumov, it became known that 8 km west of Veliky Istorop (Sumy region), the Nazis were escorting about 2,000 captured soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. The command of the formation decided: by a sudden raid on the convoy accompanying the prisoners of war, destroy it and free the prisoners of war.

To accomplish the task, a group of cavalry partisans was selected from the Death to Fascism, Chervony and them. Khrushchev under the command of Commissar Comrade Comrade. Anisimenko and political instructor comrade. Grishenko.

The Nazis stopped prisoners of war to rest in the village. Sumy Divination. At this time, cavalry partisans broke into the village. Sumy Vorozhba, with a sudden blow, destroyed a German convoy and freed prisoners of war. At the same time, Komsomol members Prikhodko, Sukhota, Nemolod, Drozdova, Lysenko and others showed examples of courage and courage. The partisans destroyed up to 40 Nazis and captured their weapons.

From Sumy Divination, the partisans transferred prisoners of war to Veliky Istorop. The released fighters and commanders, who, for health reasons, could carry weapons, joined the detachments of the formation, and the weak and sick were sent to the Sumy forests.

Chapter 3 near Mons

Under the influence of the victories of the Soviet Army, by the beginning of 1944, the partisan struggle against the Nazi invaders intensified in Belgium. The Belgian partisans, based in forests, abandoned mines, relying on the active help of the underground, intensified their combat activities. In some Belgian partisan detachments there were also Soviet citizens who fled from the Nazi death camps. So, in the partisan detachment "Free Belgium" operating southwest of Brussels there were 14 Soviet citizens who fled to Belgium from hard labor in Germany in early January 1944. The Belgian workers, who were approached by the fugitives, hid them in abandoned mines, then tied them up with the partisans. There was a Pole in the partisan detachment who knew French and Russian well. He gave French lessons to Soviet citizens. After 12 days, 7 people dressed in German uniforms came to the mine where 14 Soviet citizens were hiding. Seeing the frightened fugitives, one of the visitors said in Russian: "Don't be afraid! Everyone is here." Then he

asked who owns what weapons, and was there anyone in the Soviet partisan detachments? Nobody has been before. Those who came gave everyone a pistol and 2 pieces of home-made grenades, and explained how they should be used. Then the group, together with those who came, went into the forest to the location of the partisan detachment. Soviet citizens walked with hidden weapons, as if under escort. On the way, when approaching one small bridge, the group was stopped by a sentry. One of the partisans, dressed in the uniform of the enemy, said that they were leading the bandits they had caught. The sentry blew his whistle. Three more police officers responded to his call and demanded a "pass", but apparently no one knew him. The first to break the negotiations were the Belgian partisans, who, together with the Russians, suddenly rushed to attack the enemy. The sentry and the three police officers who came out were killed. The partisans ran across the bridge and disappeared into the darkness before the policemen who were in the guardhouse could open fire.

The fire of the police alarmed the enemy garrison in the nearest settlements and white rockets appeared in the air above them. However, the partisans, apparently already accustomed to the nervousness of the invaders and traitors, carefully moving along the roads and paths known to them, they went to the location of the detachment, where the Soviet people were warmly received.

The detachment was located in small forests, often changing their bases. All materiel, with the exception of those that people could not carry with them, the partisans hid in secret warehouses.

A few days later, a group of Soviet partisans participated in a raid on a power plant. and in its destruction.

In the second half of March, the detachment began preparations for the destruction of a heavily guarded important for the enemy railway bridge across the canal near Mons.

The command decided to make a sudden raid on this bridge by a motorized detachment, using for this purpose captured cars, motorcycles and the partisans' own bicycles in the detachment. It should be noted that the possibilities of using captured vehicles by the partisans were limited not only by the enemy's measures to protect roads and settlements, but also by fuel and lubricants, therefore, in preparation for the operation, the partisans accumulated fuel and lubricants for a long time. To capture and destroy the bridge, the following were prepared: an assault group of 60 people, a subversive group of 20 people and a combat support group of 40 people. The detachment was in a straight line 20 km from the bridge, but taking into account the detour of large settlements, it was necessary to drive about 40 km in one direction. The walking distance was over 30 km. The route ran through a densely populated area and it was impossible for a large detachment to stop unnoticed for a day. To deliver people to the facility, it was decided to use three trucks, two cars, 8 motorcycles, 3 of them with sidecars that could accommodate up to 85 people, the remaining 35 people were to ride bicycles towed outside the settlements by cars. For the convenience of towing, a rigid pairing of bicycles was used. For three days, the groups worked out the issues of movement, the fulfillment by each group of their tasks of capturing and destroying the bridge, combat support and interaction.

At 21.00 on 26.3.44, the consolidated detachment left to complete the task. All people on motorcycles and bicycles were dressed in enemy uniforms. The column of the detachment, having entered the highway, stopped and turned into an ambush in order to capture the language, since it was risky to pass through checkpoints, which were usually located in settlements and on guarded bridges, without knowing the pass-password. Traffic on the roads, especially at night, was sparse and the guerrillas had to wait in ambush for about 40 minutes until they saw the lights of two motorcycles. When the motorcyclists caught up with the column, they were stopped and silently disarmed. At first, they did not even suspect that they were among the partisans, and when they were asked for the password, they quickly answered and were about to leave, but the detachment commander told them that the password was invalid. They began to prove its validity and presented documents. The motorcyclists turned out to be Belgian fascists who were in the service of the Nazi invaders. Now the partisans had a password, and even two genuine documents. This got them out of trouble at the checkpoints. But even in the presence of a password, the detachment commander preferred not to drive into such settlements where there were strong enemy garrisons, but to go around them.

At about 24:00, the partisan column turned aside from the highway and soon stopped under the trees growing along the canal. The cars were deployed so that you could immediately go to the highway. A piercing northeast wind was blowing. But the partisans did not notice the cold, preparing to attack the bridge. Soon the partisans saw in the distance a train moving at high speed, but with barely noticeable headlights. There was no traffic on the highway.

The difficulty of capturing the bridge lay in the fact that the approaches to it were covered by firing points located behind barbed wire, which the partisans knew about from intelligence data obtained by the underground.

Leaving the cars with the drivers and one support platoon, the rest of the detachment headed for the railroad. The path on the approach to the bridge was poorly guarded and the partisans, unnoticed by anyone, went to the railway about 800 meters from the bridge. Soon the faint lights of a train appeared from the side of the bridge. When the train passed by the partisans, they, using it as cover, crossed the track to the opposite side from the guardhouse and lay down along the track, watching the bridge. The commander of the detachment decided to move along the path using trains. The next train was again oncoming, and therefore, during its movement, when it prevented the sentries from viewing the path, the partisans advanced very slightly and again lay down, preparing to use the next passing train. At about 2.30 a passing train appeared. When he caught up with the lying guerrillas, they jumped up and ran first along the berm, and then along the path following the train to the bridge. However, the sentry discovered the partisans, he fired at them, rushed to the firing point, but was struck down by the partisans. The second sentry fled. The first platoon of the assault group took possession of the bridge and one squad was located in empty firing points, which were prepared by the enemy to defend the bridge. Demomen rushed to set the charges and connect them with a detonating cord. Two other platoons of the assault group laid siege to the barracks, but failed to capture it. Partisan grenades flew off the windows, which were protected by metal mesh. The enemy from the windows and the attic fired at the attackers, as well as at the demolition workers. Under enemy fire, the demolition partisans, despite the losses, nevertheless installed the charges they had brought, ignited the incendiary pipes and retreated to the opposite side, where one of the platoons of the assault group was in ambush. The detachment commander gave the order to move away from the mined bridge, continuing to shell the barracks with machine guns. The partisans began to retreat under cover of fire. At this time, a train coming from Brussels appeared, which noticeably began to slow down. Combat guards, who were on the way, ignited the incendiary tubes of the charges installed to undermine the rails and also began to retreat to the cars. Suddenly the sky was lit up with a bright flash. The guerrillas saw the silhouette of the damaged bridge and heard the sound of an explosion and the whistle of flying fragments of the farm, which collapsed into the canal. The train stopped 1 km from the bridge and in front of it began explosions of charges installed on the side of the rails. The locomotive began to give alarm signals, green and white rockets flashed above the train. From the train they fired at an invisible enemy. The partisans, carrying away the wounded, were already approaching the cars. When the main part approached the vehicles, the rest of the partisans were already on the opposite bank, who took off their clothes and, having no means of crossing, were preparing to swim across the canal. The crossing delayed the partisans for about five minutes. However, a combat support platoon on bicycles had already reached the fork in the road to secure the path for the convoy. The wounded were put into trucks and cars, the wet comrades were given dry clothes, taking them off. The enemy did not pursue the partisans, but heavily fired at the approaches to the track, where the charges exploded, which undermined the rails. This cannonade and shooting silenced the noise of the engines, the partisans safely drove onto the highway and, fearing ambushes, headed to the base by a different route and arrived there without any special incidents. The task was completed - the bridge farm was destroyed and rail traffic was interrupted, but the partisans suffered heavy losses: 16 people fell in battle with the enemy on the battlefield, 7 people died of wounds during transportation and 3 people died of wounds in the detachment, 17 people were treated in the partisan underground for a long time.

The destruction of the bridge caused a new rise in the activity of the partisans and the underground, forcing the enemy to use even more forces to protect communication lines and artificial structures.

Significant losses of the partisans are explained by the presence of nets against grenades in the windows of the barracks, which the partisans were not aware of. Strong metal nets saved the enemy garrison from being destroyed by grenades, which not only did not cause damage to the enemy, but, bouncing off the windows, on the contrary, caused damage to the partisans themselves. It should be noted that, despite the lengthy preparation, the issues of the return of groups that crossed to the opposite bank were not worked out. The plan provided for the destruction of the enemy garrison and the return of the miners through the bridge before its destruction, but the surviving enemy garrison by fire forced the partisans to refuse to return across the bridge.

Under these conditions, it would be advisable to destroy the enemy who had settled in the barracks the enemy to use shaped charges to blind him, smoke bombs.

Approximately half a month after the destruction of the bridge, the enemy, with forces of more than two infantry regiments, surrounded the forest, in which there were up to 900 partisans, and began to comb it. The partisans withdrew, suffering losses. The command of the partisans, before the enemy created a dense ring of encirclement, managed to send messengers to neighboring detachments. After two days of stubborn fighting, when the partisans were already running out of ammunition, two other detachments arrived to help them, who, using the form and password of the enemy, suddenly attacked him from the rear at night.

The unexpected partisan attack was stunning for the enemy units and they hurried out of the forests.

The retreat of the enemy took place in the second half of the night. Panic arose in the ranks of the enemy units. The partisans found on the battlefield 42 enemy soldiers they had killed, 26 people were captured. At the same time, rich trophies were captured: 12 cars, 7 motorcycles, 27 horses, 30 machine guns, over 100 machine guns and rifles, and about 120,000 rounds of ammunition. Soviet citizens who joined the partisan detachment in January 1944 also took part in this battle.

The decisive role in the defeat of the punitive units was played by the courage of the partisans, the mutual assistance of neighboring units, which arrived at the battlefield on motorcycles and bicycles and suddenly attacked the enemy from the rear.

It should be noted the skillful use by the Belgian partisans of the form and passwords of the enemy.

The success of the fighting of the Belgian and other partisans of Western European countries is largely due to the fact that the most combat-ready enemy troops were diverted by the Soviet Army on the Eastern Front.

Chapter 4

It was part of the 454th Infantry Division.

On the afternoon of January 19, 1944, the formation crossed the Rivne-Lviv railway through the Mirogoshcha station. The guards of the station, not accepting the battle, fled. When the tail of the column crossed the tracks, several German tanks approached the station, aircraft appeared in the air, but it was too late - the column had already safely entered the hilly small forests near Kremenets.

Later, the unit fought strong and continuous battles with nationalists and German troops in the area of Kunev, Ostrog, Verkhobuzh, Zalosya and Zlochev. In these areas, the unit was continuously attacked by the enemy from the air and on the ground.

By April 1944, the formation went to the foothills of the Carpathians, the Kosuv-Mykulychyn region, with the task of passing through the Carpathians to the Borislav-Drohobych region.

Before that, - writes Shukaev (the author of the notes), - neither I, nor my comrades - none of us was in the Carpathians and, of course, imagined gray inhospitable mountains, and not as we saw them. Especially at the first halts, the Carpathians seemed to us harsh with constantly floating shaggy clouds, when our formation was on Mount Chord, in the Mykulychyn region.

After several days of staying in the Carpathians, - Shukaev says further, - we completely ran out of food. The convoy, which the formation had, was left on the plain to connect with the Red Army. We took about 200 horses under the packs, died of hunger, fell off the mountains on the move and flew down along with the packs. The villages that were close to us were all encircled by the enemy.

From hunger among the morally unstable partisans and even among some low-ranking commanders, discontent grew more and more. Some said out loud: "Where did they take us?" Indeed, the situation was very difficult. All around lay snow 50-70 centimeters deep. Desertions have begun. Fear of hunger and the lack of prospects for improving the situation in the near future more and more gripped the entire compound every day. I, - writes Shukaev, - sat for a long time over the map and looked for a solution that would preserve the main forces of the formation and achieve the goal set by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and General Strokach - to withdraw the formation in the Borislav-Drohobych region. On May 10, almost all the horses taken with us were eaten by people.

The partisans looked for a long time in the direction where the plain was visible. On this day, - Shukaev continues, - the following conversation took place between me and my deputy major Gladilin: "What do you think, - I asked Gladilin, - will we pass through the Carpathians or not?" The major was silent for a minute, then, sighing heavily, he got up and said resolutely: "Of course, we must go through." How to get through and where to get through, Gladilin did not say. For which I was ready to kiss him. Now it was clear to me that I had like-minded people, although the vast majority of the partisans were silent.

By the evening of the same date, I ordered all the personnel of the formation to line up and before formation (moreover, hungry formation) I made a big speech.

I spoke a lot, urging people not to lose heart, to remember the Motherland. The last words of my speech turned into a simple command: "Comrades, I am moving further along the Carpathians," I said, "whoever can go with me remains in place, whoever cannot go, get out of line!"

Leaning on a stick, with a bandaged arm that had not yet healed from a wound in battles with the Germans near Krutaya, I went around the formation and carefully looked at the people, and everyone stood silently with stern and even some kind of tense faces.

I turned all the partisans who had fallen out of line to face those who remained in place, and made another short speech. "Those who agree to go through the Carpathians to fulfill the order of the Party and the Motherland are true partisans," I said, "these are people who can endure all sorts of temporary hardships: hunger and cold.

Those who failed, I called people who accidentally fell into the partisans, cowards.

After my second speech, many partisans who did not want to go further along the Carpathians, ran to those who were willing to move on.

People who finally refused to go further along the Carpathians, I subjected each to a personal examination. As a result of such an inspection, I returned many partisans to the line, which was supposed to go with me.

The really feeble and weak, sick and completely emaciated from hunger, I expelled to join with units of the Red Army, for which I appointed a good command staff capable of leading people to join with it.

In the exceptionally difficult conditions of the mountainous terrain, with the complete absence of bread, they ate horses recaptured from the enemy in an ambush on highways.

Not far from Mykulychyn, we managed to recapture several tons of potatoes from the enemy, these potatoes were divided among the partisans in equal parts, regardless of rank. After sharing, people immediately destroyed the resulting potatoes: some cooked, and some just ate raw.

Our march through the Carpathians was slow. Sometimes the connection was only 4-5 km per day. All trails and mountain roads were covered with snow. Those who walked in front, paving the way for everyone, changed every 20-30 minutes, some could not stand even these 20 minutes and fell. The column went only one at a time with long sticks in their hands, which facilitated stability especially for the weak. They often rolled down the mountain and broke their heads, faces and hands.

From the horses that we took with us to the Carpathians, by the end of the march, only two remained.

Only on May 23, that is, a month later, the unit reached the Borislav-Drogobych region and spread its camp on Mount Chernaya Gora. In just a month, the formation covered 250 kilometers through the Carpathians. After a short rest, the unit began active combat operations, while simultaneously receiving landings from organized partisan groups at its base.

It should be noted that there were absolutely no partisans at the time when we arrived in the Borislav region. But there were many gangs of nationalists with whom we had to fight.

During the two months of deployment of the unit in the Borislav region, partisans blew up 8 different factories, burned 104 oil derricks, burned about 10,000 tons of fuel, derailed 40 military echelons, while about 600 wagons and 31 locomotives were broken. 18 bridges were blown up, many small enemy garrisons were defeated.

During this period, the formation was subjected to complete encirclement three times and each time with little or no losses left the encirclement, inflicting great damage to the enemy in manpower and equipment.

In August of the same year, the formation entered the territory of Poland in the Sanok-Turk region, and later on the territory of Hungary. On August 26, it crossed the Czechoslovak border at Medzilabo and entered the Stropkov area.

Along the entire border of Czechoslovakia with Poland, troops were stationed, the personnel of which consisted from Slovaks under the command of German generals and officers.

After some negotiations with the Slovak officers, two companies of soldiers under the command of Vladislav Kovacs and Lieutenant Bersky came over to our side with full armament.

Later, many Slovak units came over to our side, the numerical strength of which was about 4,000 people. This large group came over to our side under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jan Strelka and Captain Kielczyk.

All the villages adjacent to Stropkov and Humenna were occupied by partisans, all important roads, both railways and highways, were controlled.

From the soldiers and officers of the Slovak Army who came over to our side, I formed 12 partisan brigades, which were part of the formation of partisan detachments named after Stalin. The number of units in Slovakia reached 6,000 people. Formed 145

Slovak partisan brigades were commanded by Slovak officers and Soviet commissars under the overall command of the headquarters of the formation. Stalin.

Particularly noteworthy is the active participation in the leadership of the partisan movement in Slovakia of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who, through his party organizations, expanded the partisan movement throughout the territory of Czechoslovakia, provided systematic and daily assistance to the partisans up to financing.

The joint struggle against the common enemy of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet partisans continued for six months, during these six months many of the Russians mastered the Slovak language, the attitude towards our partisans was exceptionally good. Very many residents of the Czech Republic and Slovakia were our residents and reported valuable information about the enemy.

During the stay of the compound on the territory of Slovakia, he had to visit the low and high Tatras.

With the onset of winter, many Slovak soldiers could hardly endure hardships and trials.

On the territory of Slovakia, the formation defeated many enemy garrisons, derailed 31 military echelons, blew up 24 bridges, including the bridge on the Tisovets-Brezno railway, which had not been in operation for about a month, destroyed 23 aircraft at the airfield, blown up the iron foundry in Tisovets, produced many other hostilities.

On February 26, 1945, in the Spisska Novo-es region of Czechoslovakia, a partisan formation detachments came out of the rear of the enemy and connected with units of the Red Army.

Thus, during the stay behind enemy lines, i.e., from July 18, 1943 to February 26, 1945, in the combat log of the formation of partisan detachments named after. Stalin, the following is entered:

1. 206 military echelons were derailed 2. 500 different vehicles were knocked out and destroyed. 3. Motorcycles 47 pcs. 4. Aircraft 24 pcs. 5. Blown up factories 9 pcs. 6. Oil rigs burned 104 pcs. 7. 84 different bridges were blown up. 8. 10,000 tons of fuel burned. 9. 6 tanks and transporters destroyed. 10. Total sabotage carried out 803 11. Attacks on garrisons carried out 58 12. Radiograms sent to the mainland with intelligence and other additional information. 1500 pcs.

There were 22 nationalities (partisans) in the compound, including the French, Poles, Hungarians, Spaniards, etc., and everyone in it fought for a single cause - the destruction of fascism.

In addition, about the role of leaders: according to my experience of military operations behind enemy lines, I can name General T.A. Strokach, who, understanding what a partisan movement is, gave it all his strength. But such a leader as General Andreev, occupying the post of chief of staff in the second half of 1944, made a number of mistakes, which resulted in the insufficient sabotage activity of our partisans in Czechoslovakia.

Lieutenant Colonel Shukaev.

March 25, 1948.

Chapter 5

means of communication

The partisan formation, commanded by the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General M.I. Naumov, repeatedly made raids and rapid transitions behind enemy lines. At the same time, the partisans skillfully changed the direction of movement and used other measures of camouflage and misleading the enemy. As a result, the enemy usually found out about the presence of partisans at one point or another only in the afternoon, and sometimes even after they left there.

During sudden raids on garrisons and various enemy targets, partisans often fell into the hands of serviceable means of telephone and radio communications, which they skillfully used to obtain intelligence data, mislead the enemy and defeat his subunits and units.

So, for example, on March 8, 1943, the unit, which by this time numbered about 700 partisans, made a swift night march and on the 9th a sudden raid from the move

captured the village of Krymki. The garrison, which consisted of a small police detachment, was killed by the partisans, capturing several policemen.

Single shots did not attract the attention of the enemy garrisons located in neighboring villages, since single shooting was a common occurrence behind enemy lines: enemy soldiers and policemen often started shooting drunk, for the sake of bragging, and often to intimidate the local population and partisans.

Thanks to initiative and decisive actions, the partisans captured the police building so quickly that the enemy did not have time to inform the neighboring garrisons about the attack by telephone. The phone turned out to be in good order and the commander decided to use it to mislead the enemy and defeat his units with an ambush attack.

To negotiate with the enemy, the partisans needed a policeman who would be known in neighboring garrisons. The head of the police detachment and his assistant were killed during the capture of the village. However, among the prisoners was a policeman, often on duty at the telephone. Many of the commandants and duty officers of the neighboring garrisons, including the garrison of the village of Aleksandrovka, where the district commandant's office was located and a large enemy garrison was located, knew him both by his last name and by his voice.

Under the threat of being shot, the policeman quickly agreed to talk on the phone in the interests of the partisans. He was instructed how to answer calls and, in addition, a second handset was attached to the telephone set to control him and the conversation. The unit commander ordered to set up small outposts at all exits from the village, and send secrets to hidden approaches, not let anyone out of the village, and also detain all those entering the village and send them to the head of intelligence of the unit.

The partisan unit was located in the village in detachments. In order to disguise the horses, they put them in barns, stables and under sheds. Unnecessary walking around the village was banned, and the patrols sat on the rubble and on benches near the huts. From the side it was impossible to assume that there was a whole partisan formation in the village.

During the night, the enemy behaved calmly - there were no phone calls. The partisans, with the help of a policeman, called three neighboring garrisons, past which the unit passed before the raid on Krymki, and asked if the partisans had appeared there. The enemy did not know anything about the formation passing by him. This circumstance greatly favored the partisans in carrying out their plan.

At about 11 am, the commandant from Alexandrovka called Krymki and demanded the commander of the police detachment to the phone. The policeman, at the direction of the commander of the partisan formation, reported to the commandant that it was calm in the village, and the commander of the police detachment went with a group of policemen to a neighboring village, where, allegedly, several suspicious persons appeared. The commandant praised the initiative of the chief of police and ordered to hand over to him upon his return - to prepare premises for quartering in Krymki by 17.00 of the company of the security battalion. Upon the arrival of the company in Krymki, the police officers will be subordinate to its commander, who is appointed head of the Krymki garrison. In addition, the commandant reported that, according to information he had, a partisan detachment had passed in the direction of the village of Krymki. He ordered to increase vigilance and report immediately by telephone when partisans appear. This conversation was very helpful, as it saved the partisans from having to call Alexandrovka themselves in order to "lure" the enemy out of there.

The commander of the partisan unit instructed the defeat of the fascists arriving in Krymki to the detachments named after N.S. Khrushchev and "Chervony", on his instructions, on the northern and northwestern outskirts of the village, from where the enemy could approach from Aleksandrovka, set up an ambush at 16. Soon, on the road leading to the northern outskirts, where the partisans were in ambush, a convoy of about 20 carts appeared. Traitors rode ahead in a good britzka drawn by a pair of well-fed horses, about 80 Nazis were sitting on the carts. Considering that there were policemen in the village, they rode calmly, although they observed security measures, sending forward policemen from among the local traitors.

Well-camouflaged partisans let the police cart through. When the convoy of the Nazis caught up with the ambush, he came under sudden fire. After a fire attack, the partisans attacked the enemy. The Nazis rushed about in confusion and could not offer any organized resistance, and the entire company of the Nazis was destroyed.

The partisans picked up weapons, took the documents of the dead, seized ammunition, food and uniforms.

Thus, thanks to the skillful use of communications equipment captured from the enemy, the partisans defeated an entire unit without losses on their part (except for three lightly wounded) and at the same time did not reveal themselves prematurely. xxx

A few days later, a detachment of them. Kirov of this compound was occupied at night by the village named after Kotovsky.

There was a working telephone in the elder's house. The commander of the detachment, Shebetun, decided to eavesdrop on telephone conversations in order to obtain new intelligence information about the enemy and the situation in the area. During the night, the enemy almost did not talk, and eavesdropping did not give anything of value, except for a few conversations, from which it became clear that the enemy did not yet know about the occupation of the village by the partisan detachment. Kotovsky.

The detachment commander immediately appreciated this and decided to use the presence of communications to capture languages. He ordered the arrested headman to be brought to him and ordered him to call the village of Miropolye, ask the gebits commissar to the phone, report that the bread collected from the peasants in the barns began to deteriorate and ask him to send a representative for verification. The headman complied with the order, and the gebits commissar promised that the representatives would arrive soon.

By this time, the partisans had already loaded part of the bread onto carts, and the rest distributed to the population.

Not even an hour had passed before the gebits-commissar himself rolled into the village in two chaises with two of his assistants, an interpreter and a bodyguard of four policemen.

Partisan patrols on the outskirts of the village let the unsuspecting fascists pass unhindered to the barns in the center of the village, where they were captured by an ambush set by the detachment commander without firing a shot.

In the hands of the partisans, thanks to the initiative and skillful use of communications, valuable "languages" were found, which represented the entire administration of the district.

CONCLUSION

The feat of the people

In the previous chapters of the book, we had to talk mainly about missed opportunities in the partisan-sabotage war in the rear of the Wehrmacht. Alas, all this was: intrigues in the leadership of the partisan struggle, and zigzags, and underestimations. The fact that we, after more than half a century, have to talk about all this is our misfortune. The real history was so redrawn by Stalin's "chroniclers" that even now, in the public consciousness, and in historiography, a certain mythological image of the Great Patriotic War is preserved. Shedding light on the real facts and events of those years is, no doubt, a noble and necessary thing. However, the restoration of historical truth is a gradual and unhurried matter. It should be realized that with such a huge amount of lies - which we see in the Stalinist falsified history of our Motherland, when at times it is completely incomprehensible where the truth is and where it is not, the work of restoring real historical events should be extremely careful. After all, you can throw out the baby with water. Unfortunately, the eternal radicalism of our society has played its negative role here as well. With the collapse of the country, a cloudy stream of revelations poured on the reader (often falsifications that were cleaner than Stalin's); there was no need to talk about any careful attitude to history. And the most negative role played by these "revelations of Stalin's crimes" is the complete oblivion of the great historical role of the Soviet people (by which we mean all the peoples who lived on the territory of the Soviet Union), thanks to which victory in the battle with Nazi Germany became possible.

After all that I have told about the leadership of the guerrilla war and about the attitude of the leaders of the Stalinist training towards our saboteur partisans, it is impossible not to feel the moral need to tell about the great feat of the people in the struggle behind enemy lines, on our "second front", which contributed equally with the efforts of the allies, to achieve victory over fascism.

The main damage to the enemy in the guerrilla war was caused by specially trained formations that used sabotage equipment. But it should be noted that these formations carried out the tasks assigned to them to some extent and thanks to popular assistance and support. Soviet people who found themselves in the occupied territories, directly helping the partisans, risked much more than they did. The partisans hit, inflicted damage on the enemy - and left, but these people remained and, often, fell under the retaliatory strike of the punitive fascist detachments.

Local residents often supplied the partisans with food, providing them with shelter and shelter, and in the first year of the war they even obtained weapons for the partisans on the battlefields, i.e., in essence, they did the same for the partisans as military supplies for the soldiers of the Red Army. The Germans quite reasonably considered such people to be the same partisans as those who directly fought the hostilities - and dealt with them accordingly. Stalin, apparently, did not think so - after all, after the war, only a few such Soviet patriots who helped the partisans, risking their lives, received a partisan medal. This is hardly

can be considered fair. However, as I said, after the war, there was little justice for the partisans in general.

The guerrilla struggle in the Great Patriotic War in 1943 reached nationwide proportions. It was attended not only by those who ended up in the occupied territory, but also by volunteers from the non-occupied territories: Leningraders, Muscovites, Siberians and Urals. Among them, I would like to mention such as Grigory Matveevich Linkov, Ovid Aleksandrovich Gorchakov, Nina Vasilievna Moliy, Vasily Antonovich Bratus, who embarked on the path of partisan struggle, although their native places were never occupied by the enemy. But the main feature of this partisan war was that not only Soviet people took part in it; along with them, foreigners also took an active part in it.

First of all, these were the Spaniards, who entered the fight against fascism back in 1936, during the fascist uprising in Spain, and who, after the fall of the republic, managed to get into the Soviet Union. From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, they sought permission to fight the enemy in the Soviet armed forces, primarily in the rear of the invaders. It should be noted that the Spaniards, residents of a country with a warm climate, successfully participated in January-February 1942 in ice campaigns through the Taganrog Bay behind enemy lines, acted in Ukraine, Bryansk, in the Tver and Smolensk regions, in the North Caucasus.

I would like to note that their participation in the war has so far practically not been reflected in our press. (One can only recall Serno Roque's book "The Spaniards in Russia in 1941-1945"). Meanwhile, one of the main merits of the Spaniards in this war is that they generously shared their combat experience with our partisans. I would like to acknowledge the courage and bravery of José Vesco, Paso Sandoval Angel, Ramos del Osco, Juan Ramírez, Juan Bravo, Rafael Estrello and many others who helped train the relevant personnel in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia and actively participated in partisan actions.

On the side of the partisans, the Slovak units that had gone over to their side fought, which the pro-German Slovak government sent to the Eastern Front. Then these Slovak partisans, together with our partisans, participated in the Slovak National Uprising. The Hungarians and even some of the Germans went over to the partisans.

Many people successfully waged guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. The path of many of them to partisans was difficult. Some, in order to survive, first entered the police formations and other traitorous organizations, and then went over to the side of the partisans. In this regard, the example of Gil-Rodionov is very indicative. On August 16, 1943, the so-called "Russian National People's Army" under the command of Vladimir Vladimirovich Gil-Rodionov, formed by the Germans from prisoners of war, passed to the partisans. This formation was called the Anti-Fascist Partisan Brigade and operated successfully until 1944, when it joined forces with the Red Army. Commissar of the brigade I.M. Timchuk in January 1944 was even awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Here we are faced with a rather important issue, which, as I know, worries many. It can be formulated as follows: if the actions of the partisans often led to the extermination of the civilian population by the Nazis, then to what extent was their necessity justified? It would be foolish to sidestep this issue by pretending it doesn't exist. Let's try to find the answer.

Fighter part of the war was planned in advance. Numerous documents of the pre-war period convincingly testify to this. So, on March 30, 1941, at a meeting of the top generals of the Wehrmacht, Hitler declared that in the war against the USSR the struggle would be waged "to annihilate", that it would be a war of extermination in the full sense of the word. Documents such as the "Ost General Plan", "Instruction on Special Areas to Directive No. 21", dated March 13, 1941, "On Military Jurisdiction in the Barbarossa Area and Special Powers of the Troops" dated May 13, 1941, "The Twelve Commandments of the Conduct of Germans in the East and Their Treatment of Russians", dated June 1, 1941, and a number of others, elevated atrocities against the civilian population to the rank of state policy.

I cited this rather lengthy quote only to remind many who have forgotten what the Nazis were going to do in the occupied territories. Now this issue is somehow ignored, focusing mainly on Stalin's crimes. And this, in turn, leads to the emergence of neo-Nazi and openly fascist groups and organizations in our country. "What is Hitler to us," their ideologists say, "when Stalin repressed many more people. And nothing, the state was strong." Oh no, my dears. First, Stalin's crimes led directly to the present deplorable situation in the country; we can say that time bombs set by Stalin are now exploding. Secondly, if you look at how many years Stalin was in power, and how many - Hitler, count their victims and carry out a simple arithmetic operation - divide the number of repressed by the time, then we will see that under Stalin there was not and could not be such an orgy of destruction people, what

was going on in Nazi Germany and in the territories it occupied. Stalin, of course, was not a meek lamb, but he still falls short of Hitler.

The extermination and deportation of the civilian population to hard labor by the Nazis would have begun regardless of the actions of the partisans. On the contrary, quite often it was the partisans who saved the Soviet people from the fascist warriors. Another thing is that sometimes the actions of partisans really entailed repressions against the population. However, such a reaction of the Nazis was characteristic primarily of single terrorist acts against prominent representatives of the occupation administration. This, no doubt, was unacceptable. Only when carrying out simultaneous optimally planned large-scale guerrilla operations did the enemy lose any opportunity to take out his anger on the defenseless population, since he was forced to go on the defensive.

And although the guerrilla war really contributed to the large losses of peaceful population, but these victims were justified by the salvation from the destruction of millions of people.

It should also be noted here that the training of qualified cadres of partisan saboteurs would be simply impossible without the presence of a large number of volunteers who wanted to beat the enemy in his own rear.

Without broad selfless popular support, guerrilla warfare could hardly have played such a role in achieving the Great Victory as it did. This, as in a mirror, reflected one of the main historical conclusions made by the last world war: it is not governments or state structures that win wars, as ideology drummed into us, but peoples who defend their own independence win.

Unfortunately, now people often forget about the great feat accomplished by our people, which cost a lot of effort and sacrifice, and this is our national tragedy. To remember this is our duty to ourselves, and I sincerely hope that this book will help at least some to remember this, as well as the fact that victory was not predetermined.

After all, without the memory of the past, there is no future.

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* In 2001, Pavel Lipin lived in St. Petersburg.

* On the day of the centenary, Ilya Grigorievich was awarded the Order "For Merit to the Fatherland" IV degree. I don't know what "grandfather" felt at that moment, but we (people who knew and loved him, took it as a slap in the face.

* This section was dictated by Ilya Grigorievich at the end of June 2000 at the request of his friends. Recorded by M.P. Filyakov.

* **TROTSKY (real name Bronstein) Lev Davydovich** (1879-1940), politician. From 1896 he participated in the social democratic movement, from 1904 he advocated the unification of the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. In 1905 he developed the theory of permanent revolution. During the Revolution of 1905 - 1907 he actually headed the St. Petersburg Council of Workers' Deputies. From July 1917 (Bolshevik. One of the leaders of the October armed uprising. In 1917-1918 - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; in 1918 - 1925 People's Commissar for Military Affairs, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. One of the founders of the Red Army. Trotsky's struggle with Stalin for leadership in the party In 1925, he was released from work in the Revolutionary Military Council, removed from the Politburo in 1926, expelled from the party in 1927. Exiled to Alma-Ata, and in 1929 - abroad.

* **VOROSHILO Kliment Efremovich** (1881-1869), Soviet party, statesman and military leader, marshal (1935), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1956, 1968). Hero of the MNR. Member of three revolutions. One of the organizers and leaders of the Soviet Army. Since 1917, the commissar of Petrograd, together with F.E. Dzerzhinsky led the work on the organization of the Cheka. In March 1918, he led the creation of the 5th Ukrainian Army and directed its combat operations. Commander of the Tsaritsyn Group of Forces. From November 1918 People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, commander of the troops of the Kharkov Military District. In 1919 he led the defense of Yekaterinoslav and Kyiv. In 1919-1921 one of the organizers and a member of the RS. In 1921 he participated in the liquidation of the Kronstadt rebellion. In 1921-1925 commander of the North Caucasian and Moscow military districts. In 1925 - 1934 People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the RS of the USSR. In 1934-1940 - People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. During the Great Patriotic War - a member of the State Defense Committee, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the commander of the Leningrad Front, the commander-in-chief of the partisan movement.

* **KALININ Mikhail Ivanovich** (1875-1946), Soviet statesman. Member of the St. Petersburg party Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Agent of the Iskra newspaper. One of the organizers of the Putilov workers' strike. Member of the February and October revolutions. Since 1919 - Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In 1922 - Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Since 1938 - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council. During the Great Patriotic War, he was engaged in the preparation of reserves for the Soviet Army, the evacuation of industrial enterprises.

* **MAKHNO Nestor Ivanovich** (1889-1934), one of the representatives of the popular movement in Ukraine during the Civil War. In 1919-1920, Makhno entered into an agreement with the Soviet government three times and violated it three times. In 1921, his formations were defeated by Soviet troops. In 1921 he emigrated. entered into an agreement with the Soviet government three times and violated it three times. In 1921, his formations were defeated by Soviet troops. In 1921 he emigrated.

* **KARBISHE Dmitry Mikhailovich** (1880-1945), military engineer, lieutenant general of engineering troops (1940), doctor of military sciences. Participated in the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War. Supervised the construction of the fortifications of the Brest Fortress. In 1917 he joined the Red Army. From 1926 he taught at a number of military academies. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, during an inspection trip to the Grodno region, he was surrounded, was seriously shell-shocked, captured, tortured to death in the Mauthausen camp.

* **BEKAURI Vladimir Ivanovich (1882 - 1938)**, famous inventor.

Graduated with honors from the Transcaucasian Mikhailovsky Railway School. One of his first inventions back in 1905 was a cannon, built by him from a pipe for draining kerosene. It was intended to protect participants in revolutionary uprisings. From the persecution of the tsarist gendarmes, the young engineer left for Siberia, where he met his life partner, got married and moved to St. Petersburg. The Soviet government recognized the talent of the inventor. His work in the field of electrical engineering and precision mechanics was unique for those times. V.I. was invited. Lenin, who signed a decree stating that "as a matter of urgency, his, Bekauri's, inventions of a military secret nature" are to be sold. One of the founders and chief designer of the Ostekhbyuro (Special Technical Bureau for Special Purpose Military Inventions). This organization has played an exceptional role in strengthening the defense of the country. In January 1923, the Ostekhbyuro began to develop radio control of explosions. The most prominent specialists were involved in the work, a stationary radio station was equipped ... In 1925, the first tests of a model of the installation took place in the Rowing Port of Leningrad. They were attended by the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, M. V. Frunze. The explosion control unit was located on the Mikula minesweeper and operated from a 25-kilometer distance. On subsequent successful experiments, K.E. Voroshilov, M.N. Tukhachevsky, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, M.I. Kalinin... Four years of hard work paid off. In 1929, the new military equipment entered service with the Red Army. During the described period, he was engaged in the development of radio-controlled torpedo boats. In 1932, "inventor Bekauri was awarded the Order of the Red Star for exceptional dedication, energy and enthusiasm in strengthening the country's defense capability."

After Stalin saw the Ostekhburo as a "center of counter-revolution", the team was disbanded. Everything created by the titanic labor and talent of the chief designer was destroyed, and forty leading specialists shared his fate.

* **YAKIR Iona Emmanuilovich** (1896-1937), commander of the 1st rank (1935). During the civil war, commander of the Red Guard detachment, commissar of the rifle brigade, head of the political department of the Southern Section of the curtain detachments, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 8th Army. In 1919-1920 he was the head of a rifle division, commanded the Southern Group of Forces of the 12th Army, the Fastovskaya, Zlochevskaya, Lvovskaya Group of Forces and the 14th Army. After the war, he commanded the troops of the Crimean region, the Kyiv Military District. Since 1923 - commander and commissar of the rifle corps, head of the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army, commander of the Ukrainian Military District. In 1930-1934 he was a member of the RS of the USSR.

* **BUKHARIN Nikolai Ivanovich** (1888-1938), politician. Member of the Revolutions of 1905-1907 and October 1917. Member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party in 1917-1934. In 1917-1918 - the leader of the "Left Communists". He opposed the conclusion of a separate Brest-Litovsk peace with Germany. In 1918-1929 he was the editor of the Pravda newspaper. In 1924-1929 he was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party; in 1919-1929 member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. In 1934-1937 he was the editor of Izvestia. At the end of the 1920s, he opposed the line of I.V. Stalin on the use of emergency measures during collectivization and industrialization, which was regarded as a "right deviation".

* **BERZIN (Berzin) Jan Karlovich** (1889-1938). The real name and surname is Kyuzis Peteris. Participated in the revolution of 1905-1907, the February and October revolutions of 1917. During the Civil War - the head of the political department of the division and the head of the special department of the army. Since 1921 in the intelligence department of the Red Army. In 1924-1935, 1937 - head of the intelligence department. In 1936-1937 - chief military adviser to the Republican army in Spain. Peteris. Participated in the revolution of 1905-1907, the February and October revolutions of 1917. During the Civil War - the head of the political department of the division and the head of the special department of the army. Since 1921 in the intelligence department of the Red Army. In 1924-1935, 1937 - head of the intelligence department. In 1936-1937 - chief military adviser to the Republican army in Spain.

* **KAGANOICH Lazar Moiseevich** (1893-1991), statesman and politician. In 1935-1944 People's Commissar of Railways. In 1930-1957 - member of the Politburo, Hero of Socialist Labor (1943). In 1942-1945 he was a member of the GKO, the Military Council of the North Caucasian (summer 1943) and Transcaucasian (1942-1943) fronts. He was responsible for the transport of goods, as well as the work of military tribunals and detachments. Since 1944 - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

* This position of the leadership led to the actual death of the partisan movement in the Crimea.

* **STALIN (Dzhugashvili) Joseph Vissarionovich** (pseudonym - Koba and others) (1878 - 1953). After graduating from the Gori Theological School (1894), he studied at the Tiflis Theological Seminary (expelled in 1899). In 1898 he joined the Georgian Social Democratic organization Mesame Dasi. After 1903 he joined the Bolsheviks. Supporter of V.I. Lenin, on whose initiative in 1912 he was co-opted to the Central Committee and the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee (RSDLP). In 1917 he was a member of the editorial board of the Pravda newspaper. In 1917 - 1922 People's Commissar for Nationalities. In 1922 - 53 General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. In the 20s. in the course of the struggle for leadership in the party and the state, using the party apparatus, he led the party and established a totalitarian regime in the country. In the late 1920s and 1930s, Stalin destroyed real and alleged rivals. From 1941 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of the USSR, in the years 164

war chairman of the State Defense Committee, People's Commissar of Defense, Supreme Commander. During the war years, he went on to create an anti-Hitler coalition; after the end of the war contributed to the development of the Cold War. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956) N.S. Khrushchev sharply criticized Stalin's so-called personality cult. sharply criticized the so-called personality cult of Stalin.

* **TUKHACHESKY Mikhail Nikolaevich** (1893-1937), Marshal of the Soviet Union. He graduated from the Alexander Military School (1914). Member of the First World War. During the Civil War - military commissar of defense of the Moscow region, commander of the 1st Army, assistant commander of the Southern Front. In 1920-1921 - commander of the Caucasian, Western fronts. Participated in the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion and Antonovshchina in the Tambov province. After 1921 - head of the Military Academy of the Red Army, 1922-1924 - commander of the Western Front. From 1925-1928 - Chief of Staff of the Red Army. From 1928 - Commander of the Leningrad Military District. Since 1931, Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, Chief of Armaments of the Red Army. Since 1936 - 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and head of the combat training department. In 1937, the commander of the troops at VO.

* **SHAPOSHNIKO Boris Mikhailovich** (1882-1945), Marshal of the Soviet Union (1940). In the Red Army since 1918. In 1928-1931 - Chief of Staff of the Red Army. In 1932-1935 he headed the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze. From July 1941 (Chief of the General Staff, member of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander (until 1945). Participated in the development of plans for the Battle of Smolensk (1941) In May 1942 (June 1943 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. In 1943-1945 - Head of the Military Academy of the General Staff. . C July 1941 - Chief of the General Staff, member of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander (until 1945). Participated in the development of plans for the Battle of Smolensk (1941) In May 1942 (June 1943 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. In 1943-1945 (Head of the Military Academy of the General Staff.

* **PALO Dmitry Grigorievich** (1897-1941), Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union (1937). In the Red Army since 1919. Since 1940 - Commander of the Belarusian Special Military District. In the early days of the war he commanded the Western Front. In July 1941 he was removed from his post. He was groundlessly accused of treason and was shot by a military tribunal.

* Ilya Grigorievich was in correspondence with Dolores Ibarruri. At the very beginning of work on the book "Notes of a Saboteur" (1995-1996), I happened to see one of her letters. Then all the letters were transferred to the archive. (Ed. note (I.K.) Ilya Grigorievich was in correspondence. At the very beginning of work on the book "Diversant's Notes" (1995-1996), I happened to see one of her letters. Then all the letters were transferred to the archive. (Note ed. - I.K.)

* **DIAS José** (1895-1942), general secretary of the Communist Party of Spain since 1932. Played a big role in the creation of the Popular Front.

* **RING Mikhail Efimovich (real name - Friedland) (1898 - 1940), journalist.** Born in Kyiv in the family of a craftsman. In 1916 he began to collaborate in the press. An active participant in the events of 1917. In 1918 he joined the RCP (b). From 1920 he lived in Moscow. In 1920 he worked in Pravda, mainly in the style of a political feuilleton. He often spoke with satirical materials and was the most famous journalist in the USSR. Founder and editor of Ogonyok, the most popular magazine in the USSR, editor of the magazine Abroad, member of the editorial board of Pravda, head of the Journal and Newspaper Association. Creator of satirical magazines "Crocodile", "Eccentric". He was closely associated with the leaders of the NKD G.G. Yagoda and N.I. Yezhov.

Since 1937 he has been a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. For some time he enjoyed the patronage of I.V. Stalin. As a correspondent for Pravda, he was sent to Spain during the Civil War; At the same time, he performed tasks in the line of state security. Based on the results of the trip, he published The Spanish Diary (1938). He participated in the campaign against the Trotskyists, accusing them, among other things, of being in the service of F. Franco (which was absolutely untrue). In August 1938 K.E. Voroshilov sent Stalin another article by Koltsov with a note: "Please see and tell me whether it is possible and necessary to print. I do not like the article." Stalin did not leave a resolution, but after that he ordered "to deal with Koltsov." He was recalled from Spain and arrested in December 1938. In February 1940 he was sentenced to death on charges of anti-Soviet and terrorist activities. Shot. In 1954 he was rehabilitated.

* **VAUPSHASO Stanislav Alekseevich** (1899-1976), Soviet intelligence officer, participant in the partisan struggle in the Great Patriotic War. Hero of the Soviet Union (1944). In the 20s-30s - in intelligence work. Member of the war of the Spanish people. In 1942-1944 - commander of a partisan detachment in the Minsk region.

* **MERETSKO Kirill Afanasyevich** (1897-1968), Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944), Hero of the Soviet Union (1940). In the Red Army since 1918. In the Soviet-Finnish war he commanded an army. In 1940 he headed the General Staff. Before the war he was repressed, but already in

January 1941 - deputy. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. During the war he commanded a number of fronts. Since 1945 - Commander of the Primorsky Group of Forces.

* **MEHLIS Lev Zakharovich** (1889-1953), Colonel General (1944). Member of the First World War. During the Civil War - the military commissar of a brigade, an infantry division and the Right-Bank Group of Forces in Ukraine. In 1921-1936 - in the Soviet and party work. Graduated from the Institute of Red Professors (1930). In 1937-1940 he was the head of the political department of the Red Army. From 1940 - People's Commissar of State Control of the USSR. During the Great Patriotic War, he was the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (until June 1942), then a member of the Military Councils of the armies of the Voronezh, Volkhov, Bryansk, 2nd Baltic, Western, 2nd Belorussian and 4th Ukrainian fronts.

* **TIMOSHENKO Semyon Konstantinovich** (1895-1970), Soviet statesman and military figure. Member of the 1st World War. In Civil - the commander of a cavalry regiment, brigade, division. He graduated from the Higher Academic Courses (1927). After the war, the commander of the cavalry corps. From 1933 deputy commander, from 1937 commander of a number of military districts. During a campaign in Western Ukraine (1839), the commander of the Ukrainian, and in 1939-1940 - the North-Eastern Front. As you know, after the Soviet-Finnish war in the winter of 1939-1940, K.E. Voroshilov was removed and replaced by S.K. Tymoshenko as People's Commissar for Defense. During the Great Patriotic War - Chairman of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. In July-September 1941 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Since July - Commander-in-Chief of the Western, South-Western direction. Since 1943 - the representative of the Stavka on the fronts.

* **BREZHNE Leonid Ilyich** (1906 - 1982), Soviet state and party leader, Marshal of the USSR (1976), four times Hero of the USSR (1966, 1976, 1978, 1981). After graduating from the Kursk land management and reclamation technical school, he worked in Belarus and Kursk, then in the Urals. In 1931 he entered the Metallurgical Institute in Dneprodzerzhinsk, while working as a mechanic at the Dnieper Metallurgical Plant. In 1935-36 in military service: political instructor of the ZabO tank company. From 1937 - Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Dneprodzerzhinsky City Council. He volunteered for the front. In 1944 he was promoted to major general. In 1950-52 - 1st Secretary of the Moldavian Central Committee. In 1955-56 - Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. Since 1956 - Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1960-64 - Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Subsequently, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

* **Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich** (1903-1950), Soviet party and statesman. Graduated from the Institute of Red Professors (1931). Since 1935 - Chairman of the City Planning Commission and Deputy Chairman of the Leningrad City Council. From 1938 - Chairman of the State Planning Committee. Since 1941 - 1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (since 1946 - the Council of Ministers). From 1942-1945 - member of the State Defense Committee.

* **Khrushchev Nikita Sergeevich** (1894-1971), Soviet statesman and party leader, lieutenant general (1943). Member of the Civil War. After 1920 - in economic and party work. In 1929 he graduated from the Industrial Academy. Since 1931 - at the party and economic work in Moscow. In 1935-38 - 1st secretary of the MK and MGK of the CPSU (b). From 1938 to 1947 - 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine. From 1944-47 he was also the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR. From December 1949 - Secretary of the Central Committee and 1st Secretary of the MK of the CPSU (b). Since 1953 - 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Released from duty in 1964.

* **STROKACH Timofei Amvrosievich** (1903-1963), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War, lieutenant general (1944). In 1919-1922 he participated in the partisan movement in the Far East. Since 1924 - served in the border troops. Since 1940 - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR. Great Patriotic War from 1942-1945 head of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement. Since 1946 - Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR. From 1956-1957 - a responsible worker of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

* **TITO Broz Josip** (1892-1980), political and military leader of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, marshal (1943). In 1915 he came to Russia as a prisoner of war. In 1917 he joined the Red Guard in Omsk and fought against Kolchak. In 1920 he returned to his homeland. In 1935-1936 he worked in Moscow and became commander in chief of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. In 1943-1945 - Chairman of the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia. In 1945-1946 - Chairman of the Provisional Government, Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander. After the war (head of Yugoslavia

* **SERCHESKY Karol** (1897-1947), statesman and military leader of Poland. One of the organizers of the Polish Army. Member of the October Revolution in Russia. From 1918 - in the Red Army. Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1927). During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) - commander of the international brigade and division (under the pseudonym General Walter). During the Great Patriotic War - the commander of a rifle division. From 1943 - deputy commander of the 1st Polish Corps. Since 1944, deputy commander of the First and Second Army of the Polish Army. Since 1946 Deputy Minister of National Defense of Poland. Killed by nationalists. (1927). During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) - commander of the international brigade and division (under the pseudonym General

Walter). During the Great Patriotic War - the commander of a rifle division. From 1943 - deputy commander of the 1st Polish Corps. Since 1944, deputy commander of the First and Second Army of the Polish Army. Since 1946 Deputy Minister of National Defense of Poland. Killed by nationalists.

* **TOGLIATTI (Togliatti) Palmiro** (1893-1964), General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party since 1926. In 1940-1944 he lived in the USSR. In 1944-1946 - a member of the Italian government.

* **UBOREICH Ieronim Petrovich** (1896-1937), commander of the 1st rank (1935). Member of the First World War, second lieutenant. During the Civil War he served in the Red Army. He commanded an army on the Southern, Caucasian and Southwestern fronts. Participated in the suppression of the Tambov peasant uprising (1921). In 1922 Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Republic. Repressed.

* **DIMITRO Georgi** (1882-1949), Bulgarian statesman and politician. In 1933 he was arrested in Berlin on charges of setting fire to the Reichstag. Acquitted at trial in Leipzig. In 1934-1945 he lived in the USSR. The initiator of the creation and leader of the Fatherland Front of Bulgaria. Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria since 1946, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party since 1948.

* **PRIMAKO Vitaly Markovich** (1897-1937), commander (1935). During the Civil War, he commanded a cavalry brigade, division and corps of the Red Cossacks. In 1925-1926 - military adviser in China, military attaché in Afghanistan and Japan. From 1935 - Commander of the Leningrad Military District. Repressed.

* **MICHAÏ Hohenzollern** (1921), King of Romania (1927-1930, 1940-1947). During the 2nd World War, King Mihai had limited power. In fact, the country was ruled by the military dictator Antonescu. The Queen Mother is Helena, born a Greek princess.

* **MALINOSKY Rodion Yakovlevich** (1898-1967), Soviet statesman and military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944). People's Hero of Yugoslavia. Member of the First World War and the Civil War. Since 1930 - chief of staff of the cavalry regiment. He worked in the headquarters of the military districts. Participated in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). From 1941 - commander of a rifle corps. From 1943 - Commander of the Southern, Southwestern, 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. From 1945 commander of the Trans-Baikal Front.

* **KONE Ivan Stepanovich** (1897-1973), Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945), Hero of Czechoslovakia, Hero of the MPR. Member of the First World War. In Civil - the commissar of an armored train, a rifle brigade, a division, the headquarters of the NRA of the DR. In 1940-1941 - Commander of the Trans-Baikal Military District. During the Great Patriotic War - Commander of the 19th Army of the Western, Kalinin, Northwestern, Steppe, 2nd and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. Since 1945 - Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces.

* **VASILESKY Alexander Mikhailovich** (1895-1977), Soviet statesman, marshal (1943), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945). Member of the First World War, the Civil War. Since 1931 - in the management of combat training of the Red Army. Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff (1937). In 1940 - Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. From August 1941 - Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (Ed. note).

* **TOLBUKHIN Fedor Ivanovich** (1894-1949), Marshal of the USSR (1944), Hero of the Soviet Union (1965). Member of the First World War. Since 1918 - in the Red Army. During the Great Patriotic War - Chief of Staff of the Transcaucasian, Caucasian and Crimean Fronts (1941-1942) From September 1944 (Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria. From 1947 - Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District.

* **SOKOLOSKY Vasily Danilovich** (1897-1968), Marshal of the USSR (1946), Hero of the USSR (1945). In the Red Army since 1918. Chief of Staff of the Western Direction. Participated in the planning of the counteroffensive near Moscow. In 1946-1949 (Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. From 1949 - First Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. From 1950 - First Deputy Minister of War, in 1952-1960 - Chief of the General Staff.

* **BLUKHER Vasily Konstantinovich** (1890-1938), Marshal (1935). Member of the 1st World War. In Civil led troops encircled in the Orenburg region. He made a 1500-kilometer raid along the Urals with them to join with the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front. Since the summer of 1919 - the head of the 51st Infantry Division, having passed from Tyumen to Baikal. Commander of the Perekop strike group. In 1921-1922 - Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic. Corps commander-commissar, chief military adviser to the Chinese revolutionary government, assistant commander of the Ukrainian Military District. Since 1929, the commander of the OKDA. In the summer of 1938 - commander of the Far Eastern Front.

* **PIK (Pieck) Wilhelm** (1876-1960), the first president of the GDR. Since 1935 (Chairman of the Central Committee of the KKE. In 1943 (1945 - one of the leaders of the Free Germany Committee. In 1946-1954 - one of the leaders of the Central Committee of the SED.

* **THALMANN (Thalmann) Ernst** (1886-1944), Chairman of the Communist Party of Germany since 1925. Member of the Reichstag from 1924-1933. In 1933 he was captured by the Gestapo. He was held in Berlin in the Moabit prison. Killed in the Buchenwald concentration camp.

* **DUBCEK (Dubcek) Alexander** (1921-1992), Czechoslovak statesman and politician. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969. One of the initiators and leaders of reforms in Czechoslovakia. Leader of the Prague Spring. Excluded in 1970 from the CPC. Chairman of the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia since 1989.

* **FEDORO Alexey Fedorovich** (1901), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War, major general (1943), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1942-1944). Member of the Civil War. He graduated from the construction technical school (1932). From 1938 - 1st secretary of the Chernigov (from September - underground) regional party committee. Since March 1943 - Secretary of the Volyn Regional Party Committee. Commander of the Chernigov-Olyn partisan unit

* **KOPAK Sidor Artemyevich** (1887-1967), one of the organizers of the partisan struggle in Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War, twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1942, 1944), major general (1943). Member of the Civil War. Since 1937 - Chairman of the Putivl City Executive Committee. In the Great Patriotic War - the commander of a partisan detachment, then the united partisan detachments of the Sumy region. Led 5 raids on the rear.

* **VERSHIGORA Petr Petrovich** (1905-1963), participant in the partisan war, writer, major general (1944), Hero of the Soviet Union (1944). Graduated from VGIK (1938). During the Great Patriotic War - the commander of a platoon, company, battalion. Since 1942 - in the partisans. Deputy commander of a partisan unit for reconnaissance. From December 1943 commander of the 1st Ukrainian partisan division. Member of 5 raids behind enemy lines.

* **NAUMO Mikhail Ivanovich** (1908-1974), one of the organizers of the partisan movement in Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War, Major General (1943). Since 1930 - in the troops of the OGPU and the NKD. He graduated from the Higher School of the Border Troops (1938). With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - commander of a group, partisan detachment, chief of staff of the operational group of partisan detachments of the Sumy region, commander of a partisan cavalry unit. Made 3 raids in Ukraine and the Kursk region. He graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff (1945). After the war (until 1960) in the organs and troops of the MD.

* **SABURO Alexander Nikolaevich** (1908-1974), one of the leaders of the partisan struggle in the Great Patriotic War. From 1938 he was in the organs of the NKD. During the Great Patriotic War - the commander of a partisan detachment, then a unit operating in the Oryol and Sumy regions, as well as in Right-Bank Ukraine. From 1942 - member of the underground Central Committee of the CP(b)U. Chief of Staff of the partisan movement in the Zhytomyr region. Since 1944 in the bodies of the NKD, MD.

* **RUDNE Semyon Vasilyevich** (1899-1943), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Ukraine. In the Red Army from 1918-1938. In September 1941, he led a partisan detachment in the Sumy region, which merged with the detachment of S.A. Kovpak. In 1942-1943, together with Kovpak, he led a raid from the Bryansk forests to the Right-Bank Ukraine and the Carpathians. Killed in battle.

* **PONOMARENKO Panteleimonovich Kondratievich** (1902), Soviet party and statesman, lieutenant general (1943). Member of the Civil War. Graduated from the Moscow Institute of Transport Engineers (1932). In 1938-1947, 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus. During the Great Patriotic War, members of the military councils of the 3rd shock army, the Western, Central and Bryansk fronts, in 1942-1944 the head of the TsShPD. Since 1944 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Council of Ministers of the BSSR

* **GRIZODUBOA Valentina Stepanovna** (1910-1993), Hero of the Soviet Union (1938). In the Red Army since 1936. Before the war, she commanded the crew in a non-stop flight Moscow - the Far East (1938). During the war, commander of the 101st Long-Range Aviation Regiment. She flew over 200 sorties. From 1945 she worked in the aviation industry.

* **FLERO Georgy Nikolaevich** (1913-1990), physicist, academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1968). Participant in the creation of the atomic bomb. Opened spontaneous fission of heavy nuclei (1940). Under his leadership, elements with an atomic weight of 102-107 were synthesized.

* The history of this notebook is written in detail in the book by I.G. Starinov. Notes of a saboteur. M., 1996.

* **Budyonny Semyon Mikhailovich** (1883-1973), Marshal of the Soviet Union (1935). Since 1918 in the Red Army. He commanded the First Cavalry Army (1919-1923). In 1939-1941 - Deputy

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Since 1940 - First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. He was a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. Involved in the repression of military personnel. Commanded several fronts. From 1943-1953 he commanded the cavalry of the Red Army. Member of the Supreme Military Council of the NPO of the USSR.

* **EREMENKO Andrei Ivanovich** (1892-1970), Hero of the USSR (1944). In the Red Army since 1918. During the war he commanded the troops of the Bryansk, Southeast, Stalingrad, Southern, Kalinin, Baltic and 4th Ukrainian fronts. From 1945-1958 he commanded a number of military districts.

* **VATUTIN Nikolai Fedorovich** (1901-1944), General of the Army (1943), Hero of the USSR (1965). In the Red Army since 1920. From May 1942 - Deputy Chief of the General Staff. and a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Bryansk Front. He took part in the planning of the Stalingrad offensive operation. Died as a result of a wound.

* **BULGANIN Nikolai Alexandrovich** (1895-1975), Soviet state, military and party leader, Colonel General (1958). From 1918 he was a member of the Cheka, from 1922 - in economic work. In 1931-1937 - Chairman of the Moscow Council. Since 1937 - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. In 1938-1941 - Chairman of the Board of the State Bank and Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. During the Great Patriotic War - a member of the Military Council of the Western, 2nd Baltic and 1st Belorussian fronts. In 1944 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and member of the State Defense Committee.

* **MAZANIK Elena Grigoryevna** (born 1914), a member of the partisan underground in Minsk. Hero of the USSR (1943). Kube worked as a maid for the Commissar-General of Belarus. On September 22, on the instructions of the command of the partisan detachment, she destroyed Cuba by placing a mine in his bedroom. This is described in the film *The Clock Stopped at Midnight* (1959). After the war, she was in state and administrative work. worked as a maid. On September 22, on the instructions of the command of the partisan detachment, she destroyed Cuba by placing a mine in his bedroom. This is described in the film *The Clock Stopped at Midnight* (1959). After the war, she was in state and administrative work.

* Once Ilya Grigorievich, together with one of his friends, discussed the fate of Cuba in my presence. The following version surfaced in the conversation: since Cuba by this moment no longer enjoyed the confidence of the German Headquarters, it was decided to remove him. The Germans subtly used partisans to destroy Cuba by proxy. (Editor's note - I.K.).

* Once in 1999, Ilya Grigorievich spoke about this in more detail. He once worked with Tsurypa's nephew. When, after returning from Spain, the clouds began to thicken over him, he turned to him with a request to give him Voroshilov's phone number. Called. Voroshilov received him. There the question of a possible arrest surfaced. Then Voroshilov called Yezhov. (Ed. note).

* Answering a similar question for a program being prepared by the Top Secret team, it seems, in 1998, Ilya Grigorievich answered a little differently: "The Civil War was most remembered. Then I was in the infantry. In the infantry, little depends on you. In subsequent wars something depended on me." Whether this text was included in the film, I do not know. (Editor's note - I.K.)

* Ponomarenko P.K. National struggle in the rear of the Nazi invaders 1941-1945 M., 1986. S. 227.

* There.

* There. S. 228.

* There.

* there. S. 229.

* There.

* There. S. 230.

* There. S. 231.

* **SURO Alexander Vasilyevich** (1730-1800), the greatest Russian commander. As a child, he was enlisted as a private in the Semenov Life Guards Regiment. In 1745 he entered active service. In 1754 he was promoted to officer, and first entered the military field during the 7-year war. Participated in the Battle of Kunersdorf and Chernyshev's raid on Berlin. In 1761 he commanded separate detachments. In 1762 he was appointed commander of the Astrakhan infantry regiment. Commanding the Suzdal Infantry Regiment since 1763, he developed his famous system of education and training of troops, based on the combat experiences he had learned from the war. In 1768 he acted against the Polish Confederates. In 1773, he participated in the actions of P. Rumyantsev's army against the Turks, and by his actions influenced the outcome of the war and the conclusion of peace in Kuchuk-Kaynardzhi. At the end of the Turkish campaign, he was sent to gr. Panin, busy suppressing the Pugachev rebellion; but managed to reach the new destination

to arrive only after the final defeat of Pugachev. Until 1779 he commanded troops in the Kuban and Crimea. During the same time, he arranged the eviction of Christian inhabitants from the Crimea; the Greeks were settled along the Azov coast, the Armenians - on the Don, near Rostov. In 1779 he was given command of a Little Russian division, and in 1782 he took command of the Kuban corps. After the annexation of Crimea to Russia (1783), he had to subdue the Nogai Tatars, which he did, despite significant difficulties. In 1786 he was promoted to general-in-chief and appointed head of the Kremenchug division. With the beginning of the 2nd Turkish war of 1787-91, he was entrusted with the defense of the Black Sea coast, from the mouth of the Bug to Perekop. His participation in the siege of Ochakov (1788) ceased due to a quarrel with Potemkin. In 1789, commanding a division in Repnin's army, he defeated the Turks at Focsani and Rymnik, for which he received the Order of St. George I Art. and the title of Count of Rymnik, and from the Austrian Emperor - the title of Count of the Holy Roman Empire. In December 1790 he took Ishmael by storm. This feat, as a result of the subsequent collision with Potemkin, did not give Suvorov a field marshal's baton: he was awarded only the rank of lieutenant colonel of the life guards. Preobrazhensky Regiment. In 1791, Suvorov was entrusted with surveying the Finnish border and drawing up a project for its fortification, an assignment that he was very burdened with. At the end of 1792, he was entrusted with a similar assignment in southwestern Russia, in view of the possibility of resuming the war with Turkey. In August 1794 he was called to the theater of the Polish war. A number of victories won by him, culminating in the capture of Prague, was awarded the rank of Field Marshal. In 1796 he was appointed chief of our military forces in the southern and southwestern provinces, and here he developed his system of training and indoctrination of troops to the fullest. Here he gave the final edition of his military catechism ("Science to induce", "Active military art"). When, after the accession to the throne of Emperor Paul, various innovations began in the troops, Suvorov openly expressed his condemnation, for which he was disgraced. In February 1797 he was retired from service and exiled to his estate, under the supervision of the police. This link lasted for about two years, until, in February 1799, at the insistent petitions of the Vienna court, the Imperial Rescript followed, which entrusted him with command of the Austro-Russian army in the war with France. This war crowned him with new glory. Emperor Pavel granted him the title of Prince of Italy and the title of Generalissimo and ordered him to erect a monument in St. Petersburg. The last war broke the strength of the aged commander; He returned completely ill to Petersburg, where he died. His ashes rest in the Alexander Nevsky Lavra.

* **MASLENNIKO Ivan Ivanovich** (1900-1954). Member of the Civil War, commander of a cavalry group, regiment, brigade. Since 1928 in the border and internal troops, then in the bodies of the OGPU and the NKD. Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1935). During the Great Patriotic War - Commander of the 29th and 39th Armies of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front, Deputy Commander of a number of fronts. From 1944 - commander of the 3rd Baltic Front. In 1945 - Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East, then commander of the Baku and Transcaucasian Military District. Since 1948 - in the service of the MD. (1935). During the Great Patriotic War - Commander of the 29th and 39th Armies of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front, Deputy Commander of a number of fronts. From 1944 - commander of the 3rd Baltic Front. In 1945 - Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East, then commander of the Baku and Transcaucasian Military District. Since 1948 - in the service of the MD.

* Stalin IV On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. M., 1952. P. 15. I. V. O
Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. M., 1952. S. 15.

* There.

* **Todorsky Alexander Ivanovich** (1894-1965), participant in the Civil War. During the Civil War - commander of a brigade of a rifle corps, division, assistant commander and member of the RS of the Turkestan Front. Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1927). Since 1928, Assistant Commander of the Military District, Deputy Chief and Head of the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions (Ed. note). (1927). Since 1928, Assistant Commander of the Military District, Deputy Chief and Head of the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions (Ed. note).

* In Russian, this book was published under the title "Spaniards in the Great Patriotic war". M., 1986.

* **DAYDO Denis Vasilyevich** (1781 - 1839). He received a brilliant home education. In 1807 he was appointed adjutant to Prince. Bagration. In the winter of 1808, he was in our army operating in Finland, went along with Kulnev to Uleaborg, occupied the island of Carloe with the Cossacks and, returning to the vanguard, retreated across the ice of the Gulf of Bothnia. In 1809, being under Prince. Bagration, who commanded troops in Moldova, and then, when Bagration was replaced, entered the vanguard of the Moldavian army, under the command of Kulnev. At the beginning of the war in 1812, he was a lieutenant colonel in the Akhtyrsk hussar regiment and was in the vanguard troops of Gen. Vasilchikov. Before the Battle of Borodino, he was the first to think about the benefits of partisan actions and the first to start them. His quick successes convinced Kutuzov of the expediency of guerrilla warfare, and he gave it a wider development. One of the greatest feats

Davydov, during this time, there was a case under s. Lyakhov, where he, along with other partisans, captured the 2,000th detachment of Gen. Augereau; then, near the city of Kopys, he destroyed the French cavalry depot, scattered the enemy detachment near Belynichi and, continuing the search to the Neman, occupied Grodno. With the border crossing, he entered the corps of the gene. Wintzingerode, participated in the defeat of the Saxons near Kalisch and, having entered Saxony with an advanced detachment, occupied the outskirts of Dresden. In 1814, commanding the Akhtyrsk hussar regiment, he was in Blucher's army, participated with it in all major affairs, and especially distinguished himself in the battle of La Rotier. In 1815 he was promoted to major general; then he took the place of chief of staff, first in the 7th, and then in the 3rd corps. In 1827 he successfully acted against the Persians, and in 1831 against the Polish rebels.

* At present, the main part of the archive of Ilya Grigorievich has been transferred to several archives. (Editor's note - I.K.)

* By 1939, the Bekauri mines were so improved that the commands for the explosion were given from a distance of up to 170 kilometers. This weapon was called BEMI (according to the first syllables of the names of its creators: Bekauri V.I. and Mitkevich V.F. (1872 - 1951). The fourth unit of the Finnish army, advancing in the Vyborg direction, was the first to encounter explosions of unknown origin. During the crossing through Vuoksa one of the spans of the bridge flew into the air. When finding out the cause of the losses on one of the pillars supporting the span that fell into the water, the sappers discovered an unexploded charge. It turned out to be equipped with a metal box of unknown purpose. J. years later, he will tell about these events in the pages of the magazine. On August 30, he took the captured device to the radio station of Captain Jorma Jaskelainen, located near the city of Mikkeli. But attempts to open the lid of the box, excluding the possibility of an explosion, turned out to be unsuccessful. Then the device was delivered to Helsinki and in the radio company of the General Finnish experts immediately noted that the radio receiver that fell into their hands was, at that time, an invention of a high engineering class, made at the appropriate technical level. His research was continued by Lt. Kalevi Ahti. The time for studying secret until then weapons was measured not in days, but in hours. For explosions continued to thunder in the most unexpected places. The entrance of the Finnish troops to Vyborg was supposed to be made by a ceremonial march along the Fortress Bridge, but a few minutes before that it was destroyed by a strong explosion. On September 1, J. Pohjaanpalo again delivers the device to the capital, where engineer K. Syainio and radio engineer L. Sarke finally found out the principle of its construction. Now it was necessary to find means of dealing with it.

These days, abandoned by the inhabitants, dilapidated Vyborg, enveloped in fires, was a terrible picture. The city was ominous, it seemed to shrink in anticipation of a mortal blow. Figuratively speaking, these were the hours when V.I. Bekauri and Y. Pokhyanpalo, like duelists, crossed their "radio swords" over Vyborg. How did this "duel" go and what was its outcome? Time and events pushed the best specialists in Finland to work on the study of captured weapons literally day and night. Vyborg has already exploded ten mines controlled from afar. Finnish pioneerers (sappers), risking their lives, removed two radio explosives in a water tower on Batareynaya Gora. At the front, Finnish intelligence officers took the "language", which could not resist and blabbed that a special team was engaged in radio mines in Vyborg. Finally, the technician L. Sarke fully mastered the principle of operation of the television fuse. It turned out that it is triggered by a special radio signal at a frequency of 715 kilohertz. Then powerful radio transmitters were tuned to this frequency. In Koskonen's store they got records with the record "Säkkijärven Polka". (We remind you that Syakkijärvi is the Finnish name of our village Kondratievo). The nature of this music, the absence of pauses, "toffees" and stops in it, was most suitable for the intended purpose. In addition, the rhythm of the polka and the temperament ^{their} ^{three hundred} ^{things.} of the performer Vilhao Vesterinen, recorded on the record in 1939, were the best way to use it in such an unusual capacity.

Music did not leave a single "gap" in the air, where a fatal radio signal at a frequency of 715 kilohertz could slip through. "Kondratieff Polka" sounded for three days even without breaks to change the record, having successfully done its job. She reliably jammed the code messages of the radio station that caused the explosions. The sappers had enough time to completely clear the city of mines. But for this, the record was played on the air 1500 times. Often the tragic happens next to the comic. During the protracted "concert" Central Radio in Helsinki sent a request to the military with something like this: "What kind of crazy third day in a row is broadcasting the same polka ?!" The secrecy of the action being carried out then did not allow a direct explanation of what the essence of the matter was, and the response of the military was as follows: "A working radio station remained in the neutral zone between the Finnish and Soviet trenches. Because of the strong fire, it was impossible to get close to it and turn it off." They say beauty will save the world. "Kondratieff Polka" confirmed this by saving Vyborg from destruction. Our statistics have calculated that as a result of the hostilities of 1940-1944, two-thirds of residential buildings were destroyed in Vyborg, about five hundred large stone

buildings. It is quite obvious that if all three hundred more radio high-explosives had been blasted, then there would not have been a stone left on a stone from the city ...

* Anna Kornilovna was born into a peasant family. She was the fifth child in a peasant family. In 1916 she graduated from a parochial school in the village of Dorogorskoye, lost on the Mezen River. Her parents sent her to a nanny, then she worked as a laborer for about ten years.

For several years she worked as a female delegate. The Volost Committee of the Party nominated her for women's work. On March 8, 1926, Anna Kornilovna was accepted as a candidate for the Bolshevik Party. Since 1926, after graduating from the provincial courses of women's organizers in Arkhangelsk, she worked for three years as a volost women's organizer, and then studied at the Komvuz and the Yenukadze Eastern Institute, then as a translator of the International Lenin School under the Comintern.

* This article is still kept by I.G. Starinov (Editor's note - I.K.).

* Olga Kretova's face is quite real. Once, when asked which of the women Ilya Grigorievich admired, he named her name among three more. Unfortunately, I only remember her and Dolores Ibarruri. Olga Kretova after the vocational school worked at the Tekmash plant. She was recommended to the laboratory for the preparation of special explosives at the Oryol intelligence school. In the book of K.F. Firsanov "For the sake of life" tells that Kretova died near Stalingrad. (Editor's note - I.K.). Olga Kretova after the vocational school worked at the Tekmash plant. She was recommended to the laboratory for the preparation of special explosives at the Oryol intelligence school. In the book of K.F. Firsanov "For the sake of life" tells that Kretova died near Stalingrad. (Editor's note - I.K.)

* **Davydov Denis Vasilyevich** (1781 - 1839). He received a brilliant home education. In 1807 he was appointed adjutant to Prince. Bagration. In the winter of 1808, he was in our army operating in Finland, went along with Kulnev to Uleaborg, occupied the island of Carloe with the Cossacks and, returning to the vanguard, retreated across the ice of the Gulf of Bothnia. In 1809, being under Prince. Bagration, who commanded troops in Moldova, and then, when Bagration was replaced, entered the vanguard of the Moldavian army, under the command of Kulnev. At the beginning of the war in 1812, he was a lieutenant colonel in the Akhtyrsk hussar regiment and was in the vanguard troops of Gen. Vasilchikov. Before the Battle of Borodino, he was the first to think about the benefits of partisan actions and the first to start them. His quick successes convinced Kutuzov of the expediency of guerrilla warfare, and he gave it a wider development. One of the outstanding exploits of Davydov, during this time, was the case under s. Lyakhov, where he, along with other partisans, captured the 2,000th detachment of Gen. Augereau; then, near the city of Kopys, he destroyed the French. cavalry depot, scattered the enemy detachment near Belynichi and, continuing the search to the Neman, occupied Grodno. With the border crossing, he entered the corps of the gene. Wintzingerode, participated in the defeat of the Saxons near Kalisch and, having entered Saxony with an advanced detachment, occupied the outskirts of Dresden. In 1814, commanding the Akhtyrsk hussar regiment, he was in Blucher's army, participated with it in all major affairs, and especially distinguished himself in the battle of La Rotier. In 1815 he was promoted to major general; then he took the place of chief of staff, first in the 7th, and then in the 3rd corps. In 1827 he successfully acted against the Persians, and in 1831 against the Polish rebels (Ed. note).

* Davydov D. Military notes. M., 1982. S. 292.

* Vaupshasov S.A. At dangerous intersections. M., 1971. S. 201-202.

* Davydov D. Experience in the theory of guerrilla warfare. M., 1821. XVI, 220 S.

* **Nikolai Sergeevich Golitsyn** (1809-1892), Russian military historian, infantry general (1880). Participated in the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829. In 1838-1847 - head of the department of strategy, military history and military literature of the Military Academy. From 1848 - director of the Imperial School of Law, editor of the newspaper "Russian invalid". In 1857-1864 he worked at the General Staff. Author of numerous works on military history (Ed. note).

* **Clausewitz Karl** (1780 - 1831), a military writer who made a complete revolution in the theory of war with his writings. In the campaign of 1806, he was an aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus and was captured with him. In 1810-12 he taught military sciences to the Crown Prince of Prussia. In 1812 he transferred to the Russian service. In 1814 he returned to the Prussian army. In 1831, during the performance of the Prussian troops on the Polish border, he was appointed chief of staff; died in Poznań of cholera. The most important essay "On War" (1800) Distinctive features of his works - clarity of presentation, accurate critical assessment of military events, moreover, according to his guiding view of the war ("war is a continuation of politics, acting only by other means"). He gave a wide place to the political element and seeks to find out how much the fate of the armies depends on the strength and weakness of the generals, whose characteristics are given out by Clausewitz with brilliance (Ed. note).

* **Jomini Antoine Henri (Genrikh Veniaminovich)** (1779-1869), military theorist and historian, general of infantry of the Russian army (1926). From 1798 he served in the Swiss army. In 1804-1813 - in the French army. One of the founders of the Russian

Military academy. He was involved in the planning of military operations in the Russian-Turkish war (1828-1829) and the Crimean (1853-1856) wars (Ed. note).

* This work was republished in the Vypel Almanac. 1998. No 1.

* **Suvorov Alexander Vasilyevich** (1730-1800), Prince of Italy, Count of Rymnik and the Holy Roman Empire, Generalissimo of the Russian Army and Field Marshal of Austria, the greatest Russian commander. As a child, he was enlisted as a private in the Semenov Life Guards Regiment. In 1745 he entered active service. In 1754 he was promoted to officer, and first entered the military field during the 7-year war. Participated in the Battle of Kunersdorf and Chernyshev's raid on Berlin. In 1761 he commanded separate detachments and distinguished himself as a brave partisan and dashing cavalryman. In 1762 he was sent with dispatches to the Empress and was appointed commander of the Astrakhan infantry regiment. Commanding the Suzdal Infantry Regiment since 1763, he developed his famous system of education and training of troops, based on the combat experiences he had taken out of the war against such a commander as Frederick the Great. In 1768 he acted against the Polish confederates, in which his brilliant talents were manifested. In 1773, he participated in the actions of P. Rumyantsev's army against the Turks, and by his actions influenced the outcome of the war and the conclusion of peace in Kuchuk-Kainardzhi. At the end of the Turkish campaign, S. was sent to c. Panin, busy suppressing the Pugachev rebellion; but S. managed to arrive at his new destination only after the final defeat of Pugachev. Until 1779 he commanded troops in the Kuban and in the Crimea and perfectly organized the defense of the coast of the Tauride Peninsula, in case of a landing by the Turks. During the same time, he arranged the eviction of Christian inhabitants from the Crimea; the Greeks were settled along the Azov coast, the Armenians - on the Don, near Rostov. In 1779 he was given command of a Little Russian division, and in 1782 he took command of the Kuban corps. After the annexation of Crimea to Russia (1783), he had to subdue the Nogai Tatars, which he did, despite significant difficulties. In 1786 he was promoted to general-in-chief and appointed head of the Kremenchug division. With the beginning of the 2nd Turkish war of 1787-91, he was appointed head of the Kinburn Corps, which was entrusted with the defense of the Black Sea coast, from the mouth of the Bug to Perekop. His participation in the siege of Ochakov (1788) ceased due to a quarrel with Potemkin. In 1789, commanding a division in Repnin's army, he defeated the Turks at Focsani and Rymnik, for which he received the Order of St. George I Art. and the title of Count of Rymnik, and from the Austrian Emperor - the title of Count of the Holy Roman Empire. In December 1790 he took Ishmael by storm. This feat, as a result of the subsequent collision with Potemkin, did not give Suvorov a field marshal's baton: he was awarded only the rank of lieutenant colonel of the life guards. Preobrazhensky Regiment. In 1791, Suvorov was entrusted with surveying the Finnish border and drawing up a project for its fortification, an assignment that he was very burdened with. At the end of 1792, he was entrusted with a similar assignment in southwestern Russia, in view of the possibility of resuming the war with Turkey. In August 1794 he was called to the theater of the Polish war. A number of victories won by him, culminating in the capture of Prague, was awarded the rank of Field Marshal General. In 1796 he was appointed chief of our military forces in the southern and southwestern provinces, and here he developed his system of training and indoctrination of troops to the fullest. Here he gave the final edition of his military catechism ("Science to induce", "Active military art"). When, after the accession to the throne of Emperor Paul, various innovations began in the troops, Suvorov openly expressed his condemnation, for which he was disgraced. In February 1797 he was retired from service and exiled to his estate, under the supervision of the police. This link lasted for about two years, until, in February 1799, at the insistent petitions of the Vienna court, the Imperial Rescript followed, which entrusted him with command of the Austro-Russian army in the war with France. This war crowned him with new glory. Emperor Pavel granted him the title of Prince of Italy and the title of Generalissimo and ordered him to erect a monument in St. Petersburg. The last war broke the strength of the aged commander; He returned completely ill to Petersburg, where he died. His ashes rest in the Alexander Nevsky Lavra (Ed. note).

* Tarle E. V. Napoleon. M., 1942. S. 43.

* **Napoleon Bonaparte** (1769-1821), French military and political figure. Promoted during the French Revolution. During the Directory he commanded an army. In 1799, having made a coup d'état, he became the first consul, and in 1804 he proclaimed himself emperor. Thanks to victorious wars, he subordinated most of the states of Western and Central Europe to France. The collapse of his empire began with the defeat in the war of 1812. - Ed.

* Davydov D.V. Military notes. M., 1940. S. 175.

* **Kutuzov (Golenishchev-Kutuzov) Mikhail Illarionovich** (1745-1813), the great Russian commander, Field Marshal General (1812). From 1776 he served in the Crimea under the command of A. V. Suvorov. Participants of the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791. Distinguished himself during the assault on Ishmael. In 1792-1802 - ambassador to Turkey, then director of the land gentry cadet corps, commander and inspector of troops in Finland, Lithuanian and St. Petersburg military governor. In 1805 he was commander-in-chief of the Russian army in Austria. In 1806-1811 the military governor of Kyiv,

corps commander. During the Russian-Turkish war (1806-1812) he commanded the Moldavian army. During the Patriotic War, he was elected head of the St. Petersburg, and then the Moscow militia. Since August - Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army (Ed. note).

* Tarle E. V. Napoleon. M., 1942. S. 43.

* Petrovich N. Defense of the rear of the army. M., 1936. S. 10.

* Drobov M.A. Small war partisanship and sabotage//Almanac "Vypel". 1998. No 1. S. 60.

* Pavlov Ya.S. Lenin and the partisan movement. Minsk, 1975.

* **Kolchak Alexander Vasilievich** (1875-1924), one of the leaders of the counter-revolution in Russia, Admiral. He graduated from the Naval Cadet Corps (1894). Participated in the Russo-Japanese and World War I. In 1916-1917 he commanded the Black Sea Fleet. In 1918-1919 "Supreme Ruler of the Russian State". After the fall of the white movement, he was shot (Ed. note).

* Pavlov Ya.S. Lenin and the partisan movement. Minsk, 1975. Chapter "Partisan Movement in the Civil War.

* **Denikin Anton Ivanovich** (1872-1947), one of the leaders of the counter-revolution during the Civil War, lieutenant general (1916). Graduated from the Academy of the General Staff (1899). Participated in the First World War. From April 1918 he headed the Volunteer White Guard Army. After the victory of the Red Army, he emigrated (Ed. note).

* **Shкуро (Shkura) Andrei Grigoryevich** (1887-1947), one of the leaders of the counter-revolution. He graduated from the Nikolaev Caucasian School (1907). In 1918 he began an armed struggle against Soviet power in the North Caucasus. In 1919 - commander of the cavalry corps "Armed Forces of the South of Russia". After the defeat of the White Guard movement, he emigrated. In 1939-1945 he collaborated with the Nazi regime. Executed (Ed. note).

* There.

* There.

* **Makhno Nestor Ivanovich** (1889-1934), one of the representatives of the popular movement in Ukraine during the Civil War. In 1919-1920, Makhno entered into an agreement with the Soviet government three times and violated it three times. In 1921, his formations were defeated by Soviet troops. In 1921 he emigrated (Editor's note).

* **Tukhachevsky Mikhail Nikolaevich** (1893-1937), Marshal of the Soviet Union. He graduated from the Alexander Military School (1914). Member of the First World War. During the Civil War - military commissar of defense of the Moscow region, commander of the 1st Army, assistant commander of the Southern Front. In 1920-1921 - commander of the Caucasian, Western fronts. Participated in the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion and Antonovshchina in the Tambov province. After 1921 - head of the Military Academy of the Red Army, 1922-1924 - commander of the Western Front. From 1925-1928 - Chief of Staff of the Red Army. From 1928 - Commander of the Leningrad Military District. Since 1931, Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, Chief of Armaments of the Red Army. Since 1936 - 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and head of the combat training department. In 1937, the commander of the troops at the Military District (Ed. note).

* Tukhachevsky M.N. Fight against counter-revolutionary uprisings//War and revolution. 1926. No 8. S. 4-5.

* It is impossible not to admire the steadfastness of the Abyssinian army, which resisted the superior forces of the aggressor not for two, as the fascist Italian command assumed, but for seven whole months.

* **Berzin (Berzin) Jan Karlovich** (1889-1938). The real name and surname is Kyuzis Peteris. Participated in the revolution of 1905-1907, the February and October revolutions of 1917. During the Civil War - the head of the political department of the division and the head of the special department of the army. Since 1921 in the intelligence department of the Red Army. In 1924-35, 1937 - head of the intelligence department. In 1936-1937 he was the chief military adviser to the Republican army in Spain. - Ed.

* For more details on the preparation of the partisan movement in the USSR in the 20s-30s, see next chapter.

* This is discussed in more detail in the first part of the memoirs.

* Sorel A. Partisan war of the twentieth century. In Spanish lang. Paris, 1970. S. 83.

* Anchel M. Spanish partisans in France 1940-1945. Havana, 1971, pp. 17-261 (in Spanish)

lang.)

* **Frunze Mikhail Vasilyevich** (1885-1925), Soviet military, state and party leader. Civil War commander and military theorist, one of the organizers and creators of the Soviet Armed Forces.

He studied at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute. He took part in the Revolution of 1905-1907, led the Ivanovo-Oznesensk strike. In 1909-1910 he was twice sentenced to death for revolutionary activities, but it was replaced by life exile in Siberia. From 1910-1915 in hard labor. Ran. In World War I, he led revolutionary work in the army on the Western Front. During the October Revolution, he headed the Military Revolutionary Committee in Shuya. Participated in the elimination of the Left SR rebellion in Moscow and in the defeat of the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Yaroslavl. In 1919 - Commander of the Southern Group of Forces of the Eastern Front and the Eastern Front. From 1919 - Commander of the Turkestan Front. In September, he liberated the Crimea. Authorized by the RSR in Ukraine, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Economic Council. In 1924-1925 - Deputy Chairman and Chairman of the RS of the USSR, Deputy People's Commissar and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. At the same time he was the chief of staff of the Red Army, the head of the Military Academy and a member of the Council of Labor and Defense. Under his leadership, the military reform of 1924-1925 was carried out (Ed. note).

* Frunze M. V. Selected works. M., 1977. S. 43.

* Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 12. S. 181.

* Frunze M.V. Military doctrine and the Red Army//Selected works. M., 1977. S. 22-23.

* **Yakir Iona Emmanuilovich** (1896-1937), commander of the 1st rank (1935). During the civil war, commander of the Red Guard detachment, commissar of the rifle brigade, head of the political department of the Southern Section of the curtain detachments, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 8th Army. In 1919-1920 he was the head of a rifle division, commanded the Southern Group of Forces of the 12th Army, the Fastovskaya, Zlochevskaya, Lvovskaya Group of Forces and the 14th Army. After the war, he commanded the troops of the Crimean region, the Kyiv Military District. Since 1923 - commander and commissar of the rifle corps, head of the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army, commander of the Ukrainian Military District. In 1930-1934 he was a member of the RS of the USSR (Editor's note).

* **Primakov Vitaly Markovich** (1897-1937), participant in the Civil War. In 1917, in Petrograd, he led the Red Guard detachment during the storming of the Winter Palace, participated in the defeat of the Kerensky-Krasnov rebellion. He commanded a cavalry regiment, brigade, division, corps. After the war, he graduated from the Higher Military Academic Courses of the Command Staff of the Red Army (1923). Head and military commissar of the Higher Cavalry School, military attaché in Afghanistan and Japan, commander and military commissar of a rifle corps.

* Vaupshasov S.A. At dangerous intersections. 3rd ed. M., 1988. S. 219.

* For more details see: Starinov I.G. "Notes of a saboteur"//Almanac "Vypel". M., 1997. Issue. 3.

* **Sprogis Arthur Karlovich** (1904-1980), one of the organizers and leaders of the partisan movement in Belarus and Latvia. Member of the Civil Wars in Russia and Spain. Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1940). During the Great Patriotic War - the head of the school for the training of partisan scouts and demolition workers, commanders of reconnaissance and partisan detachments. In 1943-1944 - head of the Latvian headquarters of the partisan movement. (Ed. note).

* Stalin IV On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. M., 1952. S. 15.

* There.

* **Ponomarenko Panteleimonovich Kondratievich** (1902), Soviet party and statesman, lieutenant general (1943). Member of the Civil War. Graduated from the Moscow Institute of Transport Engineers (1932). In 1938-1947, 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus. During the Great Patriotic War, members of the military councils of the 3rd shock army, the Western, Central and Bryansk fronts, in 1942-1944 the head of the TsShPD. Since 1944, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Ministers of the BSSR (Editor's note).

* **Timoshenko Semyon Konstantinovich** (1895-1970), Soviet statesman and military figure. Member of the 1st World War. In Civil - the commander of a cavalry regiment, brigade, division. He graduated from the Higher Academic Courses (1927). After the war, the commander of the cavalry corps. From 1933 deputy commander, from 1937 commander of a number of military districts. During a campaign in Western Ukraine (1839), the commander of the Ukrainian, and in 1939-1940 - the North-Eastern Front. As you know, after the Soviet-Finnish war in the winter of 1939-1940, K.E. Voroshilov was removed and replaced by S.K. Tymoshenko as People's Commissar for Defense. During the Great Patriotic War - Chairman of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. In July-September 1941 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Since July - Commander-in-Chief of the Western, South-Western direction. Since 1943 - the representative of the Stavka on the fronts (Ed. note).

* Rainbow magazine. Kyiv, 1965. No 5. S. 180.

* There.

* **Churchill Winston Leonard Spencer** (1874-1965), British political, statesman and military figure. Since 1908, being a conservative, he was in various ministerial posts. One of the main initiators of the intervention in Russia in 1918-1920. In 1940-1945 and 1951-1955 - Prime Minister. During the war years, he was a forced ally of the USSR, after its end he was one of the ideologists of the Cold War. The passage quoted is taken from his book The Second World War. M., 1998. T. 3. S. 228. (Ed. note).

* **Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich** (1896-1968), Marshal (1944), Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945). Member of the First World War and the Civil War. Commander of a cavalry squadron and regiment. He graduated from the cavalry courses. Brigade commander, division. He graduated from the advanced training courses of the higher beginning. composition at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze. Since 1936 - commander of the cavalry corps. During the Great Patriotic War, the commander of the mech. corps. From July 1941 - Commander of the 16th Army. From 1942 commander of the Bryansk, Don, Central, 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. Since 1946 - Commander of the Northern Group of Forces. Since 1949 - Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic. Since 1956 - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR (Ed. note).

* **Bagramyan Ivan Khristoforovich** (1897-1982), marshal (1955), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1977). Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1934), Military Academy of the General Staff (1938). During the Great Patriotic War - Head of the Operations Department - Deputy Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff of the Southwestern Front and the headquarters of the troops of the Southwestern Direction. During the period indicated by the author, he was not a marshal (Ed. note).

* **Mekhlis Lev Zakharovich** (1889-1953), Colonel General (1944). Member of the First World War. During the Civil War - the military commissar of a brigade, an infantry division and the Right-Bank Group of Forces in Ukraine. In 1921-1936 - in the Soviet and party work. Graduated from the Institute of Red Professors (1930). In 1937-1940 he was the head of the political department of the Red Army. From 1940 - People's Commissar of State Control of the USSR. During the Great Patriotic War, he was the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (until June 1942), then a member of the Military Councils of the armies of the Voronezh, Volkhov, Bryansk, 2nd Baltic, Western, 2nd Belorussian and 4th Ukrainian fronts (Note ed.).

* **Nevsky Georgy Georgievich** (1891-1961), lieutenant general of the engineering troops (1943). Graduated from the Military Engineering Academy (1918). Participated in the Civil War, first as a divisional engineer, chief of supply for the Northern and Western fronts. Since 1934 assistant inspector, senior inspector of the Department of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army. Great Patriotic War - chief of the engineering troops of the South-Western direction. Since 1942 - Deputy Commander - Head of the Engineering Troops of the Karelian Front. In 1944-1946 he was the head of the Suvorov Military School (Editor's note).

* **Kotlyar Leonty Zakharovich** (1901-1953), Colonel General of the Engineering Troops (1944), Hero of the Soviet Union (1945). Graduated from the Military Technical Academy. F.E. Dzerzhinsky (1930). From 1937 he was a control engineer at the NKO of the USSR, head of the department of engineering troops of the military district, head of the defense construction department of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army. During the Great Patriotic War - Head of the Main Military Engineering Directorate, Head of the Engineering Troops of the Soviet Army. Since 1942 he was the head of the engineering troops of the Voronezh, South-Western and 3rd Ukrainian fronts. - Note ed.

* **Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich** (1903-1950), Soviet party and statesman. Graduated from the Institute of Red Professors (1931). Since 1935 - Chairman of the City Planning Commission and Deputy Chairman of the Leningrad City Council. From 1938 - Chairman of the State Planning Committee. Since 1941 - 1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (since 1946 - the Council of Ministers). From 1942-1945 - member of the State Defense Committee (Editor's note).

* **Aralov Semyon Ivanovich** (1880-1969), participant in the Civil War. In 1918 - head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, head of the operational department of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, member of the RS. Since 1921 - in diplomatic work. During the Great Patriotic War he was in the division of the people's militia.

* Aralov S.I. Lenin led us to victory. 2nd ed. M., 1989. S. 43.

* **Todorsky Alexander Ivanovich** (1894-1965), participant in the Civil War. During the Civil War - commander of a brigade of a rifle corps, division, assistant commander and member of the RS of the Turkestan Front. Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1927). Since 1928, Assistant Commander of the Military District, Deputy Chief and Head of the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions (Ed. note).

* **Vaupshasov Stanislav Alekseevich** (1899-1976), Soviet intelligence officer, participant in the partisan struggle in the Great Patriotic War. Hero of the Soviet Union (1944). In the 20s-30s-176

years - in intelligence work. Member of the war of the Spanish people. In 1942-1944 - commander of a partisan detachment in the Minsk region.

* **Korzh Vasily Zakharovich** (1899-1967), one of the leaders of the partisan struggle in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War. Member of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). From 1940 - head of the Pinsk Regional Party Committee. During the Great Patriotic War - the commander of a partisan unit.

* **Orlovsky Kirill Prokofievich** (1895-1968), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Belarus. Hero of the Soviet Union (1943). Member of the 1st World War. In 1920-1925 he led partisan groups in Western Belarus. Participated in the Spanish Civil War. Since 1938 - in the organs of the People's Commissariat of the USSR. In 1942-1943 - commander of a partisan detachment. Since 1943 - in the state security bodies of Belarus.

* **Shchadenko Efim Afanasyevich** (1885-1951), Colonel General (1942). Member of the Civil War. He graduated from the two courses of the Military Academy of the Red Army (1923). After the war - head of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze. Since 1937 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (Ed. note).

* Ponomarenko P.K. National struggle in the rear of the Nazi invaders 1941-1944. M., 1986. S. 73.

* Ponomarenko P.K. National struggle in the rear of the Nazi invaders 1941-1944. M., 1986. C. 72.

* Partisan formations of Belarus. Minsk, 1983. S. 20-21.

* **Kalinin Mikhail Ivanovich** (1875-1946), Soviet party and statesman. Member of the St. Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Agent of the Iskra newspaper. One of the organizers of the Putilov workers' strike. Member of the February and October revolutions. Since 1919 - Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In 1922 - Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Since 1938 - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council. During the Great Patriotic War, he was engaged in the preparation of reserves for the Soviet Army, the evacuation of industrial enterprises.

* **Vorobyov Mikhail Petrovich** (1896-1957), Marshal of the Engineering Troops (1944). Member of the Civil War. Graduated from the Military Technical Academy (1929). Since 1932 - head of the faculty of the Military Engineering Academy, head of the military engineering school, inspector general of the engineering troops of the Red Army. During the Great Patriotic War - the head of the department and the head of the engineering troops of the Western Front. From 1942 - Chief of Engineering Troops. - Ed.

* **Vasilevsky Alexander Mikhailovich** (1895-1977), Soviet statesman, marshal (1943), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945). Member of the First World War, the Civil War. Since 1931 - in the management of combat training of the Red Army. Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff (1937). In 1940 - Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. From August 1941 - Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (Ed. note).

* **Voroshilov Kliment Efremovich** (1881-1869), Soviet party, statesman and military leader, marshal (1935), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1956, 1968). Hero of the MNR. Member of three revolutions. One of the organizers and leaders of the Soviet Army. Since 1917, the commissar of Petrograd, together with F.E. Dzerzhinsky led the work on the organization of the Cheka. In March 1918, he led the creation of the 5th Ukrainian Army and directed its combat operations. Commander of the Tsaritsyn Group of Forces. From November 1918 People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, commander of the troops of the Kharkov Military District. In 1919 he led the defense of Yekaterinoslav and Kyiv. In 1919-1921 one of the organizers and a member of the RS. In 1921 he participated in the liquidation of the Kronstadt rebellion. In 1921-1925 commander of the North Caucasian and Moscow military districts. In 1925-1934 People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the RS of the USSR. In 1934-1940 - People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. During the Great Patriotic War - a member of the State Defense Committee, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the commander of the Leningrad Front, the commander-in-chief of the partisan movement. - Note ed.

* CPA IML. F. 69. Op. 1. D. 795. L. 4.

* Ponomarenko P.K. National struggle in the rear of the Nazi invaders 1941-1944. M., 1986. C. 90.

* **Klembovsky V.** - General of the Russian army. A pronounced supporter of partisan actions, carried out with the initiative from the army. He did not perceive the performance of the "popular masses" as an independent force behind enemy lines, moreover, he treated this negatively. His works were repeatedly reprinted during the Civil War. Despite their apparent one-sidedness, they were systematized. The main core of the work is the controllability of a small war. In this connection, he made himself many opponents who stood up and stood for greater and even complete freedom of the partisans.

* Kovalev IV Transport in the Great Patriotic War. M., 1981. S. 312-313.

- * Ponomarenko P.K. National struggle in the rear of the Nazi invaders 1941-1944. M., 1986. S. 241.
- * People's war in the rear of the fascist invaders in Ukraine. Book two. Kyiv, 1985. S. 208.
- * Partarhiv UF IML. F. 75. Op. 75-1. D. 3. L. 51.
- * **Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich** (1896-1974), Marshal of the Soviet Union (1943), four times Hero of the USSR (1939, 1944, 1945, 1956). Hero of the MNR. Member of the First World War and the Civil War. He graduated from the courses of the higher command staff (1930). Since 1940 - Commander of the Kyiv Special Military District. In January-July 1941 - Chief of the General Staff - Deputy. Defense Commissar. Since August 1942 - 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Deputy Supreme Commander. In 1942-1943, he coordinated the actions of the fronts near Stalingrad, to break the blockade of Leningrad, in the battles near Kursk and beyond the Dnieper. In March-May 1944 - commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, and then - the 1st Belorussian Front. On behalf of and on behalf of the Council of the Supreme High Command on May 8, 1945, he accepted the surrender of the armed Nazi formations.
- * Zhukov G.K. UK. prod. T. 2. C. 99.
- * **Masherov Pyotr Mironovich** (1918-1980), Soviet party and statesman. One of the leaders of the partisan movement in Belarus. Graduated from the Vitebsk Pedagogical Institute (1939). During the Great Patriotic War (since 1942) - commander of a partisan detachment, commissar of a partisan brigade, 1st secretary of the underground regional committee of the Komsomol of Belarus. Since 1946 - secretary, in 1947-1954 - 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of Belarus. Subsequently, the head of the Belarusian Communist Party. Died in a car accident.
- * **Huseyn-zade Mehdi Ganify-ogly** (1918-1944), lieutenant (1942). Wounded in 1942 and taken prisoner. In 1944 he fled, joined the Yugoslav party detachment. Participated in reconnaissance and sabotage operations in Yugoslavia and Italy. Killed in battle.
- * Zhukov G.K. UK. prod. M., 1971. C. 79.
- * **Shtemenko Sergey Matveyevich** (1907-1976). He graduated from the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army (1937), the Military Academy of the General Staff (1940). Since 1940 in the General Staff - Senior Assistant Chief. During the Great Patriotic War - Deputy Chief, Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. Since 1948 - Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
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- * **Zaslouov Konstantin Sergeevich** (1910-1942), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Belarus. From November 1941, he led an underground group in Orsha, which carried out sabotage activities. In 1942 - commander of a partisan detachment, then a brigade. From October 1942 he commanded all the partisan forces of the Orsha zone. Killed in battle.
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- * **Guderian Heinz Wilhelm** (1889-1954), Colonel General of the German Army (since 1940), military theorist. Along with de Gaulle and Fuller, he was the founder of motorized methods of warfare.
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- * **Fuller John Frederick Charles** (1878-1966), English military historian and theorist, major general (1930). Member of the Anglo-Boer (1899-1902) and World War I. Since 1926 Assistant Chief of Staff. Author of the "small army theory".
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